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SUMMARY 
This thesis aims to develop a new theoretical framework by which to 
understand family organisation and the processes of family therapy from 
a political perspective - a framework that will highlight (changing) 
power relationships rather than assume some notion of functional order. 
In constructing and evaluating such a theoretical framework, I will draw 
upon the traditions of critical theory and qualitative research. My 
starting points are an overview of existing critical understandings of 
'the family', and an examination of how 'power' itself may be theorised 
in a rigorous manner. I will review how such perspectives may expose 
specific relations of oppression or recognition that underpin particular 
forms of organisation, from the scale of the social formation as a whole 
to that of 'the individual'. Psychoanalysis and discourse theory have 
provided concepts whereby to deconstruct the dynamics of 'the 
individual' - in particular the concept of 'subjectivity' - which I will 
develop further so as to encompass participation, not just in discursive 
structures, but also in structures of emotional and material relations. 
In a critical appraisal of the various theoretical and practice 
traditions within family therapy, I will look at how the hegemony of 
systems theory has begun to be questioned and alternative metaphors for 
familial organisation proposed. However, as I will argue, none of these 
provide a satisfactory basis for understanding power relations in the 
family. I will therefore go on to apply a new conceptualisation of 
family organisation - that of 'subjectivity' - which is developed out of 
the theoretical traditions discussed earlier. I will theorise 'the 
family', not just as the context in which individual subjectivity may be 
constructed, but as an entity that may be seen to participate in the 
social formation as a subjectivity in its own right. Instead of 
understanding familial organisation as a natural outcome of self-
regulating processes (as in systems theory). it may thus be seen to 
reflect the ways in which a family may have been constructed as a 
subjectivity in and by an oppressive social formation - its coherence 
only being maintained by a degree of internal violence and repression. 
Building on this, I will develop a theoretical framework by which to 
analyse, from a political perspective, the breakdown.of family 
functioning and the specific ways in which the organisation of family 
life may be reconstructed through the processes of family therapy. 
Following on from this, I will test out the value of the t~eoretical 
framework in an analysis of three examples of family therapy practice. 
My source material is transcripts taken from videotapes of actual family 
sessions, and these are analysed in terms of the evidence they provide 
of minute-by-minute changes in power relations within family 
organisation (often in response to particular interventions by the 
therapist). Out of this in-depth study of a small number of case 
examples, my primary aim will be to assess the practical value of the 
various elements of the theoretical framework in exposing how familial 
power relations have been structured and how (and whether) they may be 
modified during the course of family therapy. In turn, this may enable 
me to reach some preliminary conclusions as to how specific family 
therapy interventions may affect family organisation in ways that are 
either oppressive or empowering. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Researchers in the field of social theory have commented on the absence 
of an adequate theoretical framework with which to explain the processes 
and relations that underlie 'the family' in its various forms: 
"Social science does not have an adequate definition of the family, 
or a coherent set of categories from which to analyse it, or a 
rigorous conceptual scheme to specify what is significant about it" 
<Poster 1978 p.ix). 
Unlike 'the individual' or 'society', the family has received relatively 
little theoretical attention, in particular from the 'critical' academic 
traditions such as those of Marxism or feminism. Reviewing the 
prospects for a more effective theorisation of the family, D.H.J. Korgan 
identified that it was these 'critical' traditions, together with the 
work on family dynamics arising from "the literature coming out of 
family therapy", that promised to provide the most productive ways 
forward - particularly through moves "to explore the points of 
intersection between those traditions" (1979 pp.5,16). 
An interest in such issues also arose out of my own practice as a family 
therapist. I became aware that no existing theoretical framework was 
adequate in enabling me to evaluate the impact of my work on the power 
relations of a family: whether or not my interventions were empowering 
for a family as a whole in their dealings with external structures, or 
for those family members whose distress seemed to relate to their 
oppression, abuse and subordination within the family. I found that the 
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dominant model for understanding family processes - systems theory -
failed to conceptualise family organisation in a way that permitted any 
analysis of structural power relations; of how issues of gender, 
generation, race and class could impinge on family life. 
The political relations of family living may be seen to be somewhat 
contradictory. There is a mass of evidence to show that contemporary 
Western (and many other forms of familial organisation), are 
characterised by some degree of domination, exploitation and abuse -
particularly of women and children (see, for example, Barrett and 
Kclntosh 1982; Oakley 1974; Hotaling et al 1988). However, there is 
also evidence that, for women as well as for men and children, being 
part of some sort of a 'family' setting - especially one that provides a 
"confiding relationship" - can greatly reduce the possibility of 
personal breakdown (see Brown and Harris 1978; Cochrane 1983). There is 
also evidence that it can provide experiences of support and solidarity 
for members of oppressed groups, whether on the basis of class (see 
Humphrles 1977) or race (see Carby 1982). There have been various 
attempts to set up familial relations in ways that are less oppressive 
(for example, the kibbutz and feminist or alternative households) -
which have achieved varying degrees of success and, in the process, 
demonstrated how unstraightforward it is to achieve such goals. 
There is substantial evidence that family therapy is a form of 
intervention that can achieve considerable change in family organisation 
- and thereby 'solve' the distress or problem behaviour presented by a 
particular family member (see Bennun 1986; Russell et al 1987; Chase and 
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Holmes 1990; Markus et al 1990). In the sense of achieving measurable 
changes, the 'effectiveness' of family therapy is not in doubt -
although not all practitioners may achieve such results (see Howe 1989). 
However, research on family therapy has been bedevilled by confusion and 
contradiction as to what may be considered a positive outcome. 
Generally speaking, goals have been stated in terms of the restoration 
of some definition of 'normal' or 'healthy' functioning (see, for 
example, Minuchin 1974; Textor 1989). As such, they imply "specific 
value judgements about family issues ... such as the optimal level of 
conflict in the family, the respective roles of children and adults 
[and] the division of labour between male and female" (Libow 1981 
p.173). These "value judgements" may, in turn, be seen to mask issues 
of family power and oppression behind a set of unquestioned assumptions 
about the 'rightness' of particular conventional forms of family 
organisation. It is still only a minority of family therapists that 
have begun to take seriously how issues of class, race and gender 
oppression may influence the ways that families are organised (see, for 
example, Kingston 1982; O'Brian 1990; Ussher 1991), 
However, there has been a general tendency for such issues to be 
'absorbed' within a methodology that is still predicated upon the 
assumptions of systems theory. It is only in the more radical 
critiques, arising from analyses of child abuse (Sgroi 1982; McLeod and 
Saraga 1988; Glaser and Frosh 1988) and of the position of women and men 
in the family (Goldner 1985; Caddick 1988; Perelberg and Miller 1990), 
that it has been suggested that power is not some peripheral issue, but 
that its operation is central to an understanding of how both 
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'functional' and 'dysfunctional' families are organised - thereby 
challenging the core assumptions of systems theory: 
"The use of systems theory ... has been criticised because it has 
not adequately dealt with power, or recognised the oppression that 
exists in many human relations, particularly between men and women" 
(Reimers and Dimmock 1990 p.168). 
It is in response to such critiques that the purpose of therapy has 
begun to be understood in explicitly political terms. Ussher argues 
that "families have been shown to benefit from family therapy where 
changes in the family structure can be discussed" together with the 
"development of strategies to cope with discrimination" (1991 p.138>' 
Others go further, for example, in the attempts to establish a feminist 
family therapy: 
"The goal is change, not adjustment; social change, family change, 
individual change, with the intent to transform the social relations 
that define men's and women's existence" (Goodrich et al 1988 p.12). 
Such views are also beginning to permeate the mainstream of family 
therapy practice and research, and the search has started for revised 
theoretical frameworks that can illuminate familial power relations as a 
way of understanding family distress and the possibilities for change: 
"The state of the art in the family therapy research field has moved 
beyond the constricting and misleading implications of the 
'circular' and 'recursive' versions of systems theory [which] fail 
to incorporate ... such problems as •.. gender inequality, 
individual psychodynamics ... and entrenched social class and racial 
disadvantage. For the field of family therapy to maintain or regain 
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its earlier vitality. these topics must be addressed ... Systems 
theory provided a powerful start-up orientation for family therapy. 
but major reconstruction of this theoretical framework is now 
required" <Wynne 1988 p.273). 
It is my purpose to take this debate forward and to develop a new 
theoretical framework by which to understand family organisation and 
dynamics from a political perspective - a framework that can highlight 
the presence of unequal power relationships rather than emphasise some 
notion of functional order. and can relate power issues within a family 
organisation both to the structural power relations of the social 
formation and to issues of conflict and repression at the scale of an 
individual family member. 
The second element of this research is to test out the value of this 
framework in relation to examples of family therapy practice: how useful 
is it in exposing what may be going on in terms of changing power 
relations within a family <and between therapist and family). Out of 
this may also emerge some preliminary conclusions as to the impact 
(empowering or otherwise) of certain forms of intervention. While it is 
beyond the scope of this research to attempt any overall evaluation of 
current family therapy practice. such conclusions may be useful in 
indicating aspects that may have the potential to be empowering. A 
direction for future research would be to evaluate new family therapy 
approaches that may be derived from such critical perspectives <both in 
terms of theory and practice) - and hence to establish how (and whether) 
an empowering family therapy practice may be possible. 
- 5 -
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Overview of thesis 
This thesis aims to develop a new theoretical framework by which to 
understand family organisation and the processes of family therapy from 
a political perspective - a framework that will highlight (changing) 
power relationships rather than assume some notion of functional order. 
In constructing and evaluating such a theoretical framework, I will draw 
upon the traditions of critical theory and qualitative research. My 
starting points are an overview of existing critical understandings of 
'the family', and an examination of how 'power' itself may be theorised 
in a rigorous manner. I will review how such perspectives may expose 
specific relations of oppression or recognition that underpin particular 
forms of organisation, from the scale of the social formation as a whole 
to that of 'the individual'. Psychoanalysis and discourse theory have 
provided concepts whereby to deconstruct the dynamics of 'the 
individual' - in particular the concept of 'subjectivity' - which I will 
develop further so as to encompass participation, not just in discursive 
structures, but also in structures of emotional and material relations. 
In a critical appraisal of the various theoretical and practice 
traditions within family therapy, I will look at how the hegemony of 
systems theory has begun to be questioned and alternative metaphors for 
familial organisation proposed. However, as I will argue, none of these 
provide a satisfactory basis for understanding power relations in the 
family. I will therefore go on to apply a new conceptualisation of 
family organisation - that of 'subjectivity' - which is developed out of 
the theoretical traditions discussed earlier. I will theorise 'the 
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family', not just as the context in which individual subjectivity may be 
constructed, but as an entity that may be seen to participate in the 
social formation as a subjectivity in its own right. Instead of 
understanding fami 11al organisation as a natural outcome of self-
regulating processes (as in systems theory), it may thus be seen to 
reflect the ways in which a family may have been constructed as a 
subjectivity in and by an oppressive social formation - its coherence 
only being maintained by a degree of internal violence and repression. 
Building on this, I will develop a theoretical framework by which to 
analyse, from a political perspective, the breakdown of family 
functioning and the specific ways in which the organisation of family 
life may be reconstructed through the processes of family therapy. 
Following on from this, I will test out the value of the theoretical 
framework in an analysis of three examples of family therapy practice. 
My source material is transcripts taken from videotapes of actual family 
sessions, and these are analysed in terms of the evidence they provide 
of minute-by-minute changes in power relations within family 
organisation (often in response to particular interventions by the 
therapist). Out of this in-depth study of a small number of case 
examples, my primary aim will be to assess the practical value of the 
various elements of the theoretical framework in exposing how familial 
power relations have been structured and how <and whether) they may be 
modified during the course of family therapy. In turn, this may enable 
me to reach some preliminary conclusions as to how specific family 
therapy interventions may affect family organisation in ways that are 
either oppressive or empowering. 
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2: APPROACHES TO THEORY 
Within the social sciences. a number of approaches to theory have been 
employed. Broadly speaking. following Habermas (1968). these may be 
seen to fall into one of three traditions: positivism (or empiricism). 
humanism (or idealism). and critical theory. Habermas argues that each 
of these rely on fundamentally different asssumptions as to what there 
is to be known about human experience and interaction. how theory should 
be constructed and what is its purpose. As will be seen later, each 
tradition also implies its own particular research methodology. 
Positivism derives its approach from what has been seen to be the method 
of natural science, taking this to be appropriate for the study of human 
phenomena (for example. see Popper. 1972). What is studied is simply 
the world of appearances - that which is directly observable. Questions 
of 'meaning' are not considered relevant. There is assumed to be a 
"social order" (akin to the world of physics) that is essentially pre-
given and objective. and which determines that events occur according to 
orderly rules that are unchanging over time or place. Thus it is 
assumed that. once the relevant variables are specified. the outcome of 
a social situation may be predicted. In practice. exact prediction has 
proved to be impossible, so it has come to be assumed that social 
phenomena are the result of the operation of universal laws overlaid 
with random variation. thus allowing predictions to be made on the basis 
of statistical probability. The value of positivism in the construction 
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of social theory has been subject to much criticism in recent years in 
terms of its underlying assumptions, both about what there is 'out 
there' in the social world to be studied, and about how this should be 
done (see Bottomore and Nisbet 1979). 
What positivism disallows, a priori, is the possibility that the 'social 
order' may be subject to processes of historical change, or to vary as 
between specific cultural contexts. Similarly, subjective experience is 
disregarded as being inappropriate for study, and so the thinking and 
behaviour of human 'objects' are seen as resulting (as with atoms or 
molecules) from certain essential and predictable qualities, and certain 
predictable processes of interaction. Thus capitalism may be explained 
as the cumulative actions of "rational economic man", and conformity to 
social norms as the outcome of behavioural conditioning. If such 
supposedly 'natural' laws could be established, then it would appear 
futile to resist or to try and change the "social order" in any way (see 
Keat and Urry 1975). Habermas argues that the ultimate purpose of 
positivist knowledge is to enhance the efficiency of the existing social 
order by developing techniques to understand and control deviance. 
Considered as an ideology, positivism may be seen to 'naturalise' 
current norms as universal "laws", thereby legitimating the existing 
power relations of the current social formation. 
Humanism, in many ways, represents the antithesis of the method of 
natural science. It draws on the philosophical traditions of 
hermeneutics and eXistentialism, and has been applied to social theory 
within approaches such as phenomenology, symbolic interactionism, 
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verstehen sociology and psychoanalysis (see Smart 1976; Williams 1976). 
No general laws are assumed: instead a social situation is examined in 
terms of the unique subjective experience of the actors concerned. 
Whereas positivism studies the objective appearances of social 
phenomena, humanism seeks to examine the underlying "meaning" of what is 
going on, particularly to those directly involved. In general, all 
social interaction is understood in terms of people's subjective 
experience and world-view, whether based on rational intention or 
emotional experience. Consequently, this approach tends to emphasise 
the possibility of people being self-consciously in control of their own 
lives - able to construct "their world" for themselves. In this way, 
any reality of social determination and oppression that impinges on this 
apparent existential freedom is discounted from the analysis. Indeed, 
the existence of any such external reality of power relations is 
ultimately denied. The exclusive emphasis on the subjective leads to 
the position of constructivism: what is there is only what people 
consensually believe to be there (see Berger and Luckman 1967). As this 
consensus is not seen as being constructed within the context of any 
form of political domination, we are left with the conclusion that we 
are oppressed only in how we (consensually) choose to see the world. 
As Althusser argues, humanism and positivism between them "have 
constituted the basic opposition in the bourgeois world outlook" <1971 
p.17). This dualistic mode of thought constructs people both as 
autonomous subjects free to go out and construct their own world, and as 
predictable objeets ttult fulturiilly confor·m to a pr'e-g1ven so01111 ol-·del~, 
Each approach selectively disregards the aspects of what is studied that 
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could lead to consciousness of power issues and social change. 
Positivism dismisses 'power' as something that is subjective or 
metaphysical - it cannot be directly observed or measured. Humanism 
dismisses the possibility that external power structures can have a real 
and determining impact on personal experience. Thus, on the one hand, 
we are invited to see that there must be something wrong with us if we 
fail to fit comfortably into existing social relations; on the other, we 
are invited to see any experience of oppression as individual and 
subjective, divorced from any reality of structural powerlessness. 
Critical theory seeks to gain knowledge, not of consistent appearances, 
nor of the experience of 'free' subjects, but of real social relations 
that underlie those appearances and structure those experiences of 
subjectivity (for a fuller discussion of the distinction between the 
"observable" and the "real", see Keat and Urry 1975). Critical theory 
involves a dialectical synthesis of the bourgeOis dualism between 
positivism and humanism. The existing social order is no longer seen as 
a natural pre-given but as a historical moment in the power struggles 
between various human subjects acting individually and collectively. 
Similarly, each human subject is seen to be simultaneously constructed 
by and constructing the social relations in which slhe is situated: 
"It is the task of social theory to seek to overcome the traditional 
dualisms of subject and object in the analysis of social 
reproduction ..• We have to avoid any account of socialisation which 
presumes either that the subject is determined by the social object 
(the individual as simply moulded by SOCiety); or, by contrast, 
-11-
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which takes subjectivity for granted as an inherent characteristic 
of human beings, not in need of explication" (Giddens 1979 p.120). 
The standpoint of the enquirer is very different: instead of reifying 
the status quo or creating the illusion of self-determination, the 
purpose of critical theory is to achieve insight into the reality of 
social oppression, and thereby to provide "a basis for reform of the 
structure in question" (Poster 1978 p.xix). Critical theory does not 
take the appearance of social interactions at face value, but seeks to 
explain them in terms of real underlying structural relations between 
diferent sections of the society, such as those between black people and 
white people, women and men, or the working class and the capitalist 
class. These power relations are not seen as universal or eternal, but 
instead subject to constant struggle and renegotiation. The analyses of 
socialism, feminism and anti-racism have each been 'critical' of the 
appearances of social relations by referring to the real structural 
power relations that underlie them. The development of critical theory 
has also proceeded through the reconstruction of existing (usually 
humanist) theory in the light of such frameworks, for example, the re-
reading of psychoanalysis from Marxist or feminist perspectives (see 
Marcuse 1972; Mitchell 1975). Although, given the principles upon which 
postivist theory is founded, it can offer little in the way of 
'critical' insight, empirical research can be useful in checking out the 
conclusions from theory against what may be directly measured. 
Within the Marxist tradition, the clearest statements about what 
constitutes a rigorous or 'scientific' approach have been formulated by 
- 12-
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Louis Althusser. He makes an absolute distinction between "scientific 
practice", the study of (hidden) structural relations, and "ideological 
practicel! which fails to go beyond appearances or examine the 
ideologically constructed nature of "common-sense" concepts and 
language. He states that a scientific method must start at the level of 
theory, "the concrete in thought", and constitute a "theoretical object" 
for study. This theoretical object will be a particular hypothesised 
structure underlying a set of observable social relations. However, in 
order to be able to construct such a theoretical object, one must first 
go through a rather awkward stage of simultaneously describing and 
analysing experience - the construction of "descriptive theory": 
"One must envisage this phase as a transitional one, necessary to 
the development of the theory. That it is transitional is inscribed 
in my expression: 'descriptive theory' ... The term theory 'clashes' 
to some extent with the adjective 'descriptive' which I have 
attached to it" (Althusser 1971 p.138). 
The next stage, still at the level of theory, is the construction of the 
'problematic': the theorising of the various structures and relations 
that surround and affect the theoretical object. It is only after this 
stage that it is possible to start to interpret and make sense of what 
may be observed at the phenomenal level, and hence determine how this 
may be transformed in order to promote social justice. 
The stages of Althusser's method may be illustrated by his research into 
the nature and operation of 'The State'. He starts by using the Marxian 
concept of "class" in order to construct a first level of "descriptive 
theory" through which Ctln be glimpsed, under-lying the phenomentll torms 
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of political "democracy", "the dictatorship of the bourgeiosie" (ibid. 
p.139). He stresses the need to avoid falling into the positivist trap 
of further description of particular phenomenal forms of governmental 
organisation that confuse rather than illuminate underlying strucural 
relations: 
"The accumulation of facts within the definition of the State may 
multiply examples, but it does not really advance ••. the 
development of the theory" (ibid. p.140). 
Instead one must work at the level of theory until key concepts emerge 
that expose the reality of oppression within the observed structures of 
social relationships. One is then able to reflect, "Yes, that's how it 
is, that's really true!" (ibid. p.139). In Althusser's theorisation of 
'The State', the theoretical breakthrough comes with his development of 
the concept of Ideological State Apparatuses, by which he is able to 
expose the real power relations, operating at the level of ideology, 
underlying a wide variety of institutions that are not directly part of 
the governmental machine, such as the Church, the Law, political 
parties, the media and the educational system. 
From the perspective of radical feminism, Christine I>elphy argues for 
similar criteria for a 'scientific' method: 
"The explanatory power of a theory ... is tied to its capacity ... 
to go beyond the phenomenal reality .... The belief that the reason 
for the existence of things is to be found beyond their appearance, 
that it is 'hidden', is integral to scientific procedure ... The 
initial 'objects' are in any case not 'pure' facts, but rather the 
immediate perception of things, informed in a non-explicit fashion 
- 14-
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by a certain view of the world ... The more a theory •.. is held in 
fief to immediate perception t [the more] it must stick to the 
'facts't the more it is ideological" (1984 pp.21-2). 
For DelphYt the purpose of probing beneath the surface is to establish 
the reality of power relations: 
"A feminist - or a proletarian - science aims at explaining 
oppression. In order to do this t it has to start with oppression. 
If it is coherent, it inevitably comes up with a theory of history 
in which history is seen in terms of the domination of some social 
groups by others" (ibid. p.212). 
In line with Althusser's criteria for a 'scientific' method, I will 
start my research at the level of theory, firstly in terms of clarifying 
a critical understanding of 'power' itselft and secondly reviewing 
existing critical perspectives on the family, many of which would best 
be seen as 'descriptive' rather than 'scientific' theory. It is out of 
this that I will construct a theoretical framework by which to probe 
beneath the various phenomenal forms taken by my chosen theoretical 
object, the ensemble of internal and external relations that constitute 
'the family'. Following Delphy, I would seek to understand the 
organisation of 'the family', not in terms of any regularities of 
appearance, but in terms of how it reflects and embodies relationships 
of unequal power and oppression. Out of these perspectives, I will 
attempt to construct some key theoretical concepts by which to view the 
process of family breakdown and family therapy so as to be able to 
"recognise the facts of oppression" with "a very special kind of 
obviousness" (Althusser 1971 p.139). 
- 15-
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In this chapter, I will look at what may be meant by 'power' from a 
critical perspective, and at how power relations have been theorised 
within various anti-oppresive traditions. Structures of oppression or 
mutual support may be seen to exist, not just in the context of material 
relations, but also those of ideology and emotionality. I will look at 
how this interlocking matrix of power relations may determine specific 
forms of social organisation, from the nation state to institutions such 
as the family. In the following Chapter, I will extend this analysis to 
examine how what is conventionally seen as the 'individual' may also be 
deconstructed in terms of intersecting power relations, and how this, in 
turn, leads us to refine our understanding of power relations. 
Defining concepts Of power 
Within any critical tradition, 'power' is understood as describing a 
relationship between people. However, it a concept that has been 
understood very differently within the other theoretical traditions that 
were discussed in the last Chapter. Within the bourgeois traditions of 
humanism and positivism, any concepts of power relations are rendered 
peripheral to an analysis of social and interpersonal processes, thereby 
maintaining the illusion that the current organisation of social 
relations is somehow fair and natural. The real complexity of power 
relations disappears when they have to be reduced either to subjective 
experiences or to objective entities. The two perspectives cannot be 
- 16-
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brought together as long as we remain caught between the poles of the 
dualism that is central to bourgeois thought. 
Any concepts of power relations between people are marginalised within 
the humanist tradition where the emphasis is on the subjective thought, 
experience and responsibility of the 'individual', unconstrained by any 
social context. The only notions of power that are permitted are those 
which arise within the assumed autonomy of the individual subject. For 
example, within the psychology of the human potential movement, a 
subjective sense of 'power' is seen as emerging from within each 
individual as slhe realises herlhis latent capabilities. Similarly, 
'power' is not a material entity that lends itself to measurement within 
the positivist tradition. Thus, within the economics of the "Free 
Market", structural inequalities of power do not appear within the 
analysis, as opportunities are seen to be equally available to all 
participants. Within functionalist sociology, an 'objective' concept of 
power emerges, not as a relationship that can divide people into unequal 
groups, but as the "generalised capacity of a social system to get 
things done in the interest of collective goals" (Parsons 1960 p.181). 
In line with this, it then appears 'natural' for the 'power' of this 
consensual social order to be vested in those in existing positions of 
authority, such as statesmen, fathers, industrialists and community 
leaders. In this way, this 'theoretical' perspective may be seen as 
nothing more than an ideological underpinning of the status quo. 
By contrast, power relations between people are central to feminist and 
other critical perspectives. Baker Miller (1982) starts with a 
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distinction between conventionally male definitions of power - "to 
exercise dominion or to dominate" - as against women's familiarity in 
using power "in the service of others" through acting as nurturers (a 
concept of power that is rendered almost invisible within the 
patriarchal social order). Surrey takes ,the argument further and 
distinguishes two strands within lIIale constructions of power, "mastery" 
over others and self-determination of one's own life (1987 p.4). (There 
is an obvious connection between these two understandings of power and 
the world-views underlying the bourgeois intellectual traditions of, 
respectively, positivism and humanism). Both definitions are based on 
an ideology of separateness and competition that excludes any positive 
sense of relatedness with others. 
She contrasts such concepts of power with one that draws on the specific 
experience of women and also emerges from anti-imperialist practice of 
Freire (1970). She sees in the principles of consciousness raising and 
collective action the operation of a very different sort of power, a 
power that is not dissimilar to the "nurturing" power (power for others) 
that women are familiar with using in their everyday lives (but often at 
the expense of their own choices and achievement). Such abilities and 
sensitivities may be used instead for the mutual benefit of self and 
others. Through connecting with others in a common position, people 
have the possibility of creating a "power together" that is infinitely 
more potent than the separateness of "self-determination": 
"Personal empowerment can be viewed only through the larger lens of 
power through connection, i.e. through the establishment of mutually 
empathic and mutually empowering relationships" Ubid p. 3). 
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This distinction between, on the one hand, 'power over', which forms the 
basis of relations of oppression and, on the other, 'power together', 
which is at the heart of consciousness raiSing and collective action, 
provides a crucial underpinning for any critical understanding of social 
relations. 'Power over' must first be understood in collective terms as 
the power of one group to dominate or exploit another through their 
collective control over economic or political resources. It may also be 
seen that such a collective power relation will have a determining 
effect at the scale of individual relationships, and inform the way in 
which any member of the oppressor group may interact with any member of 
the oppressed. Set against this, we have 'power together' which not 
only offers the basis for mutually enhancing relationships, but also for 
the organisation of support, self-help and consciousness raising groups. 
Such conceptualisations of power relate to people's ability to make 
choices. In this way, oppression may be understood as the (collective) 
exercise of choices that restrict the choices open to others, while 
empowerment may be seen as the (collective) opening up of choice, both 
for oneself and for others in similarly oppressed positions. However, 
as will be seen later, such definitions will have to be revised in the 
light of a critical understanding of individual subjectivity. 
Building on these distinctions, it is possible to see three possible 
modes by which a person may transact with others. If slhe is situated 
in a position of 'power over', slhe may enter into transactions of 
dDminatiDn - demanding that others meet herlhis wants and needs at the 
expense of their own. Conversely, if slhe is on the receiving end of 
such a power relationship, slhe may have no choice but to enter into 
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transactions of subordination - actively putting her/himself down as the 
only available way of having a relationship with the other at all. 
Finally, if two people are situated such that neither is exerting 'power 
over' the other, they may enter into transactions of (mutual) 
recognition. Transacting in this way is the basis both of nurturing one 
another and of establishing 'power together'. Recognition of the other 
need not be at one's own expense (as would be the case from pOSitions of 
subordination and domination, as in conventional constructions of 
'mothering'), but can open up choices for both parties. 
Within the tradition of dialectical materialism (both Marxist and 
feminist), power is seen in terms of differential access to the 
resources that are necessary for survival. In any historically occuring 
social formation, certain social groups may be identified as being in a 
position to control the way resources and responsibilities are 
distributed. In this way, the degree to which people can be in control 
of the way they live, work and make intimate relationships has depended 
on membership or non-membership of categories such as race, gender or 
social class. While these categories may appear to reflect 'natural' 
differences, corresponding to supposed innate characteristics of, say, 
"the English", "men", or "the working classes", they actually connote 
who does and does not have power within a particular social formation. 
While materialist analyses have exposed injustices in the organisation 
of economic production and consumption, this has in turn sparked off a 
growing awareness of how power struggles between groups may take place, 
just as importantly, at other 'levels' of the social formation, such as 
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in the operation of ideology (for example, in how 'knowledge' and 
'common sense', social customs and institutions, and even language 
itself, may be manipulated in order to secure the power of one social 
group over another). In this way, a concept of power may be developed 
which recognises how the collective oppression of one group by another 
may be achieved through their privileged access to key resources, 
practices and modes of expression - not only the means of material 
production, but also the means of emotional or ideological production 
(such as the media or cultural determinants of emotional expression). 
In his historical 'deconstructions' of whole bodies of attitudes and 
practices (for example, in relation to 'madness' or 'sexuality'), 
Foucault has focused on the minutiae of the operation of power relations 
in terms of who has access to specific "knowledges" and practices. 
However, he has tended to conceptualise power, not as a structural 
relationship between people, but "as a productive network which runs 
through the whole social body" (1985 p.91). In this way, he can tend to 
dissociate 'power' from 'oppression', ultimately leading him towards the 
humanist assumption of a universal "will to power" (Henriques et al 1984 
p.116). Thus, while we have much to learn from Foucault in terms of the 
power implications of apparently minute shifts in position within a 
discursive structure, it is crucial that these are seen as specific 
instances of structural power relations based on gender, race or class. 
In this way, empowerment may come to be seen, not as some once-and-for-
all shift in social relations, but as an incremental process of 
interlinked struggles: people individually and collectively gaining, 
losing and then regaining opportunitites for expression or activity. 
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Structyral pgwer relatigo$' Overview 
Existing and past social formations may be analysed in terms of the 
operation of various sets of power relations <such as those of 
imperialism, patriarchy or class struggle). In each case, social 
relations may be understood in terms of how a ruling group (race, gender 
or class) is able to exploit or oppress the daily life of subordinate 
groups by a variety of economic, ideological, political and emotional 
means. These subordinated groups in turn may, over time, organise to 
mount more or less successful resistance against their oppression. To 
use Gramsci's phrase (1971>, this constant "war of position" between the 
forces of oppression and of resistance may be seen as providing the 
motive force for historical change, whether at the scale of the social 
formation as a whole or at the scale of personal relationships. If we 
integrate this within the wider perspective outlined above, the process 
of history may be understood not only in terms of the 'power over' 
exerted by ruling groups, but also in terms of the 'power together' 
generated by oppressed groups organising their resistance and fighting 
for their collective control over their means of survival and 
expression. At any historical instance, the tension and interaction 
between the forces of oppression <'power over') and those of empowerment 
('power together') may be seen to underlie the specific ways in which 
social relations can be organised - whether at the scale of the social 
formation as a whole or at the scale of the individual person. 
If we look at the resistance against oppression that has been mounted 
over the course of history, instances of collective empowerment may be 
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found both in the informal everyday interaction of people with common 
experiences, or in more structured peer organisations such as women's 
consciousness raising groups, trade unions or black solidarity 
organisations. However, whatever the intentions of the parties 
involved, it has proved far more problematic to achieve 'power together' 
between members of oppressor and oppressed groups, even if they also 
share some common elements of experience. Black women have felt 
excluded and patronised within the women's movement and women have felt 
oppressed and marginalised by men within the trade union movement (see, 
for example, Davis, 1982). 
If we turn to the look at the changing organisation of the forces of 
oppression, we find that ruling groups themselves have been involved in 
internal struggles, and their composition may be seen to have changed 
over time (for example, the passing of control from the landed 
aristocracy to the capitalist class during the industrial revolution): 
liThe ruling elite, while it does often have some interests in common 
with all of its members, does not have all interests in common with 
all of its members. In other words, the ruling elite - or, more 
correctly, ruling elites - is not monolithic. Indeed the battles 
among them are often vicious" (Hodge et al 1975 p.34). 
Thus, in specific historical instances, there may be internal 
contradictions within the processes of oppression, such that the 
interests of, say, capitalism and patriarchy may come to be at odds. 
The specific struggles that are being waged in each case are, to some 
extent, autonomous from one another. Each experience of oppression may 
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suggest different definitions of who constitutes the ruling group and 
the oppressed groups. In each case, the ruling group may seek to 
incorporate a different set of 'allies' in securing the oppression of an 
underclass. While it seems highly significant that most capitalists are 
white and male (although not exclusively so), nevertheless working class 
men may also be seen to act oppressively to women, and white women may 
be in an oppressive position with respect to black women. Such 
contradictions have led to fruitless debates among the theorists of 
different oppressed groups as to whether one mode of oppression is, in 
some way, more fundamental than any other (see, for example, Meulenbelt 
et al 1984; Sargent et al 1981). I would see it as more productive to 
pursue (and, if necessary, extend) what Davis (1982) has termed the 
"triple jeopardy analysis": the power relations of the social formation 
are understood in terms of "the simultaneous oppression of patriarchy, 
class and race" (Carby 1982). 
Arising out of this, there is the issue of whether other instances of 
discrimination, for example on the basis of sexual orientation, age or 
disability, are simply reflections of these three modes of oppression, 
or whether they should be theorised as separate modes of oppression in 
their own right (see, for example, Jeffreys 1990; Bytheway and Johnson 
1990). Connel warns that "any number of dimensions can be added ... Yet 
the more sophisticated the cross-classification becomes, the more firmly 
is the analysis embedded in a static logic of categories" (1987 p.59). 
Therefore, at this stage, I will seek to understand "heterosexism", 
"ageism" and "disablism" in terms of the forgoing 'triple jeopardy 
analysis', rather than theorising them as separate modes of social 
- 24-
Relations of power 
oppression in their own right (although such theorisations may 
ultimately prove to be necessary>. 
Many such instances of discrimination may be seen to relate, at least in 
part, to the social relations of feudalism/capitalism, imperialism 
and/or patriarchy. For example, members of feudal, capitalist or 
imperialist wealth-owning groups are generally able to maintain their 
pri vlleged position despite the onset of disability or old age, whereas 
members of subordinated groups take on a doubly devalued status as soon 
as they become unproductive. Patronage, as a means of providing 
material support that simultaneously subordinates and stigmatises the 
recipient, may be seen to be a characteristic of feudal social relations 
that still survives in the organisation of much welfare provision. 
However, even the minimal provision of 'welfare' for older and disabled 
people is undermined by the capitalist ideology of 'free competition', 
which legitimates a systematic diversion of resources away from those 
who need them most. Finally, under patriarchal social formations, 
membership of the ruling group may be denoted by specific definitions of 
'manhood' or 'masculinity' - often in terms of characteristics such as 
sexual orientation, physical strength or position within a generational 
hierarchy - which may be seen to disqualify other groups such as 
younger, older, gay or disabled men. Such definitions of 'masculinity' 
produce complementary definitions of 'femininity' in terms of a woman's 
usefulness to men's needs and desires. Thus women who, due to age or 
disability, are not available to provide domestic care for men or 
children, or who choose not to make themselves sexually available to 
men, face similar (or even greater) disqualification. 
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Analysis of class oppression 
The first materialist analysis to be made of power relations was Marx's 
theory of class conflict. He was most rigorous in his analysis of the 
economic exploitation of the working class under capitalism, showing how 
the capitalist class had gained monopoly control over the material 
resources necessary for industrial production (factories and machinery), 
so that working people had no independent means of support and were 
thereby forced to survive by selling their labour power on an individual 
basis at well below its use value to the capitalist. This mode of 
organisation was in contrast to the earlier feudal social formation in 
which the former ruling class, the aristocracy, was in a position to 
expropriate the labour power of the peasant class through their monopoly 
ownership of land. Despite his emphasis on material relations, Marx 
also laid the foundations in his earlier work for a critical analysis of 
class struggle at the level of ideological or political activity: 
liThe ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling 
ideas ... The class which has the means of material production at 
its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental 
production ..• They ... regulate the production and distribution of 
the ideas of their age ... The dominant idea ... is expressed as an 
eternal law. Olarx, 1965, p. 65). 
Subsequent theorists, such as Gramsci and Althusser, have suggested that 
what goes on at the level of ideology is not simply determined by the 
positions reached in the class struggle at the level of material 
relations. Instead, social discourse is seen as an arena for power 
- 26-
Relations of power 
struggle in its own right, although the power relations of the economic 
base are seen as determinant "in the last instance". The struggle, 
however, is an unequal one since oppressed groups have to "live even 
their revolt against the domination of the system within the framework 
of the dominant ideology" (Poulantzas, 1973 p.223). As will be seen 
later, discourse theory has taken further the study of institutions and 
practices at the level of ideology as sites of power struggles in their 
own right. 
Although Marx recognised the impact of capitalist power relations at the 
level of emotional experience, his early writings on this subject tended 
to fall more within the tradition of humanist idealism. He argued that 
capitalist ownership of production not only alienates the worker from 
"contemplating himself in a world that he has created" <1959 p. 76), but 
also from the relationship he would otherwise have with the person who 
subsequently buys and recognises the value of what he has made: 
"An immediate consequence of the fact that man is estranged from the 
product of his labour is the estrangement of man from man ... 
What applies to man's relation to his work, to the product of his 
labour and to himself also holds of man's relation to other men, and 
to the other man's labour and object of labour" <1959 p.??). 
This analysis rested on idealist assumptions about the "essential" 
nature of the working man. We are left with a rather hollow 
narcissistic vision of "man" who, by his industry, "duplicates himself", 
a vision which ignored any more intimate emotionality among men <and 
which totally discounted the experience of women, both at home and at 
the workp1ace). 
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Analysis Of patriarchal Oppression 
A materialist analysiS along similar lines has been developed in 
relation to patriarchy: 
"Patriarchy ... is a structure ... whereby property, the means of 
production and exchange values, is appropriated by men, and whereby 
this property relation informs household and family relations in 
such a way that men may appropriate the labour and the actual 
persons of women" (Kuhn and tiolpe 1978 p.65). 
This cannot be subsumed within a Marxist analYSis, since patriarchy 
operates within a separate economic base, that of the "domestic mode of 
production" - housework and chlldcare - in which "those exploited 
are not paid but rather maintained' within a neo-feudal household 
organisation (Delphy 1984 p.18). This organisation is governed by the 
rules of inheritance, "patrimonial transmision", which "creates 
possessors and non-possessors within each family" (ibid. p.19). It also 
interlinks with the organisation of the capitalist mode of production to 
circumscribe women's economic opportunities outside the home, through 
"systematic discrimination ... in the wage labour market" <1 bid. p. 20). 
In addition to exploiting their domestic labour, patriarchy also 
exercises "control of women's fertility and sexuality in monogamous 
marriage" as a means of guaranteeing the path of inheritance (}(cDonough 
and Harrison, <1978 p. 40). At the same time, the extra-marital sexual 
domination of women is legitimated through such institutions as 
prostitution and pornography, resulting in the construction of 
'femininity' in relation to the "twin images of women as, on the one 
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hand, the sexual property of men and, on the other, the chaste mothers 
of their children. The madonna/whore dichotomy runs through western 
patriarchal culture as the means whereby men have sought to ensure both 
the sanctity and inheritance of their families and their extra-familial 
sexual pleasure" (Barrett 1980 p.45). 
The operation of patriarchy may also be reflected in particular 
definitions of 'masculinity' that have held sway at specific moments in 
history - how men have constructed themselves in order to control and 
exploit women and, just as crucially, other men. This may interlink 
with processes of class exploitation, for example producing the 
contradictory images of the "hard-working, hard-fighting 'puritan' who 
adheres to a production ethic of duty before pleasure", and the 
"aristocratic 'playboy' who lives according to an ethic of leisure and 
sensual indulgence" (Hoch 1979 p.118). Hegemcnic forms of masculinity 
have set up hierarchical power relations, both between men and women, 
and also between certain categories of men: 
"Heterosexual masculinity was historically constructed by the 
exclusion of particular forms of desire and relationship, which were 
split off into marginalised masculinities, most significantly 
homosexual" (Connel 1987 p. 161>. 
Young, old, gay or 'effeminate' men have, at various times, been 
oppressed within patriarchal sexual relations - those "whose situations 
are related in different ways to the overall logic of the subordination 
of women to men". Indeed, "any kind of powerlessness, or refusal to 
compete" becomes defined in terms of effeminacy or "the imagery of 
homosexual1 ty" (Carrigan et al 1987 p. 86). 
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Through the domestic relations of patriarchy, men have traditionally 
dominated women, children and (sometimes) older relatives, structuring 
oppression on the basis of generation as well as gender. (Under feudal 
social formations, such customary rights of domination would have 
extended to younger siblings, other relatives and servants). Those 
living under the same roof would typically have (some of) their labour 
power and property rights subordinated to the rule of the head of the 
household (a position, although male-defined, that may actually be 
occupied by a woman on a temporary basis in the absence of an 
appropriate male heir). Such arrangements may be enforced both by law 
and by social convention. In this instance, it may be seen not to be a 
person's chronological age that defines their subordination, only their 
relationship to the defined head of the household. 
Such processes of economic and sexual exploitation are underpinned by 
the organised and systematic use (or threat) of physical force. As 
Connell argues, "The control of the means of violence by some men rather 
than by any women remains a central fact" (1987 p.153). Historical 
analysis reveals that men have achieved positions of domination through 
the organisation of military action or policing, and also through the 
oppresive use of physical strength in domestic or street violence. As 
Fernbach (1981) suggests, it is not only women who are subjected to this 
intimidation, but also those categories of men who who fall outside 
prevailing definitions of 'manhood' or 'masculinity' (for example, gay 
men, youths or older men). 
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In its regulation of sexuality inside and outside the family, patriarchy 
may be seen to interlink with ideologies of heterosexism, resulting in 
specific experiences of oppression for gay women and men: 
"A fundamental element of modern hegemonic masculi ni ty [is) that one 
sex (women) exists as a potential sexual object ... The 
institutionalisation of heterosexuality, as in the family, [is) 
achieved only by considerable effort, and at considerable cost" 
(Carrigan et al 1987 p.86. See also Barrett 1980 pp.46-7). 
By patriarchal definition, women must always be ready to subject 
themselves as sexual objects for men (inside or outside marriage), so 
the very possibility of lesbian orientation may be denied, or it may be 
constructed as 'deviant', a joke, or as a subject for male sexual 
gratification. <Under British law, female homosexuality has had no 
existence). By contrast, under different social formations, the ruling 
group of men have either prohibited homosexual relations altogether, or 
have practiced it in specific circumstances (for example, with 
subordinates), according to the hegemonic construction of masculinity at 
the time. 
The construction of a separate homosexual 'identity' that distinguished 
certain men from the prevailing definition of masculinity may be seen to 
have arisen through specific struggles in the late nineteenth century: 
"Just as 'the housewife', 'the prostitute' and 'the child' are 
historically specific 'types' that should be understood in the 
context of the [patriarchal] gender relations of the time, so too 
'the homosexual' represents the modern definition of a new 'type' of 
adult male" (Carrigan et al p.87). 
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Ruling groups of men used medical and legal discourses in order to 
control, subordinate and marginalise male homosexual activity by 
specifically naming it, constructing it as a 'disease' and making its 
'practices' illegal. However, in doing so, they inadvertently provided 
gay men with the terms by which to identify themselves and 'come out' -
and construct an alternative 'masculinity' (see Foucault 1981). 
It may be seen that, at various historical instances, changes in the 
form of patriarchal and of class oppression have given rise to 
contradictions within the organisation of the ruling group, whether on 
the basis of definitions of masculinity and femininity, or on the basis 
of fundamental differences of interest between patriarchy and 
feudalism/capitalism. For example, as will be discussed later on, in 
the early stages of the industrial revolution, the opportunities for 
women and children to sell their labour power individually to the 
factory owners, while satisfying the capitalists' desire for plentiful 
cheap labour, undermined the former patriarchal organisation in which 
the man of the house directly controlled the labour of his whole family 
unit. In the event, this tendency was countered, and patriarchy 
reasserted, through the medium of protective legislation regulating the 
employment of women and children, a move which has actually reduced the 
possibilities for the capitalist exploitation of a larger workforce. In 
the following section, I will examine how processes of imperialist 
oppresion may interlink with, but also act in contradiction to, 
processes of patriarchal and class oppression. 
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Analysis pf racist and imperialist pppression 
Materialist analyses of imperialism have concentrated on the 
exploitation of the labour of subordinated races through practices such 
as slavery and job discrimination, and also through the colonial 
domination of third world economies by the West. Intersecting with this 
are analyses of the ideological construction of racist oppression: 
"That the people of a culture should view themselves as culturally 
superior is certainly common ... But not so common is the feature 
contained in Western cultural thinking, that the superior should 
control the inferior. It is this kind of thinking, which emphasises 
the value placed on control, that produces a missionary 
imperialism ... Western control over non-~estern peoples is 
therefore considered morally defensible ... " (Hodge et all 1975 p.3) 
The development of such imperialist attitudes may be seen in nineteenth 
century English political discourse: 
"Race implies difference and difference implies superiority, and 
superiority leads to predominance" (Disraeli, quoted in Walvin 1984 
p.40) 
Cohen takes this further in analysing how the white ruling class (in 
conjunction with the rest of the white population constructed together 
as a "racial" group> is able to maintain and extend its power over non-
white groups by defining "society" as "white society" at the level of 
ideology: 
"Ethnic hegemony involves ... a distinct set of strategies whereby a 
particular power elite lays claim to represent an ethnic majority in 
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such a way as to impose their own norms of language and culture on 
the rest of society as ideals or models to which all should aspire" 
(Cohen and Bains, 1988 p.26). 
Hall analyses the resistance mounted by black people against this 
hegemony, identifying the specific struggle over the meanings and 
connotations of the very word 'black', a power struggle at the level of 
ideology "with a specificity and pertinence of its own - needing to be 
analysed in its own terms... It was 'real' because it was real in its 
effects ... 'Black' could not be converted into 'black = beautiful' 
simply by wishing it were so. It had to become part of an organised 
practice of struggles requiring the building up of collective forms of 
black resistance as well as the development of new forms of black 
consciousness· (1985 p.48). 
Much of the theoretical work on imperialism and racism has tended to 
interlink this with an understanding of class or gender oppression (for 
example, Alexander 1987; Miles 1989). Sometimes these separate modes of 
oppression acted so as to reinforce one another, but at other times they 
produced contradictions, for example between the interests of racism and 
of patriarchy in relation to the organisation of slavery: 
"The slave system defined Black people as chattel. Since women, no 
less than men, were viewed as profitable labour-units, they might as 
well be genderless as far as the slave-holders were concerned ... 
Judged by the evolving ~ineteenth century ideology of femininity, 
which emphasised women's roles as nurturing mothers and gentle 
companions and housekeepers for their husbands, Black women were 
practical anomalies" (Davis 1982 p.5)' 
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Thus the material exploitation of black women as slave labour prevented 
their being subjugated as women to black men in terms of any ideology of 
femininity (and this potentially theatened to undermine the subjugation 
of all women in this way). However, white slave owners and their agents 
were still able to reassert their domination over their female slaves, 
both as women and as black people, through routine sexual as well as 
physical abuse and "the virtual institutionalisation of rape" (ibid. 
p. 1'15). 
Summary 
Let us summarise the key elements of a critical understanding of power 
relations. Firstly, we have the differentiation between relations of 
'power over'. the systematic oppression and subordination of one social 
group by another, and those of 'power together', the basis of mutual 
support and resistance against oppression. This leads us to distinguish 
between, on the one hand, transactions of domination and subordination 
and, on the other, transactions of (mutual) recognition. Secondly, we 
have an analysis of power structures, in which the complex pattern of 
power inequalities within a given social formation is seen as the 
operation, through history. of (at least) three fundamental modes of 
oppression and resistance: the 'triple jeopardy' of patriarchy, 
imperialism and capitalism/feudalism. As we have seen, these structural 
relations may interlink in complex ways, sometimes compounding the 
oppression of specific groups and sometimes acting in contradiction to 
one another. 
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pgwer relatigD5 at different leye15 Of tran5action 
In the previous section, I looked at how Althusser and Gramsci began to 
theorise ideological domination as a level of oppression and struggle in 
its own right: one that is separate from, but related to, the level of 
material exploitation. In this way, an analysis of the power relations 
of discourse starts to contextualise what, in bourgeois thought, had 
been separated off as subjective experience. An individual's capacity 
to think is no longer seen as free and autonomous, but as constructed 
and constrained within the prevailing political relations of discourse. 
However, as feminists in particular, have argued, feelings also have a 
political significance in their own right, and issues of emotional 
oppression require to be placed firmly on the agenda for analysis. 
Having embraced ideology as a crucial arena for struggle - hence the 
importance of consciousness raising groups - many women found that this 
was insufficient on its own to explain their experience of oppression at 
an emotional level: 
"We saw a clear link between our 'personal' feelings as women and 
the political structure we live in ... But even in a growing 
movement active in the world, and with a radical restructuring of 
domestic life, our feelings and relationships did not change eaSily. 
Women were gaining new power but were continuing to feel depressed, 
inadequate and confused" (Ernst and Goodison 1981 p.3-4). 
Although it has not been conventional to theorise emotional relations as 
a separate level of the social formation, they cannot easily be subsumed 
within the categories of material or ideological relations (although 
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there are obvious connections with processes taking place at these other 
levels). Therefore, emotionality requires to be understood as a third, 
separate (but related) level of social relations. The overlooking of 
this level of analysis within the bourgeois imperialist world-view may 
itself be seen as a reflection of power struggles in which white men 
have been able to construct a 'way of seeing' that privileges the value 
of certain levels of social relations over others: 
"In our dominant tradition [emotionality] has not been seen as an 
aid to understanding and action, but rather as an impediment, even 
an evil. We have a long tradition of trying to dispense with, or at 
least to control and neutralise, emotionality" (Baker Killer 1988 
p. 39). 
Feminists working in the field of therapy have, in various ways, tried 
to integrate concepts of power in order to understand oppression at the 
level of emotional relations. As they have done so, it has become 
increasingly clear that the distortion of women's feelings and desires 
is not just a reflection of other material or ideological inequalities, 
but represents a distinct level of oppression and struggle in its own 
right. Baker Killer has suggested how emotionality is constructed 
differently within dominant and subordinate groups. She suggests that, 
in addition to using economic and physical force, and having ideological 
control over "culture" and "knowledge", the dominant group "does not 
encourage subordinates' full and free expression of their experience", 
and, in particular, their anger: 
"Any subordinate is in a position that constantly generates anger. 
Yet this is one of the emotions that no dominant group ever wants to 
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allow in subordinates ... It is ... made to appear that subordinates 
have no cause for angerj if they feel anything like it, there is 
something wrong with them' <1983 p. 2). 
At the level of emotional oppression, anger, as the feeling that 
motivates and enables subordinated groups to struggle against injustice, 
may be suppressed by some combination of external force and internalised 
prohibitions. Women have come to internalise such prohibitions against 
expressing anger within the emotional construction of 'femininity', 
thereby turning their anger in upon themselves so that it becomes 
manifested in depression, anxiety or self-harm. Just as Showalter 
(1987) has demonstrated how women's attempts at self-expression have 
come to be defined as 'madness' within Western patriarchy, so, for an 
Eastern woman, -the expression of aggression is ... more often turned 
inward against either herself or other women, because if it does appear 
overtly, it is deemed illegitimate by men, who have violent means to 
control transgressing women" (Brown et al 1981 p.135). However, such 
suppression of anger applies, not just to women's experience, but also 
to that of men who experience subordination: 
"Dominant-subordinate relationships among men have been based on 
class, race, religion or other factors. Therefore, the majority of 
men have lived in positions of subordination to other men. Whatever 
rightful anger men have had in relation to that subordination has 
had to be suppressed" (Baker Miller 1983 p. 5). 
Feminist insights such as these expose how oppressive power relations 
are not just to be found at the levels of economic and ideological 
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interaction. but also. just as crucially. at the level of emotionality. 
It may be argued that such processes of repressing and distorting 
feelings and desires are just as real an instance of oppressive power 
relations as anything that has been identified in terms of material 
exploitation. Therefore. it would seem to be helpful to theorise 
emotionality as a third level of the social formation with its own 
distinct power relations of oppression and resistance. 
This analytical separation of the social formation into three distinct 
and semi-autonomous levels of social relations has its parallel in 
developments within the field of psychological therapy. As 
behaviourism. on its own. has come to be seen as an inadequate 
explanation of the complexity of human transactions. it has been 
supplemented first by an analysis of cognitive structures (for example. 
Beck 1976. Ellis 1970). and latterly by a rediscovery of the importance 
of emotionality (see Izard 1977). Such a three-way distinction between 
the cognitive. the affective and the behavioural - thinking. feeling and 
acting - also figures in recent developments in Transactional Analysis 
(see Kahler 1979). and this will be discussed in more detail later. 
Thus we can begin to see the potential of such an analysis of levels of 
social relations in overcoming the old bourgeOis dualism of "society" 
and "the individual". Each level describes a mode of analysiS that is 
equally relevant whether it is applied to the structures of the social 
formation as a whole. as in Althusser's original conception. or to the 
interpersonal and intrapsychic transactions of individual people. The 
mode of material relations may be seen to define human activity. whether 
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it be economic production or consumption, domestic labour, leisure or 
interpersonal behaviour. Within an oppressive social formation, any 
activity from the exploitation of the wage labour of a Third World 
people, to the deliberate self harm committed by an individual woman may 
be seen to be structured, ultimately, by similar sets of power relations 
<and open to the same possibilities for emancipatory struggle). 
Similarly, as the women's movement has demonstrated with their slogan 
"the personal is political", struggles at the level of ideology and 
discourse are just as pertinent, whether they are at the scale of a mass 
political campaign or in the structures of individual thought and 
conversation. Finally, it may be seen that feelings are not purely an 
internal matter for each individual. They are structured by gender, by 
race and by class, and constitute a level of oppression, and of 
struggle, in their own right. 
In this way, we may conceptualise the social formation as comprising 
distinct sets of ongoing power struggles, each taking place with their 
own particular momentum at a particular level of the social formation: 
emotionality, ideology and material relations. Such struggles may be 
seen to take place simultaneously at the scale of the social formation 
as a whole and at the scale of functioning of particular individuals, 
with individual change determining societal change and vice versa. At 
each level of the social formation we would need to distinguish the 
separate (but interlocking) interaction of forces of oppression and 
resistance in relation to struggles based on gender, race and class. 
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power relations And social organisatiOD 
In this section, I will consider how, within a specific social 
formation, groups, sub-groups and other social institutions are 
organised on the basis of relations of 'power over' and 'power 
together'. Central to an analysis of how power relations structure 
social organisation are the various definitions of how the ruling group 
may itself be seen to be organised - as white people, as men, or as the 
feudal/capitalist class. Within the current international social 
formation, it is only those people who are white, male and capitalists 
in their own right who may be seen to be in a position to exercise power 
over all other groups, and thus it is they alone who must be seen as 
constituting the real ruling group. For example, the position of a 
bourgeois wife is ultimately precarious: 
"She herself does not own the means of production. Therefore her 
standard of living does not depend on her class relationship to the 
pro1etatiatj but on her serf relations of production with her 
husband" (Delphy 1984 pp.70-71). 
Nevertheless, because the ruling group obscures itself behind this 
multiple definition, it is able to form useful alliances with specific 
group fractions (to modify Gramsci's term) who, while being ultimately 
subordinated to the ruling group, are able to excercise power over other 
groups. Black or female entrepreneurs form such group fractions, as 
does the white, male working class. 
Under the conj unction of capitalism, imperialism and patriarchy, much 
social organisation is dictated by the principles of "hierarchical 
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ordering, with its imagery of winning and losing and the potential for 
violence which it contains" (Gilligan. 1982 p.32). The ideology of 
'healthy competition' is the underlying legitimation for the exercise of 
'power over' by the ruling group and its allied fractions: 
"At the core of the conception of 'man' ..• in Western thought is a 
conception of will .•. Since the essence of each individual is his 
power to control conflict results as each individual seeks to 
control others. The resulting struggle is called competition, and 
competition is glorified as a desirable aspect of life" (Hodge et al 
1975 pp.22,26)' 
In turn, this supposedly natural conflict between individuals is seen as 
requiring proper regulation, and it is this that comes to be seen as 
sufficient explanation of why "every Western SOCiety consists primarily 
of institutional hierarchies" (ibid. p.32>. Such hierarchies situate 
white men in a 'pecking order' in relation to those to whose power they 
must defer and those whom they, in turn, have power over, thereby 
determining the organisation of men's personal and social identity. 
While feudal concepts of status according to birthright (aristocracy> 
have been replaced by the capitalist ideology of "free competition" 
(meritocracy>, the fundamental principles of hierarchical ranking 
remain, ones which separate men out as individuals and set them apart 
from any real closeness with other men. By contrast, black men have 
been, for the most part, situated outside and beneath this ranking, 
collectively subjected to the power of white men: 
"How can it be argued that black male dominance exists in the 
same forms as white male dominance? Systems of slavery, 
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colonialism. imperialism. have systematically denied position in the 
white male hierarchy to black men and have used specific forms of 
terror to oppress them" (Carby 1982 p.215). 
Gilligan has noted how women will tend to develop their identity quite 
differently from white men in terms of the "web of relationships" to 
which they belong. an identity which may make it easier for them to 
organise informally in terms of 'power together'. at least at the scale 
of close relationships. Reflecting on her own experience. Bell Hooks 
encountered the same spirit of relatedness among the black community as 
a whole within which she was brought up: 
"Discarding the notion that the self exists in opposition to the 
other ... we learned that the self existed in relation. was 
dependent for its being on the lives and experiences of everyone" 
<1989 pp. 31-2). 
However, within the dominant discourses of an imperialist patriarchal 
social formation, black people and women are denied access to positions 
from which to articulate and build on their experience of connectedness. 
They are instead invited to think and speak about themselves in 
distorted terms. ones that situate them only in relation to white men 
and not to each other. This can set them up in competition with one 
another (for example, in terms of their relative physical attractiveness 
- their beauty or the whiteness of their skin>. Gilligan conceptualises 
this in terms of a power struggle between two radically different modes 
of social organisation. that based on "hierarchy" as against that based 
on a "web" of relatedness and mutual connection: 
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"The reason women's experience has been so difficult to decipher or 
even discern is that .•• the images of hierarchy and web ... convey 
different ways of structuring relationships ... Each distorts the 
other's representation. As the top of the hierarchy becomes the 
edge of the web and as the centre of a network of connection becomes 
the middle of a hierarchical progression, each image marks as 
dangerous the place which the other defines as safe. Thus the 
images of hierarchy and web inform different modes of assertion and 
response: the wish to be alone at the top and the consequent fear 
that others will get too closej the wish to be at the centre of 
connection and the consequent fear of being too far out on the edge. 
These ... give rise to different portrayals of achievement and 
affiliation, leading to different modes of action" (1982 p.62). 
From the perspective of imperialist oppression, the construction and 
differentiation of social groupings may be seen to have resulted from 
two principal <and often intersecting> processes: those of colonialism 
and those of racism. Under colonialism, a previously separate nation 
<which could be ethnically heterogeneous) would be placed under the 
political and economic hegemony of the imperial power, as a 'going 
concern' to be exploited as a unit in itself. By contrast, racism is s 
set of ideological and material practices by which a ruling group exerts 
domination, within the internal organisation of a social formation, by 
choosing to define itself, and its pattern of inheritance, in terms of 
its ethnic lineage. On the basis of this distinction, all people of 
this particular ethnic origin, irrespective of class pOSition, become 
members of a dominant group, while those of different ethnic origins 
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become subordinated as 'other'. Such distictions are in no way 
'natural', but arise at specific moments in history. For example, as 
Miles demonstrates, "The idea of 'race' emerged in the English language 
in the early sixteenth century and was used initially to explicate 
European history" (1989 p.31). 
Within the Xarxian tradition it is Gramsci and Althusser who have 
contributed most to the understanding of the complex organisation of the 
class structure within the capitalist social formation. Despite the 
international scale of exploitation under advanced capitalism, Gramsci 
identified each nation state as a unit that needed to be comprehended as 
an entity in its own right: 
"The internal relations of any nation are the result of a 
combination that is 'original' and (in a certain sense) unique; 
these relations must be understood and conceived in their 
originality and uniqueness ... " (1971 p.239). 
He saw the nation state as comprising a ruling class who were able to 
maintain overall control through a changing series of alliances with 
different class fractions who, in return for their support, were placed 
in positions of power over other groups, at least on a temporary basis. 
However, sometimes the interests of these various fractions and groups 
would be in opposition to those of the ruling class, and the ruling 
class would have to accommodate to them to some extent in order for 
their overall position of 'power over' to remain unchallenged. 
By exploiting such contradictions within the organisation of the nation 
state, there could be significant scope for oppressed groups to organise 
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and achieve some 'power together', even if this fell short of a 
revolutionary take-over. He termed this complex and changing picture of 
oppressive alliances and empowering counter-alliances a "war of 
position", a struggle that was waged particularly in relation to gaining 
control over the various political institutions of the State: 
"The State is seen as the organ of one particular group, destined to 
create conditions for the latter's maximum expansion. But ... the 
dominant group is co-ordinated concretely with the general interests 
of the subordinate groups, and the life of the State is conceived of 
as a continuous process of formation and superseding of unstable 
equilibria ... between the interests of the fundamental group and 
those of subordinate groups - equilibria in which the interests of 
the dominant group prevail, but only up to a certain pOint" (ibid. 
p.182) • 
He also identified similar (and equally crucial) power struggles taking 
place in relation to the various institutions of "civil society", those 
that are outside direct State control, such as the Church, professional 
organisations, the media and the arts. 
Althusser also differentiated between those institutions through which 
the ruling class could repress other groups directly via their political 
control of the State, and those "civil" institutions through which they 
could exert indirect domination, albeit in negotiation with the 
interests of certain subordinate class fractions (for example, 
professional groups). He termed the former category "Repressive State 
Apparatuses· (RSAs) and the latter "Ideological State Apparatuses· 
(ISAs). Both categories of institutions are characterised by internal 
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relations of 'power over' exercised by a controlling group over 
employees, consumers, pupils, prisoners or others placed under their 
influence. However, as Althusser argues, the latter category can also 
provide sites for organised resistance ('power together'): 
"The Ideological State Apparatuses may not only be the stake, but 
also the site of class struggle ••. The class (or class alliance) in 
power cannot lay down the law in ISAs as easily as it can in the 
(repressive) State apparatus because the resistance of the 
exploited classes is able to find means and occasions to express 
itself there, either by the uti1isations of their contradictions, or 
by conquering combat positions in them in struggle" (1971 p.147). 
Ferraro has identified how such institutions are also organised in a way 
that is crucial to patriarchal domination: it is men who typically 
comprise the controlling group within such institutions, although other 
men, as well as women, may be subordinated within them: 
"A basic premise of patriarchy is that males are uniquely qualified 
to conduct the business of civil society and to maintain order 
within the private realm. Patriarchal law, religion, philosophy and 
morality stress the superiority of males and their consequent 
responsibility and right to control society and the women and 
children in their own families ... [However], under capitalist 
patriarchy, the opportunities to dominate are not equally 
distributed among men of different clases and races" (1988 p.127). 
What emerges from this development of the Marxian tradition is an 
understanding of how relations of 'power over' and of 'power together' 
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come to shape the construction of two fundamentally different modes of 
social organisation. This parallels the analysis of patriarchy as a 
struggle between organisation based on masculine concepts of "hierarchy" 
and "autonomy", as against that based on feminine concepts of "web" and 
"relatedness". On the one hand, we have institutions (that mayor may 
not be part of the political apparatus of the State) comprising people 
in positions of structural power over one another, through which 
dominant groups seek to maintain and enhance their power over 
subordinated groups. On the other, we have peer organisations who may 
work together to empower their members by increasing the opportunities 
available to them (and reduce the degree to which dominant groups may 
exercise power over them). Examples of these include trade unions, 
women's groups and black cultural organistions. Feminist theory and 
practice has concentrated on opportunities for achieving 'power 
together' at the scale of personal relationships and within the family 
itself. The political success of the women's movement in achieving 
structural changes at the scale of the social formation demonstrates 
that changes occurring at small scales of organisation can have an 
impact on the major apparatuses of state and civil SOCiety. 
In the light of this, any social organisation may be understood in 
relation to the way in which it reflects a particular moment in a 
struggle, either in the internal power inequalities of an institution, 
or in relation to processes of mutual support and empowerment within a 
group that is beginning to organise separately in order to contest its 
oppression. Some organisations {including, as we shall see later, the 
family> may emerge being defined by both sorts of power relations. 
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In this chapter, I will look at the various perspectives that begin to 
penetrate benea~h the image of the free autonomous 'individual' that is 
central to the bourgeois understanding of the person. In doing so we 
begin to see both the range of conflicting elements that co-exist within 
a 'personality' and the processes by which some appearance of unity and 
coherence is maintained. In this way, we can move beyond the bourgeois 
dualism of subject and object in our understanding of human relations, 
and hence refine our definitions of power relations. As we shall see in 
Chapter 7, these perspectives will prove particularly useful in 
developing a critical understanding of 'the family' as a unit. 
The Concept of Subjectivity 
Discourse theory has studied the operation of language itself as a basis 
for a critical theory of ideology. Broadly speaking, it has inverted 
the bourgeois understanding of the relationship between speaker and 
language: instead of a speaker being seen as free to think and express 
her/himself in language however s/he wishes, the available structure of 
language is seen as determining what can and cannot be thought or spoken 
- in short, locating the subject position(s) that may be taken by the 
speaker. A discourse may comprise, not just the operation of language 
itself, but any sets of practices that signify certain meanings, and any 
structures of beliefs, 'knowledges' and 'common-sense' that dictate what 
can be said (or done) and by whom, within specific contexts of social 
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interaction. More detailed analyses, such as those undertaken by 
Foucault, have shown how discourses set up, not a single, unified 
subject position, but a range of alternative and possibly conflicting 
positions, and that a single individual may be called to occupy more 
than one of these at different times. Furthermore, a person may have to 
participate in a variety of (conflicting) discourses <e.g. those at home 
as against those at work). Nevertheless, despite such determination by 
a range of already existing discursive structures, the speaker still 
lives the illusion that slhe is fully in control of what slhe is saying: 
"Language, in the form of an historically specific range of ways of 
giving meaning to social reality offers us various discursive 
positions ... through which we can live our lives ••. In taking on a 
subject position, the individual assumes that she is the author of 
the ideology or discourse which she is speaking. She speaks or 
thinks it as if she were in control of meaning. She 'imagines' that 
she is indeed the type of subject that humanism proposes - rational, 
unified, the source rather than the effect of language" (Weedon 1987 
pp. 25-6,31). 
By constructing an analysis in this way, discourse theory has been able 
to penetrate beneath the myth of the free, autonomous and self-directing 
individual, a concept of the 'subject' that lies at the heart of Western 
bourgeoiS thought and ideological practice. This concept is enshrined 
in Descartes' dictum "I think, therefore I amll and situates lithe 
individual ••. with regard to law, to contractual obligations and to 
property" (Henriques et al 1984 p.133). Such a concept of the subject, 
generated as it was in specific historical discourses, has become 
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hegemonic and incorporated into 'common sense'. However, this subject 
is specifically male, Western and belonging to the bourgeois class: 
"The 'normal' subject is regarded as unproblematic, that is, it is 
what can be taken for granted and, indeed, can be construed as the 
model that fixes the norms. Ideally, the model is the male European 
rational individual: both homo rationalis and homo economicus .•. 
The poor, the 'criminal', the mad, the non-European and women are, 
almost by definition, abnormal, deviant- <Venn 1984 p.130). 
In reality, the term 'subject' has a dialectical meaning. As in the 
statement "I am a British subject-, being a subject implies that one is 
constructed within a specific ideological framework <e.g. the legal and 
customary definitions of citizenship), while, at the same time, 
appearing to act freely and accepting full responsibility for one's 
actions. When this 'normal' subject is deconstructed, what emerges is a 
picture of struggle and conflict being acted out at the scale of the 
person, a conflict that is dictated by the context into which the person 
has been inserted. 'The person' may thus be seen as the site of a 
dialectical interplay between external determination and internal 
desire, and between personal history and present circumstances. 
Discourse theory provides a theoretical bridge that can at last 
transcend the analytical separation of the world of subjective 
experience from that of objective things-in-themselves, of the 
'individual' from 'society'. It is a theory that seeks to understand 
the organisation of the person, as well as that of the social formation, 
in terms of power relations. It comprises a synthesis of elements drawn 
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from Marxism, structural linguistics and psychoanalysis. It starts with 
a critique of Marx that suggests that he underestimated the relative 
importance and separateness of power relations at the level of ideology 
with respect to those of the economic base. The focus shifts to how 
language itself is constructed and used to maintain and enhance the 
power of the ruling group over subordinated groups. From structural 
linguistics came the insight that language is not simply a neutral 
medium that reflects and takes its meaning from reality, but is a code 
in which meanings are constructed in relation to an established set of 
already existing meanings and associations (see de Saussure, 1974>, 
Thus, the 'establishment' is in a position to fix the pOints of 
reference of the current language (and other discursive structures> and 
thereby to dictate that certain things can be spoken and others not, and 
to impose particular slants and meanings on to perceived reality. 
However, just as Marx could be criticised for his narrow "economism", 
discourse theory has, in turn, tended to over-emphasise transactions at 
the level of ideology in relation to other levels of the social 
formation. At its most extreme it has produced the position that the 
relations of the material world have no existence except in as much as 
they are represented in language (see, for example, Hindess and H1rst, 
1975). Meanings are seen as only having meaning in relation to, and 
difference from, other meanings. Such a position harks back to the one-
sided abstraction of the humanist conception of "pure thought" and runs 
counter to the current formulation which gives equal weight to material, 
ideological and emotional relations. 
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Any discourse may be the site of a political struggle. Discourses 
construct certain ways of seeing as right and others as wrong, vest 
authority in the hands of 'experts' and force certain groups to take on 
subject positions of subordination if they are to participate at all in 
social interaction. However, oppressed groups may struggle to 'reverse' 
the terms of the established discourse, and restructure the nature of 
their subject positions. Foucault studied the medical, legal and 
literary discourses that took place in the nineteenth century concerning 
homosexuality. While, on the one hand, gay people were repressed by 
being placed into various categories of "perversity", this "also made 
possible the formation of a 'reverse' discourse: homosexuality began to 
speak on its own behalf, to demand that its legitimacy or 'naturality' 
be acknowledged, often in the same vocabulary, using the same categories 
by which it was medically disqualified" (1981 p.l0l). 
Just as each discourse is a site of struggle, so is each subject 
position. At its most basic, it is the struggle between what is 
expected of a speaker in that position and what of her/himself the 
speaker seeks to insert into it. In the example above, gay people were 
inserted into precise and named subject positions with the strong 
expectation that they take on subordinate status. However, to a greater 
or lesser degree, they were able to use these positions to express their 
desire publically in ways that had not been possible before. 
Nevertheless, the fact that they were still struggling, using the 
subject positions made available to them by the professional 'experts', 
precluded them from expressing themselves entirely in their own terms. 
What is emerging ls a picture of the 'individual', not as a consistent 
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unity, but as the ensemble of subject positions to which the person has 
access, each one of which is a site of struggle and may be in 
contradiction to other subject positions. 
Althusser showed that, within capitalist discourse, a person is only 
recognised as if slhe were the free agent and autonomous subject of 
bourgeois thought. S/he is hailed from (or "interpellated" in) this 
position as 'subject', and it is from this position that s/he must 
transact if slhe is to be heard at all within everyday discourses. All 
our apparent self-awareness and initiative can only take place within 
the subject positions that are made available to us in ideology: 
"All ideology has the function (which defines it) of 'constituting' 
concrete individuals as subjects. .. The individual is interpellated 
as a (free) subject in order that he shall (freely) accept his 
subjection, i.e. in order that he shall make the gestures and 
actions of his subjection 'all by himself'" (1971 pp.171,182). 
Under the economic relations of capitalism, people are invited to 
construct themselves as if they were free agents who choose to sell 
their labour power to the capitalists: "the (imaginary) relationship of 
individuals to the relations of production" (ibid. p.165). 
Althusser makes the complex but fundamental point about the 'dual' 
character of ideology: it is simultaneously both imaginary and real. It 
is imaginary in the sense that it distorts and misrepresents the real 
relationship of individuals to the material relations of their 
existence. Workers, who have no control over the means of production, 
are in reality forced to accept a job on the terms that they will be 
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paid a wage based on their subsistence needs, rather than one that 
reflects the true value of the work done <and hence provide profit for 
the capitalist). However, in ideology, this is constructed as an 
exchange between individuals of 'a fair day's work for a fair day's 
pay'. This ideological relationship becomes real in the sense that it 
is lived as if it were real by the participants. When going after work, 
workers are situated, and must actively situate themselves, as free 
subjects who actually want to work, and who can therefore be held 
individually responsible for the quality and execution of that work. 
Ideology thus becomes enshrined in real customs, institutions and 
practices. 
The process whereby these conflicting elements are held together is the 
fundamental core of any ideological framework. Under capitalist 
ideology, there is an imperative on people to cover over their 
experience of internal contradiction, and instead to construct 
themselves at all times with an appearance of unity, conSistency and 
responsibility. It is this that gives them their necessary coherence to 
be ·understood" and to be able to participate within social interaction: 
"The subject in ideology has a consistency which rests on an 
imaginary identification of self: this is simultaneously a 
recognition <since it provides subject-ivity, enables the subject to 
act), and a misrecognition (a recognition in relation to 
ideology). The consistent subject is the place to which the 
. 
representations of ideology are directed: Duty, Morality, and Law 
all depend on this category of subject for their functioning, and 
all contribute as institutions to its production. The individual 
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thus lives his subject-ion to social structures as a consistent 
subject-ivity ..• The individual produces himself in this imaginary 
wholeness, this imaginary reflection of himself as the author of his 
actions" (Coward and Ellis 1977 p.76). 
Although the terminology used by various workers in this field can be 
confusing, I shall use the term "subjectivity" to denote the 
organisation of an individual's whole personality: the complete ensemble 
of their (often conflicting> subject positions, the collective 
organisation of the various "sites" and "statuses" available to them in 
interacting with others that must be lived as if they constituted a 
single unitary subject. The specific modes of repression within the 
organisation of personal subjectivity - the systematic exclusion of a 
person from certain subject positions due to their gender, sexual 
orientation, race or class - may be seen to reflect the oppressive 
organisation of the social formation into which the person is 
interpellated. Nevertheless, as Weedon argues, the construction of 
subjectivity is also a site for political struggle: 
"The political significance of decentring the subject and abandoning 
the belief in essential subjectivity is that it opens up 
subjectivity to change ... Social relations, which are always 
relations of power and powerlessness between different subject 
positions, will determine the range of forms open to any individual 
on the basis of gender, race, class, age and cultural background. 
Where other positions exist but are exclusive to a particular class, 
race or gender, the excluded individual will have to fight for 
access by transforming existing power relations" (1987 pp.33,95). 
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Within discourse theory, subjectivity is only conceptualised in relation 
to transacting within ideology. In line with the framework outlined 
earlier, I will broaden this out to embrace transactions at the levels 
of both material and emotional relations. Within the capitalist labour 
process, a worker must construct her/himself as an autonomous, 
consistent subject who can (freely> sell her/his labour power and be 
held responsible for the quality of the work done. Under patriarchy, 
the expression of raw and conflicting emotions is seen as a sign of 
weakness, "hysteria- or even madness. Instead, men and women must 
construct themselves as consistent subjects who display certain emotions 
and not others: men must typically appear aggressive, strong or 
impassive, while women must appear open, caring and empathic. 
It is instructive to see how a person's sense of self may be determined 
by the modes of transaction into which s/he is customarily inserted. 
Those situated in positions of domination over others (for example, 
ruling class men) must organise their subjectivity in a way that is 
fundamentally paranoid - as a self-in-isolation (a construction that 
most closely resembles the illusory bourgeois subject>. They are in the 
privileged position of being able to define their own subjectivity, but 
only as long as they are able to exert rigid control, both, externally, 
over the subjectivities of their subordinates, and, internally, over the 
more vulnerable aspects of their own desires. Those frequently situated 
in positions of subordination have little opportunity to have any sense 
of being in control of their subjectivity at all - its parameters are 
largely constructed for them by powerful others within transactions to 
which they have little choice but to submit. For them, any sense of 
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self may largely be replaced by a sense of duty and necessity, rather 
than anything approaching a bourgeois sense of 'individuality'. 
However, if such people are also situated within some significant 
transactions of mutuality, recognition or closeness, then they may 
experience some sense of themselves, not as a self-in-isolation, but as 
a self-in-relation to others - a sense of self that is particularly 
typical for women and black people (see Hooks 1989; Surrey 1985). 
The construction of personal subjectivity may be seen inevitably to 
involve a process of negotiation (and hence some degree of distortion), 
Certain thoughts, feelings or potential actions must be repressed 
entirely (even from the person's own conscious awareness) if s/he is to 
remain coherent and participate within the current social formation. 
These are not permitted to emerge at all above a person's 'transactional 
horizon'. The other thoughts, feelings and actions which are allowed to 
emerge, do so only in a form that is mediated (to some degree) by the 
dictates of the specific contexts and subject positions into which the 
person is inserted and inserts her/himself. It is in relation to 
analysing these processes of repression and displacement that discourse 
theory turns to various traditions within psychoanalysis, particularly 
the work of Jacques Lacan. From these frameworks for understanding 
psychic development there emerges a picture of how an infant may be 
inserted into an already existing array of subject positions, resulting 
in a significant determination of its desire. Rather than seeing this 
as an 'essential' desire becoming distorted by the dictates of 
'civilisation', we may conceptualise this as the infant continually 
negotiating its desire within a context of social power relations. 
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Integration of psychoanalytic perspective. 
Despite working firmly within a bourgeois tradition that took as 
'natural' the historically specific social relations of his time, Freud 
was the first person to theorise the inherently split nature of the 
'individual'. As Althusser argues, this insight contains the potential 
for a breakthrough in dismantling the illusory consistency of the 
subject in bourgeois ideology, exposing underlying structures of 
conflict and misrecognition: 
"Freud has discovered for us that the real subject, the individual 
in his unique essence, has not the form of an ego, centred on ... 
'consciousness' ... [but] that the human subject is de-centred, 
constituted by a structure that has no 'centre' either, except ... 
in the ideological formations in which it recognises itself" (1971 
pp. 218-9). 
Arising out of Freud's work, various psychoanalytic traditions have 
sought to theorise such processes of internal conflict and splitting in 
different ways. Each of these approaches may be of potential value in 
understanding how personal subjectivity is constructed within a specific 
social formation, a process which may be seen to take place primarily 
within the institution of the family. Jacques Lacan (1977) has focused 
on the process whereby the infant has to submit to the power of the 
father by repressing significant elements of its desiring, thereby 
splitting its psyche into the separate organisations of 'conscious' and 
'unconscious' - a process of repression that is closely linked to the 
infant's entry into the structure of language. Transactional Analysis 
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has developed further Freud's conceptualisation of the psyche as 
comprising autonomous and potentially conflicting functional 
organisations: the id (the ensemble of instinctual impulses), the ego 
{the location of rationality and decision making> and the super-ego (the 
introjection of parental and societal authority). Finally, the object-
relations theorists, such as Xelanie Klein (1955), Ronald Fairbairn 
(1952) and D. W. Winnicott (1965), have concentrated on the way in which 
an infant conceptualises and enters into relationships with significant 
others, tending to split off painful feelings. and ultimately to 
construct the other as two separate "objects", one "good", the other 
"bad". Although all of these approaches are firmly rooted within the 
tradition of bourgeois humanism. they nevertheless each cast doubt on 
the unitary character of the bourgeois subject. 
The women's therapy movement has sought to rewrite the psychoanalytic 
account of infant development from the point of view of women's 
experience. This has involved attempts to contextualise some of the 
universal and naturalist assumptions of conventional psychoanalysis, in 
particular with regard to the construction of female and male 
identities. Such a reworking of psychoanalysis could provide a basis 
for a critical theory of emotional relations, one that places at the 
centre of analysiS the class, race and gender specificity of particular 
constructions of emotionality. Whereas the original Freudian 
problematic was dualistic (opposing intrinsic 'biological' drive against 
'civilised' values), this opens up the possibility of a dialectical 
analysis that exposes the operation of 'power over' and 'power together' 
in the construction of emotional relationships. In this way, we could 
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move beyond the inherent conservatism of conventional psychoanalysis -
repression as unfortunate but necessary for "civilisation" - to examine 
the specific supressions and distortions of emotionality that are 
imposed by participation in a particular social formation. In turn, 
this raises the possibility of individual and collective struggle to 
achieve a less oppressive organisation of personal subjectivity. 
Lacan, following Freud, starts with some notion of raw emotionality as 
the internal source of 'energy' in transacting with the external world. 
Whereas Freud postulated a sexual or erotic instinctual drive, Lacan 
situates emotionality within the sphere of social relations. He uses 
the wider term "desire" to connote a wish to connect to and be 
recognised by the "Other" (in the first instance, the primary caregiver, 
who will tend, in a Western patriarchal social formation, to be the 
mother). He suggests that an infant gradually becomes aware, during the 
period 6 to 18 months, that its sense of what it wants does not always 
correspond to what is provided by the Other. However, prior to the 
infant's entry into discourse (when it first uses language), it cannot 
conceptualise the difference between self and other, and hence cannot 
distinguish its own desire for the Other from its wish to be desired by 
the Other, to be the (sole) object of the Other's desire (see Turkle, 
1979). Thus, whenever it finds itself ill-treated, or even that the 
Other is momentarily too busy to attend to it, it experiences a 
catastrophic denial of its desire, a loss which it cannot yet 
conceptualise. Its sense of wholeness and connectedness to the Other is 
profoundly shattered. 
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Object-relations theory proposes an internal mechanism by which the pre-
verbal infant deals with its experience of relative powerlessness - its 
inability to make the Other respond to its desire and its neediness at 
all times (an Other that it cannot yet conceptualise as a separate 
being). Powerless to prevent this 'rejection', it can nevertheless 
reassert some control over its experience by restructuring it within a 
pre-verbal fantasy world. In this it splits its desire into two 
separate ensembles of feelings, one directed towards an imaginary 
representation of that part of the Other that does respond to its needs 
and seems to be under its control (the "good" mother-object) and the 
second directed towards that part which it experiences as rejecting or 
denying (the "bad" mother-object): 
"The embryonic psyche ... transfers the difficult situation to the 
world of inner reality, where it can exercise more control ... The 
unsatisfying experiences that occur in relation to mother then find 
their expressions of her in the infants inner world. Kother becomes 
a disappointing person who has to be split in two: the known and 
longed-for giving mother and the known and deeply disappointing 
mother" (Eichenbaum and Orbach 1985 p.18). 
Unable, as yet, to conceptualise the Other as a subject in her (his) own 
right, the infant invests "good" feelings in relation to one imaginary 
Other-object and "bad" feelings in relation to a second other-object. 
Thus, before the infant is able to conceptualise its 'self' in any way, 
a real split may be seen to be emerging in how it organises its 
experience at an emotional level. 
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Where Eichenbaum and Orbach differ from the conventional account of 
object-relations is in their understanding of the socially constructed 
nature of the Xother-object that is internalised: 
"We acknowledge that mother is not an object, mother 1s a person, a 
social and psychological being. From this perspective, what becomes 
internalised is •.• the different aspects of mother. What the 
object relations theorists have failed to take into account is the 
psychology of the mother and the effect of the social position of 
women on the mother's psychology" (ibid. p.34). 
If we accept the object-relations account, we can see how, within a 
social formation that constructs women as the primary caregiver, 
children of both sexes will, in turn, be constructed with a tendency to 
represent women as objects that are either idealised caregivers or are 
rejecting, evil and dangerous. The implications of this, in terms of 
the gendering of personal subjectivity, will be discussed later on. 
For Lacan, the crucial process of splitting takes place a little later, 
at the point at which the infant begins to think and talk, using the 
structures of language and discourse within which it finds itself. 
Sharing Freud's bourgeoiS pessimism, Lacan sees the shattering of the 
illusion of connectedness as an inevitable part of the infant's 
development, irrespective of the culture and ideology within which the 
child is growing up. However, if a more critical perspective is 
employed, this all-or-nothing position may be deconstructed. In this 
way, the degree to which <and the way in which) it is shattered may be 
seen to depend on the specific responses that the infant receives from 
the Other (or others): the degree to which they are receptive to its 
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desiring and are able to communicate their desire to the infant, or, on 
the contrary, the degree to which they use their position of relative 
power to abuse or distort the infant's desire. This, in turn, may be 
seen to depend on the specific constructions of mothering, fathering, 
and other aspects of family organisation within a particular social 
formation, and on the specific life experiences of the people who come 
to occupy these positions. For example, it would seem that the more the 
infant has to rely on a single Other (typically the mother under 
patriarchal capitalism), the more vulnerable it is to a sense of 
catastrophic rejection, being dependent on the specific responses of 
just one person. Similarly, people's experience of past and present 
oppression will influence whether or not they may be too harrassed to 
have time for the infant, whether they are too depressed to be able to 
respond to its feelings, or whether they use their position of relative 
power to abuse the infant (perhaps having been abused themselves). 
In considering the extent to which an infant's desire is systematically 
abused within the current social formation, it is useful to refer to the 
work of Alice Killer. Also working from a psychoanalytic perspective, 
she argues that Freud (and, by implication, Lacan) have suppressed what 
their patients were trying to tell them about the specific ways in 
which, as infants, they were abused by their parents. By postulating 
"infantile sexual! ty" or "desire" as drives whose satisfaction is, by 
definition, impossible or inappropriate, responsibility for the 
subsequent repression or distortion of desire is thereby located with 
the infant her/himself, a "way of thinking that overlooks the actual 
imbalance of power" (1985 p.124). She suggests that child-rearing 
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practices actively maintain a ruthless and unnecessary oppression of the 
infant's desire (conventionally seen as "wilfulness"), by means of 
varying degrees of sexual, physical and emotional abuse, and that this 
is accompanied by a refusal even to allow expression of the immense 
anger that this generates in the infant: 
"The former practice of physically maiming, exploiting and abusing 
children seems to have been gradually replaced by a form of mental 
cruelty that is masked by the honourific term child-rearing. Since 
training in many cultures begins in infancy during the initial 
symbiotiC relationship between mother and child, this early 
conditioning makes it virtually impossible for the child to discover 
what is actually happening to him ..• The greatest cruelty that can 
be inflicted on children is to refuse to let them express their 
anger and suffering except at the risk of losing their parents' love 
and affection" (1983 pp.4,106). 
Central to Lacan's schema is the process whereby the infant is driven to 
construct itself as a subject in discourse, able to think and 
communicate using symbolic languages (and hence becoming a direct 
partici pant in ideology). He argues that it is in order to be able to 
name, and hence perhaps to deal with its "lack" of connection, that the 
infant is impelled to enter into the symbolic world of discourse, the 
domain of power in which it perceives the desire of the Other to be 
expressed and controlled. As part of the same relation that allows 
infant to signify and comprehend experience, the infant itself is 
constituted as a subject by the discourse (and thereby takes on a 
posi tion in relation to an already existing ideological framework). 
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Once it enters into this system, it is able to call upon already 
existing significations of itself and others. Speaking as 'I', the 
infant moves into a subject position that was already prepared for it 
even before it was born, one that is situated not only in relation to a 
supposedly universal "Symbolic Order", but also in relation to specific 
(familial) discourses: 
"Symbols in fact envelop the life of man in a network so total that 
they join together, before he comes into the world, those who are 
going to engender him 'by flesh and blood'; so total that they bring 
to his birth ... the shape of his destiny; so total that they give 
the words that will make him faithful or renegade... [The infant 
enters into) a discourse in ... which his place is already inscribed 
at birth, if only by virtue of his proper name" (1977 pp.68,148). 
From a more critical perspective, we may suggest that the infant, in 
accepting its name as its opportunity to think and speak within the 
domain of ideology, also takes on a specific set of attributions to do 
with its gender, race, class position, and many other matters. In 
relation to gender, it may be observed that: 
"As babies move towards their psychological birth as separate 
persons, they learn that people fall into two categories: female amd 
male ... At 18 months they can recognise themselves as either male 
or female" (Eichenbaum and Orbach 1985 p.22) 
Similarly, as the research of Semaj (1980) has shown, a black child can 
display an understanding of its racial position from the age of 2~ 
onwards. 
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Eichenbaum and Orbach suggest that it is the structural difference in 
the positions of 'mother' and 'father' within the present patriarchal 
family structure that construct the emotional meaning of 'male' and 
'female' for the girl or boy, in particular the man's status as a remote 
and powerful outsider: 
"During the first two years of life •.. father is strikingly 
absent ..• When father enters ••. he represents and is in his 
presence someone from outside .•. For the baby boy, father is 
'other' than mother and like him. The boy identifies with father 
and uses him to separate himself further from mother ... For the 
little girl, father is 'other'" (1985 pp.l0,21). 
It is by imitating the separation and autonomy of his father's position, 
that the boy can hope, in turn, to take on a position of power over 
women's desire (a sense of power that he may already have experienced in 
the special way that his mother may have treated him as 'other'). For 
the girl, there is no such access to pOSitions of patriarchal power for 
herself. Her power can only come vicariously through her being 
perceived as attractive by the source of this power - her father. 
According to Lacan, the fundamental symbol which the infant requires, in 
order to make sense of its situation, is one that describes the 
authority that is seen to control the desire of the mother; the power 
that makes her (at times) unavailable to the infant: 
"The child does not find himself of herself alone in front of the 
mother ... The Phallus forbids the child the satisfaction of his or 
her own desire, which is the desire to be the exclusive desire of 
the mother" <1957 p.14). 
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Although Lacan sees this symbol as relating to a universal societal 
authority, the fact that he calls it "The lame of the Father" or "The 
Phallus", provides us with a signification that may be seen to denote a 
domination of the desire of both the mother and the infant that is 
specifically patriarchal. As Hirst and Woolley point out, due to its 
widespread legitimation and its unconscious internalisation by women, 
this is "a symbol exceeding the 'real' father, who may be a weakling, 
absent or dead" (1985 p.10). Feminist readings of Lacan suggest that 
this symbol of patriarchal authority is so generally available within 
ideology that it presents itself as a "signifier for the absence of the 
mother irrespective of the actual existence or intrusion of an actual 
man/father" nu tchell and Rose 1982 p. 39). 
Lacan's perspective focuses on what the infant has to lose as it takes 
its place in the world of discourse. In order to fit in to its pre-
existing slot, the infant has to repress some (or, in Lacan's account, 
all) of its own desiring. It is this desire that cannot be articulated 
that comes to form the person's unconscious. Thus, by the same process 
by which the child constructs her/himself as a (unified) subject in 
discourse, s/he also splits her/his subjectivity at the level of 
emotionality: "it is the subject who introduces division into the 
individual" (Lacan 1977 p.80). The child comes to organise her/himself 
in relation to a desire that is not so much an expression of her/his own 
feelings and needs, as a reflection of patriarchal 'power over'. If, 
following Henriques et aI, we "replace Lacan's emphasis on a universal 
and timeless symbolic order with an emphasis on discursive relations, 
viewed in their historical specif1city", we may arrive at a more complex 
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picture in which we can see how~ for women and men~ black people and 
white people, working class and ruling class people~ specific elements 
of their desire may be repressed or distorted by their participation in 
this social formation~ as "particular discourses set parameters through 
which desire is produced~ regulated and channelled" (1984 pp.217,220). 
Althusser, in his reading of Lacan~ stresses the importance of the 
construction of subjectivity within historically specific forms of 
familial ideology, ones that are crucially determined by the capitalist 
mode of production. He uses the term "imaginary" to connote, not 
Lacan's idealisation of wholeness and connectedness between the desire 
of mother and child, but the reverse of this: its distortion into the 
illusory separation and individuality that is imposed on the infant as 
soon as slhe becomes a subject in capitalist discourse, expected to be 
consistent and held to be responSible for herlhis own thoughts and 
actions. According to Althusser, it is at this paint, the infant's 
point of entry into the already existing familial ideology, that it is 
led to misrecognise itself in the apparent unity of "the sexual subject 
(boy or girl) which it already is in advance" (1971 p.176). Thus 
instead of the "imaginary" being an image of paradise lost, it becomes a 
political issue of the "necessarily imaginary distortion" of an infant's 
subjectivity so that slhe may be constructed as a potential economic 
subject of capitalist production, freely willing to sell herlhis labour 
power as a separate individual. 
While a Lacanian perspective offers an understanding of the socially 
constructed nature of the symbol of 'father
' 
or lmanl that a child 
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internalises, it is the object-relations perspective that enables us to 
deconstruct the internalisations of 'mother' or 'woman'. As long as a 
woman is constructed within patriarchal social relations as the primary 
caregiver, children will enter the world of discourse with a split and 
ambivalent set of feelings towards what is represented by 'mother' - and 
hence what is represented by 'female' - that are derived from their pre-
verbal splitting of feelings on to "good" and "bad" objects (see 
Dinnerstein 1976). Within patriarchal discourse, symbols for such a 
split objectification of women are readily available - for example, 
'good fairy'/'witch' or 'madonna'/'whore' (see Welldon 1988). Thus, for 
girls and bOYS, the significations that are available to them about 
their gender - and what they will grow up to be - relate to such 
fundamental significations as 'The Phallus', or 'The Good Fairy'. 
Let us look first at the construction of male subjectivity under Western 
bourgeois patriarchy. A boy will typically have experience of being 
oppressed by his actual father (or male power in general). He is also 
debarred from sharing his intimate feelings about this - whether they be 
those of vulnerability or of anger - with his father or other men. 
Instead, as Baker Killer argues, he is expected to adopt patterned forms 
of 'phallic' aggression and competition in order to "be like a man": 
"The young boy, following the pattern of the larger SOCiety, is not 
permitted to express his anger directly and immediately, especially 
to the father ... At the same time, however, the boy is stimulated 
and encouraged to be 'aggressive' - that is to act aggressively. 
Boys are made to fear not being aggressive, lest they be found 
wanting, be beaten by another, or (worst of all) be like a girl. 
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All of these constitute ... a core part of what is ~de to be men's 
sense of identity - which has been called masculinity (1983 p.5). 
This anger towards men which cannot be expressed directly must seek its 
outlet elsewhere. XcLeod and Saraga suggest that the intense "rage" 
that underlies male violence towards women and children is actually a 
displacement of men's feelings of injury and hurt at their abuse by 
other men: 
"The source of sexual violence ... should be seen as rage at men, at 
the father, at the self, that is displaced onto and acted out 
against women and children, and instead of perceiving other men as 
threatening, which is terrifying and unacceptable, the threat is 
perceived in women where it can be controlled" <1988 p.42). 
The boy enters into discourse with the realisation that he is prevented 
from getting too close to his mother because her desire is ultimately 
placed under the control of 'phallic' male power relationships 
(irrespective of whether she is currently in a relationship with a 
specific man). He is thus placed in a contradiction at the level of 
emotional relations. In order to enter into emotional relationships 
with women (including his mother), he must construct himself as a 
recognisable emotional subject within a discourse whose terms (for both 
men and women) are dictated by the signifying power of "The Phallus". 
He finds himself in competition with other men and can only participate 
if he too constructs himself with the required 'phallic' subjectivity, 
repressing his own more intimate feelings and equating desire with the 
emotional domination and possession of women: 
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"Masculine sexual identity is established through feeling superior 
to women we are close to .•• It is as if we only know how to feel 
good ourselves if we put others down" (Seidler 1985 p.169). 
Thus, paradoxically, a boy's quest for a relationship, within the terms 
of the current social order, actually renders him incoherent at 
expressing himself directly at an emotional level. His desire for 
connection forces him to construct himself as a 'phallic' subject and 
thereby deny himself the possibility of achieving any real intimacy. 
While his masculine subjectivity will construct him as 'different' and 
'desirable' to women (who are themselves constructed in relation to 
phallic emotionality), he is only able, in practice, to switch between 
an invitation to perpetual mothering (as an emotionally incoherent 
'little boy'> and a position of sexual domination (as a phallic 'man'). 
Neither offers the possibility of real emotional connection or any open 
expression of vulnerability. This leads to a peculiar sexualisation of 
men's attempts at emotional intimacy, one which, in turn, carries the 
potentiality for violence and abuse: 
"Sex is one of the few socially acceptable ways in which men can 
aspire to closeness with others, and as such it becomes the carrier 
of all the unexpressed desires that men's emotional illiteracy 
produces. However, this same power of sex to produce emotionality 
makes it dangerous to men whose identity is based on the rejection 
of emotioni sex then becomes split off, limited to the activity of 
the penis, an act rather than an encounter ... Sexual abuse is 
inherent in a mode of personality organisation that rejects 
intimacy" (Glaser and Frosh 1988 p.24). 
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Such a distorted subjectivity is not truly interactive. It is the 
corollary, at an emotional level, of the autonomous 'free' subject of 
bourgeois thought. Its appearance of self-directed activity is achieved 
only at the expense of any receptivity to the desire of others, or any 
possibility of emotional inter-dependence. A male subjectivity which 
operates only as an active subject, demands, as its complement, a female 
subjectivity that is purely receptive and reactive - as the perpetual 
object of male desire. Such objectification is achieved through the 
signification of women in relation to icons such as the "Virgin Mary" or 
"Florence Nightingale", while any signs of independent desiring are 
subsumed within the alternative signif1cat1ons of "Witch" or "Whore". 
For men, these significations provide a structuring of emotional 
subjectivity which reproduces the specific relations of patriarchal 
domination: the perpetual expectation of emotional care and sexual 
'satisfaction' from women (women as "good" objects), coupled with the 
misanthropic rejection (fear) of any emotional demands made by women 
(women as "bad" objects). As Reimers and Dimmock argue: 
"Women are consumed as an image, presented in a way that divorces 
them from their humanity. We grow both to want and to hate these 
images, because ultimately they cannot satisfy the real needs of 
being human. For some men, these fantasies of power and sex are 
acted out in reality. Our tyranny over women, sexually and 
violently, is a result of a desire to dominate, to express some form 
of power where no real human experience exists" <1990 p.169). 
For a girl, the construction of emotional subjectivity is very 
different. By her gender, she is denied the possibility of ever 
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constructing herself as an active 'phallic' subject (although this means 
that she has no need to distance herself from her feelings in this way). 
She will never be the subject of her mother's desire - although, 
typically, this will be her closest relationship. Instead she faces the 
terrifying prospect of having to take on for herself the split 
objectif1cation - as "Good Fairy" or "Wicked Witch" - which she has 
already experienced in the organisation of her feelings towards her 
mother. This provides her with the model of how she must construct 
herself in order to become a woman within this social formation. Her 
only option is to construct herself as the object of male 'phallic' 
desire. As Eichenbaum and Orbach argue, women are thereby forced to 
participate in the construction of their own powerlessness: 
"The first psychological demand that flows from a woman's social 
role is that she must defer to others - follow their lead, 
articulate her needs only in relation to theirs. In essence,' she is 
not the main actor in her own life... Women come to bide tbeir 
desires from tbemselveS" (1985 pp.7-8). 
Each of the significations of self that are available to a woman deny 
her the possibility of being an active subject, of demanding that her 
desires are responded to and her vulnerability cared for (particularly 
by men). As a "Witch", her active desires and "bad" feelings (such as 
anger) will be punished and rejected, and as a "Good Fairy", she may 
only express "good" feelings on behalf of and for the benefit of others. 
Whereas male subjectivity gives men the right to ask and demand, but 
denies them the ability to articulate what they actually feel or desire, 
female subjectivity places women in the reverse paradox: they retain 
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greater facility in expressing feelings and desires, but primarily as a 
way of looking after others. Thus, in constructing her feminine 
subjectivity in subjugation to 'phallic' desire, a women must not only 
discount her own desire, but also, in an intuitive way, use her facility 
with feelings to discern and respond to the unarticulated wants and 
needs of men. As a ·Good Fairy·, a woman has to be able to look after a 
man, without his even having to make himself vulnerable by admitting to 
his more intimate feelings. Underlying the paradoxical distortion of 
desire for both men and women is a straightforward power relationship: 
while men may be incoherent at expressing emotionality, this incoherence 
neatly conceals their vulnerability and forces women to do their 
emotional 'work' for them. This emotional exploitation closely 
parallels women's exploitation in relation to domestic labour. 
On entering the patriarchal discourses of family life, a boy is 
immediately set up in competition with other men, and is thereby 
excluded from the possibility of experiencing emotional closeness with 
them. The position is more complex for women. Within the romantic 
ideology of bourgeois family life, girls are brought up to expect that 
they will achieve emotional closeness to a man, if they manage to 
construct themselves sufficiently well as an object of male 'phallic' 
desire. Just as men are constructed in competition with one another, so 
women must construct themselves to compete for male attention. This 
aspect of the construction of female subjectivity clearly undermines the 
possibility of emotional closeness between women. 
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However, a girl also constructs her subjectivity within the context of 
the mother-daughter relationship. As this relationship is located 
within the domestic sphere and takes place with little reference to men, 
its construction may be partly outside the direct influence of both 
capitalism and patriarchy. Bourgeois concepts of individuality and 
competition are peripheral rather than central to the way in which a 
girl comes to experience herself in relation to her mother. There is no 
process which forces them to conceptualise themselves as emotionally 
separate or different from one another. On the one hand, this lack of 
differentiation means that a girl <unlike a boy> is not constructed as 
'desirable' to her mother. On the other hand, this means that there is 
little barrier to picking up on each other's feelings. However, since 
the subjectivities of both mother and daughter are constructed in 
relation to their signification as women as "Good"I"Bad" objects, it is 
difficult for either party to express their feelings directly (and 
actively) towards the other - to ask outright for what they want. If 
they construct themselves as "Good", they are debarred from making 
demands. If one does make a demand, she is in danger of being 
constructed as "Bad" and risks being rejected and punished by the other. 
However, as intuition has come to form such a crucial part of the 
construction of their 'femininity', they will often be able to respond 
to and look after the other without even being asked. It is in this 
somewhat indirect manner that women are able to achieve a real degree of 
'power together' at the level of emotional support - something that the 
construction of masculinity makes particularly difficult for men. 
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Although much work has concentrated on the reciprocal distortions of 
emotional subjectivity that are produced in men and women through the 
operation of patriarchy, parallel processes may be seen to take place in 
the construction of subjectivity among any combination of dominant and 
subordinate groups. Members of any dominant race, class or gender can 
only maintain their superior power position at an emotional level by 
sacrificing the immediacy of their desire in order to hide any signs of 
vulnerability or openness. Correspondingly, through their control over 
the terms of key discourses, they are in a position to force members of 
subordinate groups to take on such 'weaknesses' as part of their 
subjectivities. As Jean Baker Killer argues. members of dominant 
classes and races. as well as the dominant gender are able to disown 
"their bodily, their sexual. their childish experiences. their feelings 
of weakness. vulnerability. helplessness. and other similar unresolved 
areas ... Some of the areas of life denied by the dominant groups are 
relegated and projected onto all subordinate groups ... They cannot be 
projected very far away. One must bave them nearby. even if one can 
still deny owning them" (1988 p. 47). 
It has been conventional for members of the aristocratic and bourgeois 
classes to construct themselves as "gentlemen" and "ladies". expressing 
emotion only in a 'correct' and ritualised manner. In their discourses. 
they tend to situate members of the peasant and working classes so that 
they appear "earthy" and "common". representations of an almost 'animal' 
sensuality. Similarly. racist oppression may be seen to exert a 
specific impact on the construction of desire within the subjectivity of 
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black people (and, conversely, a reciprocal distortion in relation to 
the construction of subjectivity among white people): 
"Blacks, like women, have been constructed as possessing the 
characteristics that are negatively valued in white western culture, 
for example. emotionality, sexuality and hedonism .•. Racism 
reproduces itself not only ... at an economic and social level. but 
also through the power relations between white and black people and 
the subjectivities which these produce and reproduce in both" 
(Henriques et al 1984 p.89). 
In summary, a reworking of psychoanalysis from a critical perspective 
provides a basis for understanding how our awareness of our desires, and 
of our ability to express ourselves as women and men, are crucially 
determined by our induction into the social relations of a specific 
social formation. From object-relations theory, we have an insight into 
hoW men internalise feelings towards women, and women internalise 
feelings about themselves, in terms of the split "good" object I "bad" 
object. From Lacan, Althusser and Henriques et aI, we have an 
understanding of how the identities of women and men, and of black 
people and white people, may be constructed in relation to patriarchal 
and imperialist distortions of desire, and to the bourgeois illusion of 
automomy. This illustrates how oppressive processes at the levels of 
emotionality and ideology may interlock. As is emerging from this stUdy 
of psychoanalytic theory. it is the family which appears as the primary 
site of operation and reproduction of certain oppressive power relations 
at the levels of ideology and emotionality, and this will be discussed 
further in Chapter 5. 
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Transactional Analysis· Sybiect ~ositiQns and 
ad.~t.tiQns within the organisation Of sybjectivity 
In this section I will look at the contribution that may be made by 
Transactional Analysis (TA) towards deconstructing the way in which the 
subjectivity of an 'individual' is organised within a specific social 
formation. As with Freud's original distinction between id, ego and 
super ego, TA has probed beneath the supposed unity of the bourgeois 
subject to expose an array of (often conflicting) subject positions, 
each of which corresponds to a distinctive way in which a person may 
experience her/himself and relate to others. However, whereas Freud 
described a conflict that was essentially abstract and internal, Eric 
Berne (1964) sought to isolate separate modes of "being in the world" 
which were directly observable. These were characterised as autonomous 
organisations of thoughts, feelings and behaviours that could be 
manifested in the various distinct and conflicting ways that the same 
person may be observed to transact with others. 
What is absent from Berne's an account is an appreciation of how these 
observed inconsistencies reflect more than just a diverse inheritance of 
influences, but can result from the internalisation of the relations of 
oppression, conflict and contradiction that may have characterised the 
social context in which a person was inserted as an infant. As with 
psychoanalysis, the theoretical account of TA rests on the assumption of 
a process of 'normal' development that is situated within a Western 
bourgeois family form that is seen as somehow inevitable and universal -
an assumption that reqUires to be challenged in a critical rereading of 
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TA concepts that sees as problematic issues of gender, class, race or 
sexual orientation. While it may lack some of the stark pointers to 
oppression that emerge from psychoanalytic accounts - the splitting of 
experience into conscious and unconscious, or on to 'good' and 'bad' 
objects - TA nevertheless provides a vocabulary for looking at more 
subtle (but insidious) mechanisms whereby the repression and distortion 
of subjectivity may take place, and external contradictions may become 
internalised. Whereas there is now a substantial literature that seeks 
to rework psychoanalytic concepts from a critical perspective, the 
influence of TA has remained very much within a professional arena of 
therapy where there has been little encounter with critical social 
theory. Therefore the exposition and reworking of TA concepts that I 
attempt here must be seen as very much of a preliminary exercise. 
The first stage of Berne'S analysis of separate modes of "being in the 
world" was his distinction between three possible "ego-states": "Child", 
"Adult" and "Parent" <1964 p.23)' <In TA, capital letters are 
conventionally used to distinguish the names of ego-states from actual 
children, adults and parents). In our terms, these may be seen as three 
sets of closely inter-related subject positions. According to Berne, 
they correspond respectively to how a person learned to deal with the 
world as an infant, how slhe deals with what is going on in the 
immediate present, and how slhe learned from significant others that 
slhe should deal with the world (by instruction or example). In turn, 
ego-states may comprise a number of separate and distinct elements, each 
element being, in turn, an autonomous set of inter-related thoughts, 
feelings and behaviours, developed through repeated interactions with 
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significant others - others who themselves would not be transacting as 
unitary individuals, but from their own specific ensemble of 
(conflicting) Parent, Adult and Child ego-states. 
In order to develop these concepts in a way that is not purely 
descriptive, or relating them to some supposedly natural (and universal) 
developmental schema, it is necessary to place them within a context of 
social power relations. What fundamentally distinguishes these three 
ensembles of subject positions are issues of power and responSibility. 
Taking on a Child subject position implies that either one is powerless 
to take full responsibility for one's own thoughts, feelings or actions 
(as in the case of the legal/moral space into which an actual child is 
conventionally inserted), or one is in a position of power over others 
in which one can opt out of such responsibility and to pass it over to 
someone else (as in the example of a husband who constructs his wife as 
responsible for his own violence). By contrast, one may only take on an 
Adult subject position if one occupies, at that moment, a structural 
position that empowers one to take responsibility for one's current 
thoughts, feelings and actions - in other words, a position which 
permits one to be assertive and capable. 
In taking on a Parent subject position, one assumes responsibility for 
another's experience and transactions. Such a position may imply that 
one is in a position to exercise control over the other <whether 
abusively or protectively), or simply that, through powerlessness, one 
is forced into a position of taking responsibility for an other over 
whom one has no control (as in the situation of a wife taking 
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responsibility for her husband's violence). Thus, by situating the 
concept of wego-stateW in relation to those of responsibility and power, 
we may see how the fact that a person transacts from. say. a Child (or a 
Parent) subject position, relates not just to some personal choice that 
is ultimately under her/his internal jurisdiction. but may also relate 
to a restriction of her/his potential subjectivity due to the specific 
power relations in which s/he is currently inserted. 
From the perspective of TA, it is suggested that the Parent ego-state 
may be seen to comprise functionally separate organisations of thinking. 
feeling and behaviour relating to the processes of care (Nurturing 
Parent) or of control (Controlling Parent). Within a patriarchal social 
formation, it is readily available to a man to take on a Controlling 
Parent position from which to coerce others into acting, feeling or 
thinking in particular ways (ultimately to protect his privileged 
position). It is much less available to him to take on a Nurturing 
Parent subject position in order to take responsibility for the welfare 
of another person who might otherwise be vulnerable to abuse or neglect. 
By contrast women (and sometimes children) are often thrust into the 
responsibility of the Nurturing Parent pOSition, not out of any positive 
choice, but out of some combination of externally experienced coercion 
and an internalised sense of obligation. Similarly, the range of 
available Parent subject positions <and the implications of these) are 
likely to vary according to one's position within structures of 
oppression based on class, race, disability or sexual orientation. 
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The Parent ego-state may be seen as crucial in how people reproduce 
prevailing ideology within everyday discourses. Typically, in order to 
take on responsibility for others within a specific social formation, we 
have to demonstrate that we are 'fit' to do so - that we adhere to the 
required set of attitudes, assumptions and values (which we may have 
internalised from observing those who have previously taken 
responsibility for us). They constitute an ideological "frame of 
reference" by which experience is selectively (mis)perceived, filtered 
and evaluated, and which (among other things) legitimates the inability 
of the other to be responsible for him/her self (for example, through 
specific historical constructions of gender roles or assumptions about 
childhood). As Schiff suggests, the Parent ego-state "contains all the 
definitional parameters within which people function" (1975 p.SS). Thus 
the person occupying the Parent position may be seen both to be 
subjected within a body of ideology and, at the same time, promulgating 
it to the reCipient of their care or control, who is rendered 
particularly vulnerable to accepting it without question. 
TA uses the concept of "Free Child" to represent a Child subject 
position which permits the taw and unsocia1ised expression of feeling 
and desire. It implies the existence of an idealised original 'self', 
an essential human 'nature' that is not mediated by any form of social 
connection or experience. As such, it would seem to represent the 
return of the bourgeois individual - albeit in much diminished form. It 
denies the reality that, from the very point of conception, an infant is 
already in-relationship-with-others, at the very least in terms of 
issues such as heredity and material survival. 
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While the concept of "Free Child" has no place within a critical 
reformulation, other identified 'functional' aspects of the Child ego-
state are of potential value. These signify subject positions that may 
be seen to be constructed out of struggle and interaction, out of 
negotiation between the relative powerlessness of the infant as against 
the significant others on whom its survivial depends. Depending on the 
specific circumstances, an infant may seek to negotiate its desire in 
relation to the other by complying with their perceived expectations 
<Adapted Child position), or by doing the opposite (Rebellious Child 
position) - see also Kahler's use of the term "Vengeful Child" (1978 
p.16). In both instances, although the infant is forced to take on a 
position in relation to a discourse that is defined by the other, these 
subject positions may nevertheless allow the infant some opportunity to 
negotiate recognition or connection, albeit in partial, indirect or 
distorted ways. The development of these subject positions may be seen 
as the infant's only possible responses to its relative powerlessness: 
they entail the use of feelings, actions and intuition so as to 
manipulate the responses of an otherwise unreachable other, but always 
at the cost of alienating its own desire to some degree. 
All functional ego-states (Nurturing/Controlling Parent, Adult and 
Adapted/Rebellious Child) potentially allow some (albeit distorted> 
expression of desire, some experience of connectedness and recognition -
although they reflect a choice of subject positions that may have been 
determined, to a large extent, by the power relations that obtained at 
crucial paints in a person's history. It is in this way that they may 
be seen to differ from a second category of subject positions, or 
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"roles" that have been proposed within TA theory. Karpman (1968) 
identified three key roles which he saw as underlying many instances of 
repetitive (and ultimately futile) interaction. He suggested that 
people inserted themselves <and switched between) such roles as a 
substitute to transacting from positions that allowed any possibility of 
self-expression. On the one hand, they may be seen as defences against 
showing any real vulnerability in certain situations. In some 
instances, such as the organisation of 'masculinity', people may have 
recourse to role positions as a way as maintaining their 'mastery' of 
the situation. On the other hand, they may be a recourse of desperation 
in a situation where there seems to be no way of resisting or contesting 
oppression - a way of hiding from the pain and the danger of what is 
really going on. Moving into such a position may be at some 
considerable cost to the person involved, both in the sense that slhe 
renders her/himself powerless to resolve the real situation, and that 
s/he may, in fact, be inviting further abuse or exploitation. 
It is suggested that a person may switch between role positions and each 
role position may be associated with a "self-reinforcing, distorted 
system of feelings, thoughts and actions" <Erskine and Zalcman 1979). 
In a role position, a person will fall back on a familiar routine of 
circular thinking and ineffective behaviour that is termed a "racket". 
This distances her/him from having to deal with the real situation, and 
may hook others into playing complementary roles. Examples of these 
would include the forms of "passive behaviour" identified by Jacqui 
Schiff: doing nothing, over-adaptation, agitation and incapacitation or 
violence (1975 p.lO). Transacting from each role position may also 
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engender familiar but superficial "racket" feelings which act as a 
smokescreen to distance a person from what s/he may be feeling about the 
underlying reality of her/his situation (see English 1971). Racket 
feelings, such as anxiety, guilt, aggression and euphoria, do not lead 
to an appreciation or resolution of the real situation which the person 
is actually facing, whereas more direct feelings, such as anger, fear, 
joy and sadness, may lead to change, negotiation and recognition. 
From a critical perspective, role positions may be seeuto be 
exaggerations or caricatures of functional ego-states: organisations of 
personal subjectivity that are no longer negotiated so as to permit some 
self-expression or contact, but are purely defensive in only allowing a 
predictable and ritualised series of interactions with others. In this 
way, the Rescuer role may be understood as an exaggeration of a 
Nurturing Parent position, when a person finds her/himself in the 
position of sacrificing her/his own needs and feelings completely in 
order to look after the perceived needs of another, while, at the same 
time, discounting whatever ability the latter may have to attend to 
their own needs. Within a patriarchal social formation, this subject 
position may be seen to be one which is particularly familiar to women. 
Similarly, a compliant Adapted Child position switches over into a 
Victim role when a person gives up trying to look after or stand up for 
her/himself, and allows others to take over. In an oppressive social 
formation, it is those who are already victims of structural oppression 
whose circumstances are most likely to force them into taking on the 
Victim role and to discount their needs and abilities in this way. In 
certain situations, this is almost expected of black people, gay or 
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minority groups. The third role identified by Karpman may be seen as an 
exaggeration of a Controlling Parent subject positionj this becomes a 
Persecutor role when a person starts to transact in a way that is simply 
punitive. It represents an explosion of oppressive power play: an 
attempt to put down the other while, at the same time, hiding any real 
expression of desire, distress or vulnerability. It may be seen to be a 
subject position that is utilised particularly by Western men, who will 
typically construct themselves so as to remain in control, even at the 
expense of leaving their more intimate needs unmet. 
Although Karpman only identified three role positions, I think it may be 
useful to differentiate a fourth. Following on from Kahler's 
distinction between righteous (Parent) and aggressive (Child) anger 
{1978 p.l06>, I would suggest that it could be useful to distinguish an 
exaggeration of a Rebellious Child ego-state that is different from a 
Persecutor role. I shall term this an 'Aggressor' role. Instead of the 
active confrontation that is characteristic of a Rebellious Child 
position, a person may fall back into futile attacking: picking fights 
in ways that mask the expression of real grievances, wants and needs, 
and where the recipient may be faced with anger that relates to an issue 
that is not being expressed, or that should actually have been directed 
at someone else. Whereas the Persecutor role places the person in a 
position to put the other down, the Aggressor role lacks such a context 
of 'power over' and represents a position from which the person simply 
lashes out, physically or verbally, at whatever target is immediately 
available. Such a role would be particularly available, for example, to 
male members of relatively powerless groups (young, working class and/or 
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black). For them it is only possible to live out a caricature of 
patriarchal power. They may construct their subjectivity within an 
image of 'macho' and hook others into engaging in almost ritualised 
violence, not directed against the source of their oppression, but at 
others who are similarly powerless. However, in doing so, they are able 
to hide from the real hurt that they would experience if they remained 
in the Rebellious Child position, and found themselves powerless to have 
tbeir distress attended to and their grievances addressed. 
Altbougb Karpman's work was formulated outside any understanding of 
power relations, it becomes easy to see how people in different 
structural power positions are more or less likely to insert themselves 
in particular roles, and in what circumstances. All roles offer the 
opportunity to manipulate (and be manipulated by) others into taking 
part in a ritualised pattern of interaction - one that 'protects' 
partiCipants from baving to address tbeir real concerns and desires, and 
hence serves to maintain the status quo. A wbite bourgeOiS man can 
utilise tbe position of Persecutor in order to stifle the posibility of 
any renegotiation of power relationships with others. He can use tbe 
role to maintain the stuckness of a situation of inequality (although 
tbis may be at the expense of attending to some of his more intimate 
needs). However, althougb Victims (or Rescuers) may appear influential 
<for example, witbin the dynamics of a family), tbe only 'power' that 
tbey bave is to stay stuck in an abusive situation and to hook others 
into staying stuck with them. A woman may appear powerful as a Victim 
or a Rescuer, but not in terms of having any real choice for herself or 
any opportunity to confront or renegotiate her situation: 
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"It can sometimes seem much easier to be, and remain, the victim 
than to struggle for oneself For even in a situation that is 
objectively destructive, the victim does not have to confront her 
own desires to change the situation ... nor the anger that has 
accumulated over her victimised position •.. Since society so 
firmly encourages women to remain in this position .•. to attempt to 
change the situation threatens women with no place to go" (Baker 
Killer 1988 p.122). 
One of the most exciting developments in Transactional Analysis in 
recent years has been the work done by Kahler (1979) on understanding 
personality adaptations in terms of dynamic process (see also Ware 1983; 
Klein 1985; Joines 1986). Whereas the ego-state models are essentially 
static, naming an array of potential subject pOSitions, this work looks 
at how adaptive decisions, made in response to the situation prevailing 
around the time of the entry into discourse, can determine a person's 
preferred transactional repertoire in later life (and hence much of what 
we see as their personality). In a sense, this may be seen to represent 
a more flexible reworking of the psychoanalytic notion of repression. 
A critical appraisal of childhood would suggest that, in order to 
survive, an infant must learn to co-exist with powerful and significant 
others, each with their own distinct configurations of subject positions 
located within each ego-state. This would take place in a particular 
context of material, ideological and emotional relations, which would 
tend to have a determining effect on the range of permissable responses 
(and subject positions) available to the infant. Due to its extreme 
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powerlessness and the potential threat to its survivial if it did not 
conform to expectations - at least in some situations - the infant would 
have no choice but to try to make sense of the expectations that are 
placed upon it and organise its subjectivity in a particular way that 
excludes certain potential subject positions and types of transaction. 
Linking this to Kahler's dynamic understanding of personality 
adaptations, it may be sugested that the infant comes to establish a 
specific repertoire of 'acceptable' responses, comprising some 
combination of direct expression, copying or compliance. Such an 
adaptation is seen as a response to messages internalised from the 
Parent ego states of parent figures. Such messages (termed "drivers") 
take the form" You are acceptable (to me) only if you ... 11 and may be 
seen as a key mechanism for the reproduction, at an unconscious level, 
of patriarchal, capitalist or racist ideologies. The specific drivers 
that he proposed were those to Be Perfect, to Please (others), to Try 
Hard, to Be Strong, or to Hurry Up - although this list may not be 
exhaustive, and each driver may be subject to variation given the 
specific circumstances of childhood. He suggested that each of us has a 
particular driver that is most dominant in our personal organisation, 
although one or more of the others may become prominent in specific 
situations. In this way a 'blueprint' may be constructed for (and by) 
an infant which defines the particular ensemble of subject positions 
from which it may customarily transact in later life, whether as Child, 
Adult or Parent. Such configurations may undergo continual modification 
in the light of subsequent experience, but may mevertheless constitute a 
continual and oppressive restriction of transactional possibilities. 
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The degree to which a person is driven to conform to her/his particular 
adaptation is seen to relate to the degree of stress s/he is currently 
experiencing. Placing this within a context of power relations, we may 
see that the degree to which an adaptation comes to distort a person's 
subjectivity at any instant may relate (both in infancy and in later 
life) to her/his current sense of powerlessness and threat (or, 
conversely, of support and empowerment). If a person is inserted into a 
current situation in which s/he feels as threatened or as powerless as 
s/he may have done in infancy. s/he may feel that s/he has little choice 
but to fall back on the same limited repertoire of responses which had 
appeared to ensure survival at that time. Thus, instead of 
conceptualising a relatively permanent boundary between 'conscious' and 
'unconscious', this would suggest a relatively fluid 'transactional 
horizon' that permits more or less expression, depending on the specific 
circumstances into which the person is inserted. Kahler linked the 
concept of "driver" to distinctive sets of words, tones, gestures and 
expressions that a person might display which could indicate that a 
particular adaptation was governing the operation of her/his 
subj ect! vity. 
Kahler (1979) further suggested that each adaptation reflects 
preferences for - or relative facility in - particular transactional 
levels (feelings, thought or behaviour>. A given adaptation is seen as 
representing a set of preferences of how we deal with the world: the 
level at which we make and regulate contact (contact level) and the one 
at which we choose to transact at greater depth once contact is made 
(target level). Of particular significance is the transactional level 
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which may be all but excluded by the operation of the driver in any 
situation in which we may feel threatened or powerless (the trap level). 
It is at this level that we may need to be supported and empowered 
before we can be spontaneous and effective in expressing our thoughts, 
feelings or actions (as the case may be). A simplified summary of 
Kahler's associations between drivers and a person's relative ease with 
different transactional levels is given below: 
DRIVER-ADAPTATIOI COlT ACT LEVEL TARGET LEVEL TRAP LEVEL 
Please, Hurry Up Feeling Thinking Behaviour 
Be Perfect Thinking Feeling Behaviour 
Be Strong Behaviour Thinking Feeling 
Try Hard Behaviour Feeling Thinking 
Situating this within our earlier discussion of the impact of gender on 
transactional possibilities, it would appear likely that men's 
subjectivity would tend to be organised according to those adaptations 
that made either thinking or behaviour the contact level, whereas women 
would tend to be organised in relation to adaptations that made feeling 
the contact level. This correlation has partly been borne out by the 
research of Hazell (1989). From his sample, more than twice as many men 
as women were identified with the Be Perfect driver-adaptation for which 
thinking is the contact level, whereas the reverse was true for the 
Please driver-adaptation for which feelings are the contact level. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the Be Strong driver-adaptation (in which feelings 
are the trap level, guarded by a contact level of behaviour) proved to 
be a more frequent adaptation for women than men (although it was still 
the second most frequent adaptation for men). It is easy to see how, 
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for men, feelings of vulnerability may typically be suppressed in order 
that their activity may result in some form of personal achievement or 
authority. However, such an explanation would seem implausible in 
relation to the experience of most women. Viewed from an understanding 
of patriarchal oppression, we may suggest that, for women, the exclusion 
of feelings is more likely to result from experiences of abuse and 
domination, and that their emotionality would be concealed behind a 
contact level of activity that would be directed not towards personal 
achievement, but towards the service of others. Thus for women, the Be 
strong driver might more accurately be termed a 'Keep Quiet' driver-
adaptation. As-yet, no research has been conducted to establish any 
correlations between driver-adaptations and other instances of 
structural oppression on the basis of, say, class, race, disability or 
sexual orientation. 
In Kahler's schema, there are two possible permutations of preferences 
for transactional levels which he has not theorised as corresponding to 
any specific driver-adaptation. This would suggest that there are 
further adaptations that may be significant. I will propose ways of 
conceptualising these two 'missing' adaptations, but this must be viewed 
as purely speculative at this stage. There is always the possibility of 
more than one organising principle resulting in the same order of 
transactional preferences (as in the case of a men's Be Strong driver 
and a women's Keep Quiet driver). In the forgoing analysis, personality 
adaptations have been seen as responses to expectations that are 
pervasive within prevailing ideology, and so may be expected to vary 
significantly as between specific historical and cultural contexts. 
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Within the prevailing Western social formation, structural inequalities 
lead to pervasive experiences of domination and abuse. For those born 
into the ruling group and other positions of potential 'power over', 
there may be an expectation that they appear as 'natural' leaders, and 
they may develop, in response, a drive to Take Charge. Similarly, for 
those who experience violation and abuse of their persons, an adaptation 
to appear to Be In Control may seem to be the only safe way of 
containing the extremes of violence, hurt and disgust that may otherwise 
seem overwhelming and have no possibility of expression within the 
current configuration of power relations. This would suggest the 
possibility of a driver-adaptation to Take Charge or to Be In Control 
(of self and/or others) where feelings of vulnerability would constitute 
the trap level. Control must first of all be secured at the level of 
behaviour and activity - so this would constitute the contact level. 
Transactional preferences for behaviour, thinking and feeling, in that 
order, correspond to an assumption of conventional 'leadership' 
qualities - an ability to act that is informed by thinking and not by 
emotion. 
The other significant adaptation that I would suggest could result from 
being inserted into a position that is fundamentally devalued - and thus 
be an adaptation particularly common for women, black people and members 
of the "hard-living" working class. In response to an internalised 
message that gives little or no sense of their right to 'be' - to exist 
at all - a person might adapt by continually striving after recognition. 
To an outside observer, such non-stop movement would correspond to what 
Kahler observed as the Hurry Up driver - as the person experiences so 
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little permission to exist, s/he does not have the luxury of being able 
to relax and sustain her/himself on any internalised feelings of self-
esteem. Such an adaptation might better be termed a driver to 'Keep 
Going'. Having to be 'on the go' all the time, would mean that the 
person would have little or no time to think - or, at least to think 
clearly - and so this would constitute her/his trap level. Although 
never still, the person may be too frenetic to be much at ease at the 
level of activitYi what s/he is primarily seeking 1s contact at the 
level of feelings - some emotional recognition of her/his existence and 
experience. Incorporating these additional and modified driver-
adaptations into the above schema, we have: 
DRIVER-ADAPTATION CONTACT LEVEL TARGET LEVEL TRAP LEVEL 
Please (others) Feeling Thinking Behaviour 
Hurry Up/Keep Going Feeling Behaviour Thinking 
Try Hard Behaviour Feeling Th1nking 
Be Strong/Keep Quiet Behaviour Thinking Feeling 
Take Charge/Be In Control Thinking Behaviour Feeling 
Be Perfect Thinking Feeling Behaviour 
To summarise, there are various sets of concepts that we may derive from 
TA which can be useful in exposing the political organisation of 
individual subjectivity, both in terms of what possibilities are open to 
people given their structural position within the social formation, and 
in terms of minute-by-minute changes in the way a person may present 
her/himself to the world - what mayor may not be allowed above her/his 
transactional horizon. Firstly, we have the relatively autonomous 
organisations of subjectivity that may be adopted <and switched 
between), depending on whether one is empowered to take responSibility 
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for oneself (Adult ego-state), or is situated such that one is taking 
responsibility for others (Parent ego-state), or abdicating this 
responsibility to others (Child ego-state). Each of these potential 
organisations of subjectivity arise from a process of negotiation, 
allowing some expression of desire or capability, within the context of 
socially determined transactional possibilities (both past and present). 
Distinct from these, we have identified subject positions (roles) which, 
like the psychoanalytic positions such as 'The Phallus', are available 
to people to occupy depending on their structural power positions within 
the social formation. For example, while the role positions of 
Persecutor or Aggressor may be less strictly gendered than, say, 'The 
Phallus', they may nevertheless be seen to be far more available to men 
than to women. Taking on role positions may be seen as attempts to 
retain a position of dominance or privilege, or to survive in pOSitions 
of relative powerlessness, both at the expense of any open expression of 
real desires, wants or needs. 
Finally, we have a way of understanding the overall organising principle 
by which the minute-by-minute transactional horizon of a subjectivity 
may be determined. The concept of driver-adaptation is more flexible 
than the psychoanalytic split between conscious and unconscious, one 
that can be related to the particular stresses (and power relations) of 
the current situation in which a person is inserted. Such an organising 
principle may be seen to determine the relative ease with which a person 
mayor may not be able to transact at the levels of activity, discourse 
or emotionality. 
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Integrating concepts of power and sybjectivity 
In the previous chapter, we looked at a number of interlocking concepts 
by which to examine power relations, derived from Marxist, feminist and 
anti-racist perspectives. Here, these will be reviewed in the light of 
critical understandings of subjectivity, each set of concepts being 
allowed to inform and revise the other, in order to produce a consistent 
framework for analysis. The key concepts employed were as follows: 
Differentiation of power relations into those of 'power over' and 
those of 'power together'. 
Analysis of a social formation in terms of power structures-
different social groups having unequal access to specific resources, 
or control over specific practices. 
Distinguishing between a social organisation based on a 'hierarchy' 
of 'power over' from one based on a 'web' of 'power together'. 
Analysis of how power relations may define the terms of 
interpersonal transactions - differentiation between transactions of 
domination/subordination (the exercise of 'power over') and those of 
recognition (the basis for constructing 'power together'). 
Recognising the parallel operation of specific modes of oppression 
and resistance - for instance, the 'triple jeopardy' analysis of 
patriarchal, imperialist and feudal/capitalist oppression. 
Identifying separate but interlinking processes of oppression and 
empowerment taking place at different levels of the social formation 
(material relations, ideology or emotionality), expressed through 
distinct sets of transactions at the levels of activity, discourse 
or feeling. 
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In this Chapter, we have looked at how the bourgeois notion of 'the 
individual' may be opened up to critical analysis: no longer may it be 
viewed as a unitary, consistent and responsible whole, but instead it 
may be seen to represent the uneasy holding together of certain elements 
of personality - together with the repression of certain others - in 
line with what is required by the insertion of the person within 
specific structures of social relations. On the one hand, a critical 
understanding of subjectivity may lead us to re-examine and refine our 
various ways of conceptualisating power relations. On the other hand, a 
critical analysis of power relations must extend not only to an 
examination of social structures and interpersonal transactions, but 
also to an understanding of the processes that define and take place 
within the construction of personal subjectivity itself. In this way, 
concepts of power relations may be seen to have a determining effect on 
organisation within the individual as well as between individuals. 
Our original definitions of power were as relations between people -
whether in terms of people being in a position to have 'power over' 
others, or being in a position- to develop 'power together' - given their 
location within wider power strucures (of capitalism, patriarchy, 
imperialism etc.). However, there is an inherent danger that such a 
formulation can reduce an understanding of empowerment to a liberal-
bourgeois paradigm of 'individual choice', unless the concepts of power 
are allowed to penetrate beneath the supposed autonomy of 'the 
individual'. Thus 'the person' must be contextualised, not just in 
terms of being located within wider structures of power relations, but 
also in terms of how these power struggles may also take place within 
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and between various elements of personality. From the forgoing 
analysis, it may be seen that the concept of 'choice' itself is 
problematic, since it requires not just negotiation of possibilities in 
the external context, but a process of negotiation between the relative 
power of different and conflicting elements of personality that have 
been constructed during a person's history. Thus oppression may be seen 
to be internalised as well as external, and result in a restriction of 
possibilities for action or expression over and above that imposed by 
current subjection within structures of unequal power. Similarly, 
empowerment may be seen to include the recognition and opening up of 
possibilities within the organisation of a person's subjectivity through 
sharing with others with similar histories and experiences. 
We have seen how social organisation may be understood in terms of 
membership (or non-membership) of groups who are collectively in a 
position to control access to specific resources or practices. Thus 
capitalists are placed in a position of structural power over working 
class people, white people are placed in a position of structural power 
over black people, and adult heterosexual men are placed in a position 
of structural power over women, gay men, children and older people. 
Thus, people come to be organised, formally or informally, according to 
their common structural power position (e.g. trade union or employers' 
association). As we have seen, people who share a common experience of 
disempowerment may organise themselves according to some sort of 'web' 
of connectedness, whereas those in positions of 'power over' tend to 
remain situated in some sort of a 'hierarchy', both in relation to other 
members of dominant groups and to members of subordinated groups. 
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In turn, this may determine how personal subjectivity comes to be 
organised. People who occupy positions of 'power over' may tend to hide 
their vulnerability, due to the potential threat to their position posed 
by others within a necessarily hierarchical organisation, and so have no 
choice but to construct themselves as a 'self-in-isolation'. By 
contrast, those who experience their oppression together may tend to 
organise themselves much more as a 'self-in-relation' - partly out of 
choice, but also because everyday material and emotional survival may 
demand this. Furthermore, the concepts of 'web' and 'hierarchy' may be 
seen to be equally applicable to the deconstruction of the person. The 
internal organisation of the fractured elements that comprise personal 
subjectivity may be on the basis of 'hierarchy', with certain elements 
having been given 'power over' others, due to the way that the person 
has been inserted within past or present transactional structures. In 
partiular, one element may be given the power to substitute for and 
repress another. By contrast, elements of subjectivity may also be 
organised on the basis of a mutually supportive 'web' of connectedness 
(for example, a sense of having rights in one context may reinforce a 
sense of having rights in another). Thus, just as certain social 
institutions (such as the family) may be seen to comprise elements of 
both 'hierarchy' and 'web' in their internal organisation, so both of 
these concepts may be applied to an analysis of personal subjectivity. 
Parallel to our analysis of social power structures is an analysis of 
the power relations inherent in any interpersonal transaction that takes 
place within an oppressive social formation. As we have seen, people 
who belong to groups in positions of unequal power will tend to transact 
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on the basis of domination or subordination. By contrast, those who 
occupy a common structural power position may engage in transactions of 
(mutual) recognition - the basis of constructing 'power together'. We 
must now re-examine this analysis of transactions in the light of a 
critical understanding of subjectivity. Such transactions do not take 
place between unitary individuals, but between particular elements of 
the self-organisation of each individual. Instead of the bourgeois 
notion of the autonomous individual simply being in charge of the 
transactions s/he chooses to make, each person may also be seen to be 
constructed as a subjectivity by her/his very insertion within 
transactions of a particular type. 
Transactions of domination and subordination inevitably construct a form 
of subjectivity that will exaggerate or exclude certain elements of 
personality, and may preclude any form of self' expression as in the case 
of subject positions such as 'The Phallus' or the Victim role position. 
Understanding the impact of transactions of recognition is more complex, 
since that-which-is-to-be-recognised is not the straightforward 
bourgeois individual, but an ensemble of accessible and hidden subject 
positions: a set of often contradictory elements that, by definition, 
cannot be fully comprehended within prevailing discursive structures. 
ThuS, recognition can, at best, only be partial. Even the accurate 
appreciation of - and response to - those elements that are allowed 
above a person's transactional horizon, represents, at the same time, a 
denial and rejection of those elements that are currently being 
suppresed - a denial that thereby colludes with the person's existing 
experience of oppression. Recognition can only be seen as empowering 
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when it involves the appreciation of some element that the person had 
hitherto seen the need to repress. 
It may be seen that such transactions may take place internally within 
the person, as well as externally between different people. The 
processes whereby certain elements of personality are repressed, and 
substituted by distorting or alienating elements, may be seen as 
instances of internal transactions of domination and subordination. 
Similarly, at the scale of the individual, empowerment may be seen in 
terms of internal transactions of recognition - appreciating and 
mobilising feelings, thoughts or potential actions that had previously 
been excluded from awareness. 
The remaining elements of our conceptual framework fit easily with 
critical notions of subjectivity. The various identified modes of 
oppression and resistance - the 'triple jeopardy' of patriarchy, 
imperialism and capitalism/feudalism - may be seen to operate and be 
determining whether it be in relation to the organisation of social 
institutions, a conversation, or an intra-personal conflict between 
elements of desire and internalised prohibitions. The construction of 
subjectivity depends on the availability of external transactions in 
which to participate. Such availability may be seen to relate 
crucially, within the current social formation, to one's position as 
white or black, man or woman, gay or straight, able or disabled, adult 
or child (or older person). On the one hand, those who are disempowered 
by such social relations will suffer specific restrictions in how they 
may construct themselves in their dealings with members of the groups 
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that currently have power over them. On the other hand, common 
experience of a particular mode of oppression opens up the possibility 
of transactions of recognition - appreciating the shared elements within 
their overall experience that had hitherto been excluded from 
expression, but of which each member of the oppresed the group may have 
been dimly aware - perhaps just some feeling of tension, anger or 
frustration. 
The analytic separation of processes taking place at the levels of 
material relations, discourse and emotionality may be applied to 
structures of any scale. Just as it is helpful to identify specific 
struggles at the scale of the social formation as a whole, say in terms 
of the economic exploitation of working class people, this may be seen 
to be reflected in a parallel struggle taking place within the psyche of 
the individual worker - the distortion of her/his subjectivity that is 
required in order for her/him to construct her/himself as a work subject 
who is apparently willing to sell her/his labour power at a price which 
is below its real value to the capitalist. From the perspective of 
social history, it may be seen that power struggles between groups take 
place at a different pace at different levels of the social formation: 
an improvement in, say, welfare provision may be accomplished under a 
discourse of paternalism, indicating that struggle for rights at the 
level of ideology may lag behind that at the level of material survival. 
Similarly, as we have seen, within the construction of individual 
subjectivity, certain adaptations lead to a greater ability to be 
effective in transactions at, say, the level of activity, rather than 
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at, say, the level of emotionality. This may lead a person to be much 
further on in resisting her/his oppresion at one transactional level 
than another. Thus, action to resist domination (for example, a woman 
choosing to leave her violent husband) may be accompanied by feelings of 
guilt and failure (indicating that the woman is still defining herself 
within the emotional structures of patriarchy). Conversely, a woman may 
be clear that her feelings of fear and anger are telling her that she is 
ready to leave, but the unavailability of suitable accommodation may 
prevent her from taking the necessary action. Thus, while there will 
usually be interconnections between processes taking place at different 
levels or at diferent scales of social/personal organisation, such 
connections may not always be straightforward. 
Arising out of this discussion, let us summarise what may be meant by 
the terms 'oppression' and 'empowerment' within a critical analytical 
framework. Instead of defining oppression in terms of the restriction 
of individual choice, we may now see this in terms of restriction of 
transactional repertoire through different social groups having unequal 
access to specific sets of subject positions within the organisation of 
a social formation. Ruling groups may be seen as those who have managed 
to secure privileged access to particular subject positions within 
prevailing economic, discursive and emotional structures - ones that 
give them effective control over vital resources and social practices, 
and hence opportunities to force other groups into subject positions of 
subordination if they wish to participate in (and even survive within) 
the current social order. These structures may exist at all scales of a 
social formation, being integral to the construction of nation states, 
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workplaces, families, personal subjectivities and so on. On a day to 
day basis, these structures are reproduced through the terms under which 
material. discursive and emotional transactions may be conducted: those 
of domination and subordination. 
Empowerment may perhaps best be defined as the ability to move into 
subject positions that offer opportunities for renegotiation, sharing, 
resistance and collective action. It is important to note that the goal 
of empowerment is not (as in bourgeois notions of power and competition) 
to achieve power over others, or over other elements of oneself, but is 
to achieve an equal right of participation. At any scale of 
social/personal organisation. it involves entering into (and 
maintaining) internal and external transactions of recognition that 
continually open up new experiences. ideas and opportunities - the 
broadening of a transactional repertoire. Similarly, it involves 
linking in with other people (or parts of oneself) with a shared 
experience of oppression, first of all to achieve consciousness of an 
injustice, and then to renegotiate specific power structures, so that 
all members of a group have accepted rights of access to hitherto 
unavailable subject positions (whether material, discursive or 
emotional). For example, black people and women are still struggling 
for equal access to employee subject positions - to be able to go to a 
job interview on an equal rather than a subordinate basis in relation to 
white men. Such a struggle for empowerment may be seen to take place 
simultaneously within the organisation of the personal subjectivities of 
the people concerned, and between (organised) groups of such people and 
institutionalised power structures. 
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Defined in these terms, empowerment is a complex and dynamic process of 
subtle changes in organisation. It is a process of continual struggle 
in which superficial advances may mask the underlying continuity of 
oppressive relations, or may cumulatively contribute to bringing about 
permanent changes in access to key subject positions - an understanding 
that derives form Gramsci's 'War of Position'. Whereas Gramsci's 
analysis was constructed in relation to changes in the power structures 
of a nation state, similar principles may be seen to apply in relation 
to the organisation of families and individual subjectivities. Thus 
empowerment may be seen not as an all-or-nothing process of individuals 
having or being denied their 'choices' - as in bourgeois notions of 
'democracy', but an incremental process of struggle and rearrangement, 
one that (even momentarily) opens up potential subject positions and 
transactional possibilities that had previously been denied by some 
combination of internalised and external oppression. Once deconstructed 
in this way, 'individuals' (and potentially 'families') may be seen as 
organisations that may both open up and repress specific transactional 
possibilities. Furthermore, what may open up a 'choice' for the unit as 
a whole may simultaneously close off possibilities for constituent 
elements. Such an understanding of empowerment has implications, not 
just for theory, but also for research methodology (see Chapter 9). 
Defined in these terms, empowerment may no longer be measured in any 
straightforward way, such as, say, a consumer survey. Expressed 
satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) may only give limited clues as to the 
real position since, by definition, people will tend to be unaware of 
the transactional possibilities from which they are excluded until they 
are in a situation that allows and supports their emergence. 
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Introdyctign 
In comparison with entities such as the 'individual' or 'society', there 
has been relatively little theoretical work done on the 'family' as an 
object of study in its own right. The subject area lies uncomfortably 
between the scales of analysis and the orientations of psychology, 
sociology, anthropology and economics. The term 'the family' is itself 
the subject of much ambiguity and confusion, as it is used to describe a 
material and emotional entity that does not correspond neatly either 
with the social relations of kinship or with those of cohabitation: 
"It is important to ask what a family is and how it may best be 
defined... No single criterion such as blood relationships, 
marriage ties or membership of a household is adequate. 'The 
family' is a relative term, whose meaning can change with time and 
place, with class and sex" (Jordanova 1981 p.44). 
The 'family' may also exist as an idea that is constructed and 
manipulated within political discourse: as an organisation of values and 
sentiments that is relatively autonomous in relation to any actual 
family forms, but nevertheless may have a determining influence on how 
people (try to) live. It is helpful to differentiate 'the family' as a 
set of ideas and values from 'the family' as a set of material 
relationships: the two may often be out of step with one another at any 
particular historical conjuncture, but both may be of equal importance 
in any critical analysiS: 
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"The contradictions between the ideological intentions of the family 
and its socio-economic base do not mean that we say the former is 
false" (Kitchell 1971 p.156; see also Barrett and KcIntosh 1982). 
In looking at critical understandings of 'the family', it is necessary 
to situate our discussion within a historical and trans-cultural 
perspective. The modern Western nuclear family must be seen as only one 
form of familial organisation among many. In fact, the word 'family', 
meaning a unit of co-resident kin, does not exist in many cultures: 
"Among the Zinacantecos of southern Mexico, the basic social unit is 
defined as a 'house', which may include from 1 to 20 people. 
Zinacantecos have no difficulty talking about an individual's 
parents, children or spouse; but Zinacantecos do not have a single 
word that identifies the unit of parents and children in such a way 
as to cut it off from other units" (Collier et al 1982 p. 28). 
Similarly, the use of 'family' to mean co-resident kin only emerged in 
European languages in relatively recent times. Mitterauer and Sieder 
(1982) found that no such word was to be found in the German language 
until the Middle Ages. Similarly Flandrin found that, up until the 
eighteenth century, French dictionaries defined a 'family' either: 
(1) "As a group of co-residents not necessarily linked by blood or 
marriage", or 
(U)"As a set of kin who did not live together" <1979 p.4>. 
ThuS, there were two essentially separate meanings of the term 'family': 
on the one hand, a system of kinship organised around a lineage, and on 
the other, a co-resident household comprising a domestic labour force 
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and other lodgers, many of whom would not be related by any ties of 
blood or marriage, but all of whom would be subject to the authority of 
the male head of household; it is only with the emergence of the 
bourgeois nuclear family that these two meanings became conflated. 
The work of other historians (Aries 1973, Shorter 1976, and Stone 1977) 
has emphasised the variety and real discontinuity in Western family 
forms. Placed together with cross-cultural perspectives derived from 
anthropology, this starts to provide the foundation for a critical 
perspective on conventional notions on 'the family', both as a (Western 
bourgeois) ideal, and as a set of actual material relations between 
women and men, and between adults and children. There is much evidence 
that the process of family history is not one of the gradual evolution 
of a single form, but is marked by multiple forms <related to culture 
and social class) and relatively sudden transitions from one form to 
another. In recent times, there have emerged explicit challenges to the 
prevailing forms of family organisation, from the kibbutz to feminist 
and alternative households. Lesbians and gay men have openly 
constructed their own living arrangements, and women have chosen to be 
single parents. In order to illustrate this variety of family forms, I 
will give a brief overview of some of the specific models by which 
familial relations have been organised, each of which may, in turn, vary 
according to cultural and historical context. (For example, the 
organisation of a black working class family may differ significantly 
from its white counterpart, due to its particular cultural heritage and 
experience of racism.) This selection is not intended, by any means, to 
be exhaustive. 
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lb. familY-CQmmyni\y 
In some traditional societies, it is clearly meaningless to break down 
the social organisation of a community into discrete 'family' units of 
parents and children. If the word 'family' is to have any useful 
meaning in such contexts, it can only be to connote the specific 
organisation of 'familiar' relationships between men and women, and 
between adults and children: 
"Among the Kundurucu of tropical South America ... the men of the 
village traditionally lived in a men's house with all the village 
bays over the age of 13; women lived with other women and young 
children in two or three houses grouped around the men's house. In 
Kundurucu society, men and women ate and slept apart. Ken ate in 
the men's house, sharing food the women had cooked and delivered to 
them; women ate with other women and children in their own houses" 
(Collier et al 1982 p.28). 
Kundurucu society had overtly patriarchal elements, particularly at the 
level of material relations. In terms of the division of labour, it was 
the Mundurucu women who had to cook for the men and look after their 
children. As women were not co-resident with men, it would appear that 
the closest emotional relationships would be within, rather than across, 
gender groups, with a husband and wife -meeting only for sexual 
intercourse" (ibid.). 
There has been considerable debate within anthropology as to whether, 
despite the absence of conventional family forms in more communal 
societies, patriarchal control over women's economic activity and 
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sexuality may nevertheless be universal as an underlying structure. 
Meillassoux (1981), who studied West African societies, found he was 
consistently able to define discrete domestic units on the basis of 
identifying a male figure who not only exerted authority over the 
organisation of economic production and distribution, but also over 
reproduction and child-rearing practices. Re also found that among the 
men of the community there was an elite group of elders who collecively 
made and enforced decisions in relation both to other men and to all 
women and children - an intersection of class and patriarchal 
domination. 
Such a universal male domination of family relations in African 
societies has been disputed by Leacock (1978), who suggests that it was 
the impact of colonialism that led to the removal of women from 
significant positions in public and economic life. Olivia Rarris argues 
the need for a more detailed analysis to highlight the very significant 
variation in the degree of patriatrchal control within the family 
relations of different cultures: 
"In agrarian societies men and women may own different sorts of 
property and control independently what is produced from it; or 
economic transactions between wife and husband can take the form of 
commodity exchange, as is found in parts of East and West Africa ... 
Children too cannot be assumed to be under the direct, exclusive 
control of a household head. There are many examples of women's 
control of the labour of their children, a control which is 
jealously guarded ... The nature and extent of [patriarchal] control 
needs to be investigated and specified" (1985 p.126). 
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The aristocratic family form 
In material terms, the European aristocratic household comprised a large 
unit of between 20 and 200 people, the majority of whom would not be 
blood relations of the household head but would be involved in running 
the household and the estate (see Poster 1978). The house itself would 
be a public and political place - a place to be seen in, not a place for 
privacy, even in terms of sleeping arrangements. For male aristocrats, 
both the meanings of 'family' identified by Flandrin provided the 
ideological legitimatation for their continued control over the social 
order: lineage guaranteed the system of inheritance of wealth and 
status, while the 'house' formed the unit for the exploitation of the 
domestic labour of relatives and servants. In Europe, while the head of 
household - the 'paterfamilias' - was conventionally a man, a woman 
could take on the stewardship of the man's role (as if she were a man) 
until the next adult male heir became available. This contrasts with 
the even more overtly patriarchal nature of Far Eastern feudalism: 
"In most parts of Europe historically a widow has replaced her dead 
husband, thus asserting that criteria of age and the status of 
parenthood are prior to those of sex. In Japan however, a boy 
however young would traditionally be preferred to an adult woman" 
(Harris 1985 p.128i see also Koyama 1962). 
Lineage and inheritance were seen as all important, so that marriage, 
and the arrangement of suitable partners by the respective families, was 
essentially a political and economic decision. As a consequence, there 
was little expectation that sexual relations be confined to marriage and 
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so the nobility (both male and female) practiced what Stone (1977) 
refers to as "serial polygamy". Noble women were seen as having their 
own sexuality, and there was no expectation on them to be concerned with 
child-rearing or house management. Children would be looked after by 
servants. According to Poster (1978), children would tend to be treated 
more as pets than as human beings in their own right: they could be seen 
as objects of vicarious amusement by adults, and were controlled by 
physical chastisement. However, no prohibition was placed on their 
experiencing bodily pleasure or sexual feelings. 
Despite the historical transition in the West from feudalism to 
capitalism, many of the features of the aristocratic family form may be 
seen to have been adopted by the ruling elite of the bourgeois class, 
both in Europe and America. Rayna Rapp, studying the contemporary class 
structure in America, was still able to identify an "upper class" family 
form of "multiple households •.. filled with service workers rather than 
exclusively with kin and friends" (1982 p.182). Within such family 
configurations, women are not expected to undertake much domestic 
labour, but have the primary role of being 'on show' to the rest of the 
world. Their conspicuous 'leisure' acts both as a demonstration of the 
family's elite class position and as a means of constructing the 
idealised role that women are expected to perform in society at large: 
"They appear as wives and mothers, but it is not really their family 
roles but their class roles that dictate those appearances ... They 
influence our cultural notations of what feminine and familial 
behaviour should be" (ibid. pp. 182-3). 
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The p.a.ant family form 
In European culture, the peasant family form was defined by the 
intersection of the aristocratic definitions of 'family' and a material 
reality in which such a discrete organisation of family life under the 
control of a 'paterfamilias' was impossible, and communality in social 
and economic organisation was necessary. While Poster argues that, in a 
very real sense, "the village was the peasant's 'family'" (1978 p.185), 
nevertheless, "household heads in early modern England were held 
responsible for the discipline and the moral, spiritual and physical 
welfare of the members of their household" (Chaytor 1980 p.30). In 
certain non-European peasant cultures, the head of the household would 
not be the father but a male relative of the mother - an instance where 
patriarchal power is not actually vested in the biological father. Such 
a form of organisation, coupled with a system of descent that follows 
the maternal and not the paternal line, is to be found among the 
traditional organisation of certain Indian castes - for example the 
Bants (peasant cultivators) and the Mogers (fishermen) - see Carstairs 
and Kapur (1976). 
The crucial factor which defines the structure of the peasant family is 
its role as a unit of economic production in which all family members 
participated. The household could consist, not just of a man's wife and 
children, but also of other relatives, such as a younger brother or aged 
parents, or even of hired workers. Here, as in the case of the 
aristocracy, marriage was based on hard economic considerations and not 
an ideology of romanticisation. Jordanova writes as follows: 
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"In peasant cultures ... the economic participation of women and 
children was taken for granted ... A wife or husband would therefore 
be chosen with such practicalities in mind, and a woman's skills, 
proven work capacity, hard earned dowry, even her proven fertility 
if labour were needed, were all important assets" (1981 p.43) 
Although the status of women (and children) within the family did not 
reflect the full value of their contribution to the domestic economy, 
they nevertheless derived some degree of influence from this - a power 
base that was lost as rural economies were transformed from feudalism to 
capitalism (see Harris 1985 p.126). Nevertheless, differential rights 
of consumption within the family in no way reflected the real value of 
labour performed - only a hierarchy of status based on generation and 
gender. In relations to food, it was the "head of the family ..• who 
takes the biggest pieces. He also takes the best" (Delphy 1984 p.45). 
Given the full-time involvement of both parents and elder siblings in 
the labour process, Poster cites contemporary sources to suggest that, 
among peasant families, young children would have been left to their own 
devices as a partially autonomous peer-group, with older children 
guiding younger ones, and the whole under the collective control of the 
village community. In some communities, babies would be swaddled or 
given to another woman to wet-nurse. Therefore it seems reasonable to 
assume that parents (and, in particular, mothers) were not encouraged to 
form the sort of exclusive emotional bonds with their children that are 
characteristic of the bourgeois family form. As with the children of 
aristocratiC families, there is no evidence that peasant children were 
prohibited from experiencing bodily gratification. 
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Ibe We.tern bourgepi. family form 
The emergence of the bourgeois class in the late eighteenth century 
marked a radically new economic and ideological basis for the family. 
Whereas the aristocrat had simply sought to maintain his wealth through 
the smooth running of his estates, and spend the surplus on patronage 
and conspicuous consumption, the bourgeois sought to accumulate capital 
through a controlled and disciplined lifestyle. Such a degree of 
regulation could only be achieved by withdrawing the family from the 
public sphere, and so kinship relations took on a much narrower meaning. 
Whereas for the aristocrat, kinship implied a network of obligation and 
patronage, and for the peasant, a survival net of material support, no 
such notions of 'extended family' were relevant to the bourgeois, only a 
specified line of inheritance: 
"Kinship probably shifts from the lateral to the lineal. That is, 
resources (material and economic) are invested lineally, between 
parents, children and grandchildren, and not dispersed into larger 
networks" (Rapp 1982 p. 181>. 
Aries (1973) links the historical emergence into popular discourse of 
the concept of 'childhood' with the emergence of the bourgeois class, 
between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. Prior to this, 
childhood was not seen as a state of vulnerability, requiring special 
care and attention. This new ideology of 'childhood' also implied a new 
ideology of 'motherhood': the hitherto unheard-of assumption that a 
woman should devote herself full-time to the emotional nurturing of her 
child. This romanticisation of childrearing was parallelled by a 
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romanticisation of marriage, which was no longer seen as an arrangement 
based on economic practicality - although the ideal of romantic love 
actually contained within it the assumption that the woman would take on 
the full-time emotional care of her husband in return for being 
financially supported. 
Such ideological shifts served to set up the bourgeois family as a 
privatised "haven in a heartless world", providing a sanctuary against 
the competitive maelstrom of capitalism (see Lasch 1977). However, 
feminists have rightly pOinted out that it is only a 'haven' for men; it 
remains a place of feudal oppression for women who become constituted as 
full-time carers for children and men: 
"The family household is the place where men ... can expect comfort, 
service, care and loving attention from a wife, daughters or 
sisters. It is presented as the opposite to the world of work. But 
. .. the family household is a large part of the world of work for 
women ... For women, therefore, the family household can never be a 
refuge from the demand of work and society" (Gittins 1985 p.166). 
The emergence of the bourgeois family was accompanied by a large body of 
ideological practice that exhorted families to conform to particular 
standards and ideals, much of which was devoted to subduing and denying 
the sexuality and independent will of women and children, and any 
manifestations of 'perverse' sexuality among men. Freud (1896) gives us 
some insight into the internal web of intense and repressed emotional 
relations that resulted from this. As Foucault (19B1) pOints out, the 
effort that went into defining and denying sexuality, particularly in 
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relation to women and children, served only to emphasise its importance. 
For women, their simultaneous sexualisation and disqualification 
resulted in their Mhystericisation": the conflation of their 
reproductive function with their supposed irrationality as part of a 
wider familial ideology that defined them as too fragile to take part in 
economic production: 
"Relations within the bourgeois family were regulated by strict sex-
role divisions. The husband •.• provided for the family ... The 
wife, considered less rational and capable, concerned herself 
exclusively with the home" (Poster 1978 p.169). 
The corollary of this new bourgeois ideology of domestiCity. was that 
women came to be held responsible for all aspects of the health and 
well-being of the whole family - a position of enormous responsibility, 
but with little real power (see Graham 1984). 
Although disenfranchised in terms of economics or ideological power, the 
claustrophobic intimacy and isolation of the bourgeois family rendered 
women most influential (but nevertheless exploited) at the level of 
emotionality. There is evidence that it has been women's mounting 
tension and frustration at this level that has led to their slow but 
significant rebellion against this construction of domesticity. For 
example, it has become increasingly acceptable for bourgeois women to go 
out to work, not out of economic necessity, but in order to relieve the 
boredom of their lives. Such jobs tend to be seen as a 'second income'. 
allowing the woman a small emotional 'breathing space' while not 
threatening the economic primacy of the man's income, and hence the 
fundamental economic relations of the bourgeois household. 
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rh. working ,lacc family form 
The form of the working class family arose out of the earlier peasant 
family form under the pervasive influence of bourgeois familial ideology 
and the (often contradictory) impact of capitalist relations of 
production. Instead of all members of the household working together as 
a single unit of economic production, each could be hired and fired 
separately as individual wage labourers. This new form of economic 
freedom fundamentally threatened patriarchal domination, as the labour 
of women and children was no longer under the control of the male head 
of household. This opened up a contradiction between the interests of 
the ruling class as capitalists (to exploit the wage labour of all 
family members) and as patriarchs (to maintain male domination). If 
this had allowed working class women to achieve an inadvertent degree of 
economic independence from men, this could easily have set up an 
ideological backlash of expectation among bourgeois women. 
Patriarchal domination could only be reasserted at the level of 
ideology, and this at the expense of maximising capitalist exploitation. 
The ideologies of the bourgeois family, particularly the vulnerability 
of women and children and their 'proper place' being in the home, were 
promulgated as the universal ideal for all respectable families (see 
Davidoff and Hall 1987). Barrett identifies this spread of bourgeois 
family values in relation to the ideological shifts that underlay the 
apparently altruistic protective legislation which was introduced in the 
mid-nineteenth century to regulate and curtail the involvement of women 
and children in factory work: 
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"This represented a material defeat for the interests of working 
women and, furthermore, one that is not simply explicable in terms 
of a proposed logic of capitalist development. It involved an 
assumption, shared by the labour movement amomg others, that the 
relegation of women to domesticity and childcare was natural and 
desirable .•. The eventual outcome was the product of an ideology of 
gender division that was incorporated into the capitalist division 
of labour rather than spontaneously generated by it (1980 p.138). 
Another response to the politically dangerous instability of the working 
class family was increasing state involvement and intervention, from the 
Poor Laws through to the Welfare State. As Donzelot argues, under 
feudalism, full authority was delegated to the (male) household head to 
maintain order within his family "in keeping with the requirements of 
public order", whereas under capitalism, "the family appears as though 
colonised" (1980 pp.xx,103). A whole external technology of advice, 
guidance and counselling is seen to be established, through the 
institutions of medicine, public health and social services, for 
supervising, managing and "policing" family life, particularly among the 
working classes. As with the bourgeois family, it was now the woman who 
was held accountable on a day-to-day basis for all aspects of family 
life (although the man retained all legitimated power and authority). 
Thus, more specifically, it has tended to be working class women who 
have been policed by the various state apparatuses. 
From the late nineteenth century onwards, the family structure of the 
skilled working class tended to diverge from that of the manual working 
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olass, as some men were able to earn a 'family wage' sufficient for them 
to place the rest of their family within the bourgeois ideology of 
domesticity. However, Barrett argues that, for the majority of working 
olass families, their oonstruotion in relation to this bourgeois 'ideal' 
has been in contradiction with their actual material experience: 
"At an ideological level the bourgeoisie ... secured a hegemonic 
definition of family life ... as properly organised through a male 
breadwinner with financially dependent wife and children ... Yet 
there is a disjunction between the pervasiveness of this ideology 
... and the actual household structure of the proletariat in which 
it exists. Few working olass households have historically been 
organised around dependence on a male 'breadwinning' wage and the 
earnings of other family members have usually been essential to 
maintain the household" <1980 p. 204). 
Although constrained by this ideology to keep up the appearance of 
autonomy, many working class families have relied on a network of 
material inter-dependence. As a way of resolving this contradiction, 
men would generally uphold the image of autonomy within the outside 
communities of work and leisure (e.g. the pub), while it was left to 
women, behind the scenes, to borrow and exchange the means of survival. 
From this arises Rayna Rapp's crucial distinction between the family 
organisation of the "settled living" (or respectable) working class, 
where the normative bourgeois ideal can actually be achieved, from that 
of the "hard living" working class where this is practically impOSSible: 
"Given the state of the job market, welfare legislation and 
segregated slum housing these people are essentially living 
-121-
Critical perspectives DD the family 
below socially necessary reproduction costs. They therefore 
reproduce themselves by spreading out the aid and the risks involved 
in daily life... Families do not exhibit the radical split between 
'private, at home' and 'public, at work' found in the families of 
the stable working class .•. There can be no privatisation when 
survival may depend on rapid circulation of limited resources" (1982 
pp. 177,179). 
In Bethnal Green of the 1950s, Young and Wilmott found a working class 
family form that still failed to conform exactly to the bourgeois ideal. 
An extended support network of female kin was still much in evidence, 
with nearly a third of married women choosing to live on the same street 
or block of flats as their mother. For the majority of married women, 
the extended family of grandmother, daughters and grandchildren was very 
much a reality: most had seen their mother in the previous 24 hours. 
The men still had their social life based around work and pub, but these 
were thought to be declining in importance. However, the bourgeois 
construction of childhood had begun to hold sway, with family life 
becoming increasingly home-centred and children becoming idealised and 
being given preferential treatment - a shift which was showing signs of 
undermining the overt privileges of the head of the household, as shown 
in the following interview: 
"We're different with our boy. We make more of a mate of him. When 
I was a kid Dad always had the best of everything. Now it's the 
children who get the best of it. If there's one pork chop left, the 
kiddy gets it" (1986 p.28). 
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Breaking Lbe moyld' non-normative family forms 
The forgoing models of family relations may be seen as having a reality, 
both in the sense of describing typical modes of material and emotional 
organisation, and also in the sense of describing specific ideological 
constructions of how a 'family' should be within a particular 
historical, cultural and class context. Clearly, many actual living 
arrangements have not coincided exactly with such normative models of 
organisation. Many of these, while not adhering to the norm, may not 
have challenged it in any way. Such idiosyncratic arrangements would be 
understood, both by the partiCipants themselves, and by the community at 
large, as appropriate responses to unavoidable circumstances. For 
example, a bereavement could leave a mother in the position of bringing 
up a family on her own. Despite the absence of an actual father, such a 
family unit would continue to be organised around (and hence reaffirm) 
the existence of such a position: it would be identified as a 'lack' 
within familial discourse. The woman could be seen as (temporarily> 
having to be both 'mother' and 'father' to her children. 
Although the organisation of such a family unit may reproduce some 
elements of the patriarchal norm, research on 'women-headed' single 
parent families has shown a significant 'flattening' of internal 
hierarchical arrangements (see Weiss 1979; Cashion 1982>. Children are 
typically given more responsibility for themselves and mothers more 
often negotiate decisions with them rather than simply imposing their 
authority. Interestingly. this would seem to lead to a greater sense of 
empowerment for mothers: 
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"In contrast to the two-parent family where mother and father 
establish a hierarchy with themselves at the top (father a bit more 
at the top than mother) and the children at the bottom. the single 
parent family typically functions as a consensus arrangement ... The 
consultative process with her children gives [the mother] a greater 
sense of power and competence than she would have as the wife of 
someone who not only dominates the children but her as well" 
(Goodrich et al 1988 p.73). 
Women who form single parent families out of choice (for example by 
refusing to submit to violence and abuse from a partner) may be seen to 
pose a much more fundamental threat to the dominance of patriarchal 
family forms. This is most significant (leading to the strongest 
ideological backlash) in the instance of lesbian mothers: 
"Society's view of heterosexual single mothers ... is that there is 
always the comforting assumption that a conventional relationship 
with a man is a possibility, and that the traditional social and 
economic relationships between men and women in society are not 
therefore really being contravened. Society cannot make such 
comforting assumptions about lesbians, who have challenged the 
conventional ideology of the family and rejected the cultural norm, 
by deliberately choosing social, economic, emotional and sexual 
independence from men" (Steel 1990 pp.10-11). 
Evidence of the backlash may be found in the systematic descrimination 
that lesbian mothers have faced in the courts in relation to custody 
decisions (see Rights Of Women 1986). The relative isolation of women 
in such positions can lead to a lack of 'power together' that may be 
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compounded by their being placed at considerable economic disadvantage 
due to the lack of state or workplace childcare provision. Through the 
impact of such external pressures, those households that effectively 
reject prevailing familial ideology are forced to experience themselves 
as being 'deviant' or a 'social problem' within prevailing discourses -
as lacking the all-important heterosexual patriarch that would make 
their organisation 'complete': 
"Because the [bourgeois] family is deemed the only organisation in 
which to live, all those who live outside it are either odd, 
abnormal or, in the worst cases, social outcasts ... The widowed 
are largely ignored because they occupy their place outside the 
family only reluctantly and certainly blamelessly. But for the rest 
of these people - homosexuals, lesbians, unsupported mothers and so 
on ... the conclusion which is imposed on them and with which they 
have to live, is that they have failed ... Not only are they outside 
the family because they threaten it, they were until recently, 
outside the laP!' (Comer 1974 pp. 207-8). 
To some degree, local gay and lesbian communities have been able to 
construct their own alternative 'norms' of domestic organisation in 
opposition to the hegemony of patriarchal family forms (although, at 
times, still using the terms of the dominant discourse). As Goodrich et 
al note, "Some lesbian communities may expect couples to be monogamous, 
while other communities may hold monogamy to be oppressive" (1988 
p.144). Research has shown that, despite the ever-present availability 
of patriarchal 'blueprints' for constructing relationships <e.g. 
'active'/'passive' or 'masculine'/'femtnine' roles), gay people have 
-125-
Critical perspectives on the family 
shown surprisingly little tendency to conform to such stereotypes (see 
Barrett 1980 p.65). 
Perhaps the most concerted attempt to construct an alternative family 
form has been the kibbutz movement. This achieved a shift, in both 
material and ideological arrangements, from a traditionally tight 
organisation of kinship/co-residence to a communal organisation of 
living and working, with a professionalisation of child-rearing (see 
Bettelheim 1969j Tiger and Shepher 1975). As Goldthorpe argues, the 
kibbutzim were established with the intention (if not always the 
practice) of equal rights and work responsibilities for all men and 
women without any form of class distinction: 
"[1nl the communal dining room ... cooking, serving, and clearing 
away were done by men and women alike on a rota basis, and there was 
no individual shopping for food ... Rewards and sustenance were 
collective and shared among all kibbutz members, not individual and 
effort- or enterprise-related. So no woman depended on any manj her 
sustenance was hers by right as a commune member" (1987 p.237). 
In many respects, the kibbutz may be seen as a family-community, but it 
differs form those in traditional societies in its explicit rejection of 
patriarchal and class oppression. This has resulted in significant 
differences in the way personal subjectivity has been constructed for 
those children brought up in the kibbutz, compared to those, for 
example, brought up within the patriarchal capitalism of North America: 
"If intense group ties discourage individuation, neither do they 
breed human isolation, asocial behaviour or other forms of social 
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disorganisations that plague modern man in competitive society" 
(Bettelheim 1969 p.262). 
The kibbutz also differs from a traditional family-community in that 
many (but not all) of the adult members of a kibbutz would be part of 
close monogamous partnerships which would constitute their closest 
emotional relationships. However, contradictions have emerged between 
the principles of communality and egalitarianism, and the experience of 
intimacy within conventionally privatised relationships, resulting in 
"a shift from socialist ideals" (Barrett and XcIntosh 1982 p.53). 
Other rejections of the 'nuclear' family form have tended to be more ad 
hoc and not part of any organised mass movement sufficiently powerful to 
bring about a fundamental shift in normative ideologies. While some new 
forms of household organisation have been based on an explicit critique, 
others have simply arisen out of individual and collective choices. 
Within the commune movement of the 1960s and 1970s, radical alternatives 
to the nuclear family were tried out. Although there was some challenge 
to certain aspects of conventional family life - for instance more open 
sexual relationships and more sharing of childcare - they generally 
failed to challenge the fundamentally patriarchal organisation of family 
relations. It has only been with the emergence of gay or pro-feminist 
households that this issue has begun to be addressed. 
In practice, it has not proved easy to set up alternative living units 
that are both stable, unoppressive and intimate - whether based around 
heterosexual or gay relationships (or both). Problems have arisen due 
to the ever-present pressure of conventional ideology (for example, as 
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the children mix with others at the local school) and the always 
available 'easy option' of opting back in to a more 'normal' (i.e. 
patriarchal) family structure. Furthermore, given that each participant 
will probably have internalised large elements of patriarchal ideology 
from their family of origin, it is not surprising that there is a 
tendency either to reproduce such relations as soon as close 
relationships are established in a new household, or for there to be 
confusion and uncertainty as people attempt intimacy without any 
mutually recognised 'conventions' of emotional relations: 
"We have become very good at establishing ... relatively relaxed 
households where all the gendered roles and patriarchal expectations 
have been banished •.. But it is ... [in] dealing with emotionality, 
our needs to be needed, our desires for autonomy •.. dependency, 
commitment, vulnerability, closeness, caring that the dynamics 
of our new alternatives founder" (Cl ark 1983 p.174). 
While these same issues can cause tension and sometimes break-up within 
a 'normal' family unit, their impact is limited by the pre-existence of 
conventional sets of beliefs and practices by which many 'difficult' 
areas of emotionality are suppressed and the mores of 'family life' 
sustained. By contrast, new family forms must, as it were, construct 
themselves from scratch, so that all such issues have to be confronted 
directly within a social context that undermines and denies their 
legitimacy. Thus, break-up may be more frequent. even though, in some 
ways, the degree of internal tension may actually be less than for a 
conventional family unit - as it may be constructed around a lesser 
degree of patriarchal oppression. 
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Theoretical perspectives on fAmilial Organisation 
From our overview of different configurations of familial relations, the 
picture that emerges is one of great variation in what may be meant by 
'family'. Nevertheless, in any given context, some specific set of 
arrangements may be seen to exist which governs the organisation of 
material interdependence. intimate relationships and the upbringing of 
children. This form of organisation may be seen to be a crucial basis 
for individual and collective survival. one which may be legitimised by 
a particular set of practices and discourses within a given social 
formation. However. such survival may be at the cost of accepting and 
reproducing certain patterns of inequality and oppression among family 
members. For each. 'the family' may organise their participation in the 
wage and domestic labour processes, their rights in relation to 
consumption. their experience of intimacy and the provision of physical 
and emotional care - all in ways that may be profoundly unequal or 
exploi tati ve. In such ways, the institution of • the family' can be 
crucial in constructing the personal subjectivities of children (and in 
continually reconstructing the personal subjectivities of adult family 
members) . 
Any familial organisation may be seen to comprise a set of material. 
discursive and emotional relations that may be oppressive or empowering, 
or some combination of both. • The family'. in any specific historical 
and cultural context, may be seen to be organised by, and a site of 
operation of. the power struggles of gender, class and race that are 
specific to that social formation. It may also be seen to be 
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constructed in relation to other state and civil institutions, modes of 
production and prevailing ideologies within that social formation. 
Nevertheless, we have seen the degree to which it has been possible to 
break away from ideologically prescribed family forms - although, as we 
saw with the kibbutz and feminist households, it is in no way 
straightforward to construct a secure domestic unit that does not 
reproduce any of the oppression and tension of more traditional family 
forms. Nevertheless, as female-headed (single parent) families have 
demonstrated, it is possible to develop a familial organisation that is 
significantly less structured around 'power over' and more around 'power 
together', one in which both children and parents receive a greater 
degree of respect and recognition. 
In general, the external relations of 'the family' may be seen to be 
determined by the prevailing relations of class exploitation and racial 
domination. A family may typically be seen to be organised as a unit 
whose collective class and racial position determines whether all family 
members are able to oppress, or are subject to the oppression of, the 
members of other families. For example, all members of a bourgeois 
family unit are placed in a position of power over those who are 
organised as part of a working class family unit. Similarly, those who 
belong to a 'white' family are located in a position of potential 
domination over others who are part of a 'black' family. <Mixed race or 
mixed class families constitute interesting special cases in which they 
may simultaneously be organised on the basis of two somewhat 
contradictory sets of relations). External relations of oppression may 
also have a determining effect on the ways in which internal relations 
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may be oppressive (see Barrett and Mclntosh 1980, 1985) or, conversely, 
supportive and empowering in enabling family members to resist their 
oppression by collective struggle (see Humphries 1977, Carby 1982). 
Familial relations are determined by <and actively reproduce) wider 
structures of patriarchy within the social formation. On the one hand, 
specific practices within family life may maintain and reinforce the 
authority of the 'paterfamilias' within a particular society. On the 
other, the question of who is and is not empowered to 'represent' the 
family outside in its material and discursive transactions may, in turn, 
be seen to structure inequalities of power within the internal relations 
of the family. The manner in which women, children, gay and older 
people are discriminated against within the external relations of the 
social formation (for example, in the job market) has a determining 
effect on the degree to which a man is in a position to dominate women, 
children and other men within a familial organisation. As we have seen, 
the degree to which family life is dominated by patriarchal organisation 
would seem to vary considerably, with women in some social formations 
having the opportunity to organise outside the family and exert power 
via the public sphere, while, in others, women may only be powerful 
within familial networks of exchange and support, or are effectively 
contained within the domestic sphere. 
In the next sections, I will review how critical theory offers ways of 
understanding the processes that underlie the various phenomenal forms 
of family life at the levels of material, ideological and emotional 
relations. 
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Material relations 
Within a specific social formation, the institution of the family may be 
seen to organise certain economic and physical relations between men, 
women and children. These may comprise some combination of exploitation 
or support, domination or empowerment. The family may organise aspects 
of economic production and consumption, and also of the reproduction of 
labour power and the care of those who are not economically active. 
Furthermore, it may regUlate the transmission of wealth or other 
privileges between generations, often resulting in the perpetuation of 
inequalities both between families and between different family members. 
As well as embodying such economic inequalities, a family form may also 
be organised on the basis of relations of physical force and coercion. 
As we have seen, the bourgeois family form has been organised on the 
basiS of collective economic 'power over' families of subordinate 
classes, in particular, the accumulation, control and transmission of 
wealth (and other privileges). As Xarx and Engels argue: 
"On what foundation is the present family, the bourgeOiS family, 
based? On capital, on private gain. In its completely developed 
form this family exists only among the bourgeoiSie ... [and] will 
vanish •.. with the vanishing of capital- (Xarx 1977 p.234). 
It may also be seen to be constructed around the exercise of economic 
'power over' women by men, both in terms of day-to-day organisation and 
in terms of the passing on of wealth and other privileges down the male 
line. Wives are firmly restricted from occupying significant positions 
of economic power in their own right outside the home (any paid 
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employment being seen as more of an 'interest' or a 'hobby' than as an 
economic status in its own right), but they are expected to do any 
domestic labour that is required (although working class women may be 
employed as cleaners and nannies to cover some of this work). As 
bourgeois women have no right to remuneration in line with the quality 
or value of the domestic labour they perform, they are dependent on 
making a 'good' marriage in order to achieve financial security. Thus, 
while husband and wife may ostensibly share the same standard of living, 
this masks an underlying division in real economic power and their 
security is largely illusory: 
"Even though a marriage with a man from the capitalist class can 
raise a woman's standard of living, it does not make her a member of 
that class. She herself does not own the means of production... In 
the vast majority of cases, wives of bourgeois men whose marriage 
ends must earn their own living as wage-workers. They therefore 
become in practice ... the proletarians that they essentially were" 
<Delphy 1984. pp.70-1). 
Under feudalism, the household constituted the primary unit of economic 
exploitation: in order to achieve survival, people without land had 
little choice but to offer their services to the head of an existing 
household in exchange just for subsistence. It was Marx who identified 
how the economic coherence of the peasant family unit was being 
shattered by the logic of capitalist economic production in which men, 
women and children could be hired <and exploited) as separate units of 
labour power. In this way, the former patriarchal organisation of the 
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family had become irrelevant at an economic level as the labour market 
had become individualised: 
":Modern industry, by assigning as it does an important part in the 
process of production, outside the domestic sphere, to women, to 
young persons, and to children of both sexes, creates a new economic 
foundation for the family and •.• relations between the sexes" 
(:Marx 1970 p.490). 
However, as we have seen, under the guise of "protective" legislation, 
women were systematically denied the equality of opportunity in the job 
market which would have enabled them to be fully economically 
independent of men. Furthermore, whatever had happened in the 
workplace, capitalist production had not led to any dissolution of 
patriarchal relations within the family, in terms of the exploitation of 
women's domestic labour. It has been materialist feminist analyses that 
have analysed a second mode of production operating in parallel to that 
of capitalism: a domestic mode of production governed by neo-feudal 
power relations. Women (and sometimes children) are generally required 
to undertake whatever 'housework' or physic~l caring is needed within 
the family, without any right to material or other recognition for the 
services they provide (see Oakley 1974, 1976; Finch and Groves 1983). 
As Annette Kuhn pOints out, for both bourgeois and proletarian families, 
"The marriage contract gives the husband the right of access to his 
wife's labour in reproducing his labour power and by bearing and rearing 
his children" (Kuhn and Wolpe 1978 p.56). Delphy takes the argument a 
stage further in explaining the precise relations of the patriarchal 
exploitation of women's labour power within families: 
-134-
Critical perspectives on the family 
"Domestic services and child-rearing ... are excluded from the realm 
of exchange and consequently have no value. They are unpaid. 
Whatever women receive in return is independent of the work which 
they perform because it is not handed out in exchange for that work 
(i.e. as a wage to which their work entitles them) but rather as a 
gift. The husband's only obligation ... is to provide for his 
wife's basic needs, in other words he maintains her labour power" 
(1984 p. 60). 
Due to their continued involvement in the domestic mode of production, 
women in working class families are not liberated from familial 
oppression just through their participation in the capitalist wage 
labour process. Instead, subject to the combined forces of patriarchy 
and capitalism, the typical working class family has been reconstructed 
as a single economic unit, with the man as the 'breadwinner' while the 
wife doubles as 'housewife' and 'secondary' wage earner. Women's 
participation in the wage labour market is thus unequal - their work 
opportunities are defined by what they can fit around their domestic 
'obligations' to husband and children (see Close and Collins 1985). 
Although, as Oakley (1974) showed, women currently tend to work for 
longer hours overall than men (paid employment and housework), their 
disposable wealth or rights of consumption do not reflect this. While 
it is often considered legitimate for men to retain a part of their 
wages for personal consumption, a woman's earnings are conventionally 
considered as part of the "housekeeping", to be spent on herself only 
when (or if) the rest of the family is properly provided for (see 
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Barrett and McIntosh 1982j Land 1983). Among peasant families, Delphy 
(1984) found differentials in terms of the consumption of food, 
depending on gender and age, that were continually reinforced in day-to-
day family rituals and were underpinned by an elaborate system of 
"punishments and threats". The research of Charles and Kerr (1987) has 
shown that Delphy's conclusion is equally applicable to working class 
families. The privileges accorded to the head of the household in the 
respect clearly do not bear any relationship to the quantity of physical 
work performed - simply to his status. Indeed, much research on family 
poverty has shown how it is women who consistently 'go without' in order 
that men and children (usually in that order) can have the greater share 
of whatever resources are to be distributed <Pahl 1983j Graham 1984j 
Brannen and Vilson 198?). 
A wider perspective on what constitutes the material aspects of familial 
organisation must include, not just its structuring in terms of economic 
inequalities, but also on the basis of systematic physical coercion. 
Patriarchy may be seen, not just as a mode of economic exploitation, but 
also as an organisation of social relations on the basis of the 
potential for physical force. Men's competitive relations with other 
men are mediated by the potential for systematic violence <e.g. the role 
of the police and armed forces) and this underpins their structural 
domination of women and children <although, in these instances, such 
violence may be sexualised). Furthermore, men who suffer abuse and 
domination at the hands of other men may displace their aggression on to 
• softer' targets within the family. Thus men's potential for violence 
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towards women and children becomes part of the structuring of 'normal' 
family relationships: 
"These power relations include the tension and stress, the 
psychological violence, that comes with the anticipation of the 
arrival home of the 'absent' father ... Violent actions may be 
available as part of men's repertoire at all times, but are most 
used at times of particular threat ... Frustration and anger at 
possible or potential loss of power in one sphere may be acted upon 
in another sphere of relationship, where there may be less 
resistance" (Hearn 1990 pp.69-70). 
Within a patriarchal social formation, such violence is allowed to be 
seen as normal, and policing and legal apparatuses are structured in a 
way that does not provide adequate protection for potential victims. 
This is legitimated by the ideology of domestic 'privacy', While it is 
true that women and children often receive inadequate protection on the 
street (and thereby are intimidated into remaining at home or under the 
protection of their family), the degree of legal protection is actually 
far less within the home. Assaults against children in the form of 
physical punishments (from both parents, but typically more violent from 
fathers) are generally accepted and occur with greatest frequency 
against young children who are least able to defend themselves (for a 
fuller discussion of the extent of violence against women and children, 
see Hotaling et al 1988). Although, as a result of women's political 
struggles over the last century, certain forms of domestic assault are 
now covered by the same legal framework as they would have been if they 
had taken place outside the family (although women have only recently 
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received any protection against rape by their husbands in English law), 
such violence and intimidation towards women and children can still 
sometimes be redefined by the Police as "domestic disputes" into which 
they are reluctant to intervene. 
Patriarchal control over familial relations through the sanctioning of 
violence is particularly evident in the structuring of sexual relations 
between wife and husband. Such physical 'mastery' can be used to 
enforce control over women's sexual behaviour, with the husband exerting 
'rights of ownership' over his wife's sexuality and, in particular, her 
fertility (see Dobash and Dobash 1977 p.438). Even if a man has never 
been violent or threatened violence to his family, the combination of, 
typically, his greater physical strength and the absence of any proper 
outside protection, means that familial relations (and particularly 
sexual relations) are continually organised on the basis of the fear 
that even this man might, if sufficiently 'provoked', turn violent and 
harm other family members: 
"Not all women are physically battered, but because of the nature of 
marriage, most men have the power to batter 'their' woman if they so 
wish. Feminists therefore regard battering as the extreme end of a 
continuum of oppression suffered by all women to a greater or lesser 
extent depending on their class, marital status or degree of 
economic dependence on a man" (Binney 1981 p.124). 
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IdeQlogical aspec ta 
Familial ideology, as with any other form of ideology, may be seen as a 
means of domination by ruling groups, but also as a means of resistance 
by groups that are oppressed. It may be seen to comprise "a number of 
important and culturally specific beliefs about sexuality, reproduction, 
parenting and the power relationships between age groups and between the 
sexes" (Gittins 1985 p.70). Any concept of 'family' may be seen to be 
constructed at an intersection between the operation of (and resistance 
to) imperialist, capitalist and patriarchal ideologies: 
"The assumptions made today about the natural-and-proper 
organisation of family life can be shown to have arisen in 
particular historical circumstances. The definitions of motherhood, 
childhood, fatherhood, the representation of the home as a 'haven in 
a heartless world', have been forged out of veritable ideological 
and legal campaigns, and are subject to constant renegotiation as 
needs and circumstances change" <Harris 1985 p.122). 
Actual families exist in a dual relationship with familial ideology, 
both being determined by, and (to a greater or lesser extent) living 
out, this specified set of beliefs, understandings and practices, in the 
way that the household is organised. Such an ideal of 'family' may be 
in direct contradiction to the imperatives of material or emotional 
existence (for example, survival may depend on pooling resources and 
sharing emotional support among wider networks). It may proscribe the 
very form of organisation that people desire to construct for themselves 
(for example, heterosexist familial ideology may prevent lesbian or gay 
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living arrangements being seen as 'families' at all). Nevertheless, 
participation in prevailing discursive structures requires people to 
uphold such an 'ideal' family as the 'norm' against which their own 
arrangement may be judged - a norm which should be aspired to, if not 
always achieved. Within an oppressive social formation, such a norm may 
specify patterns of inequality and repression in the internal and 
external relations of the household: 
"The family is the normative, correct way in which people get 
recruited into households. It is through families that people enter 
into productive, reproductive and consumption relations. The two 
genders enter them differently" (Rapp 1982 p.170). 
It is crucialy in relation to this 'ideal' of family (and not just their 
actual experience of material and emotional relations) that children are 
inducted into their class and racial identities, and into the attitudes 
and expectations that attach to their gender and age (see Morgan 1985 
p.98). This 'ideal' existing within the discourse of their own living 
unit, and also in the external discourses in which they may be subjected 
(at school, on the street, with neighbours etc.), may be determining 
irrespective of their individual experience of how their own living unit 
operates. Even children brought up in gay, mixed race or pro-feminist 
households will still have to construct their identity, attitudes and 
expectations in relation to the dominant norms. They will inevitably 
learn that the absence of a 'father figure', or the existence of inter-
racial or same sex relationships, defines their living unit as 
'deviant', even though their own experience of this unit may be very 
positive. 
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From the Marxist perspectives of Gramsci and Althusser, the institution 
of 'the family' may be seen to be constructed outside the direct control 
of the State or the ruling class, in a similar way to other ideological 
"apparatuses" within civil society. As with other institutions of civil 
society, it may also be a place of organised resistance, representing 
"not only be the stake but also the site of class struggle" (Althusser 
1971 p.147). Under the social relations of imperialism, and both 
feudalism and capitalism, the institution of 'the family' has acted as a 
means of guaranteeing the inheritance of male members of ruling groups 
(and allied group fractions). It has been organised around a set of 
ideological concepts, such as legitimacy, lineage, and racial 'purity', 
that have enabled wealth and power to be passed from one generation of 
white ruling class men to another. For example, at the time that 
divorce was made legal in 1857, adultery was seen as having qUite 
separate meanings for men and for women. As the Lord Chancellor stated 
to the House of Lords: 
"A wife might, without any loss of caste, and possibly with 
reference to the interests of her children, or even of her husband, 
condone an act of adultery on the part of the husband, but the 
husband could not condone a similar act on behalf of a wife. No-one 
would venture to suggest that a husband could possibly do so ... for 
... the adultery of the wife might be the means of palming spurious 
offspring upon the husband, while adultery of the husband could have 
no such effect with regard to the wife" <quoted in Walker 1990 p.3). 
The ideology of patriarchy and 'familial' ideologies are peculiarly 
intertwined. While the social relations of patriarchy may be seen to be 
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Dperating in other spheres, it is in the ideological relations of the 
family that they are perhaps most evident. It is primarily patriarchal 
ideology that structures the internal relations of family life: it 
legitimates (and makes appear 'natural') the exploitation and 
intimidation of women, children and older people by adult men, and the 
suppression of certain modes of emotional and sexual expression by 
particular family members. Although the specific ideologies of 
heterosexism and homophobia may be located within many institutions of 
the social formation, their operation is perhaps most marked in relation 
to 'the family'. Under prevailing patriarchal social relations, women 
are defined as the sole objects of male sexual desire. This not only 
subjects women in a subordinated position as men's sexual 'servants', 
but also excludes the possibility of constructing legitimate and 
recognisable 'familial' relations around lesbian or gay partnerships 
(with or without children). 
As well as being organised on the basis of heterosexist ideology, the 
family also serves as a crucial location for its reproduction. It is 
not easy for children to have the experience of growing up within the 
material, emotional and ideological relations of a lesbian or gay 
'family', since such an entity is denied any legitimate existence within 
a patriarchal social formation. Thus, almost all children, whatever the 
(covert) sexual preferences of their parents, will grow up in families 
that are overtly structured along heterosexist lines. Over and above 
this, even for the small minority of children whose parents resist the 
dominant ideology and are open about having gay relationships, this 
remains subjugated to a dominant ideology which defines these as deviant 
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and antithetical to values of 'normal' family life. In this way, within 
the current social formation, family relations are constituted (and 
desire is distorted) such that only heterosexual partnerships are 
allowed to emerge and be seen by children to be 'normal' or 'natural'. 
The set of ideological relations that comprises 'the family' within any 
context may include very contradictory elements - contradictions within 
and between the relations of imperialism, capitalism and patriarchy. 
This may be seen in the political discourses that have taken place 
around idealised concepts of 'the family'. As Barrett and Mclntosh 
argue, the institution of 'the family' has become "the focal point for a 
set of ideologies that resonate throughout society. The imagery of 
idealised family life permeates the fabric of social existence and 
provides a highly Significant, dominant and unifying complex of social 
meaning" (1982 p.29). A "war of position" has taken place in which 
forces of both the Left and the Right have attempted to employ notions 
of 'family' as part of either liberatory or repressive political 
struggles. Lasch (1977), coming from a socialist pOSition, coined the 
phrase "haven in a heartless world" so as to link the signification of 
'the family' to values of care and collectivism, values which stood in 
direct contradiction to those of competition and individual self-
interest which underpinned the 'outside world' of capitalist social 
relations. Within the political arena, a similar articulation of 'the 
family' may be found in a speech by the former Labour Party leader, 
James Callaghan (22/5/1978); 
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tiThe family is the place where we care for each other, where we 
practise consideration for one another. Caring families are the 
basis of a society that cares" <quoted in Korgan 1985 p.59). 
However, Lasch's idealisation of 'the family' was also taken over by the 
Right (for example, see Mount 1983). This idealised 'family' is 
constructed as 'natural' and 'universal', despite the obvious fact that 
lithe ideological construction of the family as the antithesis of the 
cash-nexus could only refer to a capitalist society" (Barrett and 
Kclntosh 1982 p.34). The supposedly innate caring and altruism of 'the 
family' is set in opposition to the impersonal interference of 'the 
state'. Such a meaning of 'family' is used to underpin attacks on any 
communal or state provision of welfare. 
Intersecting with this struggle over 'the family' within capitalist 
ideology is a parallel struggle within the ideological relations of 
patriarchy. Feminists have argued that the above representations of 
'family' within the discourse of both the Left and the Right are 
fundamentally oppressive to women in that they have tended to ignore and 
gloss over the fact that it is women who conventionally do all the work 
of caring in the family: tilt has generally been assumed that what is 
good for the family (read: husband) is good for all <read: wife and 
children)" (Goodrich et al 1988 p.5). Thus, while the conventional 
family may represent a 'haven' for working men, it represents a place of 
hard and unrewarded labour for women. 
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Ruling class discourses on the sanctity of 'the family' represent an 
overlapping of capitalist and patriarchal interests. often with the 
emphasiS on the latter. An example of this tendency may be found in the 
launch of the Conservative Family Campaign. which sought both to reduce 
the powers of the state to encroach on the authority of 'the father' in 
family life. and to (re-)subordinate women by using 'the family' as an 
explicit vehicle to undermine the limited gains that women have made in 
the field of employment: 
"The Conservative Family Campaign aims to put the father back at the 
head of the family table ... Years of militant feminism and harmful 
legislation like the Equal Opportunities Act have undermined the 
clear Biblical concept of the father... Twenty years of a woman's 
life devoted to nurturing the family far outweigh twenty years of 
taking a man's job - particularly when there are not enough men's 
jobs around" <Webster-Gardiner 1986). 
Such attempts to shift the signification of 'family'. not only serve to 
reconstruct conventional households as more effective institutions of 
repression. but also to deny any legitimacy to any non-normative 
arrangements. such as "homosexual and lesbian couplings" <1 bid). As 
Gerald Howarth of the Conservative "No Turning Back" group writes: 
"Instead of ... trying to accommodate unconventional lifestyles. the 
nation's spiritual leaders should unashamedly extol the virtues of 
normal family life" (Community Care 1011/91>. 
Such promotion of the supposed sanctity and naturalness of one 
particular family form has been used consistently to underpin an 
ideology of homophobia and to legitimate attacks on gay rights. 
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As Barrett and McIntosh argue, a political struggle needs to be waged to 
disarticulate the signifier 'the family' from the New Right discourse of 
'family values'. Despite attempts by the Left to subvert this 
discourse, for example by translating discourses of class inequality 
into those of 'family poverty'. these too may be seen to fall into the 
trap of accepting the conventional idealisation of 'the family', and 
hence glossing over the material inequalities faced by women (and both 
children and older people) within the family unit. They conclude: 
"Neither the socialist nor the feminist tradition has yet developed 
the political consensus on the family that we would need in order to 
persue a struggle with the right" (1982 p.17). 
It has come to be realised that somehow abolishing the institution of 
'the family' would not, of itself, end patriarchal and heterosexist 
oppression. Instead the debate has moved into a more subtle and long-
term struggle to change the nature of 'the family' at the level of 
ideology. In searching for the terms with which to mount such a 
struggle within ideology, Barrett and McIntosh propose the promotion of 
"choice" (a signifier that has until now been appropriated by the 
Right): 
"We should work for immediate changes that will increase the 
possibilities of choice so that alternatives to the existing 
favoured patterns of family life become realistically available and 
desirable" (ibid p.134). 
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Emotional a.pect. 
It is within the context of familial relations that, typically, the most 
intense and long-lasting emotional relationships are constructed: those 
of 'love' and 'care'. It is within the specific institution of 'the 
family', as constructed within a particular social formation, that 
sexual and non-sexual intimate relations between women, men and children 
are organised and regulated. Furthermore, it is most crucially within 
this institution that emotional subjectivity is constructed and 
reconstructed. As we have seen earlier, it is the construction and 
maintenance of emotional relationships within the organisation of non-
normative family forms that has proved to be most problematic - where 
new systems of regulation have to be negotiated in a context that is not 
(at least to the same extent) dictated by unequal power relations. 
As Poster has suggested, it is only with the emergence of the bourgeois 
family form, with its accompanying romanticisation of a family ideal, 
that emotional relations appear central, rather than incidental, to the 
organisation of family life. This is not to say that intense emotional 
bonds did not develop in peasant and aristocratic family forms (there is 
much evidence that they did), just that marriage was, first and 
foremost, constructed as an alliance of property or labour power. 
However, central to the bourgeois family ideal is the belief in a 
marriage based on "love", an apparently free choice by a woman and a man 
that they wish to spend their life together for emotional reasons. Such 
an ideology or romantic love may also be defining for gay people who 
choose to form monogamous relationships. As feminist theorists have 
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shown, the emotional bargain is actually rather more complex than it 
appears in relation to heterosexual relationships. Women and men enter 
marriage on a profoundly unequal basis in terms of material and economic 
relations, and this can serve to reinforce any power imbalance in the 
organisation of emotional relations, although the relation between 
oppressive processes operating at different levels is complex: 
"Women have been put in a position of being economically dependent 
within patriarchy, but the relationship between economic dependency 
and emotional dependency is not straightforward. Although this is 
not usually made explicit within the relationship, men's dependency 
needs are most often met within marriage and their emotional worries 
are processed by their wives. No equivalent place exists for women" 
(Eichenbaum and Orbach 1985 p.86-7). 
Thus women's unequal economic opportunities within family organisation 
place them in the somewhat contradictory position of feeling dependent 
on men, but actually being depended on by men (for the 'servicing' of 
their emotional needs>. As Graham argues, "for many women, being a 
dependent is synonymous not with receiving care, but with giving it" 
(1983 p.24). What men achieve, in the patriarchal marital relationship, 
is to be able to depend on their wives for emotional support (a 
continuation of the mother-son emotional configuration), while, at the 
same time, being in a position of emotional power over their caregiver 
(an almost punitive reversal of this configuration). 
This contradictory relationship is maintained partly through men's power 
base at material and ideological levels, but also through the 
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differential construction of their emotional subjectivities. We saw 
earlier how women's and men's emotional subjectivity is constructed in 
profoundly different ways within the current social formation. Women's 
personality adaptations are likely leave them far more confident 
transacting at the level of feeling rather than thinking, while men tend 
to take on the reverse adaptations. This can lead to extreme 
polarisation within the marital relationship, a polarisation that can 
also be exacerbated by their subjection within external structures: 
"It is not simply that she is emotional and he is rationali they 
push each other to the extreme. Emotionality becomes hysteriaj 
rationality becomes obsessiveness. Her capacity for intimacy 
becomes hostile dependencYi his cool reserve becomes belligerent 
distancing .•. Whereas society applauds the obsessive for his 
thoroughness, his attention to details, his obedience to the letter 
of the law, and his calm objectivity, it pathologises the hysteric 
for her flightiness, her generalisations, her emotionalism and her 
subjectivity. He, the good worker, makes up our workforce. She, 
the patient, makes up our caseload" (Goodrich et al 1988 pp.86-7). 
Furthermore, whereas men's emotionality is structured around the 
concepts of phallic 'power over' and bourgeois autonomy, women's 
emotionality is constructed around connectedness and deferment to the 
desire of others. Just as she would have seen her mother's subjectivity 
split into "Good" and "Bad" objects, so a woman will tend to construct 
her own subjectivity in terms that mirror the same split 
objectification: on the one hand. taking on the position of "Florence 
Nightingale" or "Superwoman" (or perhaps an idealised view of ber own 
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mother) and, on the other, that of a "Nag" or a "Slag" (or an image of 
her own mother as dangerous and overwhelming). 
Unable to ask directly for their needs to be met, women will tend, in 
marriage, to seek the same sort of indirect caring relationship that 
they may have experienced with their mothers - constructing themselves 
as open and vulnerable in the expectation that their partners will sense 
and respond intuitively to their feelings and needs. However, such 
sensitivity and intuitive caring will tend not to be forthcoming, and 
their vulnerability will not be fully reCiprocated. As we have seen, 
men typically construct their emotional subjectivity so as to avoid any 
openness or vulnerability: they switch between being holding back and 
acting out, either containing their feelings or taking them out on 
others - particularly through the domination of women <patriarchally 
constructed 'phallic' desire rather than any open expression of their 
own intimate feelings of love or distress). This maintains men in a 
position of 'power over' women at an emotional level. 
In order to sustain any connectedness in the relationship <and have any 
of her emotional needs met at all) a women has to do all the emotional 
'work', using her intuition to anticipate what her man might be feeling, 
and looking after his feelings without his even having to own them or 
ask for support. In this way, women are set up not just to be the 
carer, but also to act as the one in the relationship that has to 
'contain' and express the more intimate feelings that are incompatible 
with the construction of male subjectivity, whether they be those of 
affection, or of weakness and distress. As Jean Baker Xi ller argues, 
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such "parts of human experience are so necessary that they cannot be 
projected far away. One must have them nearby. even if one can still 
deny owning them. These are the special areas delegated to women" <1988 
pp.47-8). Thus. the bond of 'love' between women and men. upon which 
the bourgeois family is supposedly founded. masks an underlying 
inequality at an emotional level, with the woman having to take 
responsibility for the emotional maintenance of the relationship. while 
deferring to her husband's authority - a crucial instance of women's 
experience of having responsibility without power. 
The final paradox of inequality at the level of emotionality is the 
subjective sense of power that this gives to each gender. Women will 
generally experience that. through their openness of emotional 
expression. they are rendering themselves powerless and defenceless in 
relation to their husbands who may continue to "Be Strong" and hold back 
their feelings (or act them out on others). However. paradoxically. 
women's openness with emotion may be percived by men as a threat. 
Women's greater competance at transacting at this level means that. if 
open interactions do occur. men feel themselves to be at a relative 
disadvantage. Unused to owning this aspect of their personal weakness. 
men will tend to reconstruct the situation in terms of a projection. 
They picture themselves being in danger of being overwhelmed by the 
unconstrained emotionality of the woman. constructing her. once again. 
as the familiar "Bad" object - "Witch" or "Whore". 
Let us now turn to the power relations between parents and children at 
the level of emotionality. Alice Miller has argued that. although 
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European child-rearing practices have changed over the past two 
centuries, the fundamentally oppressive principles underlying them have 
not altered. It is understood as the 'duty' of parents to impose a 
(patriarchal) power hierarchy under which children's rights are 
systematically over-ruled. Various tactics, from "physically maiming, 
exploiting and abusing" to various forms of "mental cruelty" such as the 
(threatened) withdrawal of parental love, have been employed so as to 
alienate children from their desire - from their ability to articulate, 
or even be aware of strong feelings in themselves (1983 p.4). She 
quotes from a contemporary manual from 1748: 
"If parents ... drive out wilfulness from the very beginning by 
means of scolding and the rod, they will have obedient, docile and 
good children ... One of the advantages of these early years is that 
force and compulsion can be used ... If their wills can be broken at 
this time, they will never remember afterwards that they had a will" 
(Sultzer 1748, quoted in Miller 1983 pp. 11-13). 
Such practices may be seen as a systematic assault on the infant's 
ability to construct a subjectivity that, in any way, reflects their own 
desires (or "will"). If successful, such suppression becomes 
internalised in a subjectivity that can only transact from pOSitions of 
obedience and docility, and excludes the possibility of feeling anger 
towards the parents that perpetrated this abuse (or, by implication, 
with others in positions of authority) . However, such anger may still 
be displaced on to those in subordinate positions - perhaps most 
particularly on to their own children when they, themselves, become 
parents, thereby reproducing the patterns of abuse: 
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"The forbidden and therefore unexpressed anger ... does not 
disappear, but is transformed with time into a more or less 
conscious hatred directed against either the self or substitute 
persons, a hatred that will always seek to discharge itself in 
various ways permissable and suitable for an adult" (ibid. p.61). 
Modern child-rearing practices have moved away, to some extent, from the 
use of physical force, although in a random study conducted in 1985, 97~ 
of respondents admitted hitting their three year old child at some time, 
indicating that this is still the ultimate sanction for most children 
(see Hotaling et al 1988 p.31). To some extent, this has been replaced 
by other similarly overwhelming sanctions, but this time at the level of 
emotionality, such the (implied) threat that "Mummy won't love you" - if 
the child persists in crying, being angry or refusing to do what it is 
told. Alice Miller (1983) argues that, underpinning such practices is a 
widespread and often unconscious ideology that constructs them as 
'natural' - an ideology that needs to be challenged and contested: 
"There is a basic assumption in our society that this treatment is 
good for children ... By uncovering the unconscious rules of the 
power game and the methods by which it attains legitimacy, we are 
certainly in a position to bring about basic changes" (pp. 16,62). 
It is notable, as we saw earlier, that in female-headed households, 
moves towards more respectful and co-operative child-rearing practices 
have been made, ones which acknowledge to a greater extent the child's 
right to its own thoughts and feelings, and which see decision-making 
as, where possible, a process of negotiation rather than the imposition 
of the <patriarchal) 'will' of the parent upon the 'will' of the child. 
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The emotional organisation of bourgeois and working class family forms 
both arises out of, and actively reproduces, the unspoken rules as to 
who may own and express particular emotions. In order to understand the 
specific mechanisms of this, it is useful to explore in more depth the 
psychoanalytic concept of 'projection', the process whereby "elements 
which cannot be tolerated by one or more of the family members are 
reallocated inside or outside the family in an attempt to avoid the 
experience of internal conflict" (Koustaki 1981 p.166). An instance the 
operation of such a process is given by Anna Freud: 
"When a husband displaces onto his wife his own impulses to be 
unfaithful and then reproaches her paSSionately with unfaithfulness 
... his intention is not to protect himself against aggression from 
without, but against disturbing forces from within" (1964 p.120) 
It is suggested that this is a process that takes place almost totally 
outside awareness. As a consequence, the mechanism by which the split-
off feeling could be transferred to another person has been far from 
obviouS. The originator of the projection would seem to be faCing, on 
the verge of their awareness, an urgent but unacceptable element of 
their desiring - one that is incompatible with the organisation of their 
emotional subjectivity. For a man, that might be some element of 
distress or vulnerability. For a woman, that might be anger or 
aggression. What needs to be clarified are the mechanisms by which the 
recipient chooses to (or is forced to) take on the projected feeling: 
"Projective identification is an unconscious process which takes 
place between two people. .. Some differentiation has to be made 
between 'receiving' and 'colluding' with the projections. It is 
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important not to see the object of the projections as necessarily 
passive ... The object ... may be involved to a varied extent, 
according to the readiness or vulnerability with which he receives 
the projections" (Waddell 19B1 p. 20). 
What is missing from this framework is any analysis of interpersonal 
power relations. It is inequalities of power that can set up specific 
patterns of subjectivity and transaction in the family, which can, in 
turn, determine the degree of "readiness" or "vulnerability" of the 
recipient of a projection. For example, a woman involved in a dispute 
with neighbours, whose subjectivity is constructed so as to disqualify 
her feelings of anger and aggression, may instead take on the role of 
Victim and present the issue to her husband, hoping to set him up as her 
Rescuer who will deal with her feelings for her. In this instance, he 
may be "ready" to take on the projection of expressing anger and 
aggression on her behalf, since it invites him into one of his familiar 
roles of Persecutor or Aggressor (in relation to the neighbour>, which 
serves to maintain his power position as the one who can represent the 
family in their external dealings (and it reinforces his wife's 
incapacity to be angry on her own behalf>. However, in the instance 
cited by Anna Freud, it is unlikely that the woman "readily" accepts her 
continued subjection to her husband's Persecutory accusations. The 
inequality in the power relationship shows through in the way that the 
woman is clearly not able to move out of the position of Victim, in 
which she has to hold, and be punished for, the moral discomfort that is 
rightly her husband's. From the position of Victim, she is neither able 
-155-
Critical perspectives on the family 
to tell him to stop, nor to suggest that maybe 1t 1s he, and not she, 
who 1s tending towards infidelity. 
During her/his years of material and emotional dependency, a child is 
particularly vulnerable to accept projections from significant adults. 
The child may continually be situated in parental discourses such that 
s/he is only recognised if s/he reflects particular emotional qualities 
<e.g. appearing loving, strong, funny or sulky). S/he may perhaps pick 
up subtle signs of encouragement or discouragement for the expression of 
particular emotions, or perhaps being coerced into the display of 
certain feelings. As Goodrich et al argue, it is in response to their 
powerlessness in other spheres that "mothers in this culture project so 
many of their needs on to the child: where else do they experience their 
power so unobstructed?" (1988 p.99). However, despite the fact that it 
is the mother who typically spends more time with the children, research 
shows that it is actually the father who is most. powerful in imposing 
the attributions of 'masculinity' and 'femininity' on to how they 
behave, and ultimately on to how these are incorporated in their 
subjectivities - even in families where parents consciously attempt to 
adopt non-sexist child-rearing practices (see Johnson 1986). 
Through the particular construction of their emotional subjectivity, 
girls are more vulnerable than boys to taking on emotional projections 
from parents. As we have seen, boys learn to construct themselves to 
contain their own feelings and be insensitive to those of others - and 
hence give few openings for taking on other's projections (apart from 
taking on aggressive feelings that are consistent with 'phallic' 
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desire). By contrast, given the degree to which girls must structure 
their subjectivity in terms of the "Good Fairy"I"Bad Witch" 
significations, they open themselves to accept the projected emotions of 
those around them. As the "Good Fairy", a girl learns to use her 
intuition to construct herself to articulate and respond to other 
people's wishes and needs, even when they are not overtly expressed. As 
the "Bad Witch" she represents the ideal "container" for other people's 
unacceptable feelings and desires. 
By their being constructed as 'different', boys are able to experience 
some emotional closeness and caring from their mothers without being 
particularly vulnerable to accepting their emotional projections. 
However, the lack of boundary between mother and daughter allows the 
mother to project some of her own internalised "good" or "bad" objects, 
and the emotions that go with them, directly on to her daughter. She 
will do this by relating to her daughter as if the latter actually 
possessed these qualities: 
"When a mother looks at an infant son she sees someone who is quite 
other ... but she knows her daughter will follow in her own 
footsteps ... A mother .•. projects on to her some of the feelings 
she has about herself. Having superimposed these deeply buried 
feelings which are inaccessible and unconscious she experiences them 
as if expressed in her daughter" <Eichenbaum and Orbach 1985 p.41). 
By such a mechanism, a mother can pass on elements of her own emotional 
oppression onto her daughter - a process that is so powerful because it 
is invisible. 
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It is in situations where their still fragile subjectivity is violated -
for example, if they are physically or sexually abused - that children 
can be forced to take on (in some confused form) whatever feeling is so 
violently rejected by the parent (for example, vulnerability, hurt, fear 
or particular constructions of sexual desire). This is an extreme form 
of projection that is undertaken almost exclusively by men whose 
emotionality may be so stunted that, for them: 
"Sexual excitement is the only possible form of emotional 
communication other than rage ... [They] unabashedly reveal their 
sexual needs to their children and receive from them the ersatz 
satisfaction they reqUire. Between parents' overt violation of the 
child and their unconscious <because repressed) expectation lies a 
whole spectrum of parental attitudes that inevitably produce in the 
child feelings of bewilderment and inadequacy, disorientation, 
stress, powerlessness and overstimulation" (Killer 1985 pp. 149-50). 
It may be seen that many of the feelings that are engendered in the 
child are the very same feelings of vulnerability and uncertainty that 
the abuser is himself repressing within his own emotionality. 
From the above discussion, it may be seen that the psychoanalytic 
concept of projection, once reformulated within an understanding of 
power relations, helps to unwrap the mechanisms by which prevailing 
forms of family organisation structure the emotionality of its members: 
how, within the family, women find themselves systematically containing 
and articulating the feelings of men, and how girls more than boys take 
on specific emotions on behalf of their parents. These processes both 
reflect and reproduce inequalities in power at an emotional level. 
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OF SYSTEMS APPROACHES 
IDtrQdyc~iQD 
Despite a history going back over thirty years, family therapy has found 
it hard to gain mainstream acceptance within any existing professional 
group, or to construct itself as a profession in its own right (see 
Treacher 1986). This may have resulted from a number of factors. Many 
established professions (psychiatry, psychology, nursing and, to a 
considerable extent, social work) have employed an individualised model 
of practice - one that finds it hard to see a client's distress in any 
wider context. Family therapy has therefore tended to threaten such 
traditional ways of working (see Miller 1990). By contrast, some more 
radical perspectives (particularly within social work) have tended to 
criticise any form of 'therapy' (whether individual or family) as 
concentrating on too narrow a context - suggesting that it is only 
possible to empower people by bringing them together with others in 
similar positions through consciousness raising and collective action. 
While the latter approaches have undoubtedly proved successful in many 
contexts (such as women's groups, tenants' groups or black cultural 
associations), they may sometimes be insufficient as a means of 
addressing any legacy of repression and distortion that exists within 
the internal organisation of individuals and of their closest 
relationships. Particularly through the work of feminist therapists, 
there has been a rediscovery of the importance of work with individuals 
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- a realisation that people were not the uncomplicated subjects of 
humanism who could seize opportunities once they were presented, but 
could be held back by an internalised history of powerlessness (see 
Ernst and Goodison 1981 p.4). It is suggested that people may require 
some specific support in looking at blocks to change within themselves 
and in renegotiating intimate relationships in which they may feel 
particularly powerless. Critical perspectives may be used to expose the 
complexities of personal subjectivity and interpersonal relationships, 
and hence to inform a practice that is based on 'unconsciousness 
raising' as well as collective action. The 'Women's Therapy' movement 
has done much to rework individual psychotherapy as a way of confronting 
oppressive power relations within the organisation of the psyche (see, 
for example, Eichenbaum and Orbach 1985), 
Similar issues apply in relation to challenging oppresion within the 
context of familial or intimate relationships. For example, while a 
woman may be helped to understand her domestic oppression within a 
women's group, this may be insufficient, on its own, to enable her to 
change her situation. What it cannot do is to give her any direct 
support in conducting any process of renegotiation - a renegotiation 
that must be conducted from a position of relative powerlessness. Just 
as an individual therapist may need to give direct support to the 
repressed elements within a person's psyche in order for the oppressive 
power of dominant elements to be challenged, so a family therapist may 
perhaps be useful in facilitating and supporting those family members in 
relatively powerless positions in their attempts to negotiate a more 
equitable form of internal organisation with their current oppressors. 
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Clearly, for both forms of intervention there are intrinsic difficulties 
in relation to 'getting in'. In order for an individual therapist to be 
allowed into a person's inner world, some compromises must be made: the 
therapist cannot afford to antagonise too greatly those elements that 
are currently dominant within that person's psyche, but must, at the 
same time, offer some real possibility of support to those elements 
currently repressed. Similar dilemmas face the family therapist: some 
degree of accommodation to the dominant elements is required if the 
therapist is to be allowed in to the family at all, and some active 
participation of those currently oppressing is necessary if this 
oppression is to be addressed directly with them. This demands some 
degree of compromise in terms of how issues may be tackled, and at what 
pace - but it does not mean that questions of power and inequality have 
to be excluded from the agenda. Thus it may be seen that, although any 
form of empowering therapy has intrinsic limitations, the direct support 
and intervention of a therapist may be needed if powerless or excluded 
elements are ever to be given a voice within an oppressive personal or 
familial organisation. 
In practice, family therapists have rarely sought (explicitly or 
covertly) to achieve the emanCipation of disempowered family members -
although in recent years some practitioners have sought to include some 
concepts of power and oppression in their work. For example, White and 
Epston have turned to discourse theory as a possible source of 
understanding. They draw on the work of Foucault in identifying that 
the language and meanings employed in the therapeutic discourse have 
implications in terms of 'power'. However, the concept of power that 1s 
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used derives from a humanist rather than a critical tradition, so that 
instead of describing a structural relationship between people, it 
refers to the collective domination of (all) family members by 
discourses ("stories") that can constitute certain behaviours as 
"problems". Power is seen as residing in the realm of "meaning" and it 
is suggested that it is "the meaning that members attribute to events 
that determines their behaviour" (1990 p.3). This approach seeks not so 
much to empower family members with regard to each other (or external 
structures of power), but to take charge of and "author" their own 
unique "stories" that "externalise" and give them power over the meaning 
and significance of their identified "problems". Such a subjective and 
individualised vision of • power' fails to conceptualise how a family 
organisation (or a social formation) may be structured in terms of 
domination and subordination (or of power together). 
In the following Sections, I will review how issues of power are 
understood (or concealed) within the various current approaches to 
family therapy practice. Xost are based on an understanding of family 
organisation that is derived from general systems theory - and these 
will be considered first. Some less widely practiced approaches have 
sought to use alternative models of family dynamics, and these will be 
discussed later. Other approaches have used methods of individual 
therapy (for example, training in communication skills) within the 
setting of a family meeting (see Berkowitz and Graziano 1972, Stuart 
1976, Fal100n et a1 1986). However, as these approaches have not 
attempted to theorise familial organisation as such, they are not 
directly relevant to the present study. 
-162-
The field of family therapy 
lhe systemic approaches' theoretical base 
The use of systems theory as a model for understanding family 
organisation goes back to the work of the Palo Alto group and Gregory 
Bateson (1972). Searching for a way of conceptualising the ,family unit 
as something more than the simple aggregate of otherwise unconnected 
individuals, they borrowed ideas from various applications of general 
systems theory in biology and control engineering (see von Bertalanffy 
1968j Weiner 1961). There were two key strands to this. Firstly, from 
biology were borrowed models of the self-regulating mechanisms of 
ecosystems whereby, in the long run, different species remain in balance 
with one another and adapt to changing environmental circumstances. 
From control engineering were borrowed models used to develop artificial 
regulatory systems (cybernetics) - for example, in the efficient running 
of industrial processes or in the design of communication networks. 
Underlying the systems model are a number of theoretical assumptions, 
which, while being appropriate in the fields of ecology and control 
engineering, have major implications in how familial relations are 
understood. There is an unquestioned assumption that stability and 
regulation are desirable in themselves - the family being seen as a 
consensus situated within a wider consensual social order. Any 
'artificial' interference in the system is seen as likely to damage its 
'naturally' healthy functioning: 
liThe living world is viewed as organised in recursive layers of 
autonomous systems that are related through feedback structure, and 
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are self-regulating by nature. If left alone, these systems will 
balance and heal themselves" (Atkinson and Heath 1990 p.145>. 
The only disturbances to this stability are seen to be changes to the 
external environment and 'natural' points of transition during the 
family life-cycle (biological analogy>, or deviant activity or 
relationships that require correction in order not to disrupt the 
overall functional efficiency of the system (cybernetic analogy>. 
Change is understood in terms of the scale of system at which change 
takes place. There is the possibility of an individual change being 
accommodated within the existing pattern of system organisation. Within 
a reasonably flexible family system, events such as the illness of a 
parent, or an isolated incident of stealing by a child, may be dealt 
without any need to change the 'rules' by which the family operates. 
However, more serious or recurring incidents, or life-cycle changes such 
as a child wanting to leave home, may not be so easily accommodated by 
the system, and the system itself is reqUired to change. Possibilities 
of change are constrained by the family system itself being part of 
wider social systems (for example, the extended family> with their own 
sets of 'rules' about how families should and should not operate (see 
Cronen and Pearce 1985). Family dysfunction is seen to be caused, not 
by the precipitating 'problem', but by insufficient flexibility in the 
family system resulting in a maladaptive adjustment - an attempted 
'solution' that is maintained by the continuance of the 'problem' 
behaviour of (usually> one family member. The goal of therapy is to 
alter the systemiC context so as to enable the family to adopt a more 
functional organisation, releasing that family member from having to 
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carry on with a problem behaviour that had since become 'stuck' as part 
of the organisation of the family system. 
The assumptions of systems theory have interlinked with those of 
functionalist sociology. The behaviour of each individual is seen to 
form a complementary part of, and be functional for, the self-regulation 
of a family system. In turn, a family is seen to be organised so as to 
fit into the smooth running of a wider social order. No allowance is 
made for the possibility for oppression or conflict within the social 
order, the family or the individual. Instead, power relations are seen 
only in terms of the "generalised capacity of a social system to get 
things done in the interest of collective goals" (Parsons 1960 p.181). 
Within the context of family therapy, this leads to hypotheses that 
deviant behaviour is not to be understood as some sort of protest 
against perceived injustice, but may be functional in maintaining the 
order of the family system in the face of a perceived threat to its 
stability. A child's violent or self-injurious behaviour is perhaps 
understood as a means of keeping her/his parents from splitting up - by 
giving them something to talk about. This perspective serves to mask 
any dialectics of tension and conflict that may underlie forms of 
personal and familial organisation, and to ignore this as a potential 
motive force for change. By stifling the existence of contradiction at 
a theoretical level, functionalist systems theory operates as an 
effective way of legitimating and maintaining the status quo. 
Systemic therapy has also made connections with the philosophy of 
constructivism and the work of Maturana (see Maturana and Varela 1980j 
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Watzlawick 1984j Dell 1985). Maturana argues that, from the point of 
view of a system, there is no such thing as reality - what 'exists' is 
only what the system's own processes of self-regulation allow it to see 
or to react to. In fact, no form of reality is assumed to exist as such 
- instead there are a potentially infinite number of alternative ways of 
seeing, each of which can be equally valid. From a systemic viewpoint, 
all patterns of causation are analysed as if they were circular. but can 
be punctuated at different points of the circuit in order to give an 
infinite series of perspectives: 
"We abandon trying to determine whether explanations are true or 
false. Instead, an evolving process of inventing multiple 
punctuations of a behaviour, interpretation, event. relationship, 
and so on, helps us build a more systemic view" (Cecchin 1987 
p. 407). 
From a constructivist perspective, a situation of a husband being 
violent to his wife could be punctuated equally well as "Husband beats 
wife in response to her sexual withdrawal" or as "Wife withdraws 
sexually from husband in response to his violence". Both perspectives 
are seen as representing part of a circular and self-regulatory process 
that will continue indefinitely unless some external intervention 
delivers a jolt to the system which then sets up a different pattern of 
self-reinforcing behaviours. Oppression, as such, is not seen as real 
within a constructivist worldview, only as one possible punctuation of a 
systemic process. Thus victims of abuse may be seen as equally 
responsible with other parts of the system for contributing to and 
maintaining an abusive system - and even the question of abuse itself 
can only be a matter of individual or societal (consensual) opinion. 
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School. of systemic family therapy 
Broadly speaking, there are three schools of family therapy that are 
based on a systemiC analysis of family processes: those of strategic (or 
brief) therapy, structural therapy and the Kilan (and post-Kilan) 
approaches. In practice these all interlink to a considerable extent. 
Structural family therapists, such as Salvador Kinuchin, are 
theoretically explicit as to the ways they seek to restructure a family 
so that it can be more 'functional' <although this information is not 
directly shared with the families themselves): 
"The family system is organised around the support, regulation, 
nurturance and socialisation of its members. Hence the therapist 
joins the family ... to repair or modify the family'S own 
functioning so that it can better perform these tasks" (1974 p.14). 
The process of restructuring is achieved by the therapist using the 
power of her/his personality and position as 'expert' to take over 
temporary leadership of the family. S/he uses her/his influence to 
destabiliise and renegotiate power structures, forming alliances with 
those parts of the family that slhe sees as being insufficiently 
powerful within the existing dysfunctional family organisation. Once 
'modified' in this way, it is assumed that the family system will find a 
new and more functional equilibrium and will, thence forth, be 
maintained by its own "self-regulatory mechanisms" (ibid.). Although 
anyone family form is not seen as being inherently superior to any 
other, nevertheless "structural family therapy must start with a model 
of normality against which to measure deviance" <ibid. p.15). 
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Structural therapists identify certain features of family organisation 
as being dysfunctional. These relate to how boundaries are constructed 
between family subsystems: the children as a sibling subsystem, and the 
relationship between a couple, both as a spouse subsystem and 
(conceptualised separately) as a parenting subsystem. In order for the 
family system as a whole to be able to adapt to changing circumstances 
(for example the growing up of the children), it is seen as important 
that these boundaries are both clearly defined and flexible (in order 
for each part of the system to be able to make its own adjustments). It 
is seen as dysfunctional for boundaries to be either too diffuse or too 
rigid. Diffuse boundaries are seen as resulting in enmeshment: over-
sensitivity, instability and lack of privacy. Spouses are seen as 
needing to have the right to have a private disagreement without anxious 
children (or grandparents) intervening. Similarly, according to 
Xinuchin, "The boundaries of the sibling subsystem should protect the 
children from adult interference, so that they can exercise their right 
to privacy, have their own areas of interest, and be free to fumble as 
they explore" (1974 p.59). Rigid boundaries are seen as dysfunctional 
because a lack of sensitivity between subsystems prevents a process of 
mutual negotiation taking place as needs and expectations change. For 
example, the parental subsystem may fail to respond to the demand for 
increasing power and influence from the sibling subsystem as it grows 
older. 
As can be seen, the whole analysis is couched within a functionalist 
problematiC and so the concept of 'rights' is one derived from bourgeOis 
liberalism rather than any critical analysis. It rests on two 
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underlying assumptions: firstly, that the processes of the family unit 
are essentially harmonious and unoppressive, and secondly, on a notion 
that there is an 'appropriate' power hierarchy within family 
organisation: 
"Effective family functioning requires that parents and children 
accept the fact that the differentiated use of authority is a 
necessary ingredient of the parental subsystem ... The children 
need to know how to negotiate in situations of unequal power" (ibid. 
p.58). 
Age (and, by implication, gender) inequalities are just seen as the 
rational consequence of the power of the system (and of the social order 
as a whole) to allocate authority in differential ways to system members 
in line with their duties and responsibilities in maintaining family 
functioning. 
The practice ~thodology of structural family therapy tends to 
exacerbate these deficiencies. The therapist joins the family as a 
powerful and manipulative leader who directs the content of the session 
_ in fact, almost as a personification of patriarchal power. Thus the 
therapist is in a strong position to impose her/his values and 
assumptions as to how a family is organised. Bebe Speed suggests 
various common assumptions that are often imposed, for example that 
"parents should be in charge of their children" and that "wives share 
equal responsibility for their husbands' physical violence towards them" 
<1987 p. 236-7). 
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The school of strategic or brief therapy takes as its starting pOint the 
'problem' as it is presented by the family, which will generally be 
defined as an aspect of the behaviour of a particular family member. 
While overtly accepting the family's definition of the 'problem', and 
hence conforming with the existing power structure in the family, the 
therapist seeks to understand it on the basis of a systemic hypothesis, 
one that sees the system's dysfunctional adaptation (its attempted 
'solution') as actively maintaining the behavioural problem. In 
strategic therapy, the aim is to deliver a jolt to the system, so as to 
disrupt the existing stuck pattern sufficiently to enable the system to 
adjust to the changed circumstances. The therapist devises a covert 
strategy that puts the family in a logically impossible position, making 
it inevitable that they change one way or another, although the 
direction of the change cannot always be predicted. In order to do 
this, the therapist must maintain maximum manoeverability by never 
disclosing her/his real thoughts or feelings. Therefore, the therapist 
is never judgemental, all behaviour tending to be connoted in a positive 
fashion, with no direct confrontation of any process or behaviour, 
however oppressive it might be. 
Strategic therapy involves offering interventions to the family in the 
form of tasks or instructions, usually del! vered with some formal! ty at 
the end of a session. These are formulated so as to address the 
presenting problem (and so win the co-operation of the family), but, at 
the same time (and out of the awareness of the family>, to precipitate a 
shift in the dysfunctional organisation of the system, often by placing 
it in a logical paradox: 
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"The therapist plans a strategy for solving the client's problems. 
The goals ... always coincide with solving the presenting problem ... 
He must decide on an intervention which will shift the family 
organisation so that the presenting problem is not necessary. This 
intervention takes the form of a directive about something the 
family is to do both in and out of the interview. Directives may be 
straightforward or paradoxical ... These directives have the purpose 
of changing the ways people relate to each other and the therapist" 
(Madanes and Haley 1977 p.96). 
Within the strategic school there has been an ongoing debate between 
those. such as Haley. who employ functional notions of the appropriate 
distribution of power within the family derived from the structural 
approach, and those such as Watzlawick and Fisch, who focus instead on 
systemic circularity and the multiple punctuations that may be put on 
'reality'. While the former see power as real (but not in a critical 
sense as in gender, class or race oppression), the latter see power as a 
subjective impression that depends on who is observing rather than what 
is actually going on. In practice, the former would use the power 
position of the therapist to set interventions so as to restore an 
'appropriate' (or functional) power structure of a family (moving power 
from children or grandparents back to the parents). By contrast, the 
latter, drawing on the constructivist position of Maturana, would see 
change in terms of stimulating a perturbation 1n the system of self-
reinforcing beliefs and actions that cause the problem behaviour to be 
seen as a problem (see Hoffman 1985). 
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Many elements of the strategic approach, together with notions of 
hierarchy drawn from the structural approach, have been integrated 
within the Milan (or systemic) school of family therapy. It is this 
approach that has dominated the family therapy field in Britain for the 
last decade (less so in America), although now its hegemony is beginning 
to waver, with various 'post-Milan' approaches coming to the fore (see 
Campbell and Draper 1985, Jones 1988). The Milan approach is 
characterised by an emphasis on intellectual rigour in analysis, and the 
use of professional power to exercise total and rigid control of the 
therapy session. Typically, the therapist would be backed up by a team 
of consultants who would view the session from behind a one-way screen. 
At the close of each session, the therapist would withdraw for 
consultation and return with a carefully coded intervention, consisting 
of comments on the observed process of family relationships, and 
prescriptions for action (or inaction). 
The three key concepts of the Milan approach are "hypothesising", 
"circularity" and "neutrality". Hypotheses situate the 'problem' 
behaviour as part of the functioning of the system. Hypotheses are 
never seen as right or wrong: in strategic therapy, the only criterion 
is one of usefulness. Any hypothesis is seen as useful in that it helps 
guide the therapist in devising questions and eliciting information 
about the organisation of the system, and to maintain tight control over 
the discourse of the therapeutic session (preventing the family from 
speaking in their own way): 
"The hypothesis, as such, is neither true nor false, but rather, 
more or less useful. Even a hypothesis that proves to be false 
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contributes information ... The functional value of the hypothesis 
in the family interview is substantially that of guaranteeing the 
activity of the therapist ... Entering the session already provided 
with a hypothesis, the therapist can take the initiative, proceed 
with order, regulate, interrupt, guide, and provoke transactions, 
all the time avoiding being inundated by a flood of meaningless 
chatter" (Selvini Palazzoli et al 1980 pp.5,8) 
During the early work of the Milan school, all hypotheses were 
formulated on the basis of the supposed functionality of the 
'symptomatic behaviour' for all parts of the system, and especially for 
the relationship between the parents. 
An example of an intervention constructed on the basis of such a 
hypothesis is to be found in the work of the Milan group with an 
anorexic boy and his family. The functional hypothesis was as follows: 
the boy's anger at not being permitted by his parents to grow up into a 
man had become channelled into his anorexiaj however, this rebellion 
actually served to maintain the status quo in the family by keeping him 
physically small and dependent as a child. The boy was told that he was 
being good and helpful to his parents by acting out a typically feminine 
condition (anorexia) so as to comply with their wish that he should have 
been a girl, and it was requested that he should continue to do this. 
The intervention addresses and positively connotes the deviant 
behaviour, links it to an oblique reference to the underlying systemic 
impasse, and finally delivers a paradoxical instruction that defines his 
rebellious act as conformity, but also gives him control over his 
behaviour. This places him in the position that his desire to rebel can 
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now only lead him to eat again (which was the actual outcome in this 
case) . 
In order to structure their work along systemic lines, the Milan group 
laid great emphasis on the concept of "circularity". In order to 
distract themselves from focusing on any individual within the family, 
they only sought information about relationships, and more specifically, 
changes in relationships or comparison between relationships, as viewed 
by all other members of the family system. In particular they used this 
technique of "circular questioning" to elicit information on the 
systemic context of the symptomatic behaviour <and also to disrupt and 
silence the family's customary patterns of interaction and communication 
about 'the problem'). 
The group took further the stategic therapists' notion of retaining 
manoeuvrability and determined that the therapist's stance should be one 
of "neutrality": 
"The therapist is allied with everyone and no-one at the same 
time ... The declaration of any judgement, whether it be of approval 
or disapproval, implicitly and inevitably allies him with one of the 
individuals or groups within the family... It is OUr belief that 
the therapist can be effective only to the extent that he is able to 
obtain and maintain a different level ... from that of the family" 
(ibid. p.ll). 
This principle, so clearly enunciated, has caused particular controversy 
in relation to working with families where child abuse is, or has been, 
taking place (see, for example, Carter et al 1986). According to their 
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principles of therapy, it was impossible for them to take any moral, 
legal or political stance in relation to the abuse, or to take any 
direct action to ensure the safely of the child, since this would 
interfere with the system making its own adjustment. In practice, they 
were not able to avoid taking action - but defined this as a legal and 
not a therapeutic move: 
"Unfortunately, we cannot fully ignore the social constructions 
imposed by legalistic, societal and cultural systems. Incest is 
defined as a crime. When we are limited to working with the social 
construction of crime, we must recognise that we cannot act 
therapeutically but, rather, we are constrained to act legally ... 
If we accept the legal position, how can we address the need to be 
therapeutic?" (Cecchin et al 1987 p.409). 
This demonstrates the degree to which oppressive power relations are not 
considered to be a 'therapeutic' issue in themselves. It is only if 
this oppression is also illegal that action has to be taken <somewhat 
grudgingly) to protect the victim of abuse. In all other situations, it 
would be argued, such issues would only be resolved indirectly via some 
sort of systemic rearragement, one whose rationale would be 
functionality rather than the elimination of oppressive power 
relationships. This suggests an underlying decision, in terms of 
therapeutic values, ~hat maintaining the integrity of the system be 
given priority over maintaining that of individual family members 
against violation by more powerful members of the system. 
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The subsequent developments of the Milan school (see Jones 1988) have 
shifted the analytical focus from systems of interlocking behaviour to 
emphasise the importance of family belief systems. Following Maturana, 
there has been an increasing disinterest in any 'reality' of family 
interaction (abusive or otherwise), only in how it is constructed within 
the family's system of perceptions and beliefs - the family 'story' (see 
Boscolo et al 1987, Cecchin 1987). In Britain, the early emphasis on 
the functionality of the 'symptomatic behaviour' has been replaced by 
"the notion that problems in families result from the experience of 'bad 
fit' between the beliefs and behaviours of family members" (Campbell et 
al 1989 p.11). 
Healthy family life is conceptualised as a stable and self-reinforcing 
set of consensus beliefs and corresponding actions: the beliefs guide 
the actions, and the actions provide positive feedback for these 
beliefs. However, changes in circumstances may dictate new behaviours 
which, in turn, may require changes in the family belief system. It is 
at such points that families are seen sometimes to get 'stuck', 
requiring a therapeutic intervention that builds on any potential 
flexibility in the belief/behaviour system in order to accommodate 
behaviour that has come to be regarded as problematic: 
"The aim of a family therapist is to interact with the family in a 
way that ... [enables) individual family members ... perceive a new 
context in which the problem behaviour, and its accompanying 
beliefs, acquire new meanings" (ibid. p.16) 
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As with earlier work in the Milan tradition, great steps are taken to 
honour the existing belief system of the family, irrespective of how 
oppressive they may be to particular family members. Changes that occur 
are of a subtle nature, accommodating new possibilities without 
endangering the greater part of the family's existing world-view. For 
EIsa Jones, a feminist who works within this approach, this almost 
disqualifies any possibility of her even asking questions about 
inequalities of power, never mind acting to enable disadvantaged family 
members to work towards redressing them: 
"Therapists must do what they do in such a way as ... to enable 
members of [the] system to reorganise themselves, by drawing on 
their own resources, in a manner coherent with their own history, 
beliefs, and adaptive abilities ... I assume that it is not my 
business to hold specific goals for client system organisation post-
therapy. If I were exploring client concerns in regard to stealing, 
depression, psychosomatic symptoms, drug abuse, marital unhappiness, 
and so on, I would explore exactly how these behaviours show 
themselves at present, what the influences of wider familial 
traditions and expectations are on them, and what the consequences 
for the family system might be were they to change or not to Change. 
If I ask similar questions about gender roles and their relation to 
satisfaction/dissatisfaction, decision making, finance, role 
modelling, negotiation, and so on, am I biasing the course of 
therapy by introducing gender politics into a non-relevant arena?" 
<1990 pp.64,78). 
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CritiQyes of Systemic Approacbe$ 
Within the field of family therapy, there have appeared an increasing 
number of critiques of both the theory and practice of systemic 
approaches: "The idea that families are systems, which started as a 
metaphor, gradually became a straitjacket for family therapy" (Perelberg 
and Miller 1990 p.54). Such critiques have come not only from feminist 
and socialist practitioners, but also from some therapists who found 
that systems theory was inadequate as a metaphor for family processes, 
even to achieve the bourgeois goal of the technical adjustment of 
deviancy. Evaluating the clinical outcomes of the Milan group, one of 
its founders, Selvini Palazzoli, reflects that: 
"Some of our results were doubtful at best and there had been quite 
a number of downright failures. Moreover, we were perplexed by the 
frequency of relapse in the wake of brilliant initial response ... 
Dissatisfaction on clinical grounds with paradoxical methods began 
to co-incide with our half-spoken but growing misgivings about 
systemic theory as a whole" <1989 pp.3, 151>. 
The principal element to her critique is the way in which the use of the 
systems metaphor treats family members as objects whose purpose is 
defined by their place in a wider functional order, thereby ignoring the 
potential impact of their subjectivity: 
"SystemiC analogy involving aggregates whose components lack 
subjectivity (cells, telephones) entirely disregards the individual 
dimension. SystemiC holism takes only such variables into account 
as fit the idea of the family as a whole, i. e. communication, myth, 
rules, and the like ... The holistic idea is closely tied in with 
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that of functionalism. Functionalism considers the behaviour of all 
subsystems subservient to the survival and cohesion of the whole" 
(ibid. pp. 155-6). 
In turn, this ignores any historical dimension of analysis: how a 
particular family organisation may be seen as the end result of a 
process of interaction between active subjects. 
In recognising the impossibility of understanding familial relations on 
the basis of the actions of 'pure' subjects (a humanist position), 
systems theory switches to the opposite sense of the bourgeois dualism 
and objectifies the organisation of family relationships, beliefs and 
actions (a positivist position): 
"The basic thought form of systems theory remains classical 
positivism and behaviourism ... It offers nothing new to the 
problem of Cartesian dualism. There remains no point at which one 
can say that there is a link between subjectivity and material 
processes; the solution, insofar as they can be said to have one is 
to legislate subjectivity out of existence" (Lilienfield 1987 p.250) 
Given this, a systems understanding inevitably leads to a practice that 
focuses on technical regulation rather than fundamental change: the 
manipulation of human 'objects' into their 'appropriate' slots within a 
pre-given social order rather than seeing their potential consciousness 
of their situation as a motive force for its transformation. 
The debate between systems theory and critical theories such as feminism 
or Marxism has been somewhat confusing, particularly in relation to 
concepts such as 'causation' and 'power'. Systems therapists have 
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incorrectly characterised a feminist approach as implying 'lineal' 
causation: either blaming men as if they were free bourgeois subjects 
choosing to be violent and abusive, or blaming some ethereal entity 
called 'patriarchy' as causing both men and women to take on particular 
roles as passive 'objects' (see Libow et al 1982, P11alis and Anderton 
1986). This is then contrasted with the greater sophistication of 
systems theory in understanding circular causation. What is missing 
from these debates is an understanding of how critical theory supercedes 
both these examples of bourgeois thought with its conceptualisation of 
dialectical causation: the processes of interdetermination between 
historically specific structures of power relations, operating at the 
scales of psychic, familial and social organisation. 
Within the practice of systemic family therapy, there has been an 
ongoing debate as to questions of power, which goes back to the work of 
Bateson, one of their 'founding fathers'. In some of his early work, 
:for example, the initial formulation of the double bind theory (see 
Bateson 1972), he implicitly accepts the importance of power relations 
in understanding the impact of internally contradictory communication. 
Whereas it would seem unreasonable that ambiguity, in itself, should 
drive a person to develop schizophrenic symptoms, Bateson considers the 
position of a child who is subjected in a power position such that slhe 
cannot clarify or reject what is being asked of her/him, but is required 
to act, knowing that whatever s/he does will then be defined as wrong. 
(For example, a child cannot easily escape the situation of being 
invited by a parent to "Show me how much you love me" while, at the same 
time, seeing her/his parent tensing physically as if feeling repelled. 
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Either s/he responds to the non-verbal message and declines physical 
contact - and is thereby construed as not being loving - or s/he hugs 
the parent and is punished by a non-verbal message of disgust). 
By contrast, in his later work, Bateson conceptualised power in purely 
inter-subjective terms, as a property of the system that is constructed 
out of the collective beliefs of all system members, rather than being 
located, to a greater or lesser degree, with any individual: 
"Double binding sequences ensnare both victim and victimiser in the 
same net ... All parties behave as they do because, within a double 
bind interaction pattern, there is no other way to behave" (Dell 
1980 p.323i see also Dell 1989). 
From such a constructivist pOSition, people are only seen to be powerful 
as long as others believe them to be so: the victim is seen as just as 
influential as the victimiser in maintaining the (subjective) power 
inequality between them. Power may seem to be real to the participants 
in an interaction, but only because it has become customary, within a 
particular cultural and historical context, to view certain people as 
possessing power (for example, men). Thus, as with the emperor's new 
clothes, the "myth" of power could be taken away simply by other people 
ceasing to legitimate it - a game of bluff that, theoretically, could be 
called at any time. However, as Virginia Goldner argues, any critical 
analysis of power relations in the family must include "the material and 
social bases of interpersonal power ... money, power, access to power, 
fairness, the ability to leave, and so on", and not just focus on 
"roles" that women and men <and adults and children) can choose to 
"play" or not <1985 p. 23). Thus, in order for us to understand the true 
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position of the child in the 'double bind', we must examine whether, in 
reality, slhe is in a position to call her/his parents' bluff - whether 
their parental power is a myth - or whether slhe is likely to face some 
very real consequences in terms of deprivation and abuse if slhe 
questions (or refuses to answer) their ambiguous communications. 
Within systems therapy, even when the reality of power inequalities is 
acknowledged, it is only understood in bourgeois terms as the interplay 
between a supposedly 'natural' individual desire for status and control, 
and an equally 'natural' hierarchy of authority that is seen as 
functional within the given social structure. What is seen to be at 
issue is the legitimacy (or otherwise) of the arrangement of personal 
power within the family. It is seen as appropriate and functional for 
adults to have as much authority over children (and, by implication, for 
men to have as much authority over women) as is the consensus norm 
within the SOCiety at the time. While it is seen as unnecessarily 
oppressive for adults (and men?) to wield more than this level of power, 
it is seen as pathological for any of these hierarchies of power to be 
challenged or reversed. Goldner criticises Haley for his sleight of 
hand in legitimating the existence of such hierarchies by focusing 
exclusively on "inherently plausible" assumption that "older people 
should be in charge of younger ones": 
"By privileging the category of generation, and trivialisisng the 
category of gender, Haley could dispense with the vexing question of 
sexual inequality ... By speaking only in terms of the universality 
of generational hierarchies, Haley neutralised the issue of power" 
<1988 p. 21>. 
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The ideological implications of constructivism are ultimately just as 
conservative as those of functionalism. Maturana proposes that 
structures of perception and belief arise, not out of subjection within 
the real power relations of the external world, but out of some 
idiosyncratic internal process of self-reinforcement and gradual 
evolution (see Colapinto 1985). As we have seen, this perspective 
excludes any consideration of the impact of internal and external 
structures of oppression. As Speed argues: 
"We should be aware that constructivism and social constructionism, 
in their denial of the influence of a structured reality to what wew 
know, have taken family therapists up a blind alley. Just because 
reality is filtered through our perceptions does not mean that it 
does not exist and does not affect those perceptions" (1991 p.407). 
Within this framework of thought, feminist perspectives become divorced 
from any grounding in real power relations, and may thereby be absorbed 
as just one idiosyncratic viewpoint among many. In this way, they are 
not allowed to challenge the particular belief system of a family. This 
is reflected in the stance of 'neutrality' or 'curiosity' by the 
therapist - one that is not, as it appears, value-free, but tends 
actively to support the maintenance of the status quo: at best, it 
provides a framework by which to explore subjective assumptions about 
relative power relations (but not to confront the reality of 
oppression)j at worst, it denies the importance of power altogether. 
It is in relation to family situations in which the abuse of power is 
most overt that the appropriateness of systems approaches has been 
particularly questioned. Within the structural school, physical abuse 
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may be conceptualised at most as an inappropriate excess in an otherwise 
acceptable imbalance of power: 
"Because it does not grossly violate our democratic ideals to think 
in terms of age hierarchies, the authoritarian parent who goes too 
far can easily be seen as merely 'doing too much of a good thing'" 
<Goldner 1988 p.22). 
Similarly, as McLeod and Saraga argue, sexual abuse may be divorced from 
any understanding of power and be seen simply as "a symptom of what is 
wrong with the family, or even a 'solution' to the dysfunction" - for 
example, when a man is "depri ved" of his "conj ugal rights" (1988 
pp.31,33). They criticise the underlying assumptions of a family 
dysfunction/systems approach as covertly reconstructing and idealising 
the inherently abusive structure of the bourgeois family: 
"It focuses on the 'family' in which abuse occurs, not in order to 
expose problematic sexual politics, but in order to enshrine 
'normal' family relationships ... There is an unwritten assumption 
that families are functional when men's needs are met" (ibid.). 
Within most systemic approaches (including the Milan schdbl), there is 
no explicit commitment to even a liberal-bourgeois protection of the 
abused. These approaches are predicated on the principle of equal 
interactional influence. As power is bracketed out as a variable, all 
system members are assumed to be on an equal footing, with the apparent 
authority and helplessness of individuals simply reflecting 
"complementary" positions that they have chosen to take up, giving them 
all have equal responsibility for maintaining circular patterns of 
interaction. For Bebe Speed, herself a leading practitioner, this leads 
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her to question the application of systemic thinking in all family 
situations, not just those of overt abuse: 
"The assumption [has been) in family therapy that family members 
have equal ability to influence each other and that no-one is 
therefore more responsible than anyone else for the patterns that 
exist.... I have recently come to question this assumption, as I 
have found difficulty in assuming equality of influence and 
responsibility in cases of family violence and sexual abuse. I can 
still conceptualise these problems as reflections of relationship 
patterns which fit together 1nteractionally and systemically, but I 
also see them as consequences of an adult having greater power and 
thus ability to influence and control others ...• If an asymmetry of 
power, and hence responsibility, in the case of physical and sexual 
abuse can exist, might not such asymmetry also exist in less 
contentious interactional patterns where an equal balance is usually 
assumed?" <1987 p. 234-5). 
Such doubts are expressed much more forcefully by Sarah Nelson in her 
swingeing critique of the use of systems thinking in sexual abuse work 
for failing to take any real account of internal power structures within 
families, structures that by their very definition open up the 
possibility of certain family members being abused by others: 
"Family members are treated as equals: no source is given for the 
decisions that are arrived at. Who is isolating the family from 
contact or preventing a girl mixing with boyfriends? Who takes the 
decisions and reinforces them? Who persuades a six year old girl 
into oral sex with her grandfather? The system?" <1987 p. 83). 
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The inappropriateness of the assumption of equal interactional influence 
highlights the inadequacy of the systems metaphor as an accurate 
representation of what is actually going on in a family. irrespective of 
whether one takes a bourgeois or a critical perspective. Bennun's 
research on family members' perceptions of the therapist in determining 
the outcome of the therapy. demonstrated very clearly that it was the 
man's perception that was the dominant influence on outcome, indicating 
a very real inequality in interactional influence: 
"Systems approaches based on the theory that family members .•. are 
equal interacting parts ..• may only be part of the picture. It 
appears that the father's position is not equal to that of the 
mother in determining outcome. and that the notion of family 
hierarchy is an ambiguous one because of gender roles being linked 
to power" <1989 p. 251>. 
Although feminists have generally been united in pointing out the 
theoretical inadequacies of systems theory as it stands. they have been 
divided as to whether it could somehow be married to a perspective of 
structural inequality (see, for example, James and XcIntyre 1983. 
Goldner 1988), or whether it stands in fundamental contradiction to any 
form of critical practice. Goldner argues for "a reading of family 
relationships at two levels of description: one elucidating the 
paradoxes of circularity. the other confronting the realities of 
domination" <1988 p. 27). However. this leads to an inevitable dualism: 
a family therapy practice that can only be a "conversation" to help 
"elucidate the dilemmas of love and power", with political action to 
redress the inequalities of power being relegated to some external 
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sphere. The contrary position is put by Goodrich et aI, who argue that 
systems theory inevitably blinds the therapist to issues of power and 
structural inequality, and that therapy itself must be political: 
"Systems theory ... provides a seemingly coherent account while 
actually leaving out [the] critical variables [of] ... gender and 
power ... Who has the power over whom never has to be noticed ... 
Patterns across families reflecting large-scale oppression of women 
in society are thus kept from entering or troubling the field of 
vision and discourse ... When we concern ourselves with the internal 
functioning of families without altering the power differences, we 
are in complicity with [keeping] women oppresed" (1988 pp. 15-16). 
In addition to critiques of its theoretical base, feminists and 
socialists have looked at the power relations of the actual practice of 
systemic approaches and, in particular, at the role of the therapist. 
Unlike feminist therapy, there is no tradition of openness and 
empowerment through sharing with clients. By contrast, systemic 
therapists distance themselves in order to retain their manoeuvrability 
and neutrality in order to be able to manipulate family interactions: 
"A feminist and a family-systems approach are generally agreed to be 
at variance in two main areas. .. The first major difference is that 
feminists believe in reducing the power differentials between 
therapist and client and aim for a more open and egalitarian 
relationship. In contrast, the family therapist typically uses 
'expert power' ... The second difference which follows from this is 
that the feminist therapist will place much greater emphasis on the 
role of understanding as a means of producing change. Family 
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therapists ... find that explaining the rationale behind their 
interventions often makes them less effective. The reason feminist 
therapists promote insight concerns the issue of power and the 
belief that understanding the reasons for change is in itself 
empowering" <Burck and Daniel 1990 p.84). 
Systems therapists deliberately use their power position as professional 
'expert' in order to exert power over the family. but tend to be evasive 
as to what changes they are trying to bring about. Whether operating 
according to the more overt "push and shove" of the structural approach. 
or the more subtle interventions of the Milan approach. therapists are 
in a position to impose oppressive white bourgeois patriarchal values on 
to the way in which familial organisation is changed: 
"Family therapists ... sometimes fail to realize that their 
judgements may partially derive from [their] social class 
position ... I am not sure that they are always so observant about 
cross-class values or about gender-based values and ... this is 
particularly problematic ... All therapists inevitably operate on 
the basis of values. and one could argue that the more hidden value 
assumptions of the less directive therapists such as the Milan group 
are more insidious because they are less obvious and thus less easy 
to challenge" (Speed 1987 p.237). 
Given the nature of the therapy process, it is hard to see how it could 
lead to any form of empowerment or liberation. The process rests on the 
de-skilling and domination of families by the deliberate use of 
professional mystique and behind-the-scenes manipulation. Families have 
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little or no control over (or sense of participation in) the therapy 
process, which must exacerbate their already existing sense of 
powerlessness. Treacher criticises systemic therapy as practiced by the 
Milan group: 
"The ... approach is essentially clinical and concentrates on very 
elaborate, therapist-derived interventions which produce changes 
which take place largely outside the family's consciousness. In 
practice their approach recapitulates many features of the medical 
model, including the notorious activity-passivity dimension ...• 
The therapist remains in a position of power and persists in 
treating the family as an object" (1986 p.278-9). 
In this way, the terms under which therapy is conducted, irrespective of 
the actual content of the interventions, are so profoundly authoritarian 
that the process of therapy itself will always tend to reinforce the 
patriarchal basis of the existing power relations of the family. 
Both the theory and the practice of systemic approaches may be seen to 
be firmly wedded to the notion that the family unit is constituted out 
of order and functionality (but subject to temporary aberration), rather 
than being constituted out of domination and oppression. Thus, at the 
level of practice, there would seem to be a fundamental and unbridgeable 
gulf between a systemic approach and one predicated on principles of 
consciousness raising or empowerment. The former treats people as 
objects to be manipulated while the latter takes seriously their 
subjectivity - the complex process whereby people can, collectively and 
individually, begin to take more power over how they live their lives. 
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Altern.~iye model. of family proce •• 
Although 'system' has been the dominant metaphor that has been used to 
understand familial organisation, a number of alternative metaphors for 
family process have been proposed. I will consider these in the light 
of how successful they are in overcoming the theoretical deficiencies of 
the systems approach, in particular, their ability: 
1) To link issues of family process to those of the individual 
processes of specific family members. 
2) To transcend the subject/object dualism in relation to both 'the 
family' and 'the individual' in order to highlight dialectical 
mechanisms of conflict and change. 
3) To reintroduce history - understanding present arrangements in terms 
of how they came into being. 
4) To contextualise the family within the specific structural power 
relations of the social formation. 
5) To enable the therapist to be critically aware of the extent to 
which her/his interventions are empowering or disempowering, both to 
particular family members and to the family as a whole. 
These criteria may be seen to be central to any critical understanding 
of family process. The models that I will consider comprise two 
metaphors that have been developed out of dissatisfaction with existing 
systemic approaches, those of "The Game" and "The Dance", followed by 
two approaches that seek to extend models of intrapsychic functioning so 
as to provide metaphors for processes occurring at the scale of the 
family: the frameworks of psychoanalytic and gestalt family therapy. 
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A) The 'Game ' 
Even the early formulations of the Milan school began to show signs of 
departing from the purity of a systems approach and 'redicovering' the 
importance of the individual subject. Reviewing the seminal work of the 
Milan school, "Paradox and Counterparadox", Fisch comments that: 
"The authors ... gradually depart from a systems concept to one more 
consistent with monadic and intrapsychic concepts. Creeping in more 
and more explicitly is the view that the family, rather than a 
system, is a collection of individuals, each motivated by the same 
internal and personal striving, principally a hidden and competitive 
yearning - even an obsession - for ultimate control of the family 
and the relationships within it" (1979 p.213). 
It is interesting to note the similarity between this obsession for 
control and the concept of "will" that underlies a Western bourgeois 
view of "man" (the ideological component of 'phallic' subjectivity) -
although here it is assumed to an equally accurate description of the 
essential 'nature' of women and children. 
Of the original Milan team, it was Selvini Palazzoli (1989) who took 
this further and substituted "family game" for "system" as the basis for 
her theoretical framework. She sought a metaphor that took account of 
the intentionality of human subjects (albeit one that grossly over-
simplifies the construction of personal subjectivity>: 
"Thinking in terms of a game prevented us persisting in a typical 
fallacy inherent to systemiC thought, namely ignoring the individual 
subject. One very helpful idea was ... comparing the family to ... 
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an organisation that has its own organisational chart, on which 
individual members are positioned in hierarchical order" (p.154). 
This concept of 'hierarchy' is not based on a consensus norm, as in 
functionalism, but on an individualised competitive struggle, one that 
is implicitly structured by the ideology of patriarchal capitalism. The 
concept of "game" is seen to relate to "that which is implied by common 
expressions such as political game, power game, money game, and the 
like" (ibid.). 
Her individual subject is thus set up to play the "family game" in the 
same way that the hypothetical "rational economic man" maximised his 
advantage in his dealings in the market place. In this way, a systems 
theory that constructs people as pure objects is replaced by a game 
theory that constructs them as one-dimensional subjects - subjects that 
are so devoid of internal complexity that they might as well be 
considered as objects. Furthermore, this subjectivity is essentialised 
as 'human nature' - as "egocentricity" or "physiological self-interest". 
Each player is destined always to "vie for the most favourable position, 
both as regards his rank in the specific group to which he belongs (the 
nuclear family, for instance) and in each of the several outside groups 
of which he is also a member (the extended family, his work environment, 
the context of his leisure time, etc.)" <ibid. p.153). 
The concept of "game" highlights the interdependency between the 
players, and hence links organisation at the scale of the individual to 
that of the collective (and to that of society as a whole). Like 
systems, games must have rules, and the players must co-operate in 
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establishing and maintaining the rules that then allow them to compete 
with each other for position. In this way. bourgeois individualism is 
still constrained within an assumption of order and regulation. The 
implication is that the rules are fair and that no-one is permitted to 
break them. In turn, the game is seen as taking place within a social 
and cultural order which has its own set of rules (rules which. by 
implication, reflect some sort of consensus): 
"The ... spiralling process of moves and countermoves ... obeys the 
strategies of more or less skilled participants (on the individual 
level>. is conditioned by the opponent's moves (on the micro-
systemic level>, and by sociocultural rules (on the macro-systemic 
leveU" <ibid. p.157>. 
Unlike systems theory. power relations assume central importance within 
the game model. However, the concept of power that is used is purely a 
bourgeoiS one - it is based on an individual's capacity to dominate 
others <and avoid domination by them), not on the degree to which a 
person is able to be in control of her/his own life and be 
interdependent with others (and not to be oppressed on account of 
her/his gender, age, race or class>. Within the former understanding, a 
beautiful woman is seen as powerful in that she can use her looks to 
attract a rich man who will support her financially. Within the latter 
understanding, this would be seen as a demonstration of her structural 
powerlessness - the fact that. within a patriarchally dominated economic 
system, she is unlikely to be able to earn enough to be rich in her own 
right and has. in effect. to prostitute herself in order to ensure her 
material well-being. ThUS, although the game model takes some note of 
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social roles and status in determining the power position of an 
individual family member, power is mainly seen as the result of the 
success or otherwise of the game moves that the person has so far made -
it is thus much more to do with individual skills and capacities than 
with any notion of societal power structures: 
"Obviously, no player in a game has unidirectional power over the 
whole group of players. It is wrong, however ... to claim that 
power does not exist, that it is merely intrinsic to the rules of 
the game ... In fact, there will be important differences in the 
degree of power (or freedom) possessed by each member of any group-
with-history" (ibid p.158). 
Evaluating the "game" as a metaphor for familial organisation against 
the criteria for a critical analysis, we find that it achieves only 
limited success. While it strives to make links between the scales of 
individual and family, this is only on the basis of ignoring the 
complexity of intrapsychic organisation and postulating the existence of 
a simplified bourgeois subject. It essentialises the nature of this 
subject and fails to theorise any processes whereby such a subject might 
be produced. Similarly, while it strives to reintroduce the historical 
dimension that was lacking in systems theory, the only history that is 
actually permitted into the analysis is the history of more or less 
successful game moves. Finally, although concepts of power are 
introduced, they relate only to individualised attributes (beauty, skill 
etc.), social roles and the success or otherwise of game moves - not in 
any real way to the in~qualities of power that are embedded in the 
structuring of the social formation. 
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B) The Dance 
Some feminists, struggling with attempts to reconcile an understanding 
of structural inequality with a systems approach to family work, have 
started to make use of a new metaphor: that of the "dance". This is a 
concept that seeks to integrate two notions of causality: the societal 
determination of the possibilities open to different family members and 
the systemic interactions that take place between them. Harriet Lerner 
gives a typical instance of a "dance" that structures the organisation 
of familial relations within the current patriarchal society: 
"The all-too-familiar dance, repetitively re-enacted by the distant 
husband/father, the child-focussed wife/mother, and the symptomatic 
child who is too loyal to grow herself up - is prescribed and 
perpetuated by the patriarchal societal system, just as this 
particular type of family organisation reinforces and perpetuates 
that same societal dysfunction" <1988 pp. 50-1). 
In this formulation, Lerner fails to escape from situating her analysis 
within a functionalist systems perspective. Thus 'the family' and 
'society' are seen as two interacting scales of system, and patriarchy 
becomes reduced to being a "dysfunction" of both societal and familial 
systems, rather than a relation of unequal power that can structure 
organisations of any scale within the social formation. By taking away 
any historical or dialectical understanding of how specific power 
relations have come about and may be changed, political action becomes 
reduced to the technical manipulation of systems. Lerner argues that, 
just as "a dysfunctional individual can best be helped by disrupting and 
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changing the rigid rules, expectations and structures that inhibit 
growth in the family system", so "dysfunctional families can best be 
helped by disrupting the rigid rules, expectations and structures of 
patriarchal culture" (ibid. pp.51-2). Because this analysis remains so 
firmly rooted within a functionalist problematic that ultimately treats 
people as 'objects', it continues to ignore the subjectivity of 
oppressed family members and how this can provide the motive force for 
social transformation. 
Pilalis and Anderton develop the metaphor of "dance" in a way that moves 
beyond such a functionalist perspective: 
"Feminist family therapy perceives males and females to be caught in 
a mutual 'dance'. The steps of the dance are choreographed by the 
dominant norms and values emanating from the social structure, 
unless the dancers are aware that they have the power and potential 
to choose to change the steps to meet the needs of their particular 
family configuration. The overall goal of therapy is to empower 
family members in relation to each other and to empower the family 
in relation to SOCiety. This goal is achieved by showing families 
that they can choose to assume more or less of the choreographer's 
power. In choosing which path to take, they need to identify the 
current restraints to assuming this power" (1986 pp. 106-7). 
Although this represents a significant step forward from conventional 
systems theory, it still fails to grasp the real nature of power 
relationships. Instead of seeing power relations as being constructed 
and renegotiated in struggles waged between individuals and groups 
wi thin a specific social formation, it still s1 tuates power w1 thin the 
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traditional bourgeois dualism of 'individual' and 'society'. Some 
ethereal entity. "society" or "the choreographer" somehow has the power 
to dictate to individual men and women. who become hapless and innocent 
victims of this external power. This allows men and women to be seen as 
occupying fundamentally equal positions (both as equally caught in the 
"dance") and hence the fundamental systemic assumption of equal 
interactional influence need not be challenged. 
In this way. empowerment is seen. not as the renegotiation of power 
relationships between groups or classes of people. but to be about 
empowering small scale units (the individual and the family - both seen 
as essentially untroubled by any form of internal contradiction) in 
relation to the large scale unit of "society". It is seen as women and 
men together against "the choreographer". rather than women 
renegotiating their relationships with men, of black people with white 
people. of working class people with the ruling class. Lois Braverman 
criticises such formulations for failing to shake off their uncritical 
acceptance of much of systemic epistemology and to acknowledge the full 
implications of a feminist analysis: 
"A feminist critique shakes the very precepts upon which our 
epistemology is based; it challenges the notion that men and women 
are equal participants in a relational dance ... A feminist 
perspective demands that we take seriously the consequences of 
living in a patriarchal culture: marriage is not just an 
interactional scene, but a political institution reflective of the 
patriarchal culture in which it is immersed" <1988 p. 6). 
-197-
The field of family therapy 
C) The psychoanalytic model 
The theoretical model of psychoanalytic family therapy is an extension 
of object-relations psychoanalysis. and emphasises the parallels between 
individual subjectivity and that of a group, both seeming to be 
comprised of internal differences, and yet functioning as a single 
entity: 
"The Group tends to speak and react to a common theme as if it were 
a living entity, expressing itself in different ways through 
different mouths" <Foulkes and Anthony 1957 p.219). 
The family unit is understood as a collective psyche. as an organisation 
within which "the demands of instinct and society. impulse and control, 
may be served by different family members" (Skynner 1981 p.60). In this 
way, each family member is seen as taking on specific roles. as the 
family as a whole endeavours to find a functional compromise between the 
satisfaction of instinctual desire and the demands of 'civilisation'. 
Just as the individual may deal with this conflict by the repression and 
splitting off of feelings. so it is suggested that within the family 
group, good and bad qualities may become split off and projected on to 
particular family members, some of whom may take on and act out "what is 
denied. forbidden and concealed" on behalf of the whole family - a 
process that is largely unconscious. In this way. the family is seen to 
be organised on the basis of patterns of repression, splitting and 
projections. analogous to those of the individual psyche. In both 
cases, the internal organisation may be seen as a defence against the 
disintegration or dissolution of a fragile unity: in the one case. the 
ego. and in the other, the family group. 
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As such processes of splitting and projection continue over time, 
repressed residues of past traumas and conflicts may become embedded in 
the pattern of family roles that continue to be re-enacted, at an 
unconscious level, in the here-and-now. However painful and destructive 
this may be, it may (unconsciously) be seen as preferable to the anxiety 
of facing up to these underlying issues. The dysfunct10na11ty of a 
given familial organisation may be evaluated on the basis of the 
"particular ways that each family uses the processes of projective 
identification": whether intolerable feelings become "increasingly 
located in one member ... and tend to become exaggerated there", whether 
they are uncontained and lead to "quite primitive expressions of 
sexuality or violence", or whether the family unit becomes so locked 
together that "movements towards differentiation, on anyone's part. tend 
to be met by more or less violent reactions" (Box et al 1981 pp. 155-6). 
Although the content of this categorisation is different. its form is 
similar to that used by systems therapists in determining the 
'functionality' of particular families. Instead of focusing on what are 
seen as deficiencies in communication or in .the construction of 
subsystem boundaries. it focuses on how successful the family is in 
supressing and containing its emotional pain. However. as the approach 
glosses over the existence of any oppressive power relationships within 
the institution of the family (or within the social formation within 
which it is constituted). it may disregard what may be the very source 
of much of the emotional pain that has to be contained by the family -
or, more specifically, by the structurally weaker members of the family: 
women and children. Fundamentally. it fails to enable those family 
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members experiencing emotional oppression to become aware of this or to 
contest and resist it. 
On the face of it, the psychoanalytic model seems to be empowering in 
that it promotes choice, through the offering of insight and "engaging 
with the compulsive qualities, patterns and reactions, that constantly 
qualify or impede these possibilities" (Box et al 1981 p.60). However, 
only certain insights, and hence certain choices, are opened up. The 
weakness of the analysis is that, like systems theory, it is constructed 
within a functionalist problematic that essentialises and fails to 
question the existing power structure of the family. What is not 
explained is how one person comes to be in a position of power that 
enables them to force another to express their uncomfortable feelings 
for them. As we saw earlier, as long as processes of domination and 
resistance are excluded from the analysis, the mechanisms of projection 
remain somewhat of a mystery. 
Evaluating the psychoanalytic model in the light of the criteria 
outlined at the start, we can see that this model is potentially useful 
in linking individual process to family process and vice versa, as the 
conceptual framework and the understanding of mechanisms is essentially 
the same. Projection is a process that is not exclusively intrapsychic 
or interpersonal - within a psychoanalytic approach, individual splits 
may be seen to be prOjected onto groups and group splits onto 
individuals. Furthermore there is a historical dimension in that 
current organisation is seen as reflecting past traumas and conflicts 
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(although this historical analysis, as with the present day analysis, 
takes no account of conflicts of power as a motive force for change). 
Although the model does not transcend the subject/object dualism, it 
does deconstruct subjectivity to a degree. The 'individual' (and, for 
that matter, the 'family') are not seen as the free and uncomplicated 
subjects of bourgeois humanism. Nor are they seen as objects that may 
be manipulated and determined, as in a systems theory that is based on 
positivism. However, the terms of the analysis are such as to prevent a 
critical understanding of the role of social power relations in shaping 
the possibilities of subjectivity. As with individual psychoanalysis, 
the counterposing of the bourgeois terms 'instinct' and 'civilisation' 
leads to an acceptance of the inevitability of existing patterns of 
repression. Such an understanding of family conflict takes away any 
critical awareness of how this may be shaped by real differences of 
interest, and fought out between family members who may have unequal 
access to positions of structural power. 
Instead, it becomes situated within a consensus view of the social 
order: one that, like systems theory, sees the social formation as 
naturally pre-given. It sees accommodation to the social order as 
essentially unproblematic, leading to the balanced and harmonious 
organisation of both the individual and the family. Dysfuntion is only 
seen to arise when socially unacceptable elements are not successfully 
suppressed or contained: 
"In the individual, dissociation of an emotion may lead to the 
impoverishment of normal functioning as well as the appearance of 
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seemingly meaningless symptoms ... In the group ... one member 
becomes the chosen (and to some extent self-chosen) container of 
some aspect of personality which is unacceptable to the others. 
This individual ... will be seen as, or will become disruptive" 
(Skynner 1981 p.65). 
Such "disruptiveness" may start to challenge existing power structures 
in the family or society, but it is not seen as the purpose of therapy 
to make sense of any such challenge: quite the reverse, it must be 
accommodated within the existing social order. Although recognising 
that "excessive restriction of the lower by the higher" may lead to 
"forms of disturbance" and "lack of creativity", Skynner's theoretical 
framework nevertheless leads him to assert that any "breakdown of the 
authority structure ... leads to unco-ordinated release of tendencies 
which can be damaging to the whole system ... Families operate best 
... where the father is accorded ultimate authority" (ibid. pp. 65-6). 
Thus, the psychoanalytic model is useful in that it begins to connect 
family and individual process, to introduce a historical perspective and 
to deconstruct subjectivity. It moves beyond systems theory in starting 
to expose issues such as emotional repreSSion, which point both to the 
problematiC nature of subjectivity and to the distortion of emotionality 
that is part of family life. However, as with psychoanalytic 
perspectives on the individual, it requires to be be contextualised 
within an analysis of power relations if it is to provide the basis from 
which to develop a critical model of family organisation. 
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D) The gestalt model 
Like the psychoanalytic approach, gestalt therapy extends its analysis 
of intra-psychic processes in order to understand processes at the scale 
of the family. It is largely ahistorical, concentrating almost 
exclusively on the process of what is and is not allowed into here-and-
now awareness. This separation of what is in the "foreground" of 
experience and what is relegated to the "background" may be seen as a 
more flexible version of the psychoanalytic split between conscious and 
unconscious - one that includes not just the selective awareness of 
internal experiences but also the selective perception of what may be 
going on around. In general, it is assumed that the totality of a 
person's experience contains many elements that are in conflict with one 
another (for example, feeling angry with, and dependent on, the same 
person). Such co-existence of conflicting elements is likely to be even 
more prominent within the total experience of a family as a whole. 
Thus, although this approach was originally conceived as a way of 
understanding the individual, it may be seen as equally applicable to 
defining how a family is organised in terms of what experience is or is 
not allowed to come to the fore: 
"The same processes - bounded awareness and restricted peception of 
the environment - can be appreciated in a multi-person (family) 
context as generating an organisation. tt An observer may experience 
this phenomenon as a pervasive 'climate' or 'atmosphere' existing 
among the members ... One person is not likely to be at ease while 
others are tense and anxious, and one member is not likely to act in 
a risky, self-acknowledging manner while others are 'disowning' and 
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'blaming' ... The members mutually support a currently dominant 
organisation of experience" (Kaplan and Kaplan 1982 p.8). 
Personal (and familial) organisation is understood in terms of how this 
co-existence of conflicting elements is managed: the "boundary" 
processes whereby contradictory elements are either kept in the 
background or are allowed to emerge and be dealt with. (Returning to 
the earlier example, an individual or a family may be organised, at a 
particular point in time, so as to prevent any emergence of anger, or 
alternatively, any sensation of dependence). Should a hidden element be 
sufficiently urgent as to break through, it may still be dismissed as 
irrelevant, disowned as too threatening or unrecognised because it is so 
different from what would normally be expected. Alternatively, it may 
be permitted into the foreground, forcing some process of confrontation 
and negotiation between the elements in conflict, leading to a change in 
how the person or the family organises their experience: 
"Awareness grows ... by dancing to and fro between two pOints until 
satisfied. .. Often desires do not match. Then, conflict and 
struggle must be added as necssary steps in the process" (Kempler 
1973 pp. 62,67). 
Although appearing to resemble a dialectical understanding of social 
change, this model of productive conflict is predicated upon a bourgeois 
view of the person (or family> as an "organism ... that is in balance 
and that has to function properly" (Perls 1969 p.16), a perspective that 
totally ignores the impact of power inequalities upon the construction 
of subjectivity. Thus, the gestalt approach uses a similarly 
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functionalist perspective as that of systems theory or psychoanalysis. 
Organisation is understood simply in terms of how flexible or rigid is 
the boundary process. Dysfunction is seen as arising from excessive 
rigidity, preventing family or individual from being open to their 
existing and new experiences, and hence being able to grow as a "healthy 
organism". Just as, within the psyche, elements that are in opposition 
to the current organisation of experience may be blocked out by a rigid 
boundary process, so a similarly rigid boundary may be established 
within the organisation of a family through a combination of projection 
and introjection between family members: 
"In a family, the interactive patterns can be stabilized or 'locked 
in' ... through disowning the opposite [experience] and/or 
projecting it onto others. The mechanism complementary to 
projection is introjection, which involves incorporating into the 
self characteristics perceived in others or acquiescing to 
attributions to self made by others ... Projection and introjection 
function in a given family to produce rigidified relationships among 
members" (Kaplan and Kaplan 1978 p.197). 
However, there is no analysis of why particular people or families 
should have developed such rigid boundaries around their experience, and 
how this might relate to structures of internal and external oppression. 
The process of therapy focusses entirely on here-and-now process. The 
therapist seeks to support family members in taking the risk of 
expressing previously repressed elements of their experience, and may 
suggest "experiments" that heighten people's awareness of issues and 
clarify their discomfort and frustration. This may then spur family 
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members on to negotiate a resolution of these issues. However, it is 
assumed, since no allowance is made for power issues and the 
internalisation of oppression, that each family member is responsible 
for their own feelings, thoughts and actions. Sometimes the naivety of 
this may be productive, since it may enable people to recognise the 
extent to which they may sabotage their own power, over and above the 
degree of real powerlessness that is imposed on them in the current 
family situation. Powerlessness may be exacerbated by feelings such as 
confusion, depression or guilt, and by transactions such as blaming, 
excusing, or speaking for (and through) others, since these get in the 
way of awareness, assertion and negotiation. However, the assumption of 
total individual responsibility may itself block awareness of real power 
inequalities and may inadvertently reinforce self-blame, for example by 
leading a woman to ask herself, "Why canlt I stand up for myself the way 
my husband does?", without enabling her to see why this may be the 
result of a material difference in their power positions. 
While the gestalt approach focuses on 'healthy' family functioning, it 
differs from systems or psychoanalytic models in that it does not seek 
to accommodate potentially disruptive elements to a pre-given social 
order, but sees growth as resulting from the unfettered expression of 
desire and the open confrontation and negotiation of issues: 
"When there is no desire, conversation is hollow or absent. When 
the desire is not defined, the conversation cannot take meaningful 
form. Desire, clearly expressed and movingly delivered brings 
change in its wake ... The entire course of therapy is characterised 
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by a search ... for the immediate desire not yet expressed (Kempler 
1973 pp.32-3). 
This illustrates the underlying tension in the gestalt approach as 
viewed from the perspective of critical theory: on the one hand, it sees 
awareness and the working through of conflict and contradiction as the 
motive force for change, while, on the other it sees this process as 
taking place within the an unproblematic context of apparently equal 
power relations in which the full expression of feeling by any member of 
the family is seen as sufficient to bring about change. While the 
directness and simplicity of the gestalt model of family process may be 
very potent in guiding the therapist into issues of empowerment, and in 
enabling oppressed family members to articulate what they have 
previously been too frightened to express, its naive humanism fails to 
support them in dealing with the totality of their structural 
powerlessness. Unlike the psychoanalytic approach, this model does not 
start to theorise the structural conflicts underlying the concept of the 
pure autonomous subject, nor to take seriously people's history of 
oppressive experience. Nevertheless, its conceptualisation of the 
organisation of family and individual experience would seem to have 
something to offer a critical practice, if it could be contextualised 
within an understanding of the real power relations of the social 
formation. 
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7: 'THE FAMILY' AS A SUBJECTIVITY: TOWARDS A NEW 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In this section, I will develop a concept of familial organisation that 
derives, not from systems theory, but from a critical analysis of the 
power relations by which 'the family' is constructed, and which it 
actively reproduces. This is the concept of 'subjectivity' which, as we 
have seen, has provided a way of understanding the complex and 
contradictory construction of 'the individual'. It is a concept by 
which it will be possible to bring together our understanding of how 
social institutions are constructed on the basis of power relations and 
our discussion of the specfic material, ideological and emotional 
processes that determine familial organisation. Moving forward from 
this, we can utilise the conceptual link that 'subjectivity' can provide 
between processes at the scale of individual and family, and thereby 
start to reformulate the family-as-psyche metaphors discussed in the 
previous Chapter. In this way, it is hoped to lay the theoretical 
foundation for a more critical therapeutic practice. 
As was discussed earlier, the family may be seen as an institution 
within civil society which, although being outside the direct control of 
the ruling class or the State, nevertheless acts as a crucial arena, 
both for domination and also for resistance. While, on the one hand, 
through systems of inheritance, it serves to reproduce class 
inequalities, and the ideological components that underpin them, the 
family can also be an instrument of solidarity and struggle. Within 
racist ideologies that give superiority to 'white' lineages, the 
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institution of the family simultaneously acts as the means of oppression 
of black people, but also a primary unit of mutual support and 
consciousness raising. Within the operation of patriarchy, the family 
may be seen to be the most crucial site of struggle between the 
organising principles of hierarchy and web: the dominant organisation 
being one of 'power over', working downwards from the position of the 
male household head, but always being contested by the possibilities of 
'power together' through mutual cooperation and personal support - an 
organisation of family life that is primarily fought for by women. 
We have seen how, within a given social formation, the parameters of 
family life are already established: the 'family' is, first and 
foremost, an institution that is constructed within the context of 
patriarchal, racial and class struggle. Thus, under particular social 
formations, specific slots exist for 'the family' to occupy - people are 
not free to set up a 'family' in any way that they want. They have 
little choice but to organise themselves according to the specific 
'blueprint' that already exists for them, given their race, class, 
gender and age positions, if they are to be able to participate in the 
wider network of already existing social relations. If they fail to do 
this, they must engage in an endless struggle to establish a new form, a 
struggle that is waged not only with external pressures and constraints, 
but also with their own internalised preconceptions of 'family'. 
In our earlier discussion, we have seen how, at the scale of the person, 
subjectivity comprises not a single consistent subject position, but an 
ensemble of often jarring and contradictory subject positions <such as 
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roles and ego states) which are brought tog-ether and 11 ved as if they 
constituted a unitary whole. In order to survive and to participate in 
the specific structures of the social formation, the person must insert 
her/himself into the slots that are available to him/her. S/he must be 
constituted as an apparently free and automonous agent: one who is 
subjected <and willingly subjects her/himself) to the relations of wage 
and domestic labour that exploit and oppress her/him. Similarly, in 
discursive and emotional transactions, s/he must construct her/himself 
as a consistent subject by repressing dissonant or contradictory 
elements of her/his personality. Thus, within a patriarchal social 
formation, a man has little choice but to take on the subject position 
of appearing rational, capable and in control - and distanced from the 
intimacy of family life. By contrast I the primary subject position that 
is open to a woman is located firmly within the institution of the 
family, as being the one who has to be warm, empathic and expressive. 
The precise organisation of a person's subjectivity may be seen to be 
the product of a process of struggle and negotiation. This must be 
understood, not in terms of a simplistic bourgeois opposition between 
instinctual forces or essential qualities on the one hand, and societal 
expectations on the other (as in the Freudian problematic), but in a way 
that acknowledges the split and contradictory nature of both 'society' 
and 'individual' - with the organisation of each representing just a 
specific moment in a process of historical struggle. The constitution 
of personal subjectivity may thus be seen to reflect a moment in the 
internal struggle between disparate elements of personality - desires, 
capacities and internalised messages - negotiated against the (often 
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contradictory) subject positions that are available to the person within 
prevailing discourses and emotional and material practices. Each such 
position is not entirely fixed, and there may be some room for manoeuvre 
to accommodate particular elements of personality. For example, an 
Afro-British, working class man may have to choose to insert himself 
into one of a range of subject positions constructed within racist 
discourses <for example, 'Black Macho', 'Token Black', 'Soul Man', 
etc.), but may nevertheless be able to renegotiate the subject position 
so that it is not entirely oppressive and may allow some (albeit 
limited) expression of his own original desires, ideas and activity. 
Whereas psychoanalytic models of psychic processes have proved 
insufficient as metaphors for familial organisation, the concept of 
subjectivity, if applied to the family as a whole, could provide the 
basis for a critical understanding which places power relations at the 
centre of the analysis. It is possible to view the family-household 
system as a subjectivity in its own right: it too is a jarring aggregate 
of conflicti~g subject positions that is nevertheless constituted (and 
must actively constitute itself) as a consistent, dependable unit, in 
order that it may engage in economic production and consumption, 
discursive relations and emotional transactions. Within different 
historical and cultural contexts, family life may be seen to have been 
inserted into already existing slots as subject within a variety of 
discourses and sets of material or emotional transactions. Let us 
proceed in our examination of the family as a subjectivity in its own 
right. by considering first the external factors, and then the internal 
mechanisms. by which it is constructed. 
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External petermination of Family Sybie,tiyity 
Families are constructed as collective class or racial subjects: their 
subjectivity as 'black' or 'white', working class or bourgeois, 
determines their collective position with regard to sets of power 
relations. In a racist social formation, a 'white' family is inserted 
into a slot that situates it in a position of dominance over those who 
are forced to transact from the subordinated position of a 'black' 
family. The power of racism in determining the organisation of family 
subjectivity is particularly evident in the instance of mixed race 
families. There is no possibility of their constructing a subjectivity 
for themselves which is non-racial and they may end up in the confusing 
position of being constituted as 'black' in their dealings with 'white' 
families, and 'white' in their dealings with 'black' families. 
Within the social relations of capitalism, a family is inserted into a 
common class position as a collective subjectivity: a wife and children 
typically become bracketed in with the class position of a man (as long 
as they remain part of the family unit) and their occupational positions 
are conventionally seen as of secondary importance. Thus a secretary 
who is married to a manager is incorporated into the organisation of a 
subjectivity that places her in a fundamentally different class position 
from her colleague who 1s married to a clerk. However, in the instance 
where a woman (or child) occupies an economically superior class 
position to that of a man, contradictions are exposed between the 
organising principles of capitalism and patriarchy, resulting in uneasy 
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conflicts in how family members should situate themselves, and how they 
are situated by others, in outside transactions (see McRae 1986), 
It is the relations of patriarchy that fundamentally determine the 
internal organisation of the slots available for family subjecti vi ty to 
occupy. Whereas racism and capitalism place all family members on an 
equal footing in relation to external relations of domination or 
subordination, patriarchy produces the 'blueprint' of the internal 
structure of 'the family' within a specific historical and cultural 
context. Firstly, there is the assumption that the primary sexual 
relationships within 'families' will be between men and women - part of 
a wider ideology of heterosexism. Secondly, in each 'family' unit, an 
adul t man is placed in a position of domination over women, children and 
any other male members of the household. (In the absence of a man, a 
family will tend to be structured around the 'lack' of such a figure). 
As we saw earlier, 'the family' mayor may not be constituted as an 
economic subject, depending on the social formation. Feudal society was 
organised on the basis of economic relationships between families rather 
than individuals. It was aristocratic families (and not individuals 
within them) who were in a position to exploit the labour power of 
peasant families (as a unit, not individually). In this way, it may be 
seen that, for both classes, the available economic subject positions 
were for families as organised units. By contrast, under relations of 
slavery, the labour of family members was controlled and exploited on an 
individual basiS, so the black family was situated as an economic 
subject only in relation to the physical reproduction of labour power. 
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The external construction of family subjectivity is different again 
under the economic relations of patriarchal capitalism. Here, there is 
a constant tension between the deconstruction of the family as an 
economic subject (with the creation of individual work subjects in the 
capitalist wage labour market) and its maintenance within the material 
structures of patriarchy <particularly in the neo-feudal organisation of 
domestic labour and consumption). In a real sense, the prior 
construction of the family as an economic subject continues to determine 
the participation of women in the labour market - they often do so, not 
as discrete individuals in their own right, but as secondary earners who 
come in and out of the labour market according to the requirements of 
the family as a collective economic subjectivity. 
However, with the transition from feudalism to capitalism, the primary 
demarcation of the empty slot that the 'family' must occupy is not so 
much economic as ideological - arising from its crucial position as an 
institution within the structures of civil society. As we have seen, 
real groups of people of whatever race or class have to construct 
themselves in relation to a normative conception of 'the family', one 
which, although the subject of continual political struggle, mainly 
reflects the interests of the white bourgeoiS man - and can exist in 
marked contradiction with the realities of material and emotional 
survival. Just as individuals have to live the illusion that they are 
free autonomous subjects, so people who share their lives together have 
little option but to live the illusion that they have chosen to operate 
as a 'family' - an autonomous unit that may be held responsible for the 
activity of its members (in accordance with the prevailing norm): 
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"The concept of family is a socially necessary illusion which 
simultaneously expresses and masks recruitment to relations of 
production, reproduction and consumption ... Our notations of family 
absorb the conflicts, contradictions and tensions actually generated 
by these material, class-structured relations ... 'Family', as we 
understand (and misunderstand) the term serves as a shock-
absorber to keep households functioning yet the families they 
have (or don't have) are not the same" (Rapp 1982 p.170). 
Thus, although they may seem to be inserted into the same ideological 
slot, the reality of family life can be very different for the working 
class and the bourgeoisie, and for black families and white families. 
A bourgeois man can earn sufficient to construct his family as a single 
economiC subject dependent on his income, and so economic and 
ideological pressures converge to insert other family members firmly 
within the organisation of the patriarchal ideal. By contrast, 
capitalist wage rates have rarely been sufficient for a man to support a 
family on a single income, so working class families have very often 
depended on women and older children entering independently into the 
wage labour process. This reality of having to construct themselves, at 
least partially, as individual work subjects, can be in direct 
contradiction to a hegemonic ideology that defines the family as a 
single unitary subjectivity - as an organisation of dependants around a 
male 'breadwinner'. It is in order to live the image of 'family' that 
working family members have to deny their individual subjectivities and 
redefine their activity as marginal, secondary and supplementary 
'contribution to the household'. The contradiction and incompatibility 
-215-
'The family' as a subjectivity 
between the material and ideological slots into which the working class 
family is inserted can lead to great stress and tension for those whose 
task it is somehow to 'hold it together'. Women are invited to feel 
guilty that they are neglecting the practical and emotional maintenance 
of the home in order to go out to work, even though the physical 
survival of the family may depend on this. Working class men still feel 
pushed to fight for a 'family wage' - although they seldom get one - and 
they experience their inability to provide for the whole family as a 
slight on their masculinity. 
Under patriarchal capitalism, hegemonic ideology also defines the slot 
into which a family must insert itself as an emotional subject. 
Discourses of romanticisation have 'elevated' the family unit into a 
'haven against a heartless world': the correct (and only> location for 
intimacy, warmth and caring (however stifling this may actually be in 
practice). According to this 'blueprint' for the construction of 
emotional subjectivity, all such caring is to be provided by women. The 
corollary of this is the lack of any expectation that the world of work 
should provide any emotional comfort or desiring contact. Constructing 
itself, and constraining itself, as a subjectivity is inherently 
stressful for both a working class and a bourgeois family, but the 
nature of the stresses tend to be different: while the primary stress 
for the working class family in maintaining its subjectivity is 
economic, this may paradoxically reduce stress at an emotional level, 
since family members who are forced to go out to work (albeit guiltily) 
are at least given some release from the emotional claustrophobia that 
characterises the privatised bourgeois family. 
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Tbe formation of a family as a sybjectivity 
We have already seen how a young person has to learn to construct 
herlhimself as a subjectivity within whatever subject positions are 
available. so as to be able to participate in the emotional, material 
and discursive relations of the social formation into which slhe has 
been inserted. Parallel processes take place in relation to the 
formation of a new family as a transacting subjectivity. Within all 
patriarchal social formations, this unit must be constructed on the 
basis of an unequal relationship between women and men - thereby 
excluding the possibility of lesbian or gay households. Within feudal 
societies, the dominant emphasis would be on the construction of a 
viable collective economic subjectivity. Both aristocrats and peasants 
would arrange their marriages primarily on this basis, with crucial 
significance being given to the economic transaction between the two 
families of origin (the dowry payment) that would set up the new family 
as a viable economic unit, and would also guarantee the (male) line of 
inheritance. This economic transaction and the exact boundaries of the 
new economic unit, would be established and legitimated through specific 
practices at the ideological level: religious and secular ceremonies 
that marked the construction of the new family as a subject in its own 
right. Within feudal ideologies, there would often be no illusion of 
choice: marriages would simply be arranged by the respective families. 
Under patriarchal capitalism. family subjectivity is constructed under 
the illusion of choice: just as individuals 'choose' to be exploited 
within the wage labour process, so people 'choose' to form themselves 
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into family units, and hence to organise domestic and wage labour, 
consumption and emotional intimacy as a single organised entity. As 
Gittins argues, this ideology of individual 'choice' serves to mask the 
unequal, oppressive and exploitative nature of familial organisation: 
"By insisting that happy marriages ... are made by individuals 
through love ... the reality of the economic and patriarchal bases 
of marriage and family life are disguised and ignored" (1985 p.161). 
Within patriarchal capitalist ideology, it is, of course, women who have 
to 'choose' to be exploited within the domestic labour process, 'choose' 
to come last in terms of priorities for consumption and 'choose' to seek 
only a 'second income' within the wage labour process. This 'choice' is 
framed within the various discourses that romanticise marriage and 
family life (such as those in films and magazines), while simultaneously 
pathologising any alternatives. Choosing to remain single is redefined 
as having been "left on the shelf", while choosing a partner of the same 
sex, or choosing not to have children, is defined as being deviant, 
abnormal or irresponsible. Weedon suggests that the seductive nature of 
marriage and motherhood can only be explained by an analysis of the 
available slots into which women may insert their subjectivity: 
"In order to understand why women so willingly take on the role of 
wife and mother, we need a theory of the relationship between 
subjectivity and ... the range of possible nor~l subject positions 
open to women, and the power and powerlessness invested in them ... 
The positions of wife and mother, though subject to male control, 
also offer forms of power - the power to socialise children, to run 
the house and to be the power behind the throne" (1987 p.18-9). 
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Despite a recent temporary wavering in the value put on the institution 
of marriage, the ideology surrounding "starting a family" has remained 
very much intact. Gay and alternative households face massive problems 
in negotiating any subject positions from which to operate. They have 
no access to marriage rituals and face discrimination and annihilation 
within prevailing legal and media discourses (for example, in the 
instance of lesbian mothers seeking custody of their children). 
Once living together, or entering into marriage, heterosexual couples 
(and their children) have little alternative but to construct themselves 
as a single responsible subjectivity. This has been effected partly 
through State discourses that have constructed them as a unit for the 
purposes of income maintenance (and, until recently, of taxation). But, 
more powerfully, it is through their entry into the discourses of civil 
society - their interaction with other family units - that they must 
constitute themselves as a single subjectivity, in relation to the 
prevailing normative 'blueprint' of how a family should be. (For 
example, single parent families have to construct themselves as if they 
were families-with-one-parent-missing.) However, the responsibility for 
holding the family together falls unequally. While it is the man's 
responsibility to provide the 'family wage'. it is the woman who is 
typically seen as responsible for all other aspects of maintaining the 
image of 'family': 
"Because it is women who are identified with the family. who are 
allocated primary responsibility for its well-being, unity and 
happiness, failure to achieve such goals is overwhelmingly seen as a 
woman's problem and failure - her guilt" (Gittins 1985 p.165). 
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Internal Mecbanisms 
Let us now move on to an examination of the internal mechanisms whereby 
the family constructs and maintains itself as a subjectivity. 
Essentially the same mechanisms may be seen to operate at the scales of 
both individual and family. A person is only able to live the illusion 
of unitary subjectivity by a process of systematic misrecognition and 
selective repression: blocking out experience if it fails to fit in with 
an internalised frame of reference derived from prevailing ideology. A 
degree of consistency is maintained by excluding all or part of certain 
subject positions from the person's repertOire of internal and external 
transactions (and hence from conscious awareness) once the person 
establishes her/himself as a subject in discourse. As we have seen in 
the psychoanalytic and gestalt approaches to family therapy, such a 
split between conscious and unconscious, or foreground and background, 
can also make sense in terms of conceptualising what is and is not 
expressed within the organisation of family subjectivity: unacceptable 
subject positions may be discounted and excluded in order for an 
illusion of coherence and consistency to be kept up. 
From this perspective, it may be seen how it may be possible, with 
certain configurations of internal power relations, for the individual 
subjectivity of a family member to be rendered entirely mute and passive 
within the external (or internal) transactions of the family. S/he may 
actually be spoken for or overlooked, or may speak and act entirely as 
slhe is expected to do by the rest of the family. More commonly, it 
might only be part of each individual subjectivity that is excluded, 
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with certain sorts of transaction either not being permitted at all. or 
only to be expressed by certain family members and not others. The 
expression of anger, the open negotiation of differences and the use of 
touch (for support or intimidation) are all examples of types of 
transactions at different levels that mayor may not be permitted above 
the transactional horizon of particular families. 
Just as we have been able to theorise the minute-by-minute organisation 
of personal subjectivity in terms of driver-adaptations, so it is 
instructive to apply these concepts to the subjectivity of a family. In 
the same way that an individual deals with a fear of being rejected from 
participation in outside discourses by organising their subjectivity so 
as to Please, Hurry Up or whatever, so a family subjectivity may be seen 
to deal with stress in a similar manner. A black family living on a 
white-dominated housing estate may make the collective adaptation to 
Please Others, and, in doing so, restrict their transactional 
repertoire, particularly at the level of activity (the 'trap' level for 
the Please driver-adaptation). While a whole family may adopt the same 
driver-adaptation, it may also assume a specific configuration of 
adaptations, with different family members taking on particular aspects 
of this. For example, in order to fit in with patriarchal as well as 
racist social structures, the above family might adopt a configuration 
of the man organising himself according to the Be Strong or Be In 
Control drivers, the woman organising herself according to the Please or 
Hurry Up drivers, and the children organising themselves according to 
the Try Hard or Be Perfect drivers. 
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Painful issues and unacceptable conflicts may be suppressed below a 
family's transactional horizon if a family subjectivity becomes 
organised according to more extreme versions of driver-adaptations. 
Family members may retreat (or be forced) into making only predictable 
and ritualised transactions with one another from role pOSitions (such 
as Victim, Persecutor or Rescuer): in this way, "their interlinked 
interactions perpetuate passivity" (Massey 1983 p.33). Real concerns 
and emotions are not expressed or dealt with, and family members only 
allow themselves to experience various superficial "racket" feelings, 
and the sets of thoughts and behaviours that go with them. It is 
through manoeuvring in this way that those already in positions of power 
may maintain the status quo (particularly by making use of the 
Persecutor role position). However, family members who are too 
intimidated and powerless to be able to bring about any productive 
change within the family, may nevertheless make use of role positions 
such as Victim (or Rescuer) to exert some control over the day-ta-day 
life of the family - albeit only to the extent of hooking other family 
members into an unpleasant experience of stalemate as well. A woman who 
is so depressed that she has taken on the Victim role may, in turn, 
succeed in inviting her husband into the Rescuer role (feeling over-
burdened and guilty), or the Persecutor role (being punitive, but in a 
predictable way). Such manouevres and manipulations, while failing to 
address the real issues of oppression within the family, can 
nevertheless have a powerful determining influence on family 
organisation. 
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The concept of projection is also useful in understanding how family 
subjectivity is constructed and maintained, particularly at the level of 
emotionality. As we have seen, this concept has been developed both 
within the traditions of Gestalt therapy and object-relations 
psychoanalysis, but requires to be reformulated on the basis of a 
critical understanding of familial power relations, in order to explain 
why some family members are more vulnerable than others to accepting 
projections. As we have seen, projection is a process whereby 
unacceptable elements that are excluded from one person's subjectivity 
may be relocated within, and expressed by, another's subjectivity. Such 
transfers may be between subjectivities at the same scale <e.g. one 
family member expressing the anger of another family member). They may 
also take place between subjectivities at different scales. An 
unacceptable family conflict may be projected onto one individual 
(leading perhaps to the most vulnerable family member acting in a 
disturbed and contradictory manner). Similarly, an intra-psychic split 
within one powerful individual may be imposed on the subjectivity of the 
family as a whole (with different family members taking on the 
expression of opposite sides of the split at the expense of being able 
to express any other feelings). If a powerful family member has a 
difficulty with his/her anger, the whole family could be forced to take 
this on, perhaps with some family members repressing all expressions of 
anger, and other family members continually expressing anger that is not 
their own. 
As became clear in our earlier discussion of the mechanisms of 
projection, the process may be seen to depend on whether or not it may 
-223-
'The family' as a subjectivity 
actually suit the recipient of the projection (at an unconscious level) 
to take this on, or whether the projector is in a position of relative 
power, due to ideological, material or emotional factors, so that slhe 
can impose the projection onto an unwilling recipient. Thus women may 
be seen to be particularly vulnerable to accepting projections from men, 
and children may be forced to accept projections from parents, with 
girls being significantly more vulnerable than boys. 
Vulnerable family members may perceive intuitively that one way of 
gaining a limited degree of power and recognition is to take on and act 
out a projection on behalf of the family as a whole. Where some 
important element is consistently excluded from the family subjectivity, 
such as the expression of grief, or the resolution of conflicts, one 
family member may take this issue on and, in some way, act it out. 
Given the typical organisation of male subjectivity, a boy may act out 
an apparently powerful element, such as anger, as this will fit in with 
the organisation of his personal subjectivity. (For example, he might 
become involved in delinquency). By contrast, girls and women are more 
likely to express elements of pain and vulnerability, because their 
subjectivity is organised to be open to the feelings of others. Either 
way, whatever apparent influence or recognition may result from the 
taking on of such projections, the process is ultimately self-
destructive in that it denies any degree of genuine recognition for the 
person concerned. It is no coincidence that the 'Identified Patient', 
whose personal distress or disorder may bring a family to the notice of 
professional agencies, is most frequently a member of a subordinated 
group: a woman or a child. 
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Repeated patterns of projection may establish systems of collusion. 
This produces a locked-in pattern of relationships that are symbiotic in 
that the full repertoire of subject positions are not available to each 
person. Instead, one person may be permitted to express anger (on 
behalf of everyone), while another has to do all the thinking and 
problem solving, and a third does all the nurturing and looking after. 
In such a way, a family can become enmeshed with each totally dependent 
on another, either to express their feelings, to do their thinking, or 
to care for them. From a critical perspective, it may be seen that such 
a symbiosis is a highly effective mechanism in cementing together an 
otherwise fragile unity, so that it can achieve the necessary coherence 
in order to participate in ideological and economic structures. 
The insertion of a family within external ideological structures may 
also maintain and reproduce family subjectivity as a symbiosis that 
precludes certain family members from undertaking particular forms of 
transaction. There has been a long history of marginalising or 
mishearing the independent voice of children within family discourse. 
An extreme example of this is the Victorian bourgeois maxim that 
'children should be seen and not heard', indicating that the voice of 
children was felt to be a very serious threat indeed to the unitary 
'respectable' family subjectivity that they wished to construct. 'Baby 
talk', the deliberate teaching by adults of a substitute, non-adult 
vocabulary when dealing with young children, may also be seen to be a 
way of sabotaging the ability of children to be heard as credible 
alternative voices that could undermine or contradict the family 
subjectivity established by parents. 
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The (sexual) desires of children have often been repressed or 
misconstrued within adult-dominated family discourse. For example. 
within the eighteenth Century aristocratic family in France. although 
children's sexuality was not repressed. they were not allowed a space 
within family discourse to express their desire as a subject. but 
instead were treated only as an object. "a sexual pet to be played with 
for adult amusement" (Poster 1978 p.182). By contrast, in the bourgeois 
family of the nineteenth Century. great efforts were made to construct 
discourses that would abolish any expression of childhood sexuality. 
Myths were constructed and promulgated that masturbation (by either 
gender) would lead to impotence, blindness, insanity or even death. 
Such discourses were backed up by the threat of employing painful and 
horrific mechanical devices, and even of surgery. Thus. in this period. 
efforts were made both to distort the significance of any expression of 
children's sexuality (by situating it within a pseudo-medical discourse 
that described it as if it were part of a disease process) and. if 
possible, to suppress its expression altogether (see Foucault 1981). 
There is evidence that similar discursive processes operate in relation 
to gender in families. Women and men are inserted within different 
vocabularies. Women tend to have available to them a more sophisticated 
vocabulary in describing such areas as feelings and personal 
relationships. Men tend to have a greater facility with a technical or 
'instrumental' vocabulary. Women's discourse tends to emphasise 
domestic relations whereas men's discourse tends to emphasise external 
events and actions. However, under patriarchal social relations. these 
respective discourses do not constitute split but equally valued aspects 
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of family subjectivity. Instead, within the overall discourse of 
patriarchy, women's discourse is discounted as 'gossip' or 'rabbiting 
on', whereas 'men's talk' is seen as having priority, and women are 
expected to remain silent if men want to converse. 
The conventional construction of the nuclear family, as idealised by 
Talcott Parsons, is an excellent example of a symbiosis that restricts 
the transactional abilities of both men and women, although men are 
maintained in a clear position of 'power over'. If a woman is only 
allowed access to 'expressive' subject positions, she must force herself 
to collapse in a heap of anxiety and confusion when faced with an 
electrical plug. She thus remains dependent on her husband to fulfil 
the complementary 'instumental' role. Thus her apparent inability to 
function effectively as a separate subjectivity serves to reinforce her 
dependence on, and hence her commitment to maintain, the collective 
subjectivity of her family. Similarly, the husband has to force himself 
to repress his own emotionality and allow his feelings to be vicariously 
(and perhaps inaccurately> projected through his wife's 'expressive' 
subject positions. Again, his distortion of his own subjectivity serves 
to maintain the symbiotic organisation and apparent coherence of the 
family as a subjectivity. While such arrangements have the appearance 
of being entered into mutually, women (and men) may have little choice 
if their family is to participate in the wider social relations of a 
patriarchal capitalist social formation. However, in the last instance, 
it is clearly much more in the interests of men to maintain and uphold 
such an arrangement - a subjectivity whose appearance of unity 
systematically excludes the dissenting voices of women and children. 
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Subiectiyity System and Psyche' A Comparison Of 
Metaphors 
Both the metaphors of 'subjectivity' and 'system' conceptualise ways in 
which the activity. emotionality and discourse of family members is 
constrained by their membership of a family unit. However, the metaphor 
of 'system' fails to explain any mechanism for why particular 
constraints should exist - they are seen as somehow 'natural' and 
functional to the harmonious organisation of 'SOCiety' (itself seen as 
similarly 'natural' and unproblematic). By contrast, the metaphor of 
'subjectivity' implies and incorporates an understanding of the 
(historically changing) processes that bring about their existence, 
processes that may be analysed in terms of how they are determined by 
relations of 'power over' and 'power together' between people. In turn, 
the use of the metaphor of subjectivity may be seen to bring about the 
possibility of therapeutic intervention being directed towards enabling 
subordinated groups to renegotiate familial organisation into 
fundamentally less oppressive (or more mutually supportive) forms. 
As with 'system', 'subjectivity' may also be applied in conceptualising 
smaller constituent units within a family. Just as Minuchin refers to 
spouse and parenting sub-systems, so it would seem meaningful to 
conceive of women and men being slotted into already existing. 
ideologically sanctioned subject positions as husband-and-wife and as 
mother-and-father: subject positions that constrain them with regard to 
their participation in a variety of material, emotional and discursive 
transactions, both inside and outside the family. Within prevailing 
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forms of family organisation there is a less well defined slot for 
children to be inserted into as a collective subject position 
(equivalent to a sibling sub-system). There are fewer situations in 
which Siblings are conventionally expected to speak as if with one 
voice, or be held collectively responsible for their actions. Such 
relative autonomy may well have been more common among large working 
class families of the nineteenth century where older siblings were 
expected to take a large measure or responsibility in looking after and 
controlling their younger brothers and sisters, and the sibling 
subjectivity as a whole might often be punished for the misdemeanours of 
any of their number. With the hegemony of the bourgeois family form, 
such differentiation is less common, with virtually all responsibility 
for family functioning being placed on parents, particularly the mother. 
On occasion, other subjectivies may emerge within a family organisation, 
based on a common position with regard to particular sets of 
transactions. The 'men' of the family (father and older sons) may adopt 
a common set of rights and privileges, perhaps to do with household 
tasks (what they will and will not do), or to do with their 'right' to 
have a social life outside the home (leaving 'the women' in charge of 
looking after any dependent family members). Perhaps in response to 
such common experience of subordination, the women in the family might 
forge some sense of collective identity - based on (some degree of) 
transactions of mutual recognition. Similarly, in a family where the 
father is sexually abusive, the daughters (or children of both sexes) 
may organise themselves as a subjectivity and try to resist their abuse 
collectively rather than individually. 
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The metaphor of 'subjectivity' shares with psychanalytic and gestalt 
metaphors of 'psyche' a theoretical linkage between processs operating 
at the scale of family and individual, but contextualises these within 
an understanding of power relations. The degree of shared theoretical 
heritage means that it should be possible to incorporate into a model 
based on 'subjectivity' a number of theoretical concepts and practical 
techniques from these approaches (albeit with some reformulation). The 
theoretical concepts that seem most relevant are those of projection and 
introjection, and the splitting into conscious/unconscious or 
foreground/background <reformulated as a transactional horizon). Once 
contextualised within an understanding of power relations, 
psychoanalysis provides a useful account of how historical oppression 
may be embedded in the current organisation of a family. At a practical 
level, techniques for supporting the emergence of previously repressed 
experience (particularly from the gestalt approach) could be of great 
value. 
Where the metaphor of subjectivity is superior to these other two 
approaches is in its ability to situate both the organisations of 
individual and family as moments in a process of struggle - a struggle 
that is an instance of wider conflicts within the structural power 
relations of the soc1al formation. In turn, this opens up the 
possibility of analysing the extent to which changes in family 
organisation are (or are not) empowering, both for the family as a whole 
in its dealings with external structures, and for those family members 
who are particularly oppressed within the existing organisation of 
subjectivity. 
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Conventionally, family therapy has been used as a response to some 
perceived breakdown in the functioning of either the whole family or one 
family member (or both). In practice, such a breakdown tends to be 
conceived of as an arbitrary cut-off point along a continuum between 
what is seen as 'normal', 'healthy' functioning at one extreme, and what 
is seen as 'pathological' or 'deviant' at the other. Breakdown is thus 
a failure to live up to social norms that are seen as essentially 
unproblematic and in the best interests of all family members. Common 
scenarios for family therapy intervention would be the neurotic or 
psychotic breakdown of one family member, the incidence of violence or 
abuse within the family, or delinquency and criminality committed by 
family members outside the family. A systems perspective does help to 
situate a breakdown of functioning at the scale of one individual as 
part of a disturbance in relationships in her/his context of living. 
However, all this achieves is to shift the location of deviancy or 
pathology from the scale of the individual to that of the family. It is 
therefore important that we develop a concept of breakdown that is not 
based on a model of normality/deviancy, but which takes account of just 
how problematic so called 'normal' family functioning actually is. 
Let us return to our definition of subjectivity: it represents an 
ensemble of subject positions, each with their distinct and conflicting 
possibilities for transacting, that is nevertheless constructed so that 
it appears to transact as a consistent unity - to speak as if it were 
one voice, and to take responsibility for all its actions. This 
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illusory degree of coherence is necessary if the person or family is to 
be able to participate within the social or economic relations of the 
prevailing social formation. It is achieved and maintained by the 
squeezing of divergent elements into the subject positions that are 
available to it within its particular discursive, economic and emotional 
context. Thus a family (or person), although comprising an aggregate of 
conflicting subject positions, nevertheless is constituted, and must 
actively constitute itself, as a consistent, dependable and responsible 
unit that is organised in relation to participation in wage and domestic 
labour, and in legal or social discourses. 
As we have already seen, the precise nature of subjectivity is the 
product of a process of ongoing struggle and conflict. Its organisation 
arises from the negotiation of conflicting internal elements (desires, 
capacities and previously internalised messages), in relation to the 
variety of often contradictory subject positions that may be available 
to it. The positions that are potentially available are determined by 
the structural position of the person or family within the social 
formation - but each position, although crucially determined by 
oppressive power relations, is nevertheless open to subtle renegotiation 
and manoeuvring. Living as a subjectivity within an oppressive social 
formation is always fragile and fraught, involving, on the one hand, the 
continual frustration of patricular desires, thoughts and activities, 
and, on the other, a constant effort to 'paper over the the cracks' so 
as to maintain the illusion that the subjectivity is something that has 
been freely and actively chosen, and for which the family or individual 
may be held responsible. There may come a point where it becomes too 
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much of an effort to keep up the image of a unitary subjectivity, which 
then begins to fall apart and no longer function in the ideologically 
and economically prescribed manner. 
The phenomenon of 'breakdown' may be understood, not as a specified 
degree of deviance from a 'healthy' norm, but as the point at which a 
person or family ceases to be recognisable as the autonomous, 
responsible and consistent subject that is required of them if they are 
to be free to participate in the prevailing social formation. It is at 
this point that they may become conspicuous to friends or neighbours, 
and outside agencies may become involved. Whether it is requested or 
not, such outside involvement can become inevitable, since the breakdown 
of subjectivity will be fundamentally disturbing and seditious to the 
social order of the particular social formation. For example, under 
patriarchal capitalism, madness may be seen to threaten the supposedly 
rational basis of the social order (see Foucault 1967). Similarly, 
criminality undermines the legal underpinnings of an unequal 
distribution of property rights. 
What actually constitutes a 'breakdown' depends, not on the degree of 
distress experienced, but on whether the response to this distress 
places the person or family outside the ensemble of subject pOSitions 
that are considered acceptable for them to occupy within a specific 
social formation. For example, child sexual abuse only represents a 
breakdown of family subjectivity if it occurs within a social formation 
which provides a range of subject pOSitions (albeit distorted) from 
which victims may speak and be heard (for example within social work and 
-233-
The breakdown of subjectivity 
legal discourses). Thus, within the present configuration of the social 
formation, a man's sexual abuse of his children is now more likely to be 
disclosed and heard, thereby placing his family outside the slot that is 
prescribed for it within ideology. By contrast, at present, a man's 
sexual abuse of his wife is less likely to have such an effect. As we 
have seen earlier, her voice is not so likely to be heard within 
policing or legal discourses, which currently construct her as having 
'consented' to any such abuse by her agreement to the 'contract' of 
marriage. 
Individual and one-off instances of strange or deviant behaviour by a 
family member do not, of themselves, constitute a breakdown of family 
subjectivity - as long as the rest of the family is able to use some 
form of persuasion or coercion in order to bring them back into line 
with what is deemed acceptable. However, taken to extremes, such 
courses of action may affect not just the family member's own 
subjectivity, but also threaten collective family subjectivity. The 
family of a perSistently delinquent child, who are shown in Court to be 
unable to exercise 'proper care and control' over her/him, are also 
experiencing the breakdown of their collective subjectivity: they are no 
longer able to be held responSible for themselves as a unit. Similarly, 
the depression, anxiety or deliberate self-harm of one family member may 
constitute not only a breakdown of that person's subjectivity, but also 
a breach in the total subjectivity of the family, since the experience 
and behaviour of one constituent element may now be manifestly outside 
of their control. However, such a knock-on effect on family 
subjectivity is by no means immediate or inevitable. It is possible for 
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a family member to be acting in a seriously disturbed manner, but for 
the family to shield and cover this up, perhaps indefinitely, thus 
successfully maintaining the appearance of family unity and 
responsibility. 
It is important, at the scale of the family, to differentiate between 
the breakdown of overall subjectivity and changes in system membership. 
It is perfectly possible for adults or children to enter or leave the 
system, for people to be born and die, without the coherence and unity 
of family subjectivity being seriously disrupted in any way. Similarly 
one adult may take the place of two, or vice versa, in obtaining the 
'family wage' by participation in the wage labour or state benefit 
processes. Such changes, in themselves, do not constitute a 
disintegration of family subjectivity, (although they may indirectly 
contribute to placing strain upon it). Within the current social 
formation, divorce or bereavement does not, of itself, constitute a 
breakdown of family subjectivity, since economic and legal mechanisms 
exist to support and maintain the organisation and coherence of the 
family unit through such transitions. It would now be seen as quite 
acceptable for a different pair of adults to present themselves at the 
school parents' evening, as long as they maintained the necessary image 
of responsibility and consistency that would permit the family to 
continue to be seen as an autonomous functioning unit. (The picture 
would have been very different in the nineteenth century, when such 
events could have resulted in the dissolution of working class families 
with women and children being separated and admitted to the workhouse.> 
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Factor. leading to breakdown 
A review of the research evidence would suggest that there are strong 
correlations between the incidence of many manifestations of individual 
or family breakdown and structural oppression within the social 
formation. Broadly speaking, under Western patriarchal capitalism, 
black and working class families and individuals are more prone to break 
down at some point, and women are more prone to break down than men 
within the current organisation of family life. Women are 50~ more 
likely than men to be admitted to a psychiatric hospital at some point 
in their lives (Littlewood and Lipsedge 1989 p.97). Similarly, 
Carpenter and Brockington (1980), in their study of first admissions to 
psychiatric hospitals in Manchester, found that people from Afro-
Carribean or Asian ethnic groups were between 50~ and 300~ more likely 
to have been admitted at some point during the 15 year study period. 
(Studies that have included repeat admissions have produced more 
inconsistent results - perhaps due to the relative disinclination of 
certain communities to make use of the sort of follow up treatment that 
was offered to them.) Srole et al (1961) found that in a random sample 
of New Yorkers, lower class people were more than twice as likely as 
upper class people to be "psychiatrically impaired" (although it has not 
always been possible to distinguish the effect of class on mental health 
from the impact that mental breakdown may itself have on occupational 
status). Black and working class families are more likely to be subject 
to the 'discovery' of child abuse or neglect and the removal of children 
into care (see CRE 1977j Pelton 1981; Parton 1985). 
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Being subjected as part of a family has been shown to have a different 
effect on the propensity to breakdown for women and for men. Cochrane 
(1983) found that being married greatly reduced the likelihood of 
psychiatric admission for both genders. indicating perhaps that the 
subject positions available within the current configurations of family 
life offer considerably greater possibilities for transactions of 
recognition than do the subject positions available to single people 
within the existing social formation. However. the benefits for men 
were proportionately far greater than for women. Whereas the admission 
rates for single women and men were broadly similar. those for married 
women were nearly 70% higher than those for married men. This statistic 
would suggest that. while being subjected as part of a family reduces 
the vulnerability experienced by single people within a social formation 
that is organised around the institution of the family. the burden of 
sacrifice that goes with this falls unequally on the woman - it is she 
who has responsibility for maintaining family subjectivity and it is her 
personal breakdown that will more often signal the breakdown of that 
subjectivity. 
Brown and Harris (1978) made a more detailed study of the factors that 
were most frequently associated with depression in working class mothers 
(a group that is particularly prone to this manifestation of breakdown). 
The factors that emerged as most important related to the burden of care 
placed upon them (having three or more children under 14 at home), their 
economic powerlessness and social isolation (having no full or part time 
job), their lack of access to transactions of recognition (having no 
"confiding relationship" with their husband or other close friend), and 
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the absence of such a relationship in the past (loss of their mother 
before the age of 11). This suggests a model of susceptibility to 
breakdown that depends on both current experience (both of oppression 
and of recognition) and on the way in which such past experiences have 
become internalised within the structure of the person or family unit. 
Let us now attempt to place this empirical evidence within a theoretical 
framework and look at the factors that are likely either to enable a 
subjectivity to carry on functioning, or to precipitate some form of 
breakdown - whether for an individual or a family. The evidence would 
suggest that some degree of recognition - some meeting of wants and 
needs, some appreciation of ideas and actions - is essential if a 
subjectivity is to be able to continue to function in a coherent way. 
Such recognition may be obtained in transactions of mutuality (where no 
power relationships of domination or subordination are involved) or, in 
a more distorted fashion, by being able to demand recognition through 
being in a position of domination over others. Some degree of 
recognition may even be obtained by subtly renegotiating the terms of 
what is apparently a position of subordination - some servants are able 
to demand a certain degree of respect from their masters. 
Such recognition may be fragmentary and contradictory - as the elements 
that comprise the subjectivity are themselves fragmented and 
contradictory. Although having to subject her/himself as an apparently 
consistent subject, an individual may derive personal support, not from 
being recognised as this illusory entity, but from partial recognitions 
of elements of her/his subjectivity that actually do not fit in very 
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well with this whole (or even with each other). In a paradoxical way. 
it may be ~he degree to which a woman receives recognition that her 
interests and experience do not always coincide with those of her family 
that actually enables her to carry on sacrificing parts of herself so as 
to keep the family going. 
The meeting of needs through the internal transactions of a subjectivity 
can be equally important - for example. reassurance and nurturing may 
take place internally, whether as transactions between different ego-
states or different family members. In turn, the capacity to undertake 
such transactions may be seen to result from the internalisation of 
personal or family history and, in particular, past experiences of 
oppression or recognition. Past recognition may be reproduced within 
the current organisation of an individual or family subjectivity as a 
sense of individual or group self-esteem, as a capacity for self-
nurturing. Such acqUired "resilience" may sustain them through periods 
of their lives during which they may be receiving ~recious little 
recognition within their current experience (see Rutter 1987). More 
specifically, such resilience may be seen to comprise internalised 
permissions, rights and validations within the make-up of the individual 
or family. For instance, a person who has internalised a Parent message 
that they have a right to exist is likely to have the internal resources 
to hold their subjectivity together in an oppressive situation that 
would force another person, who lacked such a permission, to break down. 
Set against the support derived from past and present transactions of 
recognition are experiences of oppression and exploitation, and of 
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internal conflict and injury resulting from the ongoing supression of 
certain desires, ideas or activities. It is perhaps the cumulative 
effect of these that may precipitate some form of breakdown. Within the 
current social formation, all individuals and families experience the 
primary stress of having to live the illusion of free subjectivity as if 
it were real. In order to do this, they must suppress their anger with 
themselves for 'choosing' to be exploited and oppressed, and for 
alienating themselves from some of their desires and capacities in the 
process. This level of stress may be seen to depend crucially on their 
gender, race and class position. The greater the degree of current 
oppression, the greater the degree of internal contradiction and the 
greater the magnitude of internalised anger. 
As was discussed earlier, Brown and Harris identified housebound working 
class mothers with young children as a group showing a particularly high 
incidence of "clinical depression". It is easy to see why this may be 
so, due to their oppressed and contradictory position both economically 
and ideologically. They experience particular difficulties in day-to-
day material survival and in achieving the recognition necessary for 
emotional survival ("Baby must always come first"). On the one hand, as 
members of the working class, they are subjected in capitalist ideology 
to discourses that emphasise the moral worth and status of wage 
labouring <and, by the same token, take away from the status of those 
who are not in employment). On the other hand, they are subjected in 
the discourse of patriarchy which defines it as natural that women 
should be confined to, and subordinated in the home, bearing and rearing 
their men's children. Furthermore, maintaining social contact, say with 
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other (working class) women or with health and welfare professionals, 
requires that they construct the ideological pretence that they have 
made a positive choice to take up (and are enjoying) motherhood and 
domestic labour, even though the actual experience may be one of 
oppression and contradiction. 
Whatever the structural power position of the person or family, some 
degree of sacrifice of desires or capacities is necessary in order to 
'keep up the act' of the required subjectivity. However, the exact 
nature and degree of this sacrifice may depend on their gender, race and 
class position. A white, ruling class man will typically have to make 
certain distortions to his subjectivity in order to maintain his 
position of dominance with regard to other groups (for example, hiding 
any emotional expression of vulnerability>. Such a position of 
dominance is also likely to isolate him from the possibility of 
participating in any transactions of recognition that are based on 
mutual relationships with others. This may, in certain circumstances, 
lead to an unbearable degree of stress <perhaps when faced with a 
situation such as a bereavement), such that the man is no longer able to 
maintain the organisation of his subjectivity, or occupy the position 
that he had established for himself. However, in the normal run of 
events, the organisation of his subjectivity would be such that he would 
expect to sacrifice relatively little of his wants and needs. 
The situation with regard to a bourgeois family is more complex. On the 
one hand, all family members are placed in a position of privilege, and 
can similarly demand that their needs be met at the expense of others 
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outside the family. However, despite this, women and children subjected 
within such a family may be subjected to such a degree of oppression at 
the hands of the male household head that the family may reach a point 
where certain members no longer allow themselves to be bribed materially 
into toeing the line and may breach the family subjectivity - perhaps 
only for a short time until father's wealth and influence are sufficient 
either to banish or reintegrate the erring family member. 
By contrast, a working class family tends to be in a position of 
constant strain and contradiction at the economic level, since the man 
is often unable to live up to the dictates of patriarchal ideology, and 
earn a 'family wage' that is sufficient to support his family as a 
single unit in relation to the wage labour process. Instead, he is 
invited to feel guilty about not earning sufficient, while the woman may 
be placed in the position of feeling equally guilty about 'deserting' 
the home in order to earn the secondary wage that is necessary for 
family survival. 
There are even greater ideological contradictions for a woman as a 
single parent. Within the current patriarchal social formation, she is 
under pressure to construct her family as if it should be a two parent 
family, and, in her transactions both inside and outside the family, she 
must constantly apologise for or cover up the supposed 'lack' of a man 
to run the household. Similarly, the subject positions available to a 
black family are intrinsically oppressive and exploitative within the 
current social formation. 'Keeping up the act' for them would involve 
the sacrifice of many opportunities, desires and abilities, just in 
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order to be accepted and be able to participate in the social order. 
Within racist discourses. they are placed in the position of almost 
having to apologise for their very existence. with any assertion of 
their cultural heritage being defined as 'causing trouble' or 'not 
fitting in' - or as a quaint spectacle for the amusement of white 
people. 
Perhaps most crucially. it is the availability of some transactions of 
(mutual) recognition that can enable individuals and families to resist 
their current experience of oppression and to empower themselves. 
Formal structures. such as women's groups. trade unions. or black 
cultural associations. may provide real alternatives to breaking down 
under the stress of oppression and exploitation. Similarly. informal 
structures, such as the connections between families through living in 
the same neighbourhood, or being part of the same extended family 
network (links that are generally created and maintained by women). can 
ensure material, ideological and emotional survival in circumstances 
that might otherwise lead to an internalisation of hopelessness and 
eventual breakdown. From this perspective it may be seen that 
bereavement may not only cause distress, but may also contribute to 
breakdown in that it can disrupt and terminate the organisation of such 
mutual support structures. 
Some subjectivities are obviously more vulnerable than others to break 
down under a given stress. People and families develop their own 
idiosyncratic thresholds of tolerance to particular stresses. Physical 
factors, such as heredity or physical vitality, may undoubtedly form a 
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component of this. However, as we have seen, resilience or 
vulnerability may often result from their legacy of specific life 
experiences. Thus, whether or not a subjectivity breaks down may depend 
on how they have internalised their own history - the accumulation of 
their particular responses to experiences that were empowering or were 
oppressive and contradictory. 
Childhood experiences of abuse may have a devastating impact on a 
person's self-organisation, especially if these were accompanied by a 
lack of recognition or support in other key (family) relationships at 
the time. A child who is sexually abused by her/his father is forcibly 
constructed as the object of the father's (sexual) desire - with little 
room to to negotiate any possibility of personal recognition. Allowing 
her/himself, say, to be bribed with sweets or privileges, far from 
constituting an experience of recognition, actually gives the father the 
power to determine what the child's desires should be - what is to be a 
'fair' reward for her/his prostitution. It gives no acknowledgement to 
the real feelings of hurt and betrayal that may be engendered in the 
child - and which s/he may have no choice but to suppress (as was 
demonstrated in the work of Alice Killer). Such past experiences can 
give rise to an organisation of personal subjectivity that is self-
alienating: the person redefines her/his transactions with the outside 
world on the basis that s/he has no right to recognition, even when this 
is offered. 
Similarly, at the scale of the family, there can be a history of 
oppression that has been internalised as a rigid transactional horizon 
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that inhibits the possibilities for transactions of recognition, both in 
the internal and external relations of the family. Some such exclusion 
of transactional possibilities occurs, almost inevitably, in the way 
that a new family unit is formed, with the submerging of (particularly 
women's) desires and aspirations into patriarchally defined subject 
positions. This can only be achieved by processes of enforced or 
apparently 'voluntary' repression (for example, by the woman 'choosing' 
to give up her life outside the home and become a 'wife'). Such 
processes then come to define the ongoing organisation of family 
subjectivity in ways that specifically oppress and abuse women and 
children within the family. Over and above this, a history of 
subjection of the family unit within external structures of racist or 
class oppression can lead to collective withdrawal from many 
transactional possibilities - an internal suppression of desires and 
capacities that mirrors the patterns of external oppression. The family 
unit does not always function as a haven of support and mutual 
recognition. For instance, Hess (1970) identified how a long-term 
experience of economic powerlessness and subjection to rigid external 
authority structures (in workplaces, benefit offices etc.) resulted in 
poor families adopting a ·passive cognitive organisation" that excluded 
initiative or the will to achieve among all family members. 
As we have seen, both individual and family subjectivities are 
inherently unstable, so that unresolved conflict arising at one scale 
may excite conflict at the other. In many cases a breakdown of 
subjectivity is likely to result from the cumulative effect of stresses 
originating at different scales. External experiences of oppression may 
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lead to the exacerbation of splits and inequalities within a family, and 
this may, in turn, become reflected in an escalation of internal 
conflicts and the oppression of already more vulnerable family members. 
In the instance of a male breadwinner being made redundant, his family 
may direct their anger, not externally at the employer, but internally, 
in patterns of mutual blame and guilt, thereby escalating already 
existing patterns of tension and repression (see McKee and Bell 1986), 
By a similar process, a man subjected to racist abuse outside the family 
may seek to achieve some personal recognition at the expense of other 
family members by acting in a dominant or abusive manner towards them, 
and this may become part of the ongoing family organisation. In other 
instances, an unresolved legacy of personal oppression may become 
reflected in projections at the scale of the family. For example, a 
woman who had experienced sexual abuse as a child may have internalised 
this oppression by splitting off and repressing (part of) her own desire 
as 'dirty'. In her transactions with her children, she may set up one 
child to represent a projection of the 'good' or 'pretty' child that she 
had wanted to be (but had been defiled), while another child may be 
invited to act out the 'naughty' or 'dirty' child that represents both 
the child position that she was herself forced into (as the object of 
another's abuse), and the anger and rebellion that she was prevented 
from expressing at the time (or since). 
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stage. in ~be proce •• of breakdown 
As we have seen, living as a subjectivity within an oppressive social 
formation is always a struggle involving conflict and compromise. It 
involves establishing a transactional horizon that suppresses those 
elements that would jeopardise participation within a particular social 
and economic context, while allowing some (albeit distorted> expression 
of desires, capacities and ideas, and a meeting of sufficient material, 
emotional and disursive needs to ensure survival. Such a horizon would 
operate in relation to internal as well as external transactions: at the 
scale of the individual, only certain elements of past and present 
experience would be permitted into awareness, and only a certain portion 
of these would be allowed external expressioni similarly, at the scale 
of the family, only certain thoughts, feelings or behaviour would be 
permitted within family interaction, with a slightly different 
repertOire being allowed in relation to transactions outside the family. 
The structural power position of a subjectivity will determine how needs 
may be met. A position of domination over others allows the 
gratification of certain needs at others' expease - but, at the same 
time, alienates the person (or family) from close contact with others. 
There may even be some leeway within transactions of subordination for 
certain survival needs to be met (for example, being situated within the 
discourse of 'benevolent paternalism') - but always at the expense of 
ultimately being patronised or put down. However, it is outside the 
context of unequal power that needs can often be met most effectively -
through participating in transactions of mutual recognition. 
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Up to a certain point, however inadequately needs for recognition and 
support are being met, and however high the price that is being paid in 
terms of domination and abuse, family members may decide to put up with 
things as they are, either because of actual intimidation or because 
there is little realistic prospect of their needs being met any better 
outside the family. (The social formation is structured such that 
certain material and emotional needs may typically only be met within 
the organisation of the family). The fear of losing what little support 
they still have leads people to stay put and contain their experience of 
oppression within themselves. Such an uneasy stalemate (which may last 
for some time) is likely to be reflected in the transactional 
organisation of the family as a whole, in terms of an atmosphere of 
tension and pent-up feeling. Such periods of fragile stability may 
easily be upset by changes (or potential changes) in family composition 
that upset delicate power balances, such as the arrival of a new baby 
and stages in the progress of children towards independent adulthood. 
Thus family subjectivity comes to incorporate (and partly suppress) a 
history of struggle and conflict, during which family members may have 
become increasingly alienated from their own capacities and desires. 
The process of breakdown may be seen to comprise several distinct 
stages. The first of these is when, instead of a person or family 
continuing to resist their oppression <albeit in very small ways), all 
such room for manouevre may have become blocked - perhaps due to their 
dependence on their oppressors or their lack of sufficient support or 
recognition from other sources. This would place them in a position 
where they are no longer able to carry on negotiating their subjectivity 
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and simply live out what is required of them. In an effort to maintain 
the illusion of a coherent subjectivity at all costs, and hence retain 
some participation in the social formation, their transactional horizon 
would have shifted to become just a facade of social predictability 
which denies them any expression of their own ideas, capacities or 
desires. 
Let us return to the perspective of the dynamic organisation of 
subjectivities in terms of driver-adaptations. According to TA theory, 
these derive from Child responses to parental messages: how one must 
adapt in order to be acceptable within the discourse of powerful others. 
Thus, when placed in stressful situations where recognition may be in 
jeopardy, people tend to fall back on such decisions, believing that 
their minute-by-minute survival may depend on their ability to organise 
themselves so as to Be Perfect, Try Hard, and so on - and hence be 
acceptable within externally imposed discourses. Similarly, when a 
family subjectivity is under stress, it may try to safeguard its 
survival by increasingly organising itself <and its constituent members) 
according to one or more of these adaptations. Up to a certain degree, 
such driver-adaptations allow some inclusion of the creativity and 
initiative of individuals or families, so still enabling them to 
negotiate their subjectivity to a meaningful extent. However, as the 
level of stress is increased - and issues of survival seem to be more at 
stake - their subjectivity may become just a hollow mask, with all 
transactions being undertaken from role positions that are externally 
constructed, corresponding to variants of the basic pOSitions of Victim, 
Rescuer, Aggressor or Persecutor. 
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Strictly speaking, this stage would not be seen as constituting an 
actual breakdown, since, from the point of view of an observer situated 
within the prevailing transactional framework of the social formation, 
nothing would appear to be disturbing or threatening to the social 
order. In practice, for any individual or family, such a state of 
alienation or reification is likely to become unlivable at some pOint. 
Unable to play any active part in demanding that their wants or needs 
are attended to, their survival would depend on whatever vicarious 
recognition results from the performance of their role(s). For example, 
a woman who has ceased to be able to negotiate the roles of 'housewife' 
and 'mother', is situated in a position where her emotional and material 
survival is precarious, since her needs are automatically marginalised 
and subordinated to those of all other family members. Living such an 
alienated subjectivity is likely, at some point, to precipitate a person 
or a whole family into a more overt manifestation of breakdown. 
The second stage of breakdown may be seen as some version of a 'protest' 
at what is going on. It is characterised by an alteration of the 
transactional horizon in response to an actual (or threatened) emergence 
of some hitherto repressed element, albeit in some distorted form. This 
alteration may be such as to disrupt the coherence of the subjectivity, 
giving it the appearance of being in some sense 'out of control'. Thus, 
instead of anger and pain providing the basis for a constructive 
renegotiation of subjectivity, it may become deflected into futile and 
self-destructive ways of thinking, feeling and acting - but ones which 
nevertheless are sufficiently powerful as to undermine the overall 
organisation of their subjectivity and to have a disturbing effect on 
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others situated within conventional transactional patterns. Examples of 
such 'protests' would include anorexia, depression, or delinquency. 
As well as signalling a protest at having to live the unlivable (and 
feeling powerless to renegotiate the terms of their situation>, such 
forms of breakdown may also be seen to represent desperate strategies 
for exerting some control over the situation, even if only in the 
paradoxical sense of the person or family being in control of their own 
self-destructiveness (although often not at a conscious level>. The 
'hunger strike' of the young person with anorexia may be seen as both a 
public demonstration that life has become impossible, and a paradoxical 
strategy for taking control over the process of eating. 
Such strategies may represent further escalations of driver-adaptations 
_ but to the point where, rather than guaranteeing recognition within 
the terms of externally imposed discourses, they are taken to such 
extremes that they actually disrupt the coherence (and undermine the 
acceptability> of the subjectivity within the structures in which it 
must participate. In this way, the 'protest' may simply be an 
exaggeration of what seems already to be required of the person or 
family, and a further supression of their feelings about <and ability to 
resist) what is actually going on. In response to continued oppression, 
or the absence of recognition, a woman who constructs herself so as to 
Keep Quiet (in the sense of subjugating her own feelings in order to be 
of service to others) may exaggerate this to the point where she shuts 
off her feelings altogether and manifests what is defined from the 
outside as 'depression'. Thus, to a greater or lesser degree, what 
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appears as the 'protest' may also act as a desperate defence against any 
awareness of the real issues that are afffecting their life - issues 
that may seem too painful to contemplate and too dangerous to be allowed 
any direct expression. In this way, the 'protest' may be seen to be a 
defence that is taken to such lengths that it actually signals the 
existence (but not the precise nature) of underlying issues of abuse, 
oppression and alienation. 
The degree to which such issues may be suppressed reflects the extent of 
any internal imbalance of power within a subjectivity. A powerful 
element of the subjectivity may be in a position to defend itself 
against this potential awareness by imposing a horizon that is so 
excessively rigid that it begins to appear strange to those outside its 
system of control. This response, conventionally termed 'paranoia', may 
be characterised by an extreme degree of suspiciousness and imposed 
isolation from outside contact. At the scale of the individual, 
elements of Adapted Child and Parent ego states combine to overpower 
other elements of Child and Adult, resulting in the paradoxical 
situation of the Take Control driver-adaptation itself going out of 
control and totally dominating the organisation of personal 
subjectivity. A similar process of breakdown may be identified at the 
scale of the family: 
"There exists a 'paranoid family style' usually characterised by a 
'strong' parent ... who imposes a series of rigid family rules that 
may include irrational beliefs ... and a philosophy of life imbued 
with distrust, apprehensiveness and hostility. Other members of the 
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family •.. are generally weak. submissive persons who comply without 
resistance to the paranoid way of thinking" (Kaffman 1983 p.114). 
From the point of view of an external observer. a paranoid family style 
might engender some degree of distrust and unease. However. this would 
only constitute a breakdown at the point where the defence measures 
themselves became problematic (for example, keeping a child off school, 
or threatening violence towards visitors). 
As the research of Goodwin (1985) has shown, it is behind this 
particular exaggerated adaptation of family subjectivity that the 
(sexual) abuse of vulnerable family members is most likely to occur. In 
such a family, a man may get away for some time with being able to 
displace his own anger and pain (and his fear of owning these directly> 
onto the abuse of more vulnerable family members (a process that is, to 
some degree, already inherent in patriarchal family organisation). A 
paranoid family style minimises the possibility that the victim may, at 
some point, 'go public' about the abuse and trigger external 
intervention. In such an instance, family subjectivity may be seen to 
have broken down, not from the point when the abuse commenced, but only 
from the point when the victim was able to take some form of action 
which 'blew the whistle' and made the issue a public one. Very often, 
if the victim is her/himself particularly powerless and unsupported, 
this action will constitute some form of personal breakdown (such as 
self-injury> - a 'protest' that does not artiCUlate her/his distress 
directly, but does threaten the organisation of family subjectivity. 
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At this stage, breakdown of subjectivity is usually only partial. It is 
often only one element that breaks through the constraints of the 
organisation of subjectivity - in other areas, the controls remain 
intact. Many aspects are likely to remain sufficiently coherent and 
recognisable to allow the person or family still to be subjected, and 
subject themselves in relation to many other discourses, activities or 
emotional transactions. Often there is only breakdown in relation to 
one or two particular levels of transaction, while there is no 
significant disturbance at other levels. For example, at the scale of 
the individual, a form of breakdown such as anorexia may be seen to be 
very specific. In all other respects, a person with anorexia may 
continue to organise her/himself in an entirely conventional way, 
participating quite predictably in many other areas of material, 
emotional and discursive transactions (although probably in qUite a 
reified or alienated fashion). However, as long as s/he refuses to take 
responsibility for eating enough to stay alive, s/he fails to construct 
her/himself as the required autonomous subjectivity. 
Similarly, at the scale of a family, breakdown often reflects just one 
specific element that has gone 'out of control', while in all other 
respects, the family continues to be organised as a consistent and 
responsible unit. In the above instance, if a child refuses to take 
responsibility for eating enough, and the rest of the family finds 
itself unable to take over this responsibility (by threats, bribes or 
whatever), then it is not just the child's subjectivity that has broken 
down, but also that of the family. Even though the family may be 
transacting entirely conventionally and predictably in all its other 
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dealings with the outside world, the fact that it is manifestly unable 
to be responsible for its child's eating means that it is no longer able 
to organise its subjectivity so as to fit into the required slot. 
The third possible stage of breakdown is that of the collapse of any 
pretence of order, coherence or comprehensiblity, such that the person 
or family ceases to exist as a subjectivity in any meaningful sense. 
The transactional horizon between what can and cannot be expressed would 
no longer operate in any consistent way. Such a breakdown would be 
characterised by previously repressed elements of individual or family 
subjectivity breaking out independently of each other, expressing in a 
disjointed way the real underlying tensions and contradictions between 
each of them. This is likely to seem strange and disturbing to external 
observers, and may also be confusing and terrifying to any residual 
subjectivity of the person or family, against which these new elements 
may seem alien and dangerous. In the case of an individual, this would 
be seen as madness or going berserk. In the case of a family, this 
would be seen as having become chaotic, perhaps with all the children 
being defined as 'beyond parental control'. 
The key feature of this stage of breakdown is the abandoning of any 
attempt to constrain conflicting elements so as to be able to occupy a 
unitary subject position. In their discourse and activity, the person 
or family ceases to own any recognisable position of 'I' or 'We'. The 
subjectivity ceases to be comprehensible either to itself, or to others 
who are situated within conventional ideOlogy. Its discourse appears 
fragmented, psychotic or bizarre. Its actions appear unpredictable and 
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dangerous. It no longer situates itself as a single responsible 
subject. Although this breach of censorship may allow some outlet for 
previously repressed desires, ideas or activities, the expression of 
these in such circumstances will tend to be so fragmentary and 
contradictory, and so unrelated to any real here-and-now possibilities 
for recognition, that no significant or satisfying connection is likely 
to be established with others. 
Such discourse and behaviour will appear subversive, in that its content 
threatens to undermine the fragile veneer of control by which other 
subjectivities maintain their apparent cohesiveness. Often in coded and 
ambiguous ways, it expresses that which must be suppressed in order to 
maintain the prevailing social order. In 'madness', Western people may 
allude, almost in forms of parody, to their real powerlessness and lack 
of control over their lives, perhaps by attributing control to ·voices· 
in the head, or to some external conspiracy. Similar processes of 
individual breakdown may be found in other social formations. Within 
the patriarchal structures of traditional Punjabi SOCiety, women are 
forbidden to articulate any anger or aggression against their oppression 
by men (see Brown et aI, 1981). If pushed too far, the culturally 
specific form of breakdown that is available to them is that of spirit 
possession. In this they are able to abandon their conventional 
subjectivity as the spirit 'comes over' them. They are no longer a 
subject in their own right - simply a mouthpiece for the speech and 
actions of the 'spirit'. In this way, their anger and aggression is 
able to emerge in a way that does not situate them as responsible for 
these feelings. 
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At the scale of the family, Bell (1962) identified how families can 
cease to transact effectively using symbolic languages, both in internal 
and external transactions, and revert instead to a rigid and inflexible 
pattern of pre-verbal signs gestures and actions, whose meaning is not 
clearly fixed or owned by the people concerned. Such a breakdown of 
symbolic communication produces a discourse which no longer locates the 
family as a coherent subject. This places the onus to construct meaning 
out of such utterances and behaviours entirely on the observer, and 
allows the fractured elements of the subjectivity the option of 
disowning responsibility for <and even awareness of) any meaning, should 
it prove too painful. In this way, a family may express its loss of 
control by giving out a series of such messages <perhaps via different 
channels) that can project a sense of panic and chaos on to those who 
attempt to construct meaning from them. An extreme expression of such 
loss of control could be that of apparently savage and purposeless 
violence directed at other family members or family property - and any 
outsiders that try to intervene - as in the drama of the domestic siege. 
The final stage of the process of breakdown <whether partial or total> 
is that of the societal response - how it is 'managed'. If it is not to 
threaten the prevailing social order, both 'protests' and delirious 
transactions must, first of all, be deprived of their seditious meaning. 
Secondly, measures must be taken to reconstruct the errant subjectivity 
_ whether it be an individual or a family. In such instances, agencies 
of social control are swift in intervening, often by removing people to 
places where their subjectivites can be reconstructed, or constrained 
within a symbiotic relationship with state or voluntary apparatuses. 
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Conventionally, within capitalist ideology, such 'delirious' discourse 
and behaviour is dismissed as meaningless criminality or symptomatology, 
within state influenced discourses such as law, psychiatry and social 
work. As Foucault (1967) demonstrated from contemporary accounts, prior 
to capitalist domination in ideology, delirious discourse had been 
tolerated (but with little sympathy or understanding), since 
irrationality did not constitute a threat to aristocratic control. 
Feudal organisation did not depend on an ideology of people making 
apparently free and rational choices, and hence seeming to be 
responsible for their own exploitation. However, using a similar 
historical perspective, Showalter (1987) showed how, under both feudal 
and capitalist social formations, men in the legal and medical 
professions continued to suppress any content of 'madness' that 
constituted an expression of women's real experience - any suggestion 
that women could act, speak or feel on their own behalf rather than in 
the service of others, any possibility that they could exist outside the 
subject positions that were conventionally available to them. 
Similarly, just as the content of female 'madness' has conventionally 
been redefined and suppressed within Western patriarchal culture, so the 
content expressed by Punjabi women who become 'possessed' is redefined 
and suppresed by the male exorcist or "chella", so that it is not 
allowed to threaten the social order. It is through his ritualised 
interventions that the women's subjectivities are restructured within 
conventionally allowed subject positions: 
"Possession (like 'insanity' in our own society> is seen as 
something that 'comes over' people; it is beyond their control, 
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external to them, and requires different forms of treatment than 
does wilful misbehaviour. Anger and aggression expressed through 
spirit possession are accepted as part of an illness, in which the 
person is 'not herself'. Given this diagnosis ... it is finally men 
..• who cure the 'ill' woman, and return her to her appropriate 
place in the social system" (Brown et al 1981 p. 134). 
With the transition to Western capitalism, considerable (and expensive) 
steps were taken by the capitalist ruling class to repress the delirious 
activity of 'mad' individuals and 'chaotic' families. Families that 
could not organise themselves as capable and responsible subjects were 
forcibly split up and placed separately within institutions such as the 
workhouse. Individuals who failed to construct themselves as 
responsible and coherent subjectivities were banished to institions such 
as prisons or lunatic asylums, or were transported overseas. Under late 
capitalism there has been a further shift in approach. Instead of going 
to the expense of such exclusion, greater efforts are made to 'treat' 
the deviance and reconstruct the person or family as a subjectivity that 
can once again take its place within 'normal' society. Changes in 
child-care and psychiatric practice, and the rise of family therapy 
itself, may be viewed in this context. Failing such a complete 
'rehabilitation' of subjectivity, people and families may be placed in 
continuing symbiotic relationships with State or non-professional 
'carers' that prevent them from constituting any real threat to the 
prevailing social order - the ideological basis of much of 'community 
care' . 
-259-
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9: CONSIDERATIONS OF METHODOLOGY 
In Part 1, I brought together elements of a critical theoretical 
framework with which to analyse power relations within families - not 
just in the overall sense of identifying who has power over whom, and 
who has power together with others, but in the sense of identifying the 
toing and froing of power struggles, the minute-by-minute renegotiation 
of power relationships and familial organisation that may underpin both 
'breakdown' and apparently 'normal' functioning. In this Chapter, I 
will seek to develop a research methodology by which to put the elements 
of this framework to the test, to determine how useful they are in 
examining whatever changes may take place (empowering or otherwise) 
within actual examples of family therapy practice. 
In constructing this, I will consider the research implications of the 
different theoretical traditions discussed in Chapter 2 - humanism, 
positivism and critical theory - in order to derive a methodology that 
relates theory to practice <and vice versa) in a consistent way. I will 
then discuss the particular issues raised by such a study of family 
therapy practice, in terms of choice of source material <and negotiating 
access), possible interference of the researcher in what is being 
observed and, most importantly, the procedures whereby the very process 
of 'observation' itself may be detached from conventional 'common sense' 
or 'systemic' ways of viewing family interactions, in order to pick up 
what may typically be obscured by such perspectives . 
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Approaches to research practice 
In the field of social science, much of the work on research methodology 
has come out of the traditions of positivism and humanism. The former 
has produced quantitative and statistical research methods, while out of 
the latter have come the methodologies of qualitative and ethnographic 
research. As the primary purpose of this research is not to quantify 
therapeutic outcomes, but to test out the value of certain theoretical 
concepts in interpreting families' experience and interaction, it may be 
seen that positivist methodologies are not directly appropriate. 
Critical theory has yet to construct its own traditions of research 
methodology - tending instead to draw upon humanist and ethnographic 
research, either at the stage of constructing 'descriptive theory', or 
at the stage of interpreting actual experiences and interactions in the 
light of theoretical concepts (as 1s the aim of this research). 
The research traditions of humanism and ethnography are relevant in 
their ability to get close to and interrogate human subjects. For 
example, researchers as diverse as Freud (1896), Laing (1965), and Young 
and Wilmott (1986) have left us a valuable archive of what people have 
actually said about their experience. However, from a critical 
perspective, such archives may not be taken at face value. Any 
interpretation must, for instance, be based on some theoretical 
understanding of what subject positions were available to the people 
concerned from which they could speak of their experience - and hence of 
the ways in which their accounts were constructed for them by their 
insertion in contemporary structures of social relations. 
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Within the field of research on family therapy, there has been a move 
away from an exclusive reliance on positivist outcome studies, 
accompanied by an increasing interest in the practical value of 
qualitative research methodologies: 
"Whilst formal quantitative research influences the field, albeit 
slowly, many swifter changes seem to be brought about through the 
influence of qualitative research" (Speed and Carpenter 1991 p.2). 
The focus has shifted towards an examination in more depth of the 
processes of therapeutiC change, with a resurgence of interest in using 
the theoretical interpretation of single case studies (see Wynne 1988). 
This suggests a reordering of the overall research process. Instead of 
starting at the 'macro' scale and asking "Does 'the therapy' achieve 
consistent results?" <before attempting to deconstruct the complexities 
of what 'the therapy' might actually be), these approaches start at the 
'micro' scale and seek to tease out what parts of a therapeutic process 
may have contributed to bringing about (or preventing) change in a 
specific situation. In any instance where the possibility of change can 
be established, subsequent research may then focus on how (and whether) 
such changes may be sustained in a consistent way. In this way, the 
interpretive may usefully precede (and inform) the quantificatory. For 
the purposes of this research, a starting pOint at the 'micro' scale of 
qualitative approaches would seem to be more fruitful, since a focus on 
the processes of therapeutic change, rather than an overview of final 
outcomes, would provide a better testing ground for concepts that seek 
to provide a dynamic understanding of shifting power relations. 
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Humanist approaches comprise a broad spectrum of methods, from those 
closely allied to positivist hypothesis-testing, to the opposite extreme 
of largely untheorised 'naturalistic' description. Within the field of 
family therapy, an example of the latter approach has been a study of 
consumer perceptions and evaluations of the family therapy they received 
<Howe 1989). Rather than looking directly at the process of therapy, 
Howe undertook interviews after therapy was completed, and he presents 
an edited selection of consumers' subjective views and understandings. 
These must be taken at face value, since he chooses not to employ any 
theoretical framework, either to analyse changes within family 
organisation, or to examine the various discursive structures in which 
the consumers may themselves have been situated - which may have made it 
easier for them to 'see' events from particular perspectives, or to 
understand them in certain ways rather than others. Thus, his choice of 
a methodology of 'naturalistic' description means that, although this 
research constitutes a damning indictment of prevailing systemic 
approaches - in terms of consumers' perceptions rather than positivist 
outcome measures - it cannot go further and inform or reflect upon any 
theoretical understanding of what impact therapy may (or may not) have 
had upon familial organisation in these instances. In his methodology, 
Howe finds himself without any theoretical perspective (critical or 
otherwise) that enables him to move beyond the dualism that separates 
the uncritical positivism of the systemic family therapists from the 
pure subjectivism of his humanist methodology: 
liMy research method ... assumes that the subjective experience of 
the individual is fundamentally important in gaining an 
understanding of personal and social meaning... I realise fully 
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that there may be no common ground between the researcher who values 
personal experiences and the practitioner who seeks behavioural 
changes. In effect, if the subjectivist and the objectivist remain 
unmoved, the business of one has no relevance to the concerns of the 
other. There are those who attempt to discover 'meta-positions' 
which transcend these factional squabbles but, though very 
attractive ... they involve advanced theorising" (1989 pp.vii,92). 
It is precisely the purpose of this research to provide such a 'metal 
theoretical perspective - one that can penetrate beneath both empirical 
descriptions and subjective impressions, and hence examine critically 
both what is missing from positivist accounts of behavioural change, and 
the manner in which consumers' accounts of their own experience may, to 
a degree, be constructed for them given their location within an 
oppressive social formation (including the current construction of their 
particular familial organisation). 
As Hammersley and Atkinson (1983) argue, both positivist hypothesis-
testing and 'naturalistic' description can degenerate into an obsession 
with superficial appearances. Between these two extremes, there is a 
'middle ground' of ethnographic research in which theory is seen as 
important as a basis for understanding, and there is a tradition of 
"reflexivi ty" between field observation and theory. To a greater or 
lesser extent, each is allowed to inform the other in an ongoing way 
during the research. A similar connection between theory and practice 
is also to be found in critical approaches, the main difference being 
that, in critical theory, the ultimate goal is to bring about change in 
social practices (where these are oppressive), whereas ethnography seeks 
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only to make sense of what is observed. Within ethnography, there is 
considerable divergence in how to employ such reflexivity. Most 
commonly, this involves starting with detailed observations and 
attempting to construct theory out of this, as with the approach of 
'grounded theory' (Glaser and Strauss 1967). Such a methodology is 
inductive - classifying and comparing instances until generalisations 
can be specified exactly. This is actually far closer to the empirical 
methodology of the less theoretical aspects of natural science (for 
example, botany>, than it is to the more empathic traditions of 
humanism. Less common (but particularly relevant to this study) is the 
sequence of starting with an already constructed theory, applying it to 
a particular social context and then reflecting back on the theory: 
"Family therapy research should be theory-based and theory-driven ... 
Further, the relationship between research design and theory should 
be reciprocal: research findings should serve as feedback to clarify 
and strenghten the theories" (Wynne 1988 p.250). 
The use of ethnographic study to test out the explanatory value of 
theoretical concepts was pioneered by Bensman and Vidich (1960). They 
subjected data from a community study to analysis using a variety of 
established sociological theories to determine how far each theory 
"would permit us to comprehend our data" and "explain the facts which 
remain unexplained". Similar approaches that start with theory have 
been employed in studies of school cultures in Britain (see Lacey 1970i 
Hargreaves et al 1975; Ball 1981). Rather than compare the value of 
different theoretical perspectives, their intention was, "starting from 
the formal concepts of 'labelling theory' ... to extend the use of this 
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analytic framework to, and examine its value for, the study of school 
deviance" (Hammersley and Atkinson 1983 p.35). This implies a reflexive 
interaction between theory and practice. On the one hand, it is the 
theoretical framework that is used to give meaning to what is being 
observed. On the other, the value of the theory is itself being tested 
in terms of its explanatory power in making sense of what is taking 
place. Such an approach - of applying theory to a specific field and, 
at the same time, evaluating the explanatory power of the theory - may 
be seen to correspond with the purposes of the present study. 
Ethnographic approaches to examining experience and social participation 
are derived from the humanist tradition, in which subjectivity is seen 
as a unitary and unproblematic 'I', rather than an entity of conflict 
and struggle that is socially constructed and continually reconstructed. 
However, from a critical perspective, it can no longer be acceptable 
simply to take at face value the descriptions and meanings given to what 
is going on by the actors concerned (as in Hawe's study of consumer 
perceptions). We are not just interested in how they organise and 
construct their world; we are, at the same time, interested in how they 
are organised and constructed by their world. It is only a critical 
approach that may allow us to identify connections between power 
relations and forms of personal and social organisation, and hence to 
determine whether a process of therapy is empowering, either 
collectively (for the family as a whole) or individually (for particular 
family members). As we have seen earlier, it is the concept of 
subjectivity that may open up this area to critical enquiry, and form a 
theoretical bridge between humanist and materialist approaches. 
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Choice Of methodolOgy 
The concept of subjectivity suggests an understanding of current forms 
of personal and social organisation as moments in an ongoing struggle. 
rather than reflecting relatively fixed (or quasi-'natural') positions 
(as does systems theory>. It is this combined focus on power relations 
and the dynamics of change which is at the heart of a critical approach. 
Therefore. in testing out the value of such concepts in practice. a far 
richer body of data would be available if it were derived from direct 
observation of processes of familial change - with the possibility of 
seeing even momentary shifts of position and power relations - than if 
it were simply based on a comparison between static 'snapshots' of forms 
of organisation before and after a particular process of intervention 
has taken place. Such a focus on the dynamics of Change is paralleled 
in the research of Ball (1981). who found it was more revealing to test 
out his theoretical propositions in relation to school culture by 
observing a school during a process of organisational transition. In 
the context of the present research. this would suggest a focus on the 
minute-by-minute processes of renegotiation or rearrangement that may 
take place within a small number of individual case studies. rather than 
a more general overview of outcome data. 
Although such detailed analyses of case examples may generate some 
preliminary conclusions about the impact of certain family therapy 
practices - for example. whether particular forms of intervention are 
more or less empowering to (certain) family members - these outcomes 
must be seen as incidental. rather than central to this research 
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project: my primary aim in analysing case study material must be seen to 
be the testing of theory rather than any systematic evaluation or 
development of current practice. To do justice to the latter, a much 
wider study would be required, encompassing all the very different 
'schools' of family therapy practice and a critical evaluation of the 
various settings in which these may be practiced - how the political 
relations of the agency, as well as choice of techniques and theoretical 
models, may determine what changes (if any> are made possible or 
encouraged within the power relations of a family. It is also beyond 
the scope of this study to make any categoric conclusions as to the 
overall value of family therapy as a mode of intervention. Again, such 
research would require a much wider selection of case material, and 
comprehensive studies of follow-up, to establish to what extent any 
changes in power organisation that took place during the therapy could 
be sustained once the family was resubjected within the discourses and 
material relations of everyday life. 
In order to evaluate the political implications of changing familial 
organisation, two aspects need to be considered: firstly, the degree to 
which family and personal subjectivities appear more or less empowered 
in their external transactions; and secondly, the relative openness or 
oppressiveness of their internal organisation - the degree to which 
constituent elements are either able to transact on the basis of mutual 
recognition, or are subjected to distortion, exclusion or confusion as a 
consequence of their membership of the collective subjectivity. In 
studying case examples, I will be looking at whether the theoretical 
concepts expose not only how the subjectivities of the family and 
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individual family members may have come to be reconstituted within 
therapy sessions, but also any indications as to how each family may 
have come to break down in the first place. 
The choices available in order to obtain case material were to interview 
families directly, either before, during, or after their involvement in 
family therapy, or to use videotapes of family therapy sessions in which 
all the 'interviewing' would be conducted by the therapist. There are 
inherent difficulties with either approach. As we have already seen, a 
critical perspective highlights how problematic the process of research 
interviewing actually is. If one moves beyond a humanist perspective 
which assumes that interviewees, individually or in a group, are free 
subjects fully able to express what they think or feel, one is faced by 
the problem that whatever is spoken is likely to be influenced by the 
speaker's position within particular discursive and organisational 
structures - structures that are determined by the very ensemble of 
power relations about which the researcher is seeking evidence. In 
particular, current power relations within the family, and the setting 
of the research interview itself, are likely to have a very significant 
impact on what can and cannot be said. As was discussed earlier, it 
was such issues which limit the value of a consumer studies <such as 
that of Howe) in providing evidence as to whether or not any changes 
have taken place in the political organisation of the families studied. 
Furthermore, any form of direct interviewing inevitably places the 
interviewer in a relationship with the family - one that may 
inadvertently influence what is being observed (see Lofland 1971j Lacey 
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1976). In the case of the present research, there is obvious overlap 
between the roles of interviewer and therapist in that both may ask 
similar questions. Thus it would be impossible to interview a family 
before or during the course of therapy without this producing its own 
'therapeutic' outcomes in terms of increased awareness and shifts in 
position. It is equally problematic to ask a family afterwards to 
recall accurate detail of the various stages of a process of change: 
"Changes in the social environment and in the self inevitlbly 
produce transformations of perspective and it is characteristic of 
such transformations that the person finds it difficult or 
impossi ble to remember his former actions, outlook, or feelings" 
<Becker and Geer 1970 p.141). 
If we accept a critical understanding of subjectivity in which any image 
of unity and consistency is maintained only through processes of 
repression, then it is likely that elements of earlier forms of 
organisation may quite literally be excluded from current awareness or 
be denied the possibility of expression. 
By contrast, a videotape recording may offer an opportunity for 
observing minute-by-minute changes in the organisation of family and 
personal subjectivities <and the relationship between these and the 
interventions of the therapist) that is free of any influence or 
'contamination' from the activity of the researcher. Videotapes have 
been recorded as part of standard practice within certain family therapy 
agencies. Instead of potential similarities between the interventions 
of therapist and researcher constituting a problem, the various 
therapists would, in effect, have been doing the interviewing for me. 
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They would, as part of the therapy, be asking questions that would 
elicit information, in terms of both content and process, about the 
organisation of the family, perhaps including their history of the 
process of breakdown that brought them to therapy in the first place. 
Over and above this, the videotape offers an opportunity to observe how 
the family organise themselves in relation to the therapist, both in 
terms of what family members say <and what they do not say) and in the 
process of how it is said <and by whom). Even a spontaneous discussion 
of the weather, a family argument, or just an invitation to sit down in 
the chairs provided, could be revealing in terms of the changing state 
of family power relations. I therefore decided that videotapes, rather 
than direct interviewing, would provide the best available evidence on 
minute-by-minute changes in the organisation of power relations - and 
hence the greatest possibility for testing out the value (or otherwise) 
of the framework of critical theory. 
However, it is important also to recognise the various limitations of 
this research methodology. Firstly, there may be much of a non-verbal 
nature that goes on in the sessions that is not picked up by the camera 
or adequately represented in a transcription of the videotape. I have 
only been able to include the more overt gestures and movements as 
'stage directions' in the transcripts. Secondly, as none of the 
therapeutic approaches employ any structured history taking with the 
family, we may only be provided with a somewhat sketchy record of the 
processes of breakdown - but what we do have comes directly from the 
family and is not mediated by any imposed theoretical or therapeutic 
structures. Finally, what this choice of source material rules out is 
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any assessment of any changes that take place (or do not take place) in 
the way that the family is organised away from the somewhat artificial 
environment of the family therapy sessions themselves. 
If we refer to the concept of subjectivity, it is easy to see that a 
family may be organised differently when they are subjected within the 
discursive structure of family therapy, as compared to the various other 
economic, discursive and emotional structures within which they will be 
subjected as part of their everyday life. As one of Howe's sample of 
consumers puts it, "All them meetings, well, they weren't normal, if you 
see what I mean" (1989 p.49). Nevertheless, on theoretical grounds, the 
subjectivity that they display in the therapy situation may be seen to 
be just as 'real' as the subjectivity they display in any other 
situation, and any flexibility or organisational change that emerges in 
interaction with the therapist may potentially be transferable to other 
situations - depending on how this may be negotiated in specific 
instances. Given the evidence of positivist outcome research (see, for 
example, Markus et al 1990), some shifts in family organisation that 
take place in therapy would seem to be carried over into other 
situations, but this is by no means inevitable. This highlights the 
need for further research to establish how 'robust' changes in familial 
power relations can be when translated into the exigenCies of day-ta-day 
living in subsequent months and years. 
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Selecting spyrce material 
There is limited availability of videotaped examples of family therapy 
practice where consent had already been given by families for its use 
for training and educational purposes (obtaining such consent is only 
common practice in a few agencies - and many families may refuse to give 
it). As consent is given (or withheld) at the start of the therapy 
process, this would not seem to skew the sample of available material 
particularly towards 'favourable' outcomes (although those offering 
consent might be considered to be demonstrating more willingness to be 
open and co-operative). Another possible source of 'bias' would be from 
agencies being only willing to allow access to work that reflected 
favourably on the agency. This is a relevant factor in relation to one 
of my case examples which is a 'demonstration' piece of work by a 
visiting therapist. However, I was able to negotiate unconditional 
aCcess to the 'library' of material held by another agency (both 
relative 'successes' and 'failures'), so that, overall, my sample of 
material may not be seen as particularly biased in this way. 
Since I was reliant on the various therapists having, in a sense, 
conducted the interview on my behalf, I had a particular interest in 
those who might focus on some issues of power. On the basis of this, 1 
negotiated permission to use two Case examples from a family therapy 
agency which has sought to combine systemic approaches with a commitment 
to anti-oppressive practice and, by way of contrast, an example of the 
work of Salvador Kinuchin, a leading exponent of the structural approach 
to family therapy, which focuses explicitly on issues of power, but from 
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a functionalist rather than a critical perspective. I have tried to 
achieve some diversity within this selection, including examples of work 
by both female and male therapists (ranging from 'expert' to 'student'), 
and a variety of 'presenting problems'. However, in all of the case 
examples, both therapist and family are white and this limits any 
practical observation of how the politics of racism impinge upon and 
determine both the experience of breakdown and the dynamics of therapy. 
From a critical perspective, we may see that the videotape source 
material does not exist in isolation, but came to be produced within 
specifiC contexts of power relations - contexts that include the current 
organisation of the social formation, the specific backgrounds of each 
of the families and therapists concerned, and the institutional setting 
of the therapy within specific State and civil apparatuses. From the 
point of view of research, a detailed and critical analysis of any of 
these contexts would illuminate the content of each discourse that I am 
analysing. However, the converse is also true. A critical reading of 
the discourse should expose (some of) the ways in which what is said has 
been determined by the various external power relations within which the 
interaction takes place. It is this angle that is of most interest to 
me in this present study. My purpose here is not specifically to 
examine the effects of, say, agency politics on the practice of therapy, 
but to test out whether the theoretical framework is able to tease out 
the impact of such power relations (among others) within the discourse 
and changing forms of organisation that are presented during the here-
and-now of the therapy sessions (as happens in relation to the impact of 
the Team Leader's discourse on the Watkins Family - see p.404). 
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Nevertheless, some brief description of the contexts in which the case 
studies took place is probably helpful. Two of these relate to work 
conducted in a specialist agency within a Social Services Department 
which had been involved in the application of family therapy approaches 
over many years. As an agency, it had considerable autonomy in defining 
its own working practices, but nevertheless was situated within the 
overall legal and discursive framework of the wider Department, 
particularly in relation to definitions of adequate and inadequate 
parenting, child abuse and strategies for child protection. On a day-
to-day basis, the team worked non-hierarchically, sharing between them 
the roles of therapist and supervisor/consultant - although for a 
student therapist, there would be a more formal <and hierarchical) 
supervision arrangement with a member to the team. However, the team 
would ultimately be accountable for their work to Social Services 
management - particularly with respect to choice of referrals and 
definitions of 'succesful' outcomes, and in relation to any issues 
relating to child protection <e.g. use of legal proceedings). 
The normal working practice would be for one team member to act as 
therapist with a particular family, while other members of the team 
offered 'live' consultation (via a video link or one-way screen), and 
there was agreement for consultants to interrupt the session and speak 
to the therapist at any point, if this was thought to be desirable. 
Over and above this, the therapist would leave for consultation prior to 
the end of each session in order to devise an 'intervention' - an agreed 
speech - which s/he would then deliver to the family before they left. 
Such practice may be seen to be typical of systemic family therapy 
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aproaches. As we saw earlier, this places family members in a position 
of some relative powerlessness - subject to the authority of the 
therapist who is in turn subject to control by the hidden consultation 
team. This hierarchy of power is reinforced by the use of technology 
(the video camera or one-way screen) and the ritual and secret way in 
which communication takes place between therapist and consultants. 
The case example involving Xinuchin as therapist takes place within a 
context that places him in a clear position of power over the family 
members. The family have already been receiving therapy from another 
family therapist who, finding herself stuck, has invited the family to 
take part in a one-off session with Xinuchin. Thus he is already placed 
in a position of 'expert', not only in relation to the family, but also 
in relation to their existing therapist: family members are already 
'two-down' with respect to him in the way that the session has been set 
up. (It is also significant that Xinuchin, as a man, is brought in to 
take over from a woman who is perhaps perceived as lacking sufficient 
authority to shift the current family organisation). It is also known 
by the family from the outset that they are taking part in a semi-public 
'demonstration' of family therapy skills - that the tape will be made 
available for training and research purposes (although there would be an 
undertaking to preserve confidentiality). In a real sense, Xinuchin is 
made 'master' of the situation. He is not accountable within any agency 
hierarchYi all authority is delegated to him as a visiting expert (and 
as a man) to bring about change within the family organisation. 
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Tbe process Of Viewing 
As we have seen, videotapes may provide particularly valuable 
information on processes taking place in the here-and-now: who speaks 
and who is silent, who interrupts and who is interrupted, who deals with 
practical tasks while others speak, who nods agreement and who shuts 
off, and who uses "I" and who uses "We". This combines to provide 
evidence about moment-by-moment changes in the externally presented 
consistency (and the internal organisation) of the subjectivity of a 
family during the process of therapy. Nevertheless, the process of 
viewing such material is far from straightforward - aspects such as 
organisation and power relations must be conceptualised before they can 
become evident to the viewer. 
Initially, one is faced with a potentially infinite quantity of 
phenomenal data - not just the words that are spoken, but the way they 
are spoken, and all the non-verbal gestures, movements and expressions 
that accompany them, and not just those of the speaker, but of all those 
present. The process of selecting and giving significance to particular 
items of data depends on using some perceptual and conceptual framework, 
whether this be informed by prevailing ideology ('common sense'), by 
systems theory or by some critical perspective. In general, whereas a 
systemic viewing looks for a consistencies and patterns within current 
interaction, a critical viewing looks for contradictions and signs of 
inequalities - evidence of how a currently dominant pattern may have 
changed over time, and how, in the here-and-now process of the session, 
it may be being contested, undermined or renegotiated. 
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For me, the process of viewing involved a number of stages. The first 
of these was a process of unlearning - deliberately not making sense of 
what was going on within the frameworks that remained the most familiar 
to me - those of 'common sense' and systems theory. I had to discard 
conventional ways of focusing on 'patterns' and consistencies in the 
interactions observed - whether derived from systemic or from 'common 
sense' assumptions about how families operate and what is important 
within this. The painstaking process of transcribing each videotape was 
itself valuable in disrupting'my pre-existing ways of viewing. Somewhat 
arbitrarily, it reduced the sheer quantity of data with which I was 
dealing, giving particular emphasis to the actual words that were spoken 
and screening out much of the potential non-verbal data. 
Over and above this, the process of transcription forced me to give 
equal emphasis to each and every word that was spoken: the aside that 
was ignored by everyone else had to be transcribed just as diligently as 
the statement made by the dominant speaker which was attracting general 
attention. In this way, the inconsistent elements that did not fit in 
with the dominant organisation could not so easily escape recognition 
(although they may have been overlooked both by the systemic 
perspectives of therapists and by the 'common sense' perspectives of 
other family members). Such conflicts and inconsistencies would 
formerly have tended to escape my notice, because of the particular 
conceptual 'lens' that I would have been using to interpret what was 
going on. In practice, many such details can represent instances where 
established patterns are being contested and relationships renegotiated 
_ clues as to the shifting matrix of power relationships. 
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The next stage of my viewing process was to encounter each spoken word 
or gesture, to some degree, 'afresh' and without preconception -
stripped of my normal methods of structuring and responding to them. I 
allowed myself to interact with the material in a number of different 
ways, each informing the other to some degree. I noted any intuitive or 
emotional responses to what was in front of me. Did a particular word 
or phrase, an awkward pause or lack of response, trigger some reaction 
within me - perhaps fear or anger, confusion or frustration, or perhaps 
just a sense of something 'not being quite right'? Such reactions might 
draw my attention to some element of what was going on that a more 
'rational' analysiS might have overlooked. I allowed myself to be 
speculative in suggesting possible meanings underlying particular 
utterances. Many of these would subsequently have to be discarded due 
to lack of any convincing evidence; however, some might lead me to see 
signs of oppression or resistance that would otherwise have been hidden 
from me. 
By contrast, I also sought to comb my source material in more systematic 
ways, using the various elements of my theoretical framework to see if 
any of these could make sense of what had actually been spoken - what 
were the implications of the words used {or avoided> in terms of power 
relationships and the minute-by-minute organisation of family and 
personal subjectivity. For example, I looked at people's use of 
pronouns, and active or passive sentence constructions, to indicate 
whether they were speaking as a person in their own right of on behalf 
of others. I looked at how they were addressed by others - for 
instance, were they invited to speak as Mum, as wife, or by their own 
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name. I looked at the order of speaking and who spoke on what topics; 
who shared their thoughts and who shared their feelings. I looked for 
particular words, such as 'perfect', 'try' or 'please' as indicators of 
possible personality adaptations, and 'helpless' or 'violent' as 
indicators of possible role positions. 
Over and above this, I was interested in evidence of external 
determination of the positions taken within the observed interaction: 
for instance, information on material constraints, reproduction of 
elements of patriarchal, racist or capitalist ideologies, or the 
construction of identity in terms such of those reminiscent of 'The Name 
of the Father', or 'Good/Bad' images of femininity. I was also 
interested in any evidence that the process of therapy was being 
determined by the power relations of the agency context in which it was 
taking place - for instance, references to possible State intervention. 
Furthermore, despite the therapists' emphasis on finding out about the 
patterning of interaction in the here-and-now, various participants 
managed to insert material which gives clues as to how their personal or 
family breakdown had come about. Although the respective therapists had 
tended not to pay this much attention, I was able to examine it for 
evidence as to how particular configurations of power relationships and 
personality adaptations may have come about. 
My analysis of the videotape material has necessarily involved processes 
of editing in order to reduce the overall quantity of data to manageable 
proportions. As we have seen, the process of transcription gave 
emphasis to the spoken aspects of family interaction as against the non-
-280-
Xethodology 
verbal aspects of their discourse. Over and above this, I have edited 
the transcripts themselves to varying degrees in order to limit the 
overall length of the analyses. In one case example, the first session 
in reproduced almost in its entirety so as to provide an overview of the 
total process - including both periods of stuckness as well as moments 
of change, whether repressive or empowering. However, only excerpts 
from the other two case examples are reproduced and these focus on 
material that either provides evidence in relation to the process of 
breakdown, or of the impact, empowering or otherWise, of the therapist's 
interventions. In editing the transcripts, I have also changed all 
names and removed any identifying details in order to ensure 
confidentiality. 
These analyses are intended to be 'critical', not in any pejorative 
sense, but in the sense of using theoretical concepts that expose the 
underlying dynamics of power relations. It is not for me to put down, 
in any sense, any of the work that is being analysed. I assume that 
each therapist is working in good faith to improve conditions for family 
members, given her/his subjection within a specffic agency context and 
particular theoretical and practical frameworks - a position that may 
enable her/him to see certain issues more clearly than others. Even 
with the benefit of more critical analytical frameworks, therapists 
would still be constrained by their own (often unconscious) 
internalisation of ideology and their location within structures of 
race, class and gender oppression - a location that may be crucially 
determined by their position within an agency that may form part of some 
State or civil apparatus. 
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The family comprises Faith, Martin and their two children, Colin (aged 
3) and Lynne (aged 6 months). They have referred themselves for help 
with Colin on advice from a day-nursery. Although Martin is a small 
businessman of some kind, Faith's employment position would place her as 
working class. The therapist is a male student, and the session is 
supervised by two female consultants from behind a one-way screen. The 
transcript of the first session is reproduced almost in its entirety. 
[Martin returns consent form to Therapist. Faith sits down with 
Lynne on her lap. Colin plays out of the picture.] 
T: [To Martin] Well actually you've signed the second half of this, 
which is agreement to something that you may want a lot longer to 
think about. 
X: The second one there, what is that? Training? 
T: Yes. 
F: That's if they can read it. [Looks towards Martin, laughing.] 
[Martin sits down] 
X: This one says it's going to be scrubbed out at the end and the other 
one says they can keep it. 1 think it's D.K. 
F: You can do what you want with it. There's nothing private. 
T: Well, D.K. But it may be something you want to consider after a 
while. So, in that case, you may want to take that back. 
In this opening, it is already clear that Martin acts as the head of the 
household, the guardian and controller of family subjectivity. It is to 
him that questions of confidentiality are addressed - a crucial issue 
for maintaining subjectivity (and the therapist inadvertently reinforces 
this stereotypical form of organisation). There seems to be no question 
that it is he (and only he) who has to sign to open up the private 
domain of domestic organisation to outside scrutiny (although he is 
backed in this decision by Faith). The very fact that the interview 
starts with the two men transacting about the signing of the consent 
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form, tends to marginalise Faith. Thus, while the therapist's offer of 
time to reconsider provides choice for the family subjectivity as a 
whole, it does nothing to empower Faith so that she be included within 
this decision making. Had he addressed Faith specifically in his 
remark, this might have precipitated a small, but significant, shift 
within family subjectivity. 
T: [Looking at both Martin and Faith] You got here all right today? 
M: Yes. 
F: It was a bit confusing. 
M: Coming back from [ ] I decided to take a short cut and ended up in 
the back roads of [ ] somewhere [laughs]. 
F: I'm a sort of a street person myself. 
M: Is there an ashtray - can I smoke? 
T: I think there's one there you can use. [Pause.] 
By including Faith in his question, the therapist may have given her the 
necessary recognition to enable her to answer in her own right and take 
the risk of contradicting her husband (about whether the journey had, in 
fact, been that straightforward). This constitutes a real shift in the 
second-by-second organisation of the family's subjectivity. (However. 
unless such transitory shifts of power can be supported and built upon, 
they may not begin to challenge the underlying power relations of the 
subjectivity.) In this instance, Martin responds so as to re-establish 
himself in the position of authority - as the one who was making the 
decisions about the journey <albeit incompetently>. Faith allows him to 
do so and thereby retain control within the conventionally masculine 
transactional sphere of making decisions (acting on the basis of 
thinking). although she asserts her (conventionally subordinate> 
'feminine' power base of intuition - being "a sort of street person" 
(acting on the basis of feelings). 
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T: [To Faith) I know I talked to you on the phone the other day and we 
arranged to meet for an appointment and the one thing that you were 
saying was that you noticed that there had been some improvement. 
F: Yes, there's been a drastic improvement in C's behaviour as it 
happens. We were on the verge of not coming tOday. It's just that 
I'm afraid that I'm so on the edge that I'm afraid that he will be 
hurt. 
It emerges that-it was Faith who made the initial contact with outside 
agencies. This would accord with her conventional responsibility, 
within patriarchal ideology, for all internal matters to do with family 
and children. Although such responsibility is accompanied by very 
little real power, it nevertheless provides her with the authority to 
make the contact - the plea for help - that signalled the partial 
breakdown of their subjectivity as a family. Implicitly accepting this 
gendering of family subjectivity, the therapist invites Faith to occupy 
this position in the here-and-now. Had he attempted to challenge this 
gendering - and address such questions to Martin - this could have been 
doubly disempowering to Faith - effectively taking away from her the 
small degree of authority that she currently possesses within the 
current organisation of family subjectivity. 
The therapist's move places Faith within a contradictory position. On 
the one hand, her responsibility would seem to place her in the position 
of defending the family boundaries as far as possible from professional 
interference - and it is from this position that she suggests that 
everything is now under control. However, through actually being 
allowed a voice, she is momentarily able to switch to the feeling level 
and articulate her own distress <"I'm afraid that I'm so on the edge"). 
She is then unable to sustain this, presumably because she does not feel 
empowered to speak on behalf of herself (only her children) and she does 
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not feel sufficiently supported by the therapist to continue transacting 
at the level of emotionality (he has not used this level himself). She 
is trapped by the only power that family subjectivity does bestow on 
her, her power as parent/carer of her children. She perhaps sees no 
alternative but to project her own sense of danger and urgency via a 
family member who is even more vulnerable than herself: her son Colin 
("he will be hurt"). By placing him as a potential victim of abuse, she 
threatens the possibility of a more serious breach in the family 
subjectivity, one which is much more likely to be heard within 
prevailing ideology than is her distress on its own. In doing so, she 
also translates the issue back into the transactional level of activity, 
a level at which she is more likely to draw a response from the men. 
F: [Continuing) I said to Martin that, whatever it is, it's down to 
Safeways. Because Safeways have rearranged their shelves and I keep 
forgetting to buy the things he used to like for lunch before 
nursery. One of those things was spaghetti. He was overdosing on 
spaghetti, always wanting spaghetti. And then I did have one tin 
in. And the last tin I gave him, he was eating it and he was sort 
of throwing it up. you know. So I said, "Don't you want it?" and he 
said "I want it but I just can't swallow it". And I thought maybe 
his body's had that much, he's rejecting it. And I stopped him. 
And I've seen a drastic improvement, but I didn't relate it back to 
that until the other day when I looked in the cupboard and saw that 
there was no spaghetti. And then I remembered that it's been ages 
since he had it - about two months back. About a week or two after 
I spoke to the lady on the 'phone, that was when it started. I 
mean, it is embarrassing because he is well behaved compared to the 
way he was, you know. He has his moments, but I'm not .... I'm so 
content, I'm still just thinking, why? D'you know what I mean? 
[Martin reaches over and strokes baby's head on Faith's knee.] 
"1 said to Martin ... " may indicate that Faith is attempting to redefine 
the problem with Colin in a way that is acceptable to Martin. What 
follows is in such contradiction to her previous remark that it would 
suggest that she had stepped too far out of line: in 'blowing the 
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whistle' on the real level of danger in the family, she was breaching 
family subjectivity in a way that was unacceptable to Martin (and for 
which she might be subsequently punished). In a metaphorical way, her 
story expresses her powerlessness, in that she actually attributes 
responsibility to the supermarket for the changes in Colin's behaviour. 
Her conclusion that she is now "so content", when we already know from 
her that she is "on the edge", suggests that, in her fear, she is 
organising herself according to the Please driver, desperately trying to 
placate Martin. Martin's gesture of patting the baby's head may be an 
(unconscious) response to this, perhaps representing his desire to pat 
Faith on the head for being 'a good girl' and pleasing him by saying the 
right things. 
T: You believe that the food you were giving him .... 
F: It's possible. I mean I didn't really want to get on that 
bandwaggon because I know that there's some serious cases that do 
relate that to it. But I also think it is a little misused, you 
know what I mean? So what I'm trying to say is that it's part of 
it, having seen that. I haven't risked giving him any spaghetti, to 
go back to the way it was, d'you know what I mean? But other than 
that, he's been quite good. I'm wondering if it was me that was ... 
d'you know what I mean? 
The therapist does not support Faith, at the level of emotionality, to 
unravel the contradiction in what she had said about how she felt and 
to speak of her distress directly. Instead, he responds at the level of 
discourse (checking out her beliefs and explanations). Although not 
perhaps as supportive as a response to her feelings, this nevertheless 
enables her to recognise the possibility that the food "bandwaggon" can 
be Ita little misused", and almost that she might herself be responsible 
for the changes that had taken place: "I'm wondering if it was me that 
was ...... 
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T: [To Martin) And how do you feel about it. Do you agree? 
M: Well, really, as I say, I'm out most of the time anyway during the 
day and Colin is in bed by between seven and eight. So really, as 
regards me, it's .... There are times when he can be ... can be a bit 
of a .... Most of the time it's when he comes back from his 
grandmother's. 
T: Yes. 
M: Because she lets him do as he likes. 
T: [To Martin) This is your .... 
M: No, no. 
F: It's mine. 
M: It's her own fault. It's not that she tries to enforce control over 
him, its just she lets him do what he wants. And of course when he 
gets back he thinks he can do that, so .... [Looking directly at 
Therapist] That sort of thing has to be wiped out. 
T: Yes. 
It is interesting that the therapist addresses his question to Martin in 
terms of "How do you feel?" rather than the more conventional man-to-man 
discourse of "What do you think?" Maybe he had, albeit unconsciously, 
picked up Faith's need to communicate at this level, particularly with 
Martin. However, Martin is clearly wrongfooted by the question: it 
implicitly challenges the gendering of the family subjectivity by asking 
him, the man, what he "feels" about childcare issues. After thrashing 
around a little, he reasserts his patriarchal dominance, and "closes the 
ranks" of his family's subjectivity, by constructing an external threat: 
his mother-in-law. His choice of target is significant, since Faith's 
mother could represent her main source of external (female) support, and 
a source of authority that might challenge his own. 
The issue on which Martin chooses to focus - one which was brought up by 
the implications of the therapist's question - is straightforwardly that 
of (his) patriarchal power: the right of a man in his position to demand 
that the women (in this case, wife and mother-in-law) ensure that the 
child does not "do what he wants" - a process of two-fold oppreSSion. 
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Interestingly, he does not set himself up as the author of this power, 
more as its agent. He speaks directly from the subject position that is 
signified by "The Name of the Father". The devastating command "That 
sort of thing has to be wiped out" is delivered entirely impersonally, 
as a 'universal truth' rather than as his particular idea. He looks 
directly to the male therapist for his assent and for his confirmation 
that this ideology is shared. Perhaps himself feeling threatened as a 
man if he stepped too far out of line, the therapist seems to be hooked 
in to his own <patriarchally defined) "Be Strong" driver and gives the 
required confirmation. 
T: It would be useful to me if we could recap on some of the 
ingredients and what was happening beforehand really. As you see, 
it may be that this is just a passing phase and in that case it may 
be something that could crop up in the future as well. I'd like to 
know, to start with, what was happening, what was the worst thing 
that was happening? 
[Colin moves in and starts to play at the table] 
F: What made me phone was that a few weeks ago my friends came over and 
I allowed them to go up to Colin's room. You know a lot of folks 
don't let the kids go up to the bedrooms in case of the mess it 
makes. But I don't give a sod. If he makes a mess, he makes a 
mess. It doesn't matter. But he did ... he went and blitzed the 
room with Jason - books off every shelf, toys emptied out of the 
toybox in one big pile. Goes upstairs. He's got his trousers off. 
Jason's got his trousers off. And they're standing in the toybox 
fighting. Nice fighting. So I says, "Forget it, Liz. You go home 
if you've got things to do and I'll pile it all in". Anyway, I was 
picking up the books and I says, "What the bloody hell, these are 
wet. You haven't been in the bathroom have you'?" He always plays 
with water. So I thought the little sod's destroying his books. 
That annoyed me. So I was looking around and this water was coming 
again, and I thought hang on a minute and I stood up. He was weeing 
on me. I wasn't having that so I whacked him one. So I was a bit 
more embarrassed because my mate saw it and it wasn't very nice. 
That was it. That was the end of that. So, as I say, his behaviour 
was bad. 
[Baby cries and Faith attends to her. Colin leaves the table and 
returns with a toy tea-set. Therapist checks back what happened and 
Faith retells it as Colin hands out pretend cups of tea to Faith, 
Martin and then the therapist. Each in turn thank him for the tea.] 
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F: I couldn't believe what he was doing to me. He didn't feel guilty 
about it. He didn't say sorry. When I turned round and looked at 
him, he just carried on. I just whacked him one. 
Rather than continuing the discourse of patriarchal oppression (and 
thereby further alienating Faith), the therapist pauses and re-
establishes his control of the process by returning to the territory in 
which Faith is allowed to have a voice: childcare. However, by not 
confronting Martin's position and by inviting Faith to speak from the 
position of 'mother', this move only reinforces the patriarchal power 
relations of the existing organisation of family subjectivity. Faith's 
ensuing discourse indicates her extreme extreme powerlessness as a woman 
within this organisation, such that three year old Colin is able to 
'piss' on her, and not even "feel guilty about it". (In a real sense, 
he may be seen to be trying out the position of "The Phallus" in 
relation to a construction of his mother as a "bad" object.) She has 
clearly become so disempowered that she is unable to deal with this 
situation from a position of Controlling Parent: she cannot confront his 
behaviour in a caring way, or point out her feelings to him. Instead, 
it would seem that she is so threatened that she lashes out from the 
Aggressor role position. This also represents a desperate attempt to 
defend against the possibility that an outsider might see that Colin was 
out of her control: "1 was a bit more embarrassed because my mate saw it 
and it wasn't very nice". 
Crucial to Faith's sense of desperation and shame seems not so much to 
be the threat to her own subjectivity (her sense of self perhaps could 
not sink much lower), but the threat to the subjectivity of her family. 
Colin's public behaviour threatened to breach the ideologically 
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necessary illusion of the family as a unitary responsible subject, able 
to transact with outsiders in a cohesive and coherent manner. In 
practice, a woman in Faith's position will often look to her immediate 
survival, not so much in terms of how to protect or enhance her own 
personal subjectivity, but in terms of how she can prop up the family 
subjectivity, and hence secure her place within that organisation, 
however damaging and oppressive that position might actually be for her. 
T: Has that ever happened before? 
F: No, but we had bad trouble with his toilet training and it got worse 
when I was having Lynne - messing himself and everything. I mean, 
he wears a nappy now at night, but I don't care because nobody sees 
him. I ain't got time to wash the sheets every day, so 1 leave him 
be. But in the daytime he was messing himself. It really was 
laziness - he was sitting talking. 
[Colin mimes giving food out to the therapist.] 
I kept saying, "Maybe he's forgotten, or maybe his stools were loose 
and he can't control them". But he was getting sneaky - he was 
doing it and he was running off. 
T: Did you tell Martin about it? 
F: With this, Martin whacked him for it. So he started getting to the 
point where he wouldn't do it when Martin was in the house. He'd do 
it when I was in the house. He knew when Martin was there you use 
the toilet. When Kum was there you just do it all in your trousers. 
Three or four times a day I was cleaning him and it was making me 
sick. I was having to get down on my hands and knees and clean him 
- try and take them off him, with all this muck, and while I'm doing 
it, he's shouting, "You won't hit me, Kum!" And I haven't been the 
one that's whacked him for it .... Of course, [Gestures towards 
Martin] he's shouting at me for not hitting him for it. But I kept 
thinking - when the kid's doing that to himself when he had been 
pretty clean .... I was looking for an answer, but there didn't seem 
to be one, and he was going downhill and downhill. I wasn't showing 
with the baby so he couldn't have known. 
The interpretation of violence in such contexts is not straightforward. 
As Alice Killer demonstrated, it may be seen as an ideologically 
sanctioned exercise of control by intimidation, particularly if 
undertaken in a cold and unemotional (i.e. patriarchal) manner. As 
such, it would constitute a transaction that reinforces the power 
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differential between the parent, operating from the Persecutor role, and 
the child, responding in the Victim role. On the other hand, violence 
may also be construed as 'child abuse' - as a parent going out of 
control and hence undermining 'proper' parental authority. Such a 
breakdown may follow from the parent experiencing herlhimself as so 
disempowered in relation to the child that slhe attacks it from the 
exaggerated Child subject position of the Aggressor role. It would seem 
that the instance of Martin's consistent threat of violence towards 
Colin is predominantly an example of the former type of transaction, 
whereas Faith's earlier retaliation is more an example of the latter. 
In this instance, we may see the extent to which the internal relations 
of the family are dominated by the rule of the (absent) father, the one 
who dictates that any suggestion that people should be allowed to do as 
they want "has to be wiped out". The interactions between Faith and 
Colin seem to focus on power - that which both of them must feel has 
been taken away from them. It is safer for Colin to get Faith down on 
her hands and knees clearing up his mess than it is for him to take on 
the embodiment of patriarchal power: Martin as head of the household. 
There is little room for developing relationships based on mutual 
respect as Faith does not confront his abuse of her. Colin sets Faith 
up in a position of patriarchal power and simultaneously undermines this 
by exposing her inability (or unwillingness) to employ violence from the 
partiarchally prescribed position: ·You won't hit me, Hum". 
However, at one pOint, Faith does move out of the subject position 
dictated by the patriarchal discourse, no longer allowing herself to be 
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defined by Martin's "shouting at" her" for not hitting him". Instead, 
she finds enough support to subject herself in an Adult position that, 
for perhaps the first time in this session, reflects some of her own 
capacities and interests: "! kept thinking ... " From there she is able 
to consider why Colin was "doing that to himself" (instead of her simply 
reacting to what he was doing to her). Sadly, her Adult thinking is 
still 50 contaminated by her internalisation of patriarchal ideology, 
that she is unable to see the real source of Colin's oppression, and 
instead, as many women do, turns to blame some change in herself, even 
though she "wasn't showing with the baby so he couldn't have known". 
T: [To Martin] What did you think about it? 
K: I knew it shouldn't be happening. 
F: [To Martin] Can we swap now? [Passes baby over to Martin.] 
T: And so you got into some rows about it? 
K: Not rows as such, it was just a .... 
F: Conflict. 
K: Just a conflict, that was all. What I'd do and what she'd do. It 
wasn't ongoing rows. As rows go, we don't have any as such. It was 
just a passing phase .... You get back down to it, it's not an 
ongoing thing for days on end. And we didn't hold a grudge or 
anything like that. 
F: No we don't. 
K: You've got to get the bandwaggon rolling, so to speak. 
On the second occasion that the therapist seeks to involve Martin in 
childcare matters, he does so in a conventional manner (man-ta-man), 
asking the question at the level of thinking rather than feeling. This 
offers Martin the possibility of retaining his distance as household 
head and responding with another somewhat impersonal declaration of 
masculine authority: "I know it shouldn't be happening". It is 
interesting that, at the same time that the therapist is seeking to 
engage Martin in childcare matters, Faith mirrors this at the level of 
here-and-nowactivity: she publicly gives Martin the responsibility for 
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looking after the baby. The therapist supports this emergence of a more 
flexible and less unequal organisation by raising the possibility of 
conflict and disagreement. There then follows a brief airing of the 
issue, in the form of a conflict between Faith and Martin about whether 
or not they have conflicts. Faith signals her opposition and then 
retreats, while Martin performs semantic somersaults in order to restore 
the image of a unified and male dominated family subjectivity, 
underpinned by a corporate MBe Strong" driver, which he symbolises as a 
"bandwaggon" (a juggernaut or a relic from the Wild West?). 
T: So that stopped when you actually got him sorted out with his 
toileting. That stopped until the time .... 
F: What stopped? Messing himself? 
T: Yes. 
F: He only stopped about two months ago - slowly. 
T: And then after that, recently, prior to you getting in touch with 
the Centre here, that was the occasion when .... 
F: He's got this fascination when He-Man comes on telly. There's very 
little I can do to stop him watching it. 
[Martin, with baby on his knee, reaches out to Colin, off-camera.) 
And quite honestly, when children's programmes come on, I need them, 
you know what I mean? To turn the programmes on and he can just sit 
and do as he likes. 
[Looks over at Colin.] And he'S watching all these programmes and 
that. 
[Leans over to speak confidentially to the therapist, as Colin goes 
up to Karti'n.) And he's got this fascination with [whispers) blood. 
Anything - he'S got to know whether it's got blood. Have flowers 
got blood? He's got to know. 
[Colin talks quietly to Martin,] 
The therapist reverts back to addressing the old-style family 
subjectivity, with Faith as spokeswoman on childcare matters. Colin's 
aggression and protest (by which Faith had sought to indicate that there 
was something amiss within the family) is subsumed by the therapist 
within one of the conventional discourses of child care - the enforced 
internalisation of parental domination through toilet training. Faith 
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reluctantly goes along with this 'normalisation' of what had been 
happening ("He only stopped about two months ago - slowly"), but then 
raises further examples of Colin's behaviour to suggest that the family 
situation is far from 'normal'. She also alludes to there being a 
connection between her inability to control Colin and her powerlessness 
to stop his identification with the symbols of patriarchal domination 
that are available to him through the media, such as "He-Man" on 
television: "There's very little I can do to stop him watching it". The 
all-embracing domination of patriarchal ideology over their family life 
is demonstrated by the apparent paradox that the only occasion on which 
Faith can allow Colin just to "sit and do as he likes" is when he when 
he is being inculcated with the masc~line values of violence and blood. 
It ls interesting that, at the same point that Faith is explaining this, 
Martin and Colin are actually demonstrating their close identity and 
alliance, through their physical contact and private conversations. 
F: He's getting this sick fascination for it. 
[Colin leaves Martin and goes to play in the corner near Faith.] 
And then the morning I went to see the health visitor. [Indicates 
Lynne] She's got reflux, she's vomiting a lot. He started taking on 
this thing of wanting to revert back to his drinking cup with the 
lid on and lying in my arms. I thought fair enough, let him do it -
it's not hurting anyone - so I let him do it. He was on about being 
sick, but he couldn't. This one day, he turns round and says "l 
want to be sick, Mummy. I want to be sick all over Lynne". And I 
thought, "You dirty little pig". I went and saw the health visitor. 
I just told her about it. ·That's not right really·, she said, 
"1'11 send you to these peoplei tell them what he's doing: the spite 
and the disobedience. If they can help you, they'll help you·. 
Faith still seems to lack the support to express herself directly at the 
level of feelings within the session. Instead she uses words in her 
discourse that are emotive - they imply the strength of feeling involved 
but leave to the listener the task of making the connections and, if 
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this is done, actually feeling the feelings on her behalf (itself a 
process of projection>. She describes a theme of "sickness" within the 
family, perhaps expresing indirectly that she 1s "sick" of the current 
organisation of the family. She projects responsibility for expressing 
this "sickness" on to Lynne and Golin. She starts with Golin' s "sick" 
fascination with blood, and moves on to the baby being sick. Finally, 
we reach a point where Faith locates her feelings of anger and revulsion 
with Golin ("You dirty little pig") for, in turn, expressing anger and 
revulsion towards the baby ("I want to be sick all over Lynne"). Making 
sense of this chain, we have strong indications that Faith may herself 
feel angry and revolted towards her children, but is unable to express 
this directly within the existing organisation of family subjectivity 
(she is constructed as a 'loving mother' who could not pOSSibly have 
such feelings). 
Golin's willingness to accept the role of expressing the "sickness" may 
be twofold: it may both make him important to Faith (acting as the 
mouthpiece for her feelings) and allow him to express any of his own 
feelings of jealousy and resentment towards the baby. However, by 
representing Faith's 'unacceptable' feelings, he pays the price of being 
rejected by her, and becoming the sole repository of such feelings 
within the organisation of family subjectivity - in fact, taking on the 
position of 'scapegoat'. Now we begin to get a picture of how the 
family's subjectivity is organised at the level of emotionality, and 
hence the 'danger' associated with Golin's position: why, unless there 
is some rearrangement of overall subjectivity, Golin might indeed "be 
hurt". The degree of danger is such that Faith is impelled to breach 
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the family's subjectivity by going to the health visitor and admitting 
that their internal relations are out of control. The danger is also 
sufficient for her to be able to involve Martin in the process. 
F: It wasn't what he was saying, it was his total behaviour, attitude. 
I was in (maternity] hospital having my check-up. When I went in 
for my check-up, he stood in front of these two old ladies and 
says .... 
(Golin interrupts Faith and she responds to him for a moment.] 
He stood in front of them and just turned round and went, liGan I 
punch these two old ladies in the stomach?" I just wanted to die. 
And he was starting to do it on the street. He did hit an old woman 
for nothing. walking down the ( ] Road. I said I could have died. 
He'd just turned round and whopped this old lady for nothing. I 
think she'd smiled at him and he'd whacked her. [Pause.] It was 
just things like that - getting aggressive. 
Just as Faith may be displacing her anger at her situation on to someone 
in a weaker power position than herself (Golin), so Golin, in turn, is 
unsupported in any direct expression of anger within the organisation of 
the family and so may be seeking to displace it on to 'soft' external 
targets. Almost intuitively, he may identify "old women" as occupying 
an even more powerless position than himself within the current 
patriarchal structuring of society. However, by selecting an external 
target, Golin's • protest' behaviour also has the effect of breaching 
family subjectivity making public the family's internal distress. 
T: [To Martinl What was the worst thing for you? 
[Martin returns the baby to Faith for bottle feeding.] 
K: What did annoy me was when he was taking it out of Lynne at times -
squeeZing her hand or squeezing the bottle .... 
F: Biting. 
M: Or biting. 
F: He did bite her once. 
K: It was more embarrassing than anything else, especially when there 
were other kids present and it was in front of you. That was the 
most annoying thing of the lot. [Pausel 
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The therapist's return to Martin at this point finds him (literally> 
holding the baby. It is interesting to speculate what the impact would 
have been on the family's subjectivity if the therapist had supported 
Martin's tentative flexibility of role by suggesting that he feed his 
own baby, rather than passing her back when she became a little 
demanding. With the act of passing the baby over, Martin once more 
assumes the position of household head, guarding and controlling the 
family's subjectivity. It is from this position that it is distressing 
not so much that Golin bites Lynne, but that he does so in public: "it 
was more embarrassing than anything else". Nevertheless, he is not 
quite so distant and impersonal as before. Although he ends up 
expressing his position in terms of "It was ... " and "That was ... ", he 
starts off with a statement that Golin's behaviour "did annoy me", 
thereby momentarily expressing his own feeling and distinguishing his 
personal subjectivity from his position as household head. 
K: But, as I say, I wasn't there a lot of the time. It seems as 
though, when I come back, then everything changes. It's just the 
old thing, if I get home, that's it. Things have to change. I'm 
just going on what Faith told me when I come in. 
T: [To Faith] Is that right, when Martin gets home, do things change? 
F: Yes. It went through a stage when Golin refused to kiss his Dad. 
Just overnight ... didn't want his Dad to kiss me and sometimes 
walking off on Martin and me and sitting in front of the telly, 
refusing to answer us. 
[Interruption due to baby crying; both Faith and Martin involved in 
dealing with this.] 
F: I never intended to do that - to keep him in front of the telly, but 
it's the best baby-sitter I've found. He's not constantly in front 
of it by any means. Some of the things, like pictures of births, I 
keep him away from. He doesn't need to know that. 
It seems to be important for Martin to maintain his position as head of 
the household by discounting his responsibility in the field of 
parenting and he is keen to emphasise his absence: "As I say, I wasn't 
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there a lot of the time". When the therapist asks Faith to confirm the 
extent of the impact of Martin's homeCOming, he implicitly supports the 
possibility of Martin's involvement in this sphere. Faith is able to 
use this greater flexibility in family subjectivity to comment not just 
on her relationship with Colin, but also on Colin's relationship with 
Martin ("refused to kiss his Dad") and on his relationship with them as 
a partner subjectivity ("Didn't want his Dad to kiss me"). Although 
staying within the constraints of a discourse-about-activity (who kisses 
who), she is able to allude to the state of emotional relationships in 
the family. As before, she seems unable to own her feelings (whether or 
not she would actually want to kiss Martin) and again there is evidence 
of Colin acting out a projection of her forbidden feelings. 
After the interruption, the family's subjectivity reverts to its former 
organisation. It is Faith alone who has to feel responSible, and 
inadequate, in relation to all matters of childcare. The pathos of the 
television being "the best baby-sitter I've found" indicates how utterly 
unsupported she feels as a parent. Her particular concern for Colin (as 
a male) to kept away from "pictures of births" (rather than, say, 
pornography or violence) may connect with her earlier concern about his 
"sick fascination" for "blood" - a theme that emerged at the same time 
as other feelings to do with the new baby. Her need to establish such a 
taboo against male "fascination", may perhaps reflect some abusive (and 
male-dominated) experiences of childbirth that inducted her, in a 
particularly graphic manner, into the position of mother-object (for a 
fuller account of the male 'colonisation' of childbirth practices, see 
Tew 1990). 
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T: [To Faith] When he's occupied, do you feel quite happy with things? 
F: It depends. If it's been a really bad day, and I've just about had 
enough, I can't even unwind until half-eight - and he's gone to bed 
at half-seven - easily an hour after. Even if he's sitting quiet,l 
still really feel tight, tired - my eyes and my head are just like a 
drum - and I keep thinking, "Martin's coming in now, you've got to 
leave it". Because Martin leaves everything behind and 1 don't want 
him to keep walking in and always seeing a lad that's fairly 
reasonably behaved in front of him and, sort of, me - you know, me. 
He's come home to find me crying and mad and angry. And the dinner 
hasn't been done and I'm just smashing around the house. Just 
trying to work it out because I can't see - I can't see what I've 
done in the day. I might have done a lot with him and there again 
it might have been a day when I thought, "Oh, sod you! I just can't 
be bothered". [To therapist] D'you know what I mean? 
For the first time in the session, the therapist addresses Faith at the 
level of feelings. With this direct support being offered, Faith is 
empowered, for the first time, to speak from her own subjectivity, in 
her own right, being able to move fluidly to and fro between 
transactional levels, expressing both her feelings and her thoughts. 
She is able to describe her feelings of frustration and anger that 
derive from her being subjected in the conventional ideological 
positions of housewife and mother. Colin ceases for a moment to act as 
the projection of her anger - she is able to own it herself - until the 
final part of her speech when, perhaps feeling unsure of her support, 
she seeks the reassurance of the therapist: "D'you know what I mean?" 
Because of the way that her subjectivity is constituted at the level of 
ideology, she is constrained by the frame of reference of her oppression 
rather than being able to speak about it from a clear and uncontaminated 
Adult position. She constructs her anger as strange and inexplicable, 
and directs it mainly at herself for not being the perfect wife and 
mother, rather than at the sources of her oppreSSion. Her survival 
depends on her fitting her subjectivity into the prevailing structure of 
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ideological relations, so she continues to use her internalised Defining 
Parent subject position to blind her to the reality of what is going on 
around her, "I can't see - I can't see what I've done in the day". 
Nevertheless, this blinding is not total: she is aware that what she 
sees and feels does not make sense, so she is left "just trying to work 
it out". It is clear that the level of oppression that she is 
experiencing, and the strain of maintaining herself within the 
ideologically prescribed subject position, are such that her own 
subjectivity is stretched "like a drum" to the point where it seems 
likely to snap - to break down - at any moment. 
T: What do you think Martin thinks when he comes in like that? 
F: Well, when we were going through the stage when Colin wouldn't kiss 
him, I know Martin was hurt. I was hurt by it. But I know Martin 
was hurt. And then he reversed it and he'd go to Martin and he 
wouldn't go to me. And I think Martin was just feeling sort of .... 
I don't think Martin thought it was so serious, because I'm pretty 
quick to temper anyway, you sce. [To Martin] I was before, wasn't 
I? 
K: Mnun. 
F: I was pretty quick to things like that, so whether Martin just .... 
I often felt that he sort of.... "Oh this is just an excuse because 
you haven't done anything all day". [To therapist) D'you know what 
I mean? 
T: Yes. 
By couching his question at the level of thinking <and in terms of what 
Martin might be thinking) the therapist effectively withdraws Faith's 
permission to express her own feelings directly. Furthermore, by asking 
Faith to speak for Martin, rather than asking him directly, he sets 
Faith up to represent the united facade of their partner/parenting 
subjectivity that is required by prevailing ideology. Such an indirect 
form of question may be seen to derive from the "circular questioning" 
approach of the Milan school - and, in this instance, may be seen to be 
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disempowering to Faith. She speaks as if she fears that she is about to 
be caught out and expose their differences (as Co1in had done by 
switching his allegiances). Faith desperately holds their subjectivity 
together by projecting her feelings on to Martin and vice versa, so as 
to maintain the appearance that both feel the same feelings at the same 
time: "1 know Martin was hurt by it. 1 was hurt by it". However, she 
also seeks to maintain the gendered way in which the family subjectivity 
must be seen to transact, and so differentiates herself as the emotional 
one (I'm pretty quick to temper anyway, you see"). Locked in by the 
projective nature of the therapist's original question, she is now 
unable to express directly how she feels towards Martin: her "temper" is 
now only evidence of her personal weakness. Ultimately, this places her 
in the paradoxical position of being the one who has to express, on 
Martin's behalf, his anger towards her: "This is just an excuse because 
you haven't done anything all day". 
F: Maybe something hadn't been done and that would drive me really mad. 
Not his attitude, but the fact that 1 hadn't done it. And then, by 
the time that he came in, I was so tired, I'd sit and relax, get him 
to bed. Then I didn't want to do nothing. I could see things 
waiting to be done and I kept thinking, "Sod it, 1'11 do it 
tomorro~'. But I know that 1 wouldn't do it tomorrow. So 
everything around me was annoying me and I knew that Martin - sort 
of since I've stopped working and I'm at home - Martin's adopted 
the attitude - 1 mean it's not so bad until - that it's my job to be 
at home and d'you know what 1 mean? [To therapist] The sort of 
thing all we women have got to do to keep ourselves occupied. 
Faith starts with an ideologically constructed organisation of family 
subjectivity in which she takes responsibility and the blame for 
everything, including anything that "hadn't been done". However, she 
then starts to challenge this and instead of directing her anger at 
herself, she begins to direct it, falteringly, towards Martin's 
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MattitudeM of enforcing her powerlessness at an ideological as well as 
an economic level, now that she was no longer a wage earner: MIt's my 
job to be at homeM. In articulating this grievance, she begins to 
attack the patriarchal basis of her family's organisation, and the 
potential significance of this is reflected, at the scale of her own 
subjectivity, in the sudden incoherence and disjointedness of her 
speech. At the end, she seems suddenly to become aware of her potential 
vulnerability, having said what she had said in front of a male 
therapist. She switches back into patriarchal ideology that discounts 
the economic value of housework (just a way "to keep ourselves 
occupiedM) and thereby denies her own right, as a woman, to be taken 
seriously, transacting at the level of activity. In doing so, she 
checks out the therapist's position in relation to this ideology. 
T: What did you do? What was your job? 
F: I've had a lot of jobs. I was a [J. Hy last job, I took on the 
advice of my health visitor after Colin had been born. She told me 
I had post-natal depression. I didn't know I had it. She said -
she just spoke to me as the way we're talking now - and whatever I 
must have said made her think that I would be better off back at 
work and away from Colin. She was right, except now I feel guilty 
because - just in the week I was looking at a baby that was his age 
when I left him and I can't believe that I missed that year. [To 
therapist] D'you know what I mean? And I keep thinking, MBloody 
Hell, did he - was he really like that?" I mean, he was walking a 
bit when we left him with my Mum to have all day and then I'd pick 
him up at night or whatever and I just can't believe I .... 
H: [Interrupting) It was essential that you worked then. I mean it 
wasn't a question of MOh I'd better go out and get a job", because 
we needed the money and that's that. 
F: We did need it. 
By asking, "What was your job?" the therapist asserts Faith's full and 
equal right to enter into transactions at the level of activity. 
However, by only validating her as a (potential) worker, rather than 
making any comment on the value of her activity in the home, he fails to 
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confront the ideological construction of housework as 'non-work'. 
Nevertheless, his support is sufficient for her to be able to talk of an 
earlier experience of personal breakdown in a way which starts to relate 
this to structural factors <disempowerment due to loss of job) rather 
than to personal inadequacy. She connects the support that she received 
then, from the health visitor, with the support she is currently 
experiencing from the therapist: "She spoke to me as the way we're 
ta 1 ki ng now". 
While she recognises that what she did (in flouting the patriarchal 
organisation of the family) was "right" - in that it worked out for her 
_ she reports that she has more recently fallen victim to the 
patriarchally defined ideology of motherhood <"I feel guilty"). It is 
surely not co-incidence that this happened during the period when she 
has been out of work again, due to the arrival of the new baby, and 
hence out of touch with the externally validating transactions of being 
in work. Perhaps exploiting this weakness, Martin intervenes to 
reimpose a patriarchal definition of the family's subjectivity at the 
economiC level by defining her work as a temporary <and hence marginal) 
contribution to the 'family wage', that was entered into out of 
necessity rather than choice: "It was essential that you worked then." 
X: We were abroad for a year and then came back and we never had a 
penny. And then Faith was pregnant, she said, so .... 
F: I did want to get pregnant. It wasn't a case of, "Oh God, I'm 
pregnant. What am I going to do?" I was quite fulfilled, over the 
moon. It just happened to me - it just crept up on me. I didn't 
have - we was in the circumstances - I'd sort of had him when I was 
at Mum's and we moved out of there and he was sick and nobody would 
believe me he was sick ... 
[Interruption as warmed up bottle is brought in for the baby.] 
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Faith describes how she started off being able to express positive 
feelings towards herself and had the potential to transact on a basis of 
mutuality with the new infant. However, her personal subjectivity came 
to be transformed as she was subjected in a series of oppressive 
transactions. Rather than sharing the experience with her, Martin 
implicitly blamed her for becoming pregnant: "We never had a penny. And 
then Faith was pregnant, she said". He was able to call upon an already 
existing patriarchal 'blueprint' for their parenting subjectivity: one 
in which responsibility for having children is located almost entirely 
with the woman. Although they must have been equally responsible for 
Colin's conception, Faith (as the one who was pregnant) was held 
accountable for the baby. Not only was Faith unsupported in negotiating 
a subjectivity as a mother that allowed her to hold on to her positive 
feelings, but the family's powerlessness at an economic level also made 
it impossible for her to insert the domestic aspect of her family's 
subjectivity into the ideologically prescribed slot as a separately 
defined and cohesive unit. Instead, she was only able to fit them <and 
herself) in with her mother's household. She reveals the absence of any 
emergent family subjectivity - any sense of her 'starting a family' -
when she admits apologetically that, "I sort of had him when I was at 
Mum's". She then found it difficult to be taken seriously in the 
subject position of 'mother': "Nobody would believe me he was sick". 
T: [To Martin] When did your wife give up work? 
[Martin looks across at Faith.] 
F: March last year. When I found out I was having Lynne. 
M: The first time or the second time? 
F: No, he means when ..•. I started work when Colin was just one. I 
finished last year in March. Xostly because I got the sack. I was 
working for [ ] and I enjoyed it. I moved to a new restaurant 
called [ 1 and they said I had a disruptive attitude. I was 
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questioning too many of their policies. Which I weren't. Anyway, I 
came home. I was quite happy. He could afford for me to come home. 
[Faith passes the baby over to Martin and there is an interruption 
as the baby is crying.] 
So I stopped last March. I found out I was having Lynne anyway. I 
started to look for another job or take a course. I got on a course 
for how to do programs for industrial computers and I passed that. 
Only because I was a woman and they wanted women on the course. At 
the same time I found out I was having her, so I rang up and said, 
"No" and he said, "Come back any time you like". 
[Faith takes baby back and starts to feed her.] 
But I said I was having her and I wanted to ... be there for him. I 
was going to lose him to nursery soon and I just felt he was turning 
out different from how I wanted him to be. 
[Interruption due to baby.) 
So I gave up and stayed at home. I was quite happy to. I enjoyed 
it. 
The therapist starts with a move that not only cuts across Faith's 
construction of herself as a failed mother and addresses her again in 
the subject position of a working woman, but also invites Martin to 
recognise her in this position. However, this move fails to challenge 
the underlying patriarchal organisation, in that his language actually 
maintains Martin's position of control. His use of the term "your wife" 
in this man-to-man discourse implicitly places Martin in a position of 
patronage over Faith. Although Martin does not give Faith any direct 
recognition as a working woman, he does indicate to Faith that she can 
answer for herself. The shift is sufficient for Faith to be able to 
speak in her own right about how she dealt assertively with the attempts 
by management to subject her within transactions of subordination. 
However, it is ironic that her only power base in this situation derived 
from her option of giving up work and appearing to be "quite happy" to 
subject herself within patriarchal economic relations at home. In the 
here-and-now of the session, she balances her account of her loss of 
access to the world of ecomonic activity <and her consequent dependency 
on Martin) with the action of passing him the baby to hold for a minute. 
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However, as soon as she takes the baby back for feeding, she seems to 
become engulfed in maternal ideology and describes how she started to 
feel guilty about going out to work. From this position, her change of 
role has less of an appearance of a positive choice - just one of 
resignation: "So I gave up and stayed at home". 
T: [Addressing both Faith and Martin] So I'd like to go back to what 
you were saying originally that it was Colin's aggression that you 
were saying was the worst. What else would you say ..• as being 
problematic? 
[Pause. Martin looks at Faith]. 
F: That was it - just his behaviour and his aggression. Everything was 
aggression. His demands on you all the time. He had to have you 
there, be doing with you all the time. And if you didn't, he'd 
throw a tantrum and then I'd throw a tantrum back. And I was 
frightened that the only way I could communicate with him was to 
stand and scream. I shouted one day and scared myself. You know, I 
shouted at him and he jumped three foot and I jumped three foot. He 
ran downstairs and I thought, "Oh Christ, is it coming to this?" 
Every time I talk to him it's going to come to .... Every time I 
talk to him I shout at him. I did talk to him, I did, but ... he 
only heard what he wanted to hear. 
[Consultants call therapist out for a five minute break to confer.] 
The therapist gives up on his attempt to transact with Faith's position 
as a woman in her own right. Instead he returns to the issue of 
parenting, and asks the question as if Faith and Martin are equally 
involved in this and constituted as a joint parenting subjectivity. 
Martin declines to be part of such a subjectivity and once more sets up 
Faith to be the family spokeswoman responsible for these matters. 
However, despite being set up in this way, Faith does not speak from the 
position of 'mother' - in the sense of taking responsibility for, and 
defending, the childcare aspect of family subjectivity against Colin's 
'protests'. Instead, she abandons her place in family subjectivity and 
speaks of herself occupying a similar structural position to that of 
Colin: as a Child, screaming for the recognition of her emotional needs 
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and frightened at her raw anger when she was not heard. Unfortunately, 
she was screaming at the wrong person - one who, at his developmental 
stage, was unable to meet her needs. She is able to express that she 
did not ~ant to 'mother' her child and, due to the lack of personal 
recognition that she was currently receiving within the family 
(principally from Martin), she experienced Colin's "demands" for 
attention as "aggression" - as potentially threatening her ability to 
have her own basic needs met. 
C: [To Faith] Can I play? 
F: Can we just talk for a while and then we'll play. Build me another 
street to show the man. 
T: (Reading from notes] My colleagues say that they're glad that you've 
been able to talk. It's helped them to get a clear picture of 
what's happening in your family. But they think that Martin knows 
that you've got a Hell of a lot on your plate and they think there 
must be more to tell. We're sure that Martin has a lot to add and 
perhaps we'll have the chance another time to talk about that. But 
for the moment we appreciate the fact that [Turns to Faith) he is 
letting you do the talking. That was just something that they 
wanted to share with you. 
F: [Glancing at Martin] Martin is quiet at first. 
[To Colin) Now I've said that's enough, thank you. 
As we see them after the break, the family have reconstructed their 
subjectivity, at least temporarily, in accordance with conventional 
ideology. Faith is now the 'competent mother' keeping Colin in his 
place, and the 'competent wife' able to speak for her husband in 
emotional matters ("Martin is quiet at first"). The therapist's 
intervention is influenced by the Milan approach. He seeks to connote 
their existing positions in a positive light, while nevertheless 
bringing out underlying issues where change may need to take place, 
although change is not actively encouraged at this stage. Thus the 
therapist hints at certain imbalances between the pOSitions of Faith and 
-307-
The Hirst family 
Martin (e.g. "You've got a Hell of a lot on your plate" and ":Martin has 
a lot to add"), while appearing to confirm, or at least not immediately 
threaten, the existing arrangement ("For the moment we appreciate the 
fact that he is letting you do the talking"). 
Although formulated in relation to the concept of system rather than 
subjectivity, this intervention could have a potentially destabilising 
effect on the existing arrangement of family subjectivity if, by 
highlighting the inequalities, it served to energise family members, 
unhappy with their subordinate positions, to take action to change them. 
However, systems theory ignores structural imbalances of power, and 
hence implicitly assumes that all family members are equally empowered 
to bring about change within an organisation that is seen to reflect 
consensus and not underlying conflict. Nothing in the intervention 
explains to Faith why she is actually not in as powerful a position as 
Martin. This leads to tbe danger that the intervention simply rubs salt 
in Faith's wounds - by confirming her distress while ignoring her 
powerlessness - and thereby leaves her not only feeling distressed, but 
also feeling personally inadequate that she is unable to cbange things. 
Her only potential for support, in challenging Martin's power over her, 
rests with the therapist (all other pressures tending to reinforce the 
status quo). However, by tbe very process of a systemic intervention, 
the therapist makes himself remote and his position ambiguous, and hence 
he does not come over as being supportive of Faith. By exposing Faith's 
powerlessness, but not acknowledging this or supporting her in 
challenging her position, the therapist's intervention could even serve 
to harden the existing gendered nature of the family's subjectivity. 
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T: What I would do would be to recap basically and say that, from what 
I've gathered, what you are saying is that Co1in's aggression was or 
is the main thing that has been getting you down. That's something 
that you might have to talk some more about and because of that we 
thought it may take some time to go through all of that. What I 
wanted to know from you is whether that is something that you want 
to do. It might take you a few sessions if that was something that 
you wanted to do. 
F: I don't mind doing it, but what if it doesn't come back again? What 
if he's good for ever now, as long as I avoid spaghetti, you know 
what I mean? Because at the time I phoned you, I really did need 
someone to help me. It was no good just sending him to my Xum's for 
a day just to get him away. That wasn't it. I needed someone to 
tell me - well if I was imagining it, [to therapist) d'you know what 
I mean? Maybe it was me. You know I'm a bit quick - you know - I 
can only cope with so much at anyone time - that's the way I'm 
made. I was beginning to wonder whether it was me. 
Having delivered an intervention which carefully focussed on the 
imbalances between the positions of Faith and Martin, the therapist 
backtracks and goes along with the family's construction of Colin as the 
problem. This has the dual effect of reinforcing the view that the 
patriarchal organisation of the family subjectivity is unproblematic, 
and also reopening Faith's subject position as mother, able to speak on 
behalf of this organisation on childcare matters, but unable to speak 
her real views and feelings: her sense that she is "on the edge" of a 
breakdown, and her anger and frustration at being subjected as 'mother' 
within the current organisation of family subjectivity. 
F: Now that he's good, I know it wasn't me. 
[Colin climbs on to Martin's knee for a play-fight and a cuddle.) 
Now that he's good, I can wake up in the morning really calm. I've 
adopted a new attitude now that he's given me the chance. When I 
was trying to before with him, he didn't want to know, but now I've 
got this new thing with him. I don't care if he's 3~ - if he wants 
to know something, he can know it. He's capable of thinking really 
well, but he wasn't doing that before. He was being really selfish. 
You can't expect him at 3~ to be considerate of me, but there should 
have been something in it, you know what I mean. It was just the 
fact that he was deliberately setting out to do it. Now I talk to 
him and he can be so sensible. You know, the last couple of weeks, 
he's so sort of .... I don't want a little old man who listens and 
does everything he's told. I don't want one of them. But he's 
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listening, he's understanding, he's been better with me .... When I 
tell him, "Don't do it, love", he doesn't even say to me, "But why, 
but why?" What he does now, he helps me with a lot more things and 
he's not greedy for it now - not greedy for the time to me". 
In this discourse, Faith seems to construct Golin more as her idealised 
partner than as her son: as someone who is more considerate than a 3~ 
year old, but is not yet an "old man", someone who can think and act on 
his own account, but is "understanding" and "helps with a lot more 
things", someone who is not "greedy" or demanding. From this position 
he appears powerful but benevolent: "He's given me the chance" so that 
"I can wake up in the morning really calm". This idealised partner may 
represent what Martin is currently not offering her. Projecting her 
needs on to Golin in this way may have become her only way of expressing 
them, as she may feel too powerless to ask Martin directly. Colin, in 
his even weaker power position has little choice whether he accepts the 
subject position into which he is being projected. It may also seem an 
attractive position for him as it appears so powerful. In the here-and-
now of the session, he seems comfortable to sit on his father's knee, 
and perhaps identify with his father's position of patriarchal power. 
This brings him, in somewhat Oedipal fashion, to be simultaneously close 
to his father and in contest <play-fighting> with him. But this Oedipal 
contest is far more a reflection of Faith's position of powerlessness 
than of any desires originating with Golin. 
F: 
[Faith continues her theme of expressing her ambivalence about 
whether there is any need (or any purpose> for the family to come 
back for a further session, given Golin's apparent behavioural 
improvements. Golin moves onto Faith's knee, but continues to play 
wi th MarUn.) 
[To therapist) You'll be honest with us, will you, at the end of it. 
I mean, if you find - if we find that we need to come - if I find I 
need to bring them all back - right - with me, and you find it's me, 
maybe, will you be honest with us and tell us the truth without 
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sparing our feelings. Or will you say, "Sorry, it's not Coli nil , but 
not go any further, d'you know what I mean? 
T: Well, that's quite a difficult question, really. We often don't 
know how things come about, so it's hard to be able to answer that 
really. 
F: Not "They were ... n_ or whatever. But if you feel, by talking to me, 
at the end of it, when you assess what I've told you - that's what 
I'll be honest with you about, because I really want to be told the 
truth at the end of it, d'you see what I mean? I want to know 
whether I've been wrong in the way I've handled things and that, and 
I need to know that you'll be honest with me at the end of it. 
T: Well, we do try to be as honest as we can, but as you can 
appreciate, it's difficult to know. 
F: (Interrupting] I know what you mean exactly. 
T: Every situation is different, so we wouldn't know what we might be 
saying to anybody at this stage. 
F: [Interrupting] Oh no, not at this stage. I mean, at the end of it 
all, you'll be honest, as much as you can be. Or at least in the 
way that you see it. 
T: [Interrupting] We wouldn't want to be dishonest .... 
F: [Interrupting] No, O.K. But I really need to know that if this 
comes back again, that I've got another opinion - on my side. 
And I can either look to it and think of it, "There I go again, I'm 
in the wrong", or I can look at it and say, "We're off again and 
this is how I'm going to handle it". You see, I know how I want to 
handle it, but I don't want to - just because I know how to handle 
it, in myself - it doesn't mean that it's right, d'you know what I 
mean? Or right for Colin, you see. 
T: Those are some of the things we can look at - if you want to explore 
some of these issues in a fortnight's time. 
F: [Interrupting] We'll do it then, yes. (Session ends.] 
Faith struggles to ask the therapist to commit himself: is she simply to 
be blamed (as the mother) for Colin's behaviour, or will he explore 
deeper issues "without sparing our feelings" and, if so, how far will he 
go: "Wi 11 you say 'Sorry, its not Colin', but not go any further?" 
Finally, would he commit himself to supporting her position: can she 
knoW "that I've got another opinion - on my side"? Her persistence, 
coupled with her difficulty in asking, suggest both that she had found 
the therapist potentially supportive (so it was worth raising the 
issue), but also that his attempts to retain his manoeuvrability meant 
that she was unsure whether she could rely on his support. Such 
experiences are an understandable consequence of any systemic approach. 
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SESSION 2 
[At start of session, Colin is playing noiSily in the background and 
Faith is finishing feeding the baby.] 
F: We're thinking of moving schools. 
T: Yes. 
F: Where they should go. (Turns towards Martin) We don't discuss 
clothes and food and diet or anything. I do all that business. 
T: You see to that. 
F: I mean, I do say ... [Conversation drowned by Colin.} We do discuss 
things like what's best for Colin, because we were considering 
sending him to private education - to music lessons - because music 
seems his strongest point ... [Conversation again drowned by Colin.] 
T: So do you disagree about that, or do you ..• 
K: Well, occasionally there is disagreement, but usually it is ... 
[Pauses and turns to Faith} I've lost the word. 
F: Mutual understanding. 
K: Mutual understanding. [Laughs] There aren't any real disagreements 
as such. 
F: We've never had one, have we? We've never had a disagreement. 
(Pauses and turns to Martin] Martin knows my temper. [Both laugh.] 
[To therapist] Sorry! 
T: No, no. That's good. [ ... ] 
Faith starts by presenting how their family subjectivity is currently 
organised: she 1s responsible for day-to-day internal decision making. 
while Martin is involved in those decisions that have a bearing on the 
external standing of the household. The therapist homes in on whether 
Faith's use of the term "discuss" implies that there is room for 
disagreement within this organisation of family subjectivity. As 
before, it is Martin, as head of the household, who intervenes in order 
to define the nature of the disagreement, so as not to threaten the 
unity of family subjectivity. However. this time, he fumbles and has to 
invite Faith to come forward with the form of words ("mutual 
understanding") that cover over the possibility of fundamental conflict 
_ conflict that may not be voiced as long as she remains subjugated to 
his power. This would suggest a little more flexibility in the 
organisation of family subjectivity (Martin can stumble and Faith can 
fill in), although ultimately she says what Martin wants her to say. 
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Nevertheless, this flexibility allows Faith, first of all to parody 
MArtin's statement ("We've never had a disagreement"), and secondly to 
indicate that although Martin may be in a structural position of power 
at the levels of activity and ideology, she has the potential to fight 
back at the level of emotionality ("Martin knows my temper"). Although 
significant, this does not constitute any real equality: while she has 
the power to hurt and frighten him if he pushes things too far, this 
does not mean that he takes her feelings seriously, nor does it give her 
any equality of participation in transcations at the levels of discourse 
and activity (such as their discussions on schooling). Thus it may be 
seen that family subjectivity remains significantly gendered at all 
transactional levels. 
It would seem that, rather than continue to struggle for more equal 
power within the internal organisation of the family, Faith has opted to 
work with MArtin to enhance the class position of the family 
subjectivity as a whole. Although her work experience would define her 
as working class, she is vicariously located within the social formation 
as part of a family subjectivity whose class position is defined 
primarily by the economic power of her husband's occupation (a small 
business), and also by how he may determine that any accumulated wealth 
is to be consumed or passed on as inheritance. It is the latter domain 
that is relevant here: decisions about the education of (male) children 
relate both to defining class position via conspicuous consumption (if 
bought privately) and to the inheritance of class position (privilege on 
the basis of educational background). Thus, although Faith stands to 
gain nothing by such decisions as a person in her own right, she may 
-313-
The Hirst family 
hope for some vicarious enhancement of her class position, which however 
remains conditional on her toeing the line and staying within the bounds 
of family subjectivity - a price to pay that may actually be greater 
than any advantage achieved. 
F: (Indicating Colin] He has been a bit more spirited since the last 
time we came, when I told you everything, like. 
(Conversation drowned by noise from Colin.] 
But otherwise, he'S had a few highs - but then I've been at the bad 
time of the month. But other than that, he's not been too bad. 
He's been at my Mum'S today, playing with his friend, because he's 
ben on school holiday - nursery holiday - so he's been there today. 
Faith redefines what she had previously termed as Colin's "aggression" 
~s "spirit", as a positive expression of his deSiring. She no longer 
perceives his demands for recognition as threatening the integrity of 
her own or the family subjectivity. This indicates that she has moved 
into a more secure power position, both at the scale of her individual 
subjectivity vis-a-vis that of Colin, and as part of a more secure 
family subjectivity. However, within the organisation of the family, 
whereas Colin is now permitted to express his feelings (be "high" or 
"spirited"), she still disqualifies her feelings as the "bad time of the 
month" - indicating that she remains significantly disempowered at the 
level of emotionality. This could lead to a continuation of the process 
of projection whereby Col in, not only expresses his own strong feelings, 
but also, by proxy. has to express those of his mother. 
T: What do other people in the family think? Why do they think you've 
come here today? Does anybody know? 
F: No. 
M: I spoke to Steve and he said ... 
F: (Interrupting) Did you tell Steve? 
M: Yes, I mentioned it to Steve. 
T: Who is Steve? 
M: Well he's just a business partner, on a small ... 
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F: [Talks to therapist cutting across Martin] You don't smoke, do you? 
[Therapist declines cigarette.] 
K: He's ... I ... To be quite honest, I don't find anything 
embarrassing about it. Perhaps she finds it embarrassing, but I 
don't. 
T: Do you? 
K: I don't find anything embarrassing about it. In saying that, I 
think that a lot of people would suggest - or think to themselves -
either I'm wrong in the head and I can't cope, or you're admitting 
that there's something actually wrong with your child. [Shrugs.] 
Very few things embarrass me anyway as such. You know, everything 
that happens, I regard as normal, even though it's not normal, if 
you see what I mean. 
F: [To therapist) The Kums at them schools now - you know what I think 
about some of their kids? In fact, I felt like giving your address 
to one the other day. I did, honestly. I know what I think about 
their kids when they do nasty things ... 
[Faith continues to discuss the other women that use the nursery.) 
The therapist's question elicits information about the degree to which 
their family subjectivity is itself subjected within a wider 
subjectivity: that of the extended family. As we have seen, it is 
typically the woman who 'represents' the nuclear family within wider 
familial networks. In this case, it has been Faith's responsibility to 
protect the fragility of her family's subjectivity from becoming 
overwhelmed in the subjectivity of the extended family, by denying them 
information as to what is actually going on. This line of action is 
probably against the interests of her own personal subjectivity as she 
is cutting herself off from any support from her own mother. It is 
perhaps perhaps because of this that she is so taken aback when she 
discovers that Martin has secretly breached family subjectivity in order 
to gain personal support from his business partner. 
Martin's action also constitutes a major breach of the previous gender 
organisation of family subjectivity. Previously, as head of household, 
he had appeared deliberately uninvolved in matters of childcare, leaving 
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all responsibility to Faith. Now he has admitted that he was 
sufficiently concerned to discuss things (and reveal family secrets) to 
another man. Clearly Faith does not see this as a positive move - one 
that signals Martin's willingness to become more involved with her on 
childcare (he had not consulted her) - but as a threat to her one 
remaining position of power and responsibility within the family. 
Martin's admission temporarily displaces him as head of household: it is 
he who has acted out of line with the patriarchal organisation of family 
subjectivity. Now seriously wrongfooted, he attempts to regain his 
position with a show of bravado: an attempt to deny that "anything 
embarrassing" to family subjectivity had taken place. He has to 
acknowledge that he had either laid himself open to the charge that "I'm 
wrong in the head and I can't cope", or the family subjectivity to the 
charge that "there's something actually wrong with your child", both of 
which would signify breakdown of some sort. He falls back on his 
ultimate authority as patriarch to deny the reality of what occurred -
to redefine it as "normal, even though it's not normal". However, 
neither the therapist nor Faith seek to capitalise on his vulnerability 
and explore any of the contradictions that he is exposing. Instead, 
Faith moves in to shore up the family subjectivity by distracting the 
therapist's attention on to the "nasty things" she sees in the way other 
families operate (and the therapist goes along with this). 
[Faith talks about how she disciplines Colin.] 
T: When there is something that goes wrong or something that you do, 
[turns to Faith] like you were just explaining how you put Colin 
outside the door, do you both come to an agreement about how you'll 
handle that sort of thing with each other when things like that go 
wrong? 
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F: 10. 
[Faith and Martin start to speak simultaneously. Faith gives in 
first and attends to Colin instead.] 
K: If one is taking care of the matter their way, then you don't jump 
in. 
T: [To Faith and Martin) That's something that you have agreed then? 
K: Yes, because, you know, it gets to the point where you're losing 
charge, sort of thing, so ... 
T: So how did you arrive at that agreement then? 
[Colin places Lego set on Faith's knee.] 
F: What's this, I missed it? [Looks suspiciously at Martin.] What 
agreement's this? 
K: [Laughs] D'you want to know which one? [He mimes looking through a 
set of cards.] I'll have a look. 
The therapist does not allow the family subjectivity to slip back into 
an organisation in which Faith takes over sole responsibility for 
childcare matters and Martin is able to reconstruct his position of 
relative distance and unquestioned authority. By asking about how they 
reach agreement on childcare strategies, he draws Martin in again and 
also brings to the surface issues of power in the decision making 
process between them. Before Martin is able to silence her, Faith 
indicates that they do not actually reach agreement. However, before 
she can say any more, Martin intervenes and once more takes on the 
position of "The lame of the Father". From this he restates the 
principles of patriarchal family organisation, by which, as a parent, 
"one" should take "care of the matter" by ensuring that "it never gets 
to the point where you're losing charge". He does not use 'I' to own 
the authority himself, but speaks it as if it were a self-evident truth 
guaranteed in accepted ideology. Whereas, in the first session, Faith 
would fall in with such a restatement of patriarchal control, it is 
interesting that here she is able to distance herself from having been a 
willing party to any such "agreement" - although lacking sufficient 
support in the here-and-now to renegotiate it directly. 
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F: Well, we do differ a little because Martin's ideas are short, sharp 
and then - just - smack him, if it sort of deserves a smack. Shout 
first: warn him. So we always give him - well Martin always gives 
him - the benefit of the doubt: he's been warned, but only once. 
Like he's 3~. He knows if he wants a drink. He knows if he's 
hungry. Therefore he knows what ... 
[Turns to Colin] Watch! Colin, I don't want this on my lap, son. 
No. not on my lap. on the floor. 
C [Himics] On your lap. [Hoves Lego.] 
M No, on the floor! 
F: [To therapist] So Martin will say, "Now you've been told. Don't do 
it again" or ·Pick it up" or whatever. If he doesn't pick it up, 
[indicates striking action with her arm] whack! "Now do what you're 
told". He - "Colin, will you do it, will you do it?" You see, I 
take ages to tell him, and at the very limit I will smack him. But 
sometimes I will sort of shout at him, you know, "Bloody do it!" 
When I put on my bad voice - my shouting voice - he does it, half 
way. 
Despite Martin's efforts to silence her, Faith does take the opportunity 
to articulate the differences between their parenting styles. There 
seems to be somewhat of a contradiction between her reported inability 
to assert herself with Colin at home ("I take ages to tell him") and her 
clear and unconfrontational approach to him in the here-and-now of the 
session ("I don't want this on my lap, son"), which is demonstrably 
effective while not intimidating or putting him down in any way. 
Martin's late intervention ("No, on the floor") is actually unnecessary 
_ the Lego has already been moved - but may indicate the way in which he 
overrules Faith's more gentle and respectful approach at home. Whereas 
Martin's power position allows him to slip easily into the Persecutor 
role position and intimidate Colin, if Faith is unable to assert 
herself, she tends only to have access to the less powerful Agressor 
role position (her "bad voice"), from which all she can do is to shout 
and swear at Colin. In doing so, she has placed herself in a Child 
position alongside Colin. As this gives her no structural power over 
him, they have to compromise and he meets her "half way". 
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F: But it's usually because I don't want to - ·like tidying up or 
picking something up for me. But I don't want my little boy to pick 
my things up, d'you know what I mean? I don't make him do things in 
the house unless he wants to. But there are certain things that 
are, like, his duties. He does it at nursery so he should do it at 
home - cleaning up his bits and pieces, d'you know what I mean? So 
that I don't have to keep running after him. We've got the little 
Lego and that goes everywhere. He tips that box on the floor, but 
he doesn't want to pick it up. [ ... l And his toybox - a huge 
toybox - he'll empty it every single day, put his toys on the floor 
and then run off and do something else. And I'll say, "Clear it up" 
and he'll say, "No, you do it", and that annoys me. "You do it." 
I've started him off with, "We'll do it together", you see. 
[Golin puts Lego back on side table without being asked.l 
But now I'm trying to show him that, at school, we don't do it 
together. If we use it, we put it away, d'you see what I mean? 
We're having a little bit of a battle. Maybe I've done it too often 
for him, d'you know what I mean? So ... 
Faith's subjection to patriarchal ideology within the family is 
reinforced by her own internalisation of gender roles - as embodied in 
her Parent subject position. From this position she sees it as somehow 
emasculating for her to ask any man (even her son) to do any of 'her' 
work, or to clear up even some of his own mess. Effectively, she gives 
Golin two contradictory Parent messages: "Will you clear it up" and 
"You're not a man if you clear it up". Faced with the ideological 
double bind that he will not be respected by his mother if he responds 
to her wishes, Colin is likely to internalise, as part of his emerging 
Parent subject position, a conventionally male sexist attitude that 
"Women will only respect me as a real man if I act abusively towards 
them." Interestingly, it is their subjection as part of the 
institutional culture of the day nursery that provides Faith with her 
only support against her own internalisation of sexism, and Golin the 
alternative experience of being expected to clear up his own mess (and 
being respected for doing so). 
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[Golin attempts to drag Martin away to play with him. Martin 
resists but does not stop Colin from pestering him.] 
T: So you have different ways of doing things - that's what it comes 
down to in the end. 
F: Discipline's different with each of us - like Martin won't sit there 
and watch me tell him three times, he'll say, "Your mother's told 
you twice and that's enough". 
T: And do you agree with Martin about this way of doing things? 
F: He's right I suppose. At the time, I look at it, and to me it 
doesn't deserve the smack he's been given. 
[Golin is still attempting to drag Martin away.) 
[To Golin] Colin! We have told you. We are not going to play now. 
You've been playing all day. Come and sit! 
[Colin starts to cry and goes to Martin for comfort. Martin gives 
him a cuddle.] 
G: I don't want to. 
F: We - like him. [looks disapprovingly at Martin and then back to the 
therapist] he'll whack him. But I wasn't on the edge of whacking 
him. I was on the edge of shouting two or three more times, d'you 
see what I mean? 
[Martin continues to cuddle Golin.] 
So - and sometimes that's not hard. like - and then I might comfort 
him and Martin would say, "Don't do that because you are 
contradicting me by hugging him". Contradicting him. making it look 
like, "If Daddy smacks you, Mummy will make it better", d'you see 
what I mean? Whereas Martin never goes against me when I punish 
him. 
[Colin gets off Martin's knee but still holds on to him.) 
So, I'm wrong. d'you see what I mean? He'll never contradict 
anything I do. 
[Golin puts his arms around Martin.] 
If I smack Colin, he'll never say. "There was no need for that", but 
I'll say to him. I shouldn't really, but it's just instinctive if I 
see him crying. He's got a way of looking at you and making you 
think, "Oh God, I think it's a shame". 
[Golin starts playing with Martin.] 
Later on. it may not seem that important to him, but he's got to 
understand it's important to us, d'you know what I mean? 
Throughout the whole of this section there is a dramatic contradiction 
between what Faith describes as happening at home and what is happening 
in the here-and-now of the session, at times appearing to constitute an 
exact reversal of positions. Faith starts by bowing to patriarchal 
authority and stating that Martin's authoritarian approach is the 
"right" one, while at the same time restating her misgivings that his 
approach is unnecessarily violent and punitive. At the cost of 
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constructing her opinions as inferior and "wrong", she manages to have 
her 'difference' heard, but without threatening the current organisation 
of family subjectivity. Although it is "wrong", she describes how she 
continues to respond to Colin at the level of feelings, even though 
Martin experiences this as undermining his authority. 
However, while Faith is speaking, a total reversal of this process is 
actually being enacted. In the here-and-now it is Faith who exercises 
discipline sternly on behalf of the parenting subjectivity" We", and it 
is Martin who responds to Colin at the level of feelings and thereby 
could be construed as undermining Faith's authority. Thus, although 
there continues to be a hard/soft polarisation within the organisation 
of the parenting subjectivity, Faith and Martin have actually swapped 
subject positions. This, in turn, has an impact on Colin's position 
within the organisation of family subjectivity. While Martin occupied 
the position of head of household. Faith and Colin experienced their 
oppression separately. They did not form themselves into a common 
subjectivity, offering each other mutual support against a common 
oppressor. Due to their difference in both age and gender, they 
experienced their oppression as separate and unconnected, and, much of 
the time, identified each other as the target for their anger and 
resistance. However, when Faith temporarily moves into the position of 
authority, Martin and Colin are immediately formed into a common 
subjectivity - a powerful alliance of mutual support based on their 
common maleness which isolates Faith, particularly at the level of 
feelings. Thus Faith gains a position of authority, but not one of real 
power, in this temporary rearrangement of family subjectivity. 
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It is interesting to speculate on what would have been the outcome if 
the therapist had invited the family to experience the overt 
contradiction between the home situation and the here-and-now: for Faith 
to acknowledge her ability to use authority and for Martin to 
acknowledge his responsiveness at the level of feelings. By utilising 
and exploring such contradictions as they emerge, it may be possible to 
precipitate a real shift in the underlying power relations of a family 
subjectivity - a 'capturing' of new transactional possibilities within a 
therapeutic "'War of Position" at the scale of the family organisation. 
T: So do you give each other ideas then, about things you could do 
differently, or other things you could do, maybe? 
F: I have discussed problems with Martin and Martin's always said, "Do 
what you feel is best. Try it.· So Martin's very good. He knows 
that I'm with him for the majority of the time in the day. It's me 
that's having the problem, not Martin, d'you see what I mean? But I 
feel that the problem's overflowing into the relationship as well, 
not on Martin's side but on mine. He's not very serious. He never 
lets anything worry him, [to Xartin] do you? D'you see what I mean, 
he's very happy-go-lucky and that. [Martin nods acknowledgement.] 
And I'm very concerned about most things. I suppose I'm what people 
call a worrier. I let things worry me more, where you say, "Oh, 
tomorrow, tomorrow,· you know, "Things will get better". And they 
always get better for him. Things go right for him all the time. 
Nothing goes my way. 
The therapist's question implicitly redefines Faith's account as if she 
had been describing a situation in which she and Martin had equal power 
to influence each other's approaches to discipline <perhaps responding 
to the shifts taking place in the here-and-now). However, this offers 
no recognition of Faith's difficulty in having her approach acknowledged 
and taken seriously by Martin - the fact that she does not "give ideas" 
to Martin, only the other way around. This leads Faith, for the first 
time, to disclose that there are problems and imbalances within the 
partner subjectivity. She is not sufficiently empowered to be able to 
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tackle this from an Adult subject position. Instead, she lets it out 
indirectly from a Victim subject position, as if it is entirely her 
fault for being a hysterical and ineffective mother. Nevertheless, she 
describes a very clear imbalance in responsibility, with Martin leaving 
all the "worrying" to her: while he sits back with an attitude of 
"tomorrow, tomorrow", it is Faith who is left to do whatever is required 
in order to ensure that things "always get better for him". 
She describes a partner subjectivity that is is oppressively organised 
on gender lines. He would seem to withdraw at the level of feelings 
(under the organisation of the typically male version of the Be Strong 
driver) and to project on to her all responsibility for transacting at 
that level. He knows that he can leave her to do all the "worrying" for 
their combined subjectivity, since he is 'sitting pretty' in a 
comfortable position of power, while she is in the typically vulnerable 
position of a woman who sees the survival of her personal subjectivity 
as depending on the survival of the relationship. Her subjectivity 
becomes organised around some combination of perhaps the Please and Try 
Hard drivers, and these various drivers, acting in complementary ways, 
effectively define the overall subjectivity of their relationship. Due 
to the unequal power relations underpinning their different adaptations, 
it is perhaps no accident that "things go right for him all the time", 
whereas for her, "nothing goes my way". 
T: Things don't always get better for you, you find? 
F: No they don't. I find it harder. I've tried doing what he does, 
which is, sort of, "O.K., let it all flow by. Let everything ... 
It'11 come". I've tried it. I've tried it for a couple of weeks. 
It's a lovely feeling, just to look up and say, [shrugs] "So what." 
But my personality, in the end, comes ... At the end of, say, two 
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weeks, I think I'm going to .•. I find myself sitting there because 
I'm pretending not to care, d'you see what I mean? I've tried it so 
many times, I can't do it anymore. I can't pretend that things 
aren't that important. They are. It's things that are really ... 
Martin's right, in a way, not worrying about that, but I do because 
that's just something that worries me. So ... 
[Pause. Colin starts grizzling and rubbing his eyes. Martin holds 
him. There is further discussion of the advice they get from their 
extended family and then the therapist is called out for 
consul tatton. ] 
Her experiment of trying out his role is an imaginative one. However, 
because she conceptualises the situation at the scale of her 
11 personali ty", she fails to realise how she will be forced back into her 
former role unless Martin shifts his position within the overall 
subjectivity of their relationship. When she tries out the "happy-go-
lucky" role, it does not change her objective power position within the 
relationshipi she does not have the luxury of knowing that there is 
• someone else, who is in a more vulnerable pOSition, who can be left to 
maintain contact with reality at a feeling level, to "worry" for both of 
them. It is not surprising that she remained uneasy and unable to relax 
fully. Because there was no real shift in power, there was no pressure 
on Martin to take over the vacant role. 
T: I'll just read this to you. O.K? My colleagues think that you're a 
terrific family. [Pause.] 
F: Really? 
T: They like the fact that you are so open about the differences in 
your personalities. They think that you both know how to use the 
differences to the best effect and the result is a good team. with 
plenty of life about you. Colin is already showing that he is 
benefiting from what he has got from both of you. You may not 
realise it, but you have already started a lot of the hard thinking 
that is involved in bringing up children, and some of the hardest 
work of all for parents is coming up against your own feelings and 
memories from when you were a child yourself. You two have between 
you a whole range of ways of solving problems and you make full use 
of your thoughts, your instincts and your feelings, so what the team 
say is that the task for you is to use these ways about whether or 
not you want to come back - and that's all they want to say. 
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The intervention addresses issues of conflict from a systemic rather 
than a critical perspective. Taking the lead from Faith's redefinition 
of Golin's 'problem' behaviour as "spirited" rather than "aggressive", 
this is expanded into an overall family theme of "plenty of life". 
Thus, the "differences" that Faith identified between herself and Martin 
are linked in with Golin's behaviour, both being connoted in a positive 
light: "Golin already shows he is benefitting from what he has got from 
both of you". This theme is used to undermine their collective 
insertion within a bourgeois ideal subject position of a consistent and 
conflict-free 'happy family', and to validate an alternative 
construction of family subjectivity in which internal dissent could be 
seen as 'healthy'. This possibility is posed in a way that does not 
threaten the disintegration of family subjectivity: having "differences" 
is made to be part of being "a good team". Thus, ultimately, the 
conflict between Faith and Martin is not exposed as the consequence of 
unequal power relations, but is understood as a debate between apparent 
equals that is functional to the overall family organisation: "You know 
how to use the differences to the best effect". In this way, the first 
part of the intervention stays firmly within a systems perspective, 
although it does challenge a significant aspect of their internalisation 
of prevailing familial ideology. 
The second part of the intervention would not appear to be 'strategic' 
in any sense, but to relate to an educational or consciousness-raising 
approach. The invitation to connect their current experience with their 
particular "feelings and memories" from their respective childhoods 
could lead on to a better understanding of how they were inducted into 
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their relative power positions. However, as it stands, this theme is 
not sufficiently elaborated to be likely to have such an effect, as 
there is no differentiation between Faith's experience as a girl and 
Martin's as a boy. Any motivation to look at such issues could also be 
diminished by their being told what a "terrific family" they are. 
Finally, a more explicitly pro-feminist shift in the transactional 
organisation of family subjectivity is promoted by including, as 
important in the problem solving process, the levels at which Faith is 
most competent ("instincts" and "feelings"). alongside that of 
"thinking" where Martin is dominant. However. the symbiotic gendering 
of their partner subjectivity is not challenged: it is accepted that 
they should only have a full transactional repertOire between them -
with Faith still doing the feeling. and Martin the thinking. for both of 
them. Until Martin becomes aware of the importance of transacting at 
the level of feelings (for example. if he had got in touch with how he 
had responded to Colin's distress in the session). he is still not going 
to take Faith's instincts and feelings seriously and allow her to be 
powerful at this level of family transaction. 
There would seem to be fundamental difficulties in bringing together 
systemic and feminist paradigms within the one intervention. In the 
Kilan approach. positive connotation is used as part of a hidden 
strategy of change: if behaviours can be dissociated from their 
'deviant' or 'problem' label within the family's belief system, they 
will no longer serve to reinforce the existing 'stuck' pattern in the 
family. Here, the intervention starts off in such a strategic vein, 
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with phrases such as "You're a terrific family" and "The result is a 
good team" which are designed to alter the family's belief system such 
that they no longer define their behaviour as deviant. However, these 
phrases also gloss over the reality of their breakdown: the instances of 
• protest' that subsequently revealed evidence of inequality, distress 
and oppression in the family. Unfortunately, the lack of directness or 
honesty in such manoeuvres may well have served to undermine the impact 
and credibility of the later parts of the intervention which seek, in an 
entirely straight way, to empower Faith and Martin to take seriously 
their past and present experience. This highlights the practical (as 
well as theoretical) contradictions between consciousness-raising and 
the strategic manoeuvring of systemic approaches. 
From a perspective of power relations, it is simply insufficient to 
redefine their "differences" as something positive - as if this, in 
itself, would jolt the system into a less oppressive form of 
organisation. Instead of acknowledging that Martin has the power to 
intervene and force Faith to define her child-care approach as "wrong", 
whereas Faith has no power to influence Martin's authoritarianism, the 
intervention sees the situation in terms of "personalities" and that 
"you both know how to use the differences to the best effect". It 
reflects an idealisation, not the reality of the situation. Thus the 
subsequent opening up of the possibility of conflict within a 
reconstructed family subjectivity still leaves Faith struggling from a 
totally unrecognised one-down position, likely to blame her 
ineffectiveness in influencing Martin on the inadequacy of her 
"personality" rather than on the structural organisation of the family. 
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Nevertheless, although her power inequality with respect to Martin has 
not been acknowledged, the intervention may enable her to use whatever 
power she has more effectively, no longer being so afraid of destroying 
the ideal of a 'happy family' if she challenges Martin, and thereby 
allowing her to experiment with being more assertive. 
F: I don't know. I didn't think you were going to say that. I thought 
you'd say the opposite. 
T: M.mm. 
F: So we're - I'm - we're normal then. This is normal, is it? D'you 
see what I mean? So really we haven't got problems, then? 
T: We felt you demonstrated a number of different things and you're 
quite able to sort things out when you come up against problems. 
[Consultant comes into the room.] 
Con:The thing that we really wanted to say is that you're on the right 
track. 
F: We are? [Laughs] Sorry, I've forgotten what I was going to say. 
T: So basically it's up to you ... 
F: [Interrupting] If you don't think we need it, we won't come back 
again. 
T: It's for you to sort out, and if you want to ring in any time ... 
F: You see, I came in because I thought I had a problem, but if you 
don't think I - you think it's normal - then I haven't got a 
problem, have I? [ ... ] But if this is right, the way I'm feeling, 
the worry - or any of the little things I'm doing - are right, then 
I haven't got a problem, have I? I needed to know that I hadn't got 
a problem, d'you see what I mean? [Laughs.] 
T: The problem that I've got is that we're going to be turfed out of 
the building because it gets shut up. 
F: [Interrupts, smiling] It's a.K., we've got to go anyway. 
[Martin laughs. End of session.] 
This final section of the interview shows both the power and the 
limitations of this sort of intervention. At one level we see a 
dramatic change in Faith's position. In response to the positive 
connotation of her participation in the partner/parent subjectivity with 
Martin, she no longer disempowers herself by placing herself in the 
Victim role position, as the MproblemM, and instead explores the 
possibility that she, and they, are Mnormal M. Although they were set 
the "taskM of deciding jointly about coming back, she now decides, 
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without hesitation or consultation, that "we won't come back again", 
showing that she is now, without question, the person responsible for 
the parenting aspect of family subjectivity. Family subjectivity is now 
reconstructed as a "normal family", one that is allowed to have some 
degree of internal stress and conflict, but 1s still very clearly 
oppressive in its gendering of roles and responsibilities. Its "normal" 
status means that the family subjectivity is empowered in its external 
relations (but at the expense of the non-recognition of the oppression 
within its internal relations). They can now comfortably accept being 
situated by the therapist as "quite able to sort things out when you 
come up against problems". 
The main impact of the intervention has clearly been to "normal"-ise the 
family subjectivity so that it can participate unproblematically in 
existing structures of ideology, emotionality and activity, and has 
thereby also been to "normal"-ise Faith into the position of mother. 
From a conventional systems perspective, a positive change would be seen 
as having taken place with Colin's problem behaviour having reduced and 
Faith seeming to be in control of him again. The system is once again 
functional and able to regulate itself. Conventional hierarchies of 
authority are restored. 
From an analysis of subjectivity, a different perspective emerges. The 
original breakdown, as manifest in Colin's 'problem behaviour', may be 
seen as a signal of both Faith's and his own distress at their 
powerlessness and oppression within the patriarchal organisation of 
their family. At particular moments during the course of the seSSions, 
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this is articulated more directly by Faith. indicating that the process 
of therapy is altering <albeit temporarily) the construction of family 
subjectivity. in a way that empowers her to speak <and even to be 
recognised by Martin). However the intervention that is delivered. and 
the way that it is delivered. only partially support this process of 
empowerment. The underlying patriarchal power relations are largely 
unaddressed and Martin. Faith and Colin remain firmly located within 
their already existing subject positions. 
From a feminist perspective. the gains for Faith, in terms of more 
permission to argue and to feel her feelings. must be set against her 
continued imprisonment in the ideologically specified subject position 
of • mother' • within a 'normalised' family subjectivity that is now more 
secure against the possibility of change. At least. during the period 
of family breakdown, she had some opportunity to be heard as a person in 
her own right. Looked at from the perspective of Colin's empowerment. 
the effect of the intervention is likely to be broadly positive. 
Faith's empowerment as a mother. and as a person with feelings and 
sensibilities. would tend to counteract to some degree the patriarchal 
strictures of Martin's approach to parenting. In addition. if Faith 
gains in self-respect, albeit only as a mother, Colin may tend to have 
less opportunity to express his desire in the distorted image of "The 
Phallus" and to 'piss' on her <at least until he is much older). This 
could offer some prospect of more transactions between them based on 
mutuality. However, until Faith is validated as a person in her own 
right. the significance of such a change remains severely limited. 
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The Morton family have already been seen by a family therapist six times 
before being invited by their therapist to be seen by Salvador Minuchin 
as a one-off consultation. The social position of the Morton family 
would seem to be 'respectable' working class, with father and eldest son 
in regular work and no pressing struggle for material survivial. Mary 
suffered depression following the birth of the children, and Frank had 
episodes of phobic anxiety. More recently, Chris has been referred to a 
psychiatrist for psychosomatic stomach pain, and Derek has been seen by 
the same psychiatrist following a suicide attempt. However, none of the 
family have been subject to any compulsory State intervention <e.g. 
mental health admission, criminal proceedings or child protection). The 
family comprises Frank and Mary, Mary's mother, Gladys, and their three 
adult children, Lesley (25), Derek (23) and Chris (21). 
[The family are introduced to Hinuchin as therapist <T)] 
T: I will use this hour and a half to try to help you and your 
therapist to understand what the situation is and, if I can, to help 
you to change something. But first, I would need to know from you 
what is going on in the family that you would like to change. 
F: Well. due to circumstances over quite a long period of years, we've 
more or less made wrong decisions, you know. 
T: [Laughs] Oh we all do. What were the ones that you did? 
F: At the present moment it's a ... We're not living right, really. 
T: You're not living right? 
F: No, it's ... [Pause) It basically boils down to now that we'd like 
mother to have her own place. We've never lived as a family and 
we've all suffered really, and now it's affecting our family, our 
children, and that's worrying us deeply. 
In this initial presentation of the organisation of family subjectivity, 
Frank clearly occupies the position of head of household: it is he that 
the therapist addresses and it is he who responds, not as an individual 
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family member but as the family spokesman. His personal subjectivity is 
constructed such that he generally speaks as "We", not as "l", and he is 
thereby able to include Xary in what he says without her having a voice 
of her own. The element that is clearly excluded from the organisation 
represented by "We" is Xary's mother, Gladys - she is clearly the object 
and not the subject of the discourse. Frank is able to draw upon the 
modern Western patriarchal definition of the nuclear family as the slot 
into which their family subjectivity should fit, thereby rendering 
Gladys' co-residence somehow 'abnormal': "We're not 11 vi ng right ... 
We've never lived as a family" - and citing this as the self-evident 
reason why "We've all suffered really". This indicates a structuring of 
family subjectivity in terms both of generation and gender. 
T: Your children? Each one of them? 
F: Well, first of all it came with Chris, he had three miserable years. 
T: Which one of you is Chris? [Frank gestures with his hand.) 
M: [Raises head and speaks hesitantly) It was Derek, it wasn't ... 
F: No, no, Xary, [Wags forefinger; Xary lowers head) can I talk please? 
M: Yes, sorry. It's been a long time ... 
F: No, no. Let me explain, then we'll know what we're doing. 
M: Right. 
F: You can say your piece as well, O.K? It started, really came to a 
head .•. 
T: I like what you did just now. It was nice, you know. You want to 
finish your piece and then you will give space to your wife to do 
her piece. That was nice, yes. 
F: [Smiling] She means a lot to me so that probably accounts for it. 
Here we see Mary's first attempt to find a subject position from which 
she can speak - one that is separate from Frank's all-inclusive "We". 
She does not speak on behalf of herself, only in the position of 
'mother', trying to disagree with her husband as to which of her sons 
had been most affected by the distress in the family. However, Frank is 
still in an ideologically sanctioned position which allows him to define 
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her attempt to speak as rudeness and hence to silence her: "No, no, 
Mary, can I talk please". As the man, he is privileged to set the 
parameters of the sUbsequent discourse ("Let me explain, then we'll know 
what we're doing">, before he offers her the opportunity to speak: "You 
can say your piece as well, O.K?" He is thereby able to determine the 
conversation into which her contribution may be inserted, and the 
subject positions that are available to her within that. The therapist 
intervenes, not to challenge this domination, but to reinforce it. He 
uses his power position as a 'professional' man to validate Frank's 
control of Mary's right to speak. Within this man-to-man discourse, 
Frank's apparent 'fairness' in allowing Mary to speak at all becomes 
defined as a token of his regard for her: "She means a lot to me". 
F: But mainly it seemed to come to a head, I suppose, when Chris 
started to have a lot of stomach trouble, and he spent nearly three 
miserable years trying to get this ... 
T: [Interrupting] How old are you, Chris? 
C: 21. 
T: 21. Um hm. 
F: He spent three years with a very good doctor at [1. He treated 
him, and his symptoms, as genuine, with many, many tests. They 
proved negative, and then it was suggested by [ 1 that he saw [ 1 
the psychiatrist at [ 1 hospital. 
T: [To Chrisl You are now working with the psychiatrist? 
[Mary raises her head and looks at Chris.l 
C: No, it's entirely up to me whether I see him again and I said I 
probably would. About six months ago, he said if I want to come 
back, it's up to me. If I do go back after the six months period, 
that will be in about two weeks, but I doubt that I probably will. 
[ ••• 1 
T: That's very good, O.K. [To Frank] Carry on. 
F: [Hary has lowered her head) And then in this period that Chris was 
seeing [ 1, unf.ortunately Derek had problems that came to a head -
that had been with him, through our living conditions, for many 
years, and they came to a head and unfortunately he ... 
Although Frank is given an absolute right to finish speaking when it is 
Mary who wants to speak, as soon he starts to speak for Chris, he is 
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interrupted by the therapist and Chris is given the right to speak for 
himself. In this way, the therapist encourages certain changes in the 
power relations of the family subjectivity but not others. The 21 year 
old son is enabled to speak as an adult in his own right because it is 
considered 'functional' that he should begin to act independently at 
this stage of the family life-cycle. However, it is clearly not seen as 
necessary or appropriate to establish Mary's independence as a woman in 
her own right - instead she is required to take second place after her 
husband. Nevertheless, this intervention in support of Chris does serve 
to disrupt Frank's smothering control of the whole family subjectivity: 
his right to speak for everyone. This offers Mary the possibility that, 
at some pOint, she too might have an opportunity to participate in her 
own right. It seems significant that she responds by raising her head 
at this point, only to drop it back down when the therapist passes 
control back to Frank. 
T: [Interrupting) May I ask Derek? I will come to you, but since you 
mentioned Derek's problems, I would like him to describe it to me. 
F: Yes, all right then. 
T: [To DerekJ Please. [ ... J 
D: I don't know what to say really. 
T: Uh huh. You'd prefer your father to talk about what he thinks are 
your problems? Or will you prefer your mother to talk about what 
she thinks are your problems? Or your grandmother to talk about 
what she thinks are your problems? Or Lesley? [ ... ] Or would you 
like to say what you think are your problems? It's perfectly O.K. 
with me. [Pause.] Who do you select to talk about you? [ ... ] 
D: My Mum or Dad. 
T: Which one? Select one. 
D: My Dad. 
T: That will be the best one? 
D: That's what I think. 
T: O.K. fine. [ ... ] 
Whereas the therapist interrupted Frank when he attempted to speak for 
Chris, he asks Frank's permission before speaking directly to Derek. In 
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defering in this way, he places Frank in a position of authority over 
Derek. When Derek finds himself unable or unwilling to talk, he is not 
offered any right of silence, or any support in speaking for himself. 
Instead, the therapist reinforces his disempowerment by suggesting that 
he choose someone speak for him. Although Derek mentions the option of 
Mum as well as Dad, as Mum has already been silenced by the combined 
patriarchal power of Frank and the therapist, he has little choice but 
to put his father back into the position of family spokesman: he thus 
finds himself manoeuvred into a subject position where he has actively 
to disempower himself and reinforce his father's control. 
T: CTo Frank] What are his problems, since he gave you permission to 
talk about them? 
F: Never a settled home life. I mean, his mother's been very ill for a 
long while and there's been disturbances between my wife and myself, 
arguing about things that we could really have sorted out. 
T: What kind or things? Can you be concrete about Derek's problems so 
that I can understand them. C ••• ] 
F: He's frightened of making mistakes. He's frightened that people 
might talk about him, about his - probably a simple little thing 
that nobody else would notice. 
T: Like what? 
F: Well, he's been ... He's just started on to another section - in his 
job where he's working - and down there they play cards - you know, 
most factories or places of employment do this sort of thing - and 
he's worried about doing it wrong, and he feels that they're 
probably talking about him or probably laughing about him. l ... l 
The way that Frank finally describes Derek's problem is actually in 
terms of exaggerated personality adaptations, ones which seem to be on 
the verge of causing a breakdown of his subjectivity that would 
jeopardise his participation in his workplace. On the one hand, he 
would appear to organise his subjectivity according to the Be Perfect 
driver <"He's frightened of making mistakes"), while, on the other, he 
displays a paranoid outlook which, as we saw earlier, may reflect a Be 
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In Control driver that has become exaggerated to the point of breakdown 
("He feels that they're probably talking about him or probably laughing 
at him"). These adaptations may relate to the positions that had 
previously existed for him within the organisation of a family 
subjectivity that, we learn, was dominated by his mother's long-term 
"illness" <1.e. depression) and by "disturbances" between his parents. 
They may also reflect his parents' own adaptations and expectations. On 
the evidence of the session so far, Frank's continual drive to speak for 
(and hence control the communications of) his family would indicate that 
his subjectivity too is organised according to the Be In Control driver. 
T: Let me find out from Derek. Derek, is your father doing a good job 
in describing your problems, or isn't he? Because I would like you 
to enter if your father is not doing a perfect job. [Derek nods 
agreement.] He can continue, he is doing a good job up to now? 
[Derek nods.] O.K, pay attention, because maybe you will need to 
remind him of some of the problems that he is not telling, O.K? 
D: Yes. [ ... ] 
F: If conditions had been a lot better for him, he would have done a 
lot better. And it really fetches us up to the present day, it's 
really brought out all his problems, and it now centres on our home 
life and, you know, you reach a position now where mother would be 
better off in her own home. 
T: O.K, that means that you had come to the conclusion - or, at least 
you, Frank, [to Mary] I'm talking with Frank, not with you, O.K? 
M: [Looking up] Yes, I ... 
T: You'd come to the conclusion that, if your mother-in-law would have 
her own home, then your life situation and the problems of Derek and 
the problems of Chris will - and I don't know if you have problems, 
Lesley, or not - you will be able to solve. 
F: Yes, I think ... 
T: [InterruptingJ O.K, very good. [To GladysJ Your name is ... 
G: Gladys. 
[Interruption in background as Derek raises a point with Frank.) 
F: [To therapist] Derek's afraid that you're saying ..• 
D: [Interrupting) I'm not afraid, I'm saying that ... 
T: [Interrupting) Do you want to talk directly with me? 
D: I'm saying that ... [mumbles) ... somewhere else, well, basically, 
then all my problems would go, but I don't know, that's not ... 
T: You don't think so. [ ... ] I'm so glad that you have contributed 
your point of view that I think is very important. You see, 
sometimes your father knows what you think, but sometimes he 
doesn't, you know. 
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The male domination of the interview continues. When Nary tries to 
enter the discourse, she is immediately silenced by the therapist: "I'm 
talking only with Frank, not with you, O.K?" However, the therapist 
allows his conversation with Gladys to be interrupted as soon as they 
have started. The therapist's interventions subtly alter the power 
relations between Frank and Derek: on the one hand he still asks Frank's 
permission before turning to Derek ("Let me find out from Derek"), 
while, on the other, he permits Derek to comment on his father's 
performance if he "is not doing a perfect job", thus placing him in a 
position of power over his father. This, and the suggestion that there 
might be certain issues about which Frank is "not telling", opens up the 
possibility of open difference or conflict between them, Although Frank 
tries to 'play safe' by shifting the focus back on to Nary's mother <who 
is doubly vulnerable due to both her gender and her generation), such a 
disagreement emerges. Derek moves into the position set up for him by 
the therapist of disputing how accurately Frank is actually able to 
speak for him - and whether Frank may have been using his position as 
spokesman to project his own concerns as if they were those of Derek. 
However, there is still no room within the organisation of family 
subjectivity for overt conflict between Frank and Derek as individuals 
in their own right - only between Derek and Frank-speaking-for-Derek. 
T: Let's see if your Mum can answer something. Will you allow her to 
talk about you as well? 
D: Yes. 
T: It's O.K. [To Xary] Your name is Josephine? 
F: Yes. 
K: Yes, [Looks to Frank for confirmation] but I'm usually called Nary, 
though. I don't really use the name Josephine. 
T: What shall I call you? 
K: Mary. 
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T: Mary, I see how helpful your family is, especially how helpful your 
husband is, because I just asked you your name and he gave me your 
name and then he also gave me your nickname. That is very lovely 
and very nice, but let me ask you, because I am a stranger, do you 
really need reminding about what your name is, do you really need 
Frank's help about that? [Pause. Frank laughs in embarrassment.] 
1(: No. 
T: Isn't that wonderful how families are? You know, when families are 
so helpful as your family is, sometimes they are over-helpful. Like 
in this moment, for instance, in which Frank was doing something you 
didn't need to. When Frank is over-helpful, do you tell him that 
you do not need that amount of help? [Pause.] 
1(: No, because I don't think that he's really... I don't think that he 
is over-helpful with me. [ ... 1 I never really used the name 
Josephine - it never seemed to be my name. I prefer the name Mary. 
At long last, Mary is invited to speak. However, her subject position 
in the discourse has already been set for her. She Is to speak as "Mum" 
and she is to talk about her son's problems, provided that he gives her 
permission to do so. However, Frank seems to be so driven in to Be In 
Control (as family spokesman) that he intercepts the therapist's first 
question ("Your name is Josephine?") and answers it for her. This is a 
dramatic indication of the extent to which Mary is not even allowed to 
be in control over her own identity within the current (and previous) 
organisation of family subjectivity (IIJosephine •.. never seemed to be 
my name"). The therapist intervenes to confront this process, but in a 
way that does not empower Mary. The main force of his sarcasm is 
directed against Xary for not standing up for herself (liDo you really 
need reminding what your name is?"). Due to her already reinforced 
powerlessness within the family organisation, this does not spark her 
off into some outburst of angry self-assertion. Instead, she meekly 
agrees with the therapist and ends up actually trying to protect her 
husband from any criticism that he might be "over-helpful", in doing so 
maintaining herself in the Victim position as someone who must be so 
'inadequate' as to need "help" of this sort. 
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T: a.K, Mary - let me call you Mary - how do you see the problems in 
your family? 
M: Well, I suppose I'm in two different minds. It's a simple solution 
now seems - which I should have done ten years ago when we did a 
kind of a split up with the family, I didn't really want us to live 
together - I would have preferred Mum to have had her own place and 
us to have our own place, but I didn't think it could be done, so I 
suppose we lived - I lived - in a way that I didn't really want to 
and I suppose that would have had an effect on the family that I've 
only just realised. [ •.. ) This that we've been thinking of doing, 
this splitting up, would help Derek, would help us all, wouldn't it? 
And also it's what we want - we want for us and Mum - we want to 
have our own place and live differently to what we've been doing, 
instead of keeping in this one way that we've got into, and that 
would help all of us a lot. [Pause.] 
When Mary speaks, it is to slot into the subject ('I') position of the 
discourse that Frank has already set up for her in which it is already 
defined what "we want for us and Mum". While she expresses the required 
"simple solution", she hints that her personal view would be more 
complex and conflicting: "I suppose I'm in two different minds". What 
she does allude to is that she did not want her mother to be part of 
their family in the first place, but was powerless to do anything 
different at the time. It seems that she was unable to construct the 
domestic aspect of the family subjectivity in the ideologically 
prescribed manner - as a separate unit that was clearly her 
responsibility: "I would have preferred 
but I didn't think it could be done". 
us to have our own place, 
M: But then there comes the problem - I don't know where they both meet 
_ but I used to have this problem right from when they were babies. 
I had this kind of feeling - I didn't know what it was - but it used 
to mess up our lives - arguing - and now I can't .•• To me it's 
called depression. And not only did I find it hard to live - and 
find a reason for living - but it was hard to have to get up and 
look after three children, and I know I was probably messing up 
their lives at the same time. And I think Derek's a bit inclined 
that way. He's had that problem from when he was small - so he 
wants that cleared up - but this other problem will help clear it up 
as well, which is what we want before it is too late. We want to 
sort it out and have our own place and Mum have her own little 
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place, and we'll be closer in a better way than we've been. There's 
the two things, isn't there? There's what I call this depression 
feeling and there's this sorting out of the living - which seems, 
now we've started to do something about it, it seems fairly simple 
if we can find a place. But it was so hard, it felt - I felt guilty 
in trying to split us up or trying to arrange separate living - I 
didn't think anything could be done. So there's the two [looks at 
Frank} and I suppose that each kept the other gOing. 
F: Yes. 
K: The depression feeling that I've lost now and the living problem 
which we had right from when we were married. But I didn't like 
living on top of each other then, and we've sorted out a little bit 
but not properly, and now, although it is a little bit late in Mum's 
life, I think it's still best to do it. 
F: I quite agree. [ ... ) 
Mary is able to negotiate a subjectivity for herself that comprises not 
just the subject position that Frank had prepared for her, but also some 
opportunity for her to speak in her own right about her experience of 
breakdown. She connects this with her inability (for whatever reason) 
to establish her family as a separate unit: "the living problem which we 
had right from when we were married". The tension between ideology and 
material reality may have left Mary blaming herself for not having a 
'proper' family. It may also have been difficult for her to establish 
any sort of viable position for herself within the organisation of the 
household, probably having to defer, in different ways, to the authority 
of both husband and Mum (Simultaneously being pressured to "arrange 
separate living" and feeling "guilty" about this). It is only recently 
that she would seem to have been able to start to renegotiate the 
organisation of family subjectivity, and their respective positions 
within that: "We've sorted out a little bit but not properly". 
Her experience of "depression" was initially manifested in her 11 arguing" 
with her husband. This suggests that, at this stage, she was able to 
articulate some of her dissatisfaction and anger - feelings that would 
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make sense, given the above analysis of her situation (although she 
would seem to have been unable to make the connection at the time). 
However, she seems to have been unable to renegotiate family 
subjectivity so as to resolve her dissatisfaction: she was finding "it 
hard to live - and find a reason for living". It would seem that Mary's 
personality adaptations, in common with many women, were to Please 
Others and to Keep Quiet (suppressing her her own feelings in order to 
look after others). Under stress, her tendency would be to escalate 
these adaptations in the vain hope that this would lead to her being 
accepted and looked after. However, there is no indication that she 
received any meaningful support from either her husband or her mother. 
This exaggeration of her adaptations may be seen to define the form of 
her breakdown: the 'shutting down' of her own desiring and activity (in 
order to Keep Quiet and Please Others) became manifested in her 
"depression" and suicidal tendencies. Nevertheless, there was an 
element of 'protest' <albeit a very polite one) in that she found 
herself unable to construct herself, any more, as the ever willing 
mother: "It was hard to have to get up and look after three children, 
and I know I was probably messing up their lives at the same time". Cut 
off in this way, it seems that Mary identified some form of alliance 
with the young Derek - posibly on the basis of projecting similar 
qualities and experience on to him (a projection that he may have had 
little choice but to accept given his relative powerlessness and 
dependency as an infant): "I think Derek's a bit inclined that way. 
He's had that problem from when he was small". 
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T: Lesley, now you know I have a need to understand and to hear the 
voice of each of you people here. You know, I am a little bit 
puzzled and I need your help. Do you think that the problem that 
Chris had with his stomach, the problem that Derek has with his ... 
[To Derek] You are not a very confident kind of person? [Derek nods 
agreement.] The sense that people are looking at him - will be 
solved by this change? 
L: Um. [Pause.] I think it will help Derek, like, but I don't think 
it will completely solve it because it will take a long time. 
T: What do you think? Everybody, I think, is very concerned for 
everybody else in this family, so I'm sure you've been concerned 
about Derek, so what do you think about Derek's problems? 
L: He gets very worried. 
In not responding to MAry's account of her distress, the therapist not 
only dismisses her as a significant speaker in her own right, but also 
closes off her attempt to open up transaction at the level of feelings. 
Although superficially more respectful to Lesley, he subjects her within 
a similarly conventionally feminine subject position - one from which 
she cannot speak in her own right, but only express her concern for male 
members of the family. 
T: He gets very worried. What else? 
L: Like, if he wants something, he wants it exactly right and, if it's 
not, if it's a tiny bit wrong, that worries him as well. I think he 
wants things exactly how he sees them in his mind, so if they're not 
like it ... 
T: Oh my goodness! [Lesley laughs.) Tell me something. How does that 
affect you, because people that want things to be perfect can be a 
pain in the neck to other people. 
L: [Smilingl Yes. He loses his temper ... He loses his temper quickly 
and, I suppose, a bit unpleasant when he does. [ ... l 
T: In what way is he unpleasant? 
L: Well, we argue - not so much now because I suppose I understand a 
little bit what's wrong with him and how he feels - but we used to 
argue a lot. 
T: Yes. Can you give me an example of in what ways he can become a 
pain in the neck [turns to Chrisl or a pain in your stomach, or 
wherever it is that you are a pain. [All laugh, including Derek.l 
L: Mostly it's about what he eats. He seems to me to be very fussy and 
I think, "I'm eating this all right, so why is he making such a fuss 
and sort of making extra work for Mum?" 
T: Is he very much of a fussy eater? 
L: Yes. [ ... ] 
T: So, he is a little bit of a controller of other people? 
L: Um. I don't know. I don't think so, really, because ... 
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Up until now, no-one in the family has been able to express anger openly 
when it concerns real issues such as oppression, injustice or personal 
hurt. Instead, we have seen how Mary was unable to resolve her anger at 
her situation within the family, and ended up turning it in on herself 
as depression. Similarly, Chris may be internalising his anger as 
psychosomatic stomach pain (the family situation being, metaphorically, 
a "pain in the stomach" to him). The only expressions of anger that are 
permitted above the family's transactional horizon arise out of 
secondary issues: issues to do with the driver-adaptations that each 
family member had taken on. Thus, Derek can be violently angry if he is 
"worried" that something is done "a tiny bit wrong", but cannot be 
directly angry with his father over more serious issues. His 'protest' 
remains within the context of the escalating impact of his Be Perfect 
driver-adaptation: he has become such a "fussy" child that this 
threatens the breakdown of not just of his personal subjectivity, but 
that of the whole family. Although his 'protest' is evidently se1f-
destructive and infanti1ising, it nevertheless has the effect of 
dominating the current organisation of the family. 
Set against this overall pattern, we see in this section, an instance in 
which Les1ey speaks out clearly against the oppression of her Mum by 
Derek: "Why is he making such a fuss and •.. extra work for Mum?". It 
is probably not coinCidental that this transaction of recognition (and 
the consequent potential for power together) took place between women. 
It is also no surprise that this potential for empowerment and change is 
ignored or passed over in the therapist's continued focus on the power 
positions of male members of the family. 
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T: [Interrupting] You said he controlled your Mum in his demands that 
she should prepare him special kinds of food. Am I right? 
L: In that way. But I don't think he controls what I eat or things 
like that. 
T: You mean he doesn't control you? 
L: I don't think so. 
T: Thank God he doesn't control you. Who besides Mum. who else does he 
control with his demands for perfection? 
L: Um. 
T: Is your Dad also a sucker for it or only your Mum? 
L: In a way, because I think it worries him a bit that he's not eating 
what Dad thinks he should be eating. or he's not eating enough. or 
Dad thinks it's not enough. 
T: That means that your Dad is concerned about his thinness and about 
his not eating. and your Mum is concerned as well. 
L: Yes. 
T: O.K. so both of them, when you go to the dinner table. both of them 
are eating and looking at him? 
L: Um. [Frank nods agreement.] [ ... ] 
Here we see the substitute battleground upon which Derek and Frank have 
their indirect confrontation. Instead of a conventionally constructed 
'man-ta-man' contest between father and son, based on their respective 
bases of 'power over' one another <physical strength. property 
ownership. aggressiveness, etc.), we see Frank trying to exercise 
meticulous control over his son's eating habits, not from a position of 
patriarchal dominance, but from the less powerful <and conventionally 
feminine) position of an over-protective Rescuer. Derek's 'protest' 
behaviour keeps him ever more stuck in a Rebellious Child position. 
Thus the conflict that is actually taking place is between two people in 
relatively disempowered positions, both responding to stress by 
escalating their respective Be In Control adaptations. However. both 
these men are still situated in relatively powerful positions with 
respect to Mary. She is caught in a desperate attempt to accommodate 
herself to the conflicting demands <however ineffective) of the two men. 
She acts as the mutual object of their struggle for control. taking on 
whatever "extra work" is required of her without question. Her lack of 
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any real resistance may be seen to be determined by the disabling 
conjuction of her already existing personality adaptation and the 
ideological position to which she is assigned as the woman of the house. 
T: Chris, is he a pain in the neck for you? [Chris laughs.] In what 
way ... Because I know these people that want perfection in certain 
things, and they can have a very different world, but the life of 
people around them can be very tough also. How does he demand that 
you should be? [ ... ] I'm wondering if sometimes you feel like 
kicking him. Do you sometimes feel, "Stop it'" 
C: That's what I was going to say about controlling people, because he 
does, in a way, dictate how you react to things or the way you treat 
him and, where other people would probably lose their temper, you 
don't. You sit there and you just sort of let it go. 
T: You're 21. At 21, people should lose their temper. Why don't you? 
C: You do. I have, a couple of times. 
T: And what happened? 
C: Well no, I used to lose it, but now, more often that not, I don't 
say anything. 
T: You've stopped your ability to lose your temper. 
C: No, I haven't stopped it, you suppress it. 
T: You suppress it. 
C: You don't do it for the sake of keeping things qUiet. For the sake 
of it's not going to make anything better if you start having a go. 
T: Are you certain? 
C: [Smiles) It's a lot nicer, then. [ ... ) 
T: Who is the biggest peacemaker in this family, Lesley? Can you 
nominate somebody? 
L: Mum, I think. 
T: Your Mum, yes, Chris, would you agree with that? 
C: Yes. One thing that I talked about when I was seeing Dr. [ ] was 
that he thought that I thought I was, if you see what I mean. And I 
was considering - being considerate here and there, and making sure 
that people don't argue, and doing this and not doing that to the 
right people. But actually physically dOing things - probably not. 
The therapist invites Chris into a significantly different subject 
position to that previously occupied by Lesley - one that reinforces a 
clear gender difference between them. Whereas Lesley was just asked 
about the "unpleasant" way in which she is "affected" by Derek's 
"temper", Chris is invited to go further and is told that, as a 21 year 
old boy, he "should" lose his "temper" with Derek. However, he owns the 
fact that he normally tends to go out of his way to be "considerate" of 
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others, and to placate them if they become argumentative - indicating 
that he, like his mother, has come to organise his subjectivity 
according to a Please Others driver. In childhood, he may have been 
(covertly> invited to take on this adaptation as a way of relieving his 
mother of some of her sense of burden and duty as the family was growing 
up (and she was breaking down). 
T: Is Dad sometimes able to create some kind of aliveness - can he get 
upset? 
c: Sorry? 
T: Can Dad get upset and kind of ... 
c: Can Dad? Yes. 
T: He is the one that can get upset easier? 
C: What, out of Xum and Dad? 
T: Between ... 
C: Between Mum and Dad? Dad gets upset quicker. 
T: Thank God. [To Frank] That means that you get upset and angry with 
Derek when he becomes a pain? 
F: It gets too much. 
T: And you would like to say to him, "For crying out loud ..... 
[To Derekl How old are you? 
D: 23. 
T: "You are 23. Don't act like you're 15". 
F: That is the point. You've hit the nail on the head. That's what 
Derek's got to be taught, that he's a man. He ain't a boy no more. 
T: And you do that. 
F: Yes. In a sense. Ho. In a sense. You try to get on that line. 
T: So soft. [To Maryl They are so soft, my goodness. [ ... 1 
The therapist turns the focus back on to Frank by asking Chris whether 
his father can be "alive" or "upset" (1.e. express anger) in the 
ideologically specified way for the man of the house. He then seeks to 
manoeuvre Frank into the required pOSition, feeding him a suitable put 
down line to use against Derek: "For crying out loud. 0 0 don't act like 
you're 15". Frank recognises that this fits perfectly with his 
internalisation of what is required by patriarchal ideology ("You've hit 
the nail on the head"), but he remains unable to insert himself into the 
required subject position and speak the words himself. 
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Furhtermore, when Frank agrees that "Derek's got to be taught, that he's 
a man", he exposes his own failure to induct Derek into the position of 
'man' within the relations of patriarchy. The passive construction of 
the sentence indicates that, even with the therapist's manly support, 
Frank is still not sufficiently confident in his own potency as a man to 
be able to do the teaching himself - his tentative "Yes" becomes a "No", 
he can only "try to get on that line". The therapist ends up seeking 
the support of Xary, on the basis of her internalisation of patriarchal 
ideology, in ridiculing the lack of masculine 'hardness" displayed by 
Frank and his sons: "They are so soft, my goodness". 
It is thus emerging that the organisation of Frank's personal 
subjectivity is such that he has great difficulty in being angry 
directly with other family members <suggesting a driver-adaptation to 
Please Others). This places the family in a situation of internal 
contradiction. If the family is to insert itself in to the reqUired 
slot within patriarchal ideology, Frank must take on the position of 
expressing the righteous (Persecutor) anger that is conventionally 
associated with the position of domination of the household head. 
However, given the way in which his past experience may have shaped his 
personal subjectivity, he seems to be profoundly uncomfortable with 
this, prefering instead to exercise control in a more indirect (but 
potentially smothering) fashion as the family Rescuer, the one who 
always speaks and acts on others' behalf. 
This leaves the family in a position of uneasy stalemate. No-one seems 
willing to challenge or be angry with Frank directly - perhaps for fear 
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that he would not be able to stand up to this, thereby bringing about 
the collapse of the <ideologically required) image of patriarchal 
domination. In order for the family to remain acceptable within 
external discourses, they would seem to have organised themselves so as 
to collude with the i~ge of Frank as having unquestioned patriarchal 
authority. This has resulted in the whole family subjectivity becoming 
organised on the same basis as Frank's own subjectivity: no real anger 
may be expressed above their collective transactional horizon. Thus 
their emotionality comes to be suppressed, not directly by the man of 
the house, but by the very existence of that position within prevailing 
ideology. Their collective self-distortion is made more complex by the 
fact that Frank is such a tenuous occupant of that position. 
T: We will come back to you [indicates I>erekl and what you are doing to 
your family, and what your family is doing to you, because you are 
in a vicious circle and you are doing things to your family that you 
should not accept. You know, he's a tyrant. 
F: You get an eXChange of silly little words like, you know, and that 
sort of ... 
T: [Interruptingl I think Derek is a tyrant. 
F: He wants to be someone ... 
T: [Interrupting) I think he controls you. 
D: I don't understand any of this. 
T: Of course you don't understand. 
D: Why am I a tyrant? 
T: You are a tyrant. You control his behaviour [indicates Chris], you 
control her behaviour [indicates Lesley], you certainly control your 
Mum - she is a sucker for you - and your Dad that would like to say 
to you, "Oh for crying out loud, grow up" gets afraid in the middle 
of a phrase and stops it. If that's not a tyrant, I don't know what 
is. [Pause.) He's a very controlling man. [ ... ] 
The way in which the therapist confronts Derek's power contains two 
contradictory perspectives. On the one hand, he acknowledges that 
Derek appears stuck <and effectively powerless) within a "vicious 
circle" of reciprocal family interaction: "What you are doing to your 
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family and what your family is doing to you". On the other, he suggests 
that Derek is, in fact, occupying the (vacant) position of patriarchal 
power within the family: that of "a tyrant... a very controlling man". 
The apparent assumption is that, given the conventional organisation of 
family subjectivity, someone must be occupying this position: if Frank 
"gets afraid" in the middle of laying in to his son, then it must be his 
son who is the real "tyrant". No other form of organisation is seen as 
possible or permissable. In reality, however, Derek is as unable as his 
father to transact from such a position: far from telling the therapist 
to shut up (or some similar tyrant-like statement) he is still 
transacting from a rather bewildered Child position: "I don't understand 
any of this". Frank is also manifestly failing to construct himself as 
the necessary tyrant and is reverting to an almost childlike 
complaining: "You get an exchange of silly little words." In the here 
and now of the session, it is actually the therapist who ressurects the 
vacant position of patriarchal power within their discourse and uses it 
to overrule both Frank and Derekj it is he who is modelling to them how 
to be a tyrant within a patriarchal social order. 
T: [To Lesley] Are you able to move out - do you have a boyfriend? 
L: Um. [ .•• ] 
T: You don't bring your boyfriend home. 
L: No. 
T: That's very good, I congratulate you. [Shakes Lesley's hand.] 
That's very very good. That's life for you out of the home. Great, 
it must be very very difficult to create a corner out of the home -
your family is so close. 
L: Yes, I never used to go out. [ ... 1 
T: What about you, Chris - are you able to create a world away from 
home? [ ... ] 
c: I dunno, I feel horrible about it sometimes, and it probably sounds 
horrible, but it's not meant to be done in a nasty or horrible sort 
of way, but a lot of the time, I feel that 1 enjoy it a lot more 
being somewhere else than at home, and 1 don't find it difficult at 
all to get on with other people's families. [ ... 1 
-349-
The Norton faml1y 
T: What happened to Derek - that is a person that prefers that other 
people talk for him - [to Chris] so I will ask you to think for 
Derek. Is Derek able to leave home? 
C: No. 
T: No, he's stuck at home. [ ... ) 
C: He used to go out up until a little while - until a couple of years 
ago I didn't really realise there was anything particularly worrying 
really - he used to go out with his mates and everything. [ ... ] 
T: [To Lesley) Do you think that boys would accept Derek if he comes 
with the silly kind of things that he comes - that your Mum accepts 
and that your Dad accepts - do you think boys of his age would 
accept things like that? 
L: I suppose not, if he is exactly the same outside as he is at home. 
[The therapist asks Lesley and Chris how old Derek appears to be and 
concludes that he is Ma very confused tyrantM who "jumps from 6 to 
75", acting either as a selfish child or as a grandparent who tries 
to take care of his own parents.] 
The therapist explores with both Le61ey and Chris the extent to which 
they are able to construct themselves within other subjectivities 
outside the home. Just to have such choices is empowering in itself, 
and even more so if this permits them to construct their personal 
subjectivitie6 within different contexts, in ways that allow more self-
expression, mutual contact and support. Chris seems to find it 
positively liberating to subject himself within the organisation of 
other families: "l don't find it difficult at all to get on with other 
people's families". By contrast, we may see clearly how Derek's 
influence in the family does not equate with personal empowerment: his 
control is contingent on his remaining locked into subject positions 
within the family organisation that give him no access to Adult choices 
(and opportunities for recognition) outside the home: he is now unable 
to Mgo out with his mates and everything". 
T: [To Frank) Do you have anything that you do where you and Karie ... 
F: [Interrupting] Mary. M.A.R.Y. Mary. 
T: Mary. M.A.R.Y. Ah, thank you. You see, Mary, how helpful is your 
family. Do you do some things with Frank, Mary? Can you go out? 
Can you go to the movies, or do you go bowling, or - I don't know 
what kind of things British families do? 
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M: Well. um ... We're together a lot during the day, because Frank 
works evenings and nights. We go shopping - we go round the shops a 
lot. We're together a lot. We don't especially go out to the 
pictures and that. Frank enjoys his golf, so we've got no problems 
that way. 
T: Do you play golf also? 
M: No. [laughs.] 
T: So he enjoys his golf alone. 
M: Yes he's a good er ... plays golf well. He enjoys it. It's a part 
of our life, kind of thing, although I don't go with him. 
The therapist enquires about how Xary and Frank are organised as a 
partner subjectivity (we have previously only seen how they are 
organised as a parenting subjectivity>. By (deliberately) mistaking 
Mary's name, he provokes yet another demonstration of Frank's 
suffocating domination of the relationship - it still seems to be he who 
is in control of his wife's name. However, even though it is a 
relationship in which she hardly figures, it seems to fall to Mary to 
speak about it on their behalf. indicating a gendering of the partner 
subjectivity in which it is her duty, as the woman, to maintain and 
uphold it. Although they go shopping together. there seems to be little 
opportunity within the organisation of their partner subjectivity for 
any satisfying contact between them, or for Mary to enjoy herself in her 
own right. Instead, the emotional inequality of the relationship is 
demonstrated by the fact that her only satisfaction seems to come 
vicariously from knowing that Frank is enjoying himself, but on his own: 
"Frank enjoys his golf, so we've got no problems that way ... It's a 
part of our life, kind of thing, although I don't go with him". 
T: Ah. What about young, old man Derek there - is he a companion for 
you? 
M: No, no. 
T: No. 
M: No, he's just - he's our son, he's not a companion for me. 
T: A son can be a companion; a son can not be a companion. A son can 
talk with you. 
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M: Oh, yes, we can talk together all right, but this er - being 
concerned and worrying business - he's had it from a baby. We knew 
it was wrong then, but didn't know how to sort it out. It always, 
right from as soon as he could - as a toddler, he has always had 
this worrying business and ... 
T: He was very close to you. [Pause.] 
M: Well, perhaps the way I was, made him... I dunno, because he used 
to ... I had a job to get him to school and I knew that was wrong. 
T: You what? I didn't hear you. 
M: Perhaps I caused him to be that way, but I knew it was wrong that it 
was a job to get him to school or to - he used to back out of 
everything which, you know, I didn't like him doing. Perhaps, in a 
way, I tried to force - with Lesley. I tried to force her to - I 
tried to send her to Sunday School when she was very tiny because I 
wanted her to mix with people. I was probably wrong doing that. 
But Derek was a worrier right from the start. [ ... ] 
Having uncovered Mary's lack of support and recognition within the 
construction of her partner subjectivity with Frank, the therapist 
probes to see if she might also be subjected within an 'unofficial' 
partnership with Derek. Mary rejects this: "He's not a companion to 
me". Instead, their relationship is characterised not by mutuality 
("liking"), but as a reversal of a parent-and-child subjectivity, with 
Derek taking on the position of "concern" and "worrying". This 
configuration would seem to have been longstanding - from around the 
time of her breakdown - but contravened the ideological blueprint of how 
the family should be organised: "We knew it was wrong then". It seems 
clear that, within the organisation of the family, both Lesley and Derek 
were inducted into the position of 'caring' for Mary at home. but at the 
same time, Mary was subjected within ideological and legal discourses 
that dictated that they should be separated from her. This placed both 
her and the children in a contradictory situation. On the one hand it 
felt "wrong" that the children should seem to want to stay at home with 
her (Derek began to be blamed for his "worrying business"), while on the 
other, it felt "wrong" to force Lesley to go to Sunday School. 
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C: I mean, the only reason that Derek gets away with it is because 
we've known it's Derek, and what is happening there at the time 
isn't really Derek, and the only reason he gets away with it ... 
T: [Raising hand to stop Chris] That's impressive. 
D: [To Chris] Get away with what? 
C: The fact that you probably are annoying me, and I'm not doing 
anything or telling you to shut up. [Pause.] 
D: How's that again? 
C: If at any time you're annoying me and you're keeping on annoying me, 
and I don't say anything and I don't tell you to shut up. 
D: By doing what? 
C: Anything. If we're sitting down having our dinner and you're going 
on and on about the same bit of bread and I don't tell you to shut 
up. The only reason that you'd get away with that, and probably 
someone at work wouldn't - say it was happening at work - you'd turn 
round and say, "What the Hell are you going on about? I mean it's a 
piece of bread for Christ's sake". 
T: [In background] So nice. 
D: Well, you do things that annoy me such as ... 
C: Well, you know, fair enough. [Derek mumbles.} You see, the thing 
is, I reckon I could qUite easily tell you to shut up a damn sight 
more than I do. 
T: You know something, Chris, Derek is annoyed now, but he is stopping 
himself because he doesn't know what to do with that. Just now, you 
gave him a piece of your mind and I was enjoying that. [Chris 
laughs.] I think that's lovely. You see, why should a young man 
like you get kind of stop yourself being normal and natural, just 
because he is saying to you ... He's manipulating you, saying you 
need to accommodate to me. Everybody had to accommodate to Derek. 
Everybody. It is a strange family. You all had accommodated to 
Derek and that's not helping you a bit, because you have a strange 
kind of world around you, Derek, a strange world. 
[The therapist continues to encourage Chris and Lesley to confront 
Derek as a "person", not a "sick character", but they reveal their 
fear of doing so, following his suicide attempt a year previously.} 
Chris now moves into the subject position that the therapist has been 
preparing for him from which he can transact with his brother on the 
basis of mutuality. He seems to have received sufficient recognition 
from the therapist for him to abandon his drive to Please, and is able 
to express his thoughts and feelings on his own behalf. By contrast, 
Derek is stuck in a position where, as Chris says, he "isn't really 
Derek". As the therapist pOints out, Derek is also angry, "but he is 
stopping himself because he does not know what to do with that". By the 
same process by which Derek has control within the family organisation, 
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he is also silenced from the open expression of his feelings. He is 
part of constructing, and is simultaneously constructed by, the "strange 
kind of world" that is his family's subjectivity. In the way in which 
they have organised themselves in response to his "manipulating" them, 
they have established a transactional horizon which has prevented them 
from expressing themselves in relation to any real issues, or offering 
him any recognition except in relation to the roles that he has 
performed. Thus the restrictive organisations of personal and family 
subjectivities come to mirror one another. Hence, when his subjectivity 
reached the point of personal breakdown (in the form of suicidal 
behaviour), their collective adaptation also became exaggerated to the 
point of breakdown - a breakdown that led to their eventual referral for 
family therapy. 
T: Frank, why do you accept that he should demand so much of your 
wife's time? 
F: Because you don't want to upset the atmosphere. In a sense, we all 
know what Derek's done, so we're all afraid that we might tip him 
over the edge and he'll try something again, and, in a sense ... 
[He turns to Xary who tries to get a word in.] Listen, the way you 
run around and get a special this and a special that, and, if we 
haven't got it, we nip in the car and go down the road and we get 
it, especially for Derek. I shouldn't stand for that. That's what 
I get angry about at times. He has what is put in front of him. 
[Mary tries to protest.] If he don't like it, he leaves it. If the 
bread is one inch thick and it's a slope on it, is that another 
problem? No, that's all right: the two slices of bread finish up 
the same near enough, and the second one he cuts himself, but that's 
all right. That is what is the trouble. 
[Both Mary and Derek try to interrupt.] 
T: No, no. Frank, continue talking. Don't let him interrupt. You are 
talking to your wife and what you are saying is important. 
F: You see that, personally, I shouldn't allow them things to happen. 
Derek should tell you ..• He shouldn't get you into a flat spin 
whether you've got the right or the wrong stuff. If it's good 
enough for me to eat - and you do good food, we live well - it must 
be good enough for Derek. But he demands different variations of 
spaghetti bolognaise. We had something the other night that I 
didn't like at all. 
D: Yes, so you see .•. [Xary also tries to say something.] 
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T: Don't let him interrupt you. 
F: Which I didn't like at all, but we eat it. 
D: I didn't ask for that. 
T: Don't let him interrupt. 
The implication of the therapist's opening question is that it is Frank 
that should be in control of his wife's time (not Mary herself): it is 
to him that the question is directed. Here we see a return to the 
earlier configuration in which the men in the family battle for control 
over the woman-as-object. Despite being aided and abetted by the male 
therapist, Frank struggles to perform as the man of the house and is 
aware of falling short of what is required of him ("I shouldn't allow 
them things to happen"). He starts off as Rescuer ("You don't want to 
upset the atmosphere") and finishes up more as a squabbling Child ("We 
had something last night that I didn't like at all"). Whether the topiC 
is the use of her time or what she should cook for dinner, Mary does not 
exist as a speaking subject in this discourse (she just has to do the 
work). While the therapist intervenes to support Frank, it is always, 
"Don't let him interrupt you" as if Mary's attempts to speak do not even 
deserve a mention. It can just be assumed that Frank will be able to 
overrule her. However, this competitive discourse between the men 1s so 
accepted within patriarchal ideology that the therapist gets away with 
describing it as "talking with your wife". 
F: [Talking down to Mary, very slowly and deliberately) Really, what we 
are saying is that I agree we are more or less putting Derek in 
cotton wool, and instead of saying to him ... 
K: [Interrupting) I don't think so.' 
D: Hang on. 
F: [Raising voice) Why don't you tell him to stop getting you running 
around for different foods? 
D: Well, you do the same. 
F: [Ignoring Derekl Is it getting too much for you, Kary? 
[Kary tries to answer. Frank continues in a hectoring tonel I'll 
ask you now, is it getting too much for you? 
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K: [Flustered] Well, it is beginning to, because ... 
F: [Interrupting] Well, that's because of, like, what's being explained 
to us. 
K: Up until a year ago, he was coming in every night - everything I had 
for dinner was, whatever I had, was wrong. But I knew that was 
carrying on before he'd started to attend the hospital. Well, since 
then, he doesn't eat ordinary food like we do. He has a banana and 
brown bread and that kind of stuff. He doesn't eat the food we're 
eating. He doesn't have a meal like we do. 
F: Seeing as we're being open about this, Mary. I think that you'll 
agree that every night that Derek comes in there's a fault with the 
food. Would I be right, [raises voice] am I right in saying that 
there is a fault with the food? 
K: Yes, I know. [Faltering] I've said that, that is right. 
F: It's wrong. innit? [Raises voice) How can he come in every meal 
time and say, "What's that again?" or ... 
K: [Pleading tone] How's Derek going to get out of it, then? What's 
going to happen? 
F: [Gesticulates with hand] He's got to accept what's here. 
Frank still seems unable to take on Derek from the position of the man 
of the house. lnsteadt he can only transact in this way in relation to 
Nary, who will more willingly subjugate herself to his authority. He is 
able to displace his anger on to her from the position of Persecutor, 
intimidating her into taking on Derek on his behalf <"Why don't you tell 
him to stop getting you running around?"). Frank does not allow Mary 
the space within the discourse to explain whether it is Derek's 
behaviour, or his own hectoring, that is "getting too much" for her. 
Nevertheless, under this pressure, she breaks with her symbiotic 
alliance with Derek - no longer rescuing him in return for his attempts 
to "worry" about her. However, when she does confront Derek's 
behaviour, she still remains locked within her mothering role. She does 
not allow herself to express anger at being messed about, so much as 
hurt that he does not like the "ordinary food" that she provides. 
F: [Patronising tone] Like is being said, you cannot dominate people. 
If it's wrong, then say, "1 don't think that's very nice" or 
whatever. Explain yourself differently [Hary tries to speak] so 
that thing the other night, instead of it being pushed on you ... 
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D: [Trying to interruptl Everybodyelse ..• 
F: [Ignoring Derekl Say I come in, eh, and I don't like what's on the 
table ... 
D: [Interrupting] That's what I was trying to say. 
F: [To Mary, ignoring Derek] Where are you going to finish up? 
D: The other night, everybody else liked it except you. 
T: (Stands up, walks over and shakes Frank's handl Stop, I want to 
congratulate you, you just did some ... 
F: I'm not proud of anything. [Turns on Derek and wags finger) But I 
want a word with that boy and he knows it. 
T: But I tell you what you've just done. Hold on a minute and I will 
tell you what you did just now. 
[Kneels down in front of Maryl Can I tell you what Frank did just 
now that is very, very important? He was having a discussion with 
you. It was a discussion of husband and wife. 
K: Um. 
T: And a discussion of husband and wife needs to be respected by grown 
up children. [Gestures to Derek] And this man that is a grown up, 
but also sometimes very young, feels he has the right to interfere 
in conversations between husband and wife. (Turns to Frank] And you 
didn't let him and I thought that was good. [Derek tries to 
interrupt.l That was very good. Because, you see, Derek started 
the session saying that you should talk for him. He first gives you 
the right to talk for him and then he insists he has the right to 
intervene when you don't want him. So I think you did a very nice 
boundary here and I like it. That gives me some kind of hope that, 
in this family, maybe you can help this man to become older because 
he is, in many ways, still six, seven, eight, nine years old, a 
demanding spoiled child. [To Mary and Frank in turnl It's true 
you've spoiled him and you spoiled him. He's still spoiled and he 
thinks that his needs are more important than your needs. 
The battle for position between Frank and Derek continues. Frank is 
only able to maintain his position of authority by transacting through 
Kary. He seems unaware of the irony of telling Mary that "you cannot 
dominate people" (referring to Derek), while he is actually flaunting 
his domination of her. The difference between them lies not in what 
they are actually doing, but in its ideological legitimation: whereas it 
is 'natural' for Frank to dominate )[ary, it is problematic when Derek 
competes with this. Whenever Derek paints out that he is only imitating 
his father's behaviour, this bid for equal power (over Mary> can be 
disregarded by Frank - as long as he is supported by the therapist. 
When Derek actually does manage to speak a complete sentence ("The other 
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night everybody else liked it except you"), the therapist intervenes 
using the power of his physical presence to silence him. Encouraged by 
this demonstration of patriarchal domination, Frank momentarily takes on 
the position of "man" in the family and uses his anger to put down Derek 
as a mere "boy" who is subject to his authority: "I want a word with 
that boy and he knows it". 
With this change of position, the therapist freezes the action and seeks 
to build on this restructuring of family subjectivity. He emphasises 
the appearance of Frank's new-found power by kneeling down before him. 
He consolidates Frank's position of domination within the parenting 
subjectivity by informing Mary that Frank's harangue constituted a 
normal "discussion between husband and wife", and informing the rest of 
the family that this "needs to be respected by grown up children". He 
redefines Derek's attempts to imitate his father's domination as being 
"spoiled". He ridicules the suggestion that Derek "thinks that his 
needs are more important than your needs", implying that, by definition, 
Frank must have the right to have his needs met before those of his son 
(Mary's needs having been discounted all along). 
T: The question is, can you help your wife to free herself from Derek, 
so Derek will become free to grow up. 
F: [Quiet and seriousJ Yes, I will help her. C ... l 
[Therapist gets up and returns to seat.l 
T: Talk with Mary about what you can do to help her to free herself 
from Derek's demands, so that she treats Derek like a son, but like 
a 23 year old son. 
F: [To MaryJ You've got to expect what any mother would expect, and 
that is respect. Unless you get respect, and keep bowing down, then 
he will continue to be what he is. 
[The therapist invites Lesley and Gladys to swap seats so that 
Lesley is now on one side of Mary and Frank is on the other.) 
He will conti~ue to carry on like this, because there is no way you 
should bow down and prepare food for him, O.K? 
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[The therapist asks Chris and Derek to swap seats so that Chris now 
sits next to Frank.] 
That is very good, do these things for him, but you are a person, 
you are his mother, and he's got to respect and treat you like his 
mother. [ ... 1 
The therapist's question constructs Nary as a (female) parasite impeding 
Derek's growth into a man. It is her maternal clinginess that is now to 
be blamed for Derek's failure to be "free". The suggestion that it is 
Frank's duty to "help" his wife make the separation, indicates that the 
corollary for Nary of being made "free" of Derek is that she will become 
further subjugated within the partner subjectivity. Frank responds by 
lecturing her on how she should be treated with "respect" as "a person" 
by Derek, while at the same time patronising her and denying her any 
opportunity to speak in her own right (showing her the very antithesis 
of respect). While Frank is speaking, the therapist rearranges the 
family such that those who are most likely to undermine Frank's control 
over Mary <Derek and Gladys) are moved away from her, and replaced by 
the therapist's 'allies' in the restructuring process (Lesley and 
Chris). This leaves Mary more and more vulnerable to being shut off and 
engulfed within the organisation of the partner subjectivity, in which 
her only available transactional position is to be submissive to Frank. 
T: Let Mary answer. NOW, go ahead, Mary. And I want you, Chris and 
Lesley, to listen and to intervene, because all four of you need to 
do something that will help your brother grow up. He operates in 
some way as if he is stuck at the age of nine. He needs to grow up. 
[To DerekJ Your Mum is in some way still holding you, she's still 
holding you tight to her apron strings. And I want you, Mary, to 
talk with Frank, but I would you two also - four adults. [To Derekl 
I want you to listen, because ... [Derek tries to interrupt] No, 
after, after. 
D: I want to say it now. You're saying, Dad, you're worried that I'm 
going to do something. VeIl, all of these years, I have been 
worried that Mum is going to do something. 
F: I know, that's what we're saying. 
T: D.K, very good. That's beautiful. 
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D: [To Frank] And the other night, when we had that food, I didn't ask 
for whatever it was, that stuff that Mum made, but everyone else 
liked it except you. And you said, "Don't do that any more". 
F: That's the position you've got .. . 
M: [Sounding apologetic) It wasn't .. . 
T: [Interrupting) Oh, no, no, no. [Moves to stand over Derek and 
touches him on the shoulder] Listen, at this moment you are 23. In 
just this moment you were 23. But most of the time you are younger. 
[ ... ] 
Although nominally giving Mary the right to speak, the therapist sets up 
the discourse in such a way that she finds that she has no voice of her 
own. First of all he constrains her by instructing his two 'allies' to 
act as her 'minders', "to listen and to intervene" in her speech to 
ensure that she does not stray from what she is supposed to say. He 
then goes on to define the parameters of her discourse: rather than 
offering her an opportunity to speak in her own right, she has to talk 
about "something that will help" Derek "to grow up". At the same time, 
she herself is defined as the problem: it is she that is seen to be 
holding him "tight to her apron strings". It is not possible for her to 
speak of her oppression at the hands of Frank or Derek as they compete 
for power over her; instead she is held responsible for Derek's failure 
to become a man-tyrant rather than a boy-manipulator. Faced with all 
this, it is not surprising that she is in fact unable to speak at all. 
With Mary now defined as the problem, Derek temporarily reverts to his 
position of 'carer' to describe how it had been her suicide bid that had 
hooked him into a symbiotic relationship with her in the first place. 
Although congruent with the therapist's blaming of Mary, this utterance 
sidesteps the therapist's attempt to restructure the family subjectivity 
on conventional lines, with Frank as the 'man' having authority over 
Derek as the 'boy'. From the still vacant position of 'carer', Derek is 
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able to wield sufficient power to withstand Frank's attempt, backed up 
by the therapist, to hush him up and reconstruct his meaning <"l know, 
that's what we're saying"). He then challenges Frank directly for the 
position of head-of-the-househo1d, tackling him for acting from the 
child-tyrant position himself in relation to Mary's food preparation. 
This attack sufficiently resembles "manly" behaviour for the therapist 
to go over and acknowledge him as a 23 year old, on the verge of 
fighting (over women) like a man (although the therapist still 
emphasises his greater power by standing over him). 
T: I like that you are growing up, and when you said that you need to 
stay at home because you are worried that your Mum will commit 
suicide, that's not your job, that's the job of your father - and 
that probably has kept you young for too long a time. Chris can 
trust your father that your father will help your Mum. Your sister 
trusts your father that your father will help your Xum. You don't 
trust your father that he will do the job. 
C: The reason ... 
T: You feel that you need to look if your Xum will do something. 
K: Yes, that goes back to when Derek was young. I used to ... I used 
to have this horrible look on my face because there was this kind of 
heaviness and nobody - I couldn't make any - it used to upset the 
family life because nobody ... 
[The therapist moves from Derek to stand opposite Nary.] 
I couldn't put it into words and my husband couldn't make out what 
was wrong with me, and he thought I was against him, and ... 
T: [Interrupting] Mary, these are some issues for your husband to be 
helpful to you. 
M: Yes he is, now. 
T: But it's not his job? 
K: It wasn't then, it wasn't. You see, Frank couldn't - it used to 
cause rows between us - Frank couldn't understand it was something 
in me, and not anything wrong with him, that was causing this 
feeling. And I think Derek was aware of it and he couldn't go to 
school and leave me. And I knew that was wrong, but I didn't know 
what to do about it. [ ... ] 
Despite the therapist's attempts to silence her and contain her 
discourse within the privacy of the partner subjectivity, Mary reveals 
the reason why Frank could not be trusted to "do the job" of caring for 
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her. Not only had he failed to offer her any positive recognition, but, 
within the organisation of the partner subjectivity, he had redefined 
any expression of her distress as blaming him (Victim role), thereby 
inviting her to feel guilty and attend to his feelings of hurt at the 
expense of suppressing her own (Rescuer role). Losing contact with (and 
unable to articulate) her own feelings, and lacking any real personal 
support, she could only signify her distress through her "horrible 
look". The oppressive force of her pe rsonali ty adaptations (Please and 
Keep Quiet), linking in with the expectations of patriarchal ideology, 
lead her to deny that this "look" could express feelings towards anyone: 
it was just "something in me". 
T: [To Frank] And the question is, your wife needs your help, because 
unless you spend some time with her [sits down] helping her how to 
separate from your son, she will not know how to. Can you teach her 
to play golf, or is she too poor at that? 
F: Very poor. 
l(: Um ••• 
C: You've never tried. 
K: I'd like to. [Reaches out and holds Frank's hand.] 
T: That's beautiful. He never tried, eh? 
C: He never tried to do anything. 
K: I'd like to say that Frank helps me as - he's completely with me 
now, when years ago he wasn't, and I think that was when Derek 
started to try and ... 
T: [Interrupting] We all know that. [ •.. ] 
The therapist goes back to Frank to help Mary with her 'problem' of 
separation as "she will not know how to". By setting it up in this way, 
he invites Frank to patronise her rather than work on an equal basis on 
renegotiating their partnership. It is almost a foregone conclusion 
that she will turn out to be "too poor" at golf. Interestingly, it is 
Chris who confronts Frank that he "never tried to do anything" with 
Kary. It is also interesting that, despite the put-down, Mary's initial 
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response is so positive, taking the initiative of reaching out for 
Frank's hand. However this progress is dashed by her overpowering drive 
to Please and to placate; immediately, she has to rush to Frank's 
defence against the criticism from Chris and say how "completely" 
helpful Frank is to her now. From a tentative move to renegotiate the 
partner subjectivity on the basis of some mutuality (playing golf 
together), she allows the relationship to fall back into a complex of 
patronage and Rescuing. neither allowing the other to stand up for 
themselves, but with Frank in a position of overall power (he can still 
go on rejecting the possibility of their playing golf together). 
T: 
D: 
T: 
D: 
T: 
D: 
T: 
D: 
T: 
D: 
T: 
But in general. you see, I think that the issue about should your 
Mum have another house or a flat or something - it's some issues 
that you will resolve. These are issues of families, these are not 
psychiatric issues. [To Derek] But what you do to your parents, and 
what your family does with you, that is a psychiatric issue, because 
you are caught and you are their gaoler. You demand that they 
behave with you in ways that are not normal for them. And they are 
your gaolers because they treat you in ways that you are remaining 
concerned with silly, shitty things - things of a very small child -
so they are controlling you also. I don't know how you will free 
yourself, man, I really don't know, because I am impressed that you 
don't think with your head: you ask your father to explain, you ask 
your brother to explain. 
No. 
Oh, yes, don't tell me that. This is your chance. You're very 
childish. 
No, I said that ... 
[Interrupting] No, no, no, you can defend yourself, but it's crap. 
Will you let me say it? I said before we came up here, I said I 
couldn't see the paint, because I talk to Dr. [ ] about it, right? 
So I didn't want to talk to - about the things I think. I didn't 
want to talk to it - about it all in here. And then you said, 
"Nominate someone" - you told me to do it. 
So I was manipulating you? 
Yes, because if I didn't nominate no-one to talk about it, then 
who's going to talk about it? Are we going to sit here quiet, or 
what? Because I don't want to come here and talk about it. 
I think you are extremely clever. 
Why? 
You're childish, but clever. [ ... ] 
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The therapist constructs the issue of whether or not Gladys remains co-
resident as one which does not affect the organisation of family 
subjectivity in any fundamental way: it is an internal matter 11 that you 
will resolve". By contrast, he constructs Derek's inter-relationships 
with the rest of the family as "psychiatric" - as so pathological to the 
functioning of family subjectivity that they become external issues that 
necessitate outside intervention. Thus he makes it appear that the 
breakdown of family subjectivity is located, not with Gladys's position 
in the organisation (as was previously construed by Frank), but with 
that of Derek. The therapist's description is careful to locate the 
breakdown, not at the scale of Derek's personal pathology, but at the 
scale of family relationships: "You are their gaoler ... and they are 
your gaolers". He presents the reality that while Derek may be 
controlling and influential in the family, it is at the expense of being 
stuck in a position of personal disempowerment, one that offers few 
options or choices in ways of transacting: "1 don't know how you will 
free yourself". Perhaps in response to the real recognition that he has 
received, Derek seems to be sufficiently empowered to try to express 
himself directly: "Will you let me say it?" Although ultimately out-
manoeuvring him, the therapist nevertheless allows Derek to make his 
point, and acknowledges that he might be a "manipulator" as well. 
T: [To Chris] You're younger, aren't you? 
C: Um, yes. 
T: But he demands that you should protect him. [ •.. l When you 
disagree with him, do you feel free to tell him? 
C: No. 
T: Why not? 
C: Because I don't want to cause him any more aggravation than he's 
already got. 
T: [Stands upl Because he had managed to organise you into being his 
protector, like he managed to organise Mum to cut the piece of bread 
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in the right way, because he had managed to have his father stop 
himself instead of saying, RMary, my dear wife, let's begin to deal 
with our son as if he is a normal 23 year old". So I will leave you 
now. Before I leave - because I think you have enough of what I can 
tell you - what I can tell you is that, unless you change, he will 
not change, [Indicates Lesley, Mary, Frank and Chrisl unless you 
change. I am not including you, Mum, because I did not talk with 
you, because I felt that your issues 1n the family are family issues 
and you will resolve them. 
F: Yes. 
T: Like you will resolve also, when you have regard to the fact that 
your son is 23. 
The therapist initially focuses on Chris as the family member who had 
earlier been willing to take Derek on 'man-to-man' - who had modelled to 
Frank the subject position which he should, in conventional ideology, be 
occupying. In his summing up, rather than foster the illusion that 
Frank is actually transacting from this pOSition, the therapist chooses 
to challenge Frank's inability to exert patriarchal control over his 
son. Finally he insists that Frank and Mary, as the parenting 
subjectivity, and Lesley and Chris as their 'minders', must transact 
with Derek as if he is Ra normal 23 year old". In this way, family 
subjectivity would also be reconstructed so that it appeared "normal" to 
the outside world, with each family member transacting from subject 
positions that fitted in with the specific expectations of capitalist 
patriarchal ideology for a person of their age and gender. 
K: When you talk about manipulating, arranging things, Derek can't seem 
to get into a way of life - he can't seem to let things take their 
course, things like Christmas and holidays, he thinks they have to 
be arranged rather than let things take their course. How can he ... 
T: [Interrupting] You know something, Mary, I don't mind when he 
organises his life fully. The question is, he organises your life, 
why do you accept that he should organise your 11fe, why do you cut 
the piece of bread? [Pause.l 
X: Well, he complains about the piece of bread. 
T: Oh, no, no, no, Mary, how old is he? 
K: 23. 
D: And she cuts bread for Chris, Lesley, Dad, anyone. 
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X: He cuts it himself again if he's not satisfied with the piece I've 
cut. He cuts it himself, another piece. 
T: Now, what he says is that you really treat everybody else like they 
are younger than they are. 
X: Bo. 
T: 10. You treat Frank as if he is your husband and an adult person. 
X: Xore now I do. I never used to so much. Iow I do. 
T: You can stand with him and you are the same size. [ ... 1 
Having said that he is leaving, the therapist does not go, and it is 
clear that the intervention that he delivered did not have sufficient 
resonance with the immediate organisation of family subjectivity to jolt 
them into a "normal" pattern of interaction. Rather than rise to the 
challenge, Frank remains silent. In the resulting discursive vacuum, in 
which 'normal' ideology is failing to operate, it is those who have 
earilier been denied access to speaking positions who come forward. 
Kary attempts to redefine "manipulating" as "arranging", and describes 
Derek's fear of spontaneity (an aspect of his Be Perfect and Be In 
Control adaptations), and how this affects family life. Derek comments 
on hoW Kary constructs herself as the servant of the whole family (and 
not just him): "She cuts bread for Chris, Lesley, Dad, anyone". 
Even such a momentary empowerment of Kary and Derek undermines the 
hiererchy of authority that the therapist has been seeking to establish. 
He ignores the gender basis of Mary's oppression and her lack of choice 
as "Mum" within the family organisation, and instead blames her for 
treating "everybody else like they are younger than they are". This 
raises the anomalous position of Frank who, as a man, also expects to be 
waited upon. Even though such 'infantile' and demanding behaviour can 
reflects a typical subject position within masculine subjectivity, Xary 
is able to exploit the contradiction between this and patriarchal 
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expectations of 'manhood'. She indicates that there was a time when she 
was not able to treat Frank as an adult - not only having to serve him, 
but (presumably) having to look after him in some sense. If this had 
been the case when she was feeling depressed, it is likely that she 
found Frank unsupportive, not because he was occupying a position of 
patriarchal dominance, but rather due to his acting as another demanding 
'boy' for her to look after. 
T: I hope, Chris, that you begin to treat your brother as if he is 
older than you, instead of as if he is younger than you. It's not 
your business to be his protector. 
c: That's the thing, you see, in this family. [ .•. 1 As soon as 
literally any words fly, or anything anywhere, 1 go somewhere else. 
I leave because I just feel sort of - stick it, it's not my problem. 
D: VeIl, sometimes I think it is your problem and I think you're 
walking out on it. [Hary tries to intervene.] When you leave 
things lying about, like, and I'll say about it, then you'll say 
something and just go storming off, which you shouldn't do. 
C: Yes, but 1 ... 
T: He storms off your way. [ ... 1 He can't be natural with you. ( ... 1 
The therapist sets up another dispute between Derek and Chris, but this 
time it is Derek who is 'natural' and expresses anger and resentment 
directly: "1 think it is your problem and you are walking out on it", 
This suggests a real shift in the here-and-now organisation of his 
personal subjectivity, and in the organisation of their relationship 
(first or all, neither could express anger, then it was only Chris), 
The fact that, for the first time, Hary tries to interrupt Derek while 
he is speaking, suggests that Derek's shift of position has also had an 
impact on her position within the organisation of family subjectivity, 
X: 
T: 
X: 
T: 
If you don't mind me just saying.,. 
[Interrupting] Mary. 
I don't understand why he is stuck at the age." 
[Interrupting] Oh, so you think he is nine years old, yes? [ ... 1 
Frank, your wife has her heart too - she has a big heart and she is 
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stuck with little children. I think that you need to take over a 
larger part of her heart. She needs to be more concerned with you 
and [gestures to each child in turn] less concerned with him and 
less concerned with her and less concerned with him. Can you do 
that? 
F: Yes. 
T: Can you make yourself attractive? [Frank laughs.] 
K: I've changed from that, haven't I, Frank, I'm not like that. I used 
to be like that - that was what was wrong. I'm not like that now. 
F: That side, I'll agree. But the side that Dr. Kinuchin is talking 
about is quite right. I said to you just now and you've forgotten. 
He's got to learn to respect you regarding your arrangements with 
food. You're not to run around looking for him and getting it right 
for him. (Therapist shakes hands and says goodbye to everyone in 
turn except Frank and Kary.) If he suggests something that you 
would like for a meal or he would like for a meal, get it for him, 
but not to be unduly criticised until you're snowed under. 
(Therapist interrupts Frank to shake hands.) 
K: You'll have told him that himself - to talk to me differently. 
[Therapist interrupts Xary to shake hands and then he leaves.] 
The therapist discounts Kary's desire to make progress at the level of 
understanding. He puts her down within the context of patriarchal 
stereotyping as a typically emotional woman who is "stuck" because of 
her "big heart" which, it is presumed, excludes any abUi ty to reason. 
Furthermore this boundless emotionality is constructed as being up for 
grabs - it may be given to the children or to Frank, but it does not 
seem to be in any way under Xary's own control. She does not seem to 
have the choice of who she actually desires in any active sense. As 
mother and as wife, she is simply obliged to have her "hig heart" used 
up by children and husband: it is for Frank to push the children away 
and take it for himself if he so chooses. As the therapist is preparing 
to leave, Frank is demonstrating his new-found control as he instructs 
Kary on how to deal with Derek. However, Xary is able to Slip in the 
proviso - that, if they are to operate according to a patriarchal 
'blueprint', Frank must now be 'man' enough to deal with Derek directly: 
"You'll have told him that himself - to talk to me differently". 
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If we reflect back on the session, it is striking how the therapist's 
interventions are directed at some power relations but not others. He 
would clearly see it as dysfunctional for a father to be unable to stand 
up to his son, but as qUite acceptable for a woman to be so subordinated 
to the wishes of her husband and children that she ceases to have any 
life of her own. His interventions serve to reinsert the family into 
the slot that is prescribed by patriarchal capitalist ideology: a set of 
male wage earners being serviced by the domestic labour and emotional 
support of a woman. The positions of Gladys and Lesley are peripheral 
to this - they can leave or stay part of the household without 
disturbing the basic organisation of the family subjectivity. 
This raises wider issues about therapeutic outcome from a perspective of 
power relations: what is the value of enabling a family to function more 
effectively as a unit, if this is at the expense of (further) 
disempowering those family members who are experiencing the most 
oppression? In this instance, the probability is that the family 
subjectivity will have been sufficiently reconstructed along 
conventional lines for all of them (with the probable exception of Mary> 
to be able to participate coherently once again within a 'normal' range 
of external transactions (holding down jobs, making relationships with 
boys/girls, not having to see psychiatrists, etc. >. However, they will 
be doing so in exactly the same ways as before, and hence be just as 
vulnerable to oppresion and exploitation within these transactions as 
they were previously - they have not been empowered to deal with the 
world in any more assertive ways, nor have they been linked in to any 
networks of mutual support, either inside or outside the family. 
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There would seem to have been little enhancement of opportunities for 
mutual support and recognition within the family organisation. On the 
contrary, the family's participation in external transactions as a fully 
functioning subjectivity would seem to be at the expense of the 
reimposition of internal patterns of oppression and domination, 
structured on the basis of gender and generation. It would seem 
significant that the only instance of potentially empowering support 
within the family took place between women (Lesley speaking out against 
the way her mother was being abused by Derek), and that this was ignored 
within the patriarchally dominated discourse of the therapy. Given that 
Mary's oppression has not been dealt with in any way, there would seem 
to be a strong possibility that her subjectivity may break down again -
leading once again to the possible breakdown of the family subjectivity 
and various forms of 'protest' by other family members. 
If the process of therapy had concentrated on empowering those suffering 
the greatest oppreSSion, this might also have had been empowering for 
the family as a collective subjectivity. Instead of being reconstituted 
so as just to conform to the available patriarchal 'blueprint', their 
subjectivity as a whole might perhaps have been reorganised so that, 
collectively, they could support each other in pushing to the limits 
what could be possible within the prevailing structures of the social 
formation. Positive experience of renegotiating subject positions 
within the family could provide a basis for similar struggles outside. 
Not only might Xary have got as far as the Golf Club - but she might 
then have felt sufficiently supported by her family to demand a change 
of club rules in order for her to become a member in her own right! 
-370-
12: THE WATKINS FAMILY 
This is an analysis of exerpts from a longer piece of work, undertaken 
over seven sessions. The family comprises Angela, Dave and their 
children Tracey (aged 6), Matthew (aged 4~) and Linda (aged 2). There 
had been two home visits by the therapist before Angela and Dave agreed 
to attend for a family therapy appointment to discuss their request for 
Matthew to be received into the care of the Social Services Department. 
The therapist is a female social worker and the work is observed by 
female colleagues acting as consultants. In the final session, the 
therapist is joined by a male student as co-worker. 
SESSION 1 
[The therapist starts by enquiring about the family's experience of 
reception into Social Services care.] 
T: So in your generation and your parents' generation - no experience 
of Care. How about your own children? [To Angelal Do I remember 
that once you went into hospital? 
A: Yes, they went into Care then. I don't really know about that much 
because, of course, me being in hospital because I took an overdose. 
Dave being at work and nobody looked after him on my side. Well, my 
side wasn't really asked. But on his side, nobody would look after 
them. They'd look after one but not the other one - because of 
Matthew being premature, you see. And Dave said no way did he want 
them split up, so a social worker came round and she took them into 
Care, to a foster home. 
T: So you, Dave, were the one that had the experience of talking to 
social workers about Care. Can you remember what the process was 
then - what happened? Did you phone up the Social Services and say, 
"Can you help me?" or how did it all come about? 
~: It was in the hospital, because you get social workers in the 
hospital. 
D: She came out the following day and said, "I hear you've had a bit of 
trouble and you've got no-one to look after the kids, and I'm going 
to sort it out for you - find a foster home". I said, HI don't want 
them split up - they've got to be together". So we went down to the 
CliniC, filled the forms in, had them checked over and put over to 
this place - went into care for a bit. 
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On this earlier occasion, an action that constituted a breakdown at the 
scale of Angela's individual subjectivity - her taking a serious 
overdose - also precipitated a major breakdown in family subjectivity. 
It would seem that Dave saw it as more important to hold on to his 
economic power base as a wage-earner, than to hold together the family 
subjectivity. Nevertheless, he retained some control of family 
organisation, in that it was he who decided that the children had "got 
to be together", and hence retain some of the structure of their family 
unit. It was also he who prevented them becoming absorbed into Angela's 
extended family <and perhaps thereby sliding out from his control). 
However, in delegating to the social worker the task of sorting out who 
would provide care for the children, he subjected the family 
organisation within the discourses of the State childcare apparatus. 
It 1s already emerging that the Watkins family has been even less 
successful than the Morton or the Hirst families in inserting their 
overall subjectivity into the bourgeois image of self-containment and 
responsibility. Their family is barely formed as a subjectivity in its 
own right. It is not fully differentiated from those of their 
respective families of origin - both Angela and Dave speak as if they 
still belong to their respective "sides" as much as they are constrained 
by their membership of their own family subjectivity. Similarly, they 
have drifted in and out of being subjected within the discourses of 
State apparatuses. As will emerge more later, their membership of these 
overlapping subjectivities has often seemed vital to their economic and 
emotional survival, but, in turn, has had a determining effect on how 
they construct their individual and joint subjectivities. Their ongoing 
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experience of powerlessness pOints to their occupying a significantly 
different class position to the Hirst and Morton families, being located 
more within what Rapp describes as the "hard living" working class. 
T: When they went into Care, was there any sort of agreement about how 
long they were going in for? Were any complications anticipated? 
D: Just a little bit longer than I agreed to - until Angela got back on 
to her feet. 
A: They wanted us to have Tracey but [Turns to Dave) they reckoned that 
we used to neglect Matthew, didn't they? They said we couldn't have 
Matthew and I said, "If I don't have one of them back, I'll just 
come down and take him back". Because they wouldn't let me see him 
so much because I was tempted to take - you know - I used to upset 
them because I used to try and take them - you know - they were mine 
and that's it. She used to say that I let Matthew sleep too long, 
but a premature child always sleeps a lot, and, if a child is 
asleep, I don't intend waking the child up. And she used to say 
that I let him sleep too much and it was my fault that he wasn't 
crawling the way he was. When he went to this foster parent, he 
started crawling and things like that, and I said that's got nothing 
to do with it at all. 
In giving over responsibility to the Social Services Department, Dave 
effectively lost control of the family subjectivity. By opening up the 
inner workings of their family to outside scrutiny, the parenting 
subjectivity as a whole became vulnerable to the collective charge of 
"neglect" within a State controlled discourse of 'acceptable parenting', 
This discourse subjected Angela within a double bind: the more she tried 
to fit herself back in to the position of 'mother' (attempting to 
reassert control over the childcare aspect of the family subjectivity by 
demanding to take back the two children), the more she became 
constructed as a 'threat' to the children, as a 'bad mother', ultimately 
losing even her rights of access. In the here and now of the seSSion, 
she still seems unsure whether or not the subject position of 'mother' 
is available to her, hesitating before taking issue with the social 
worker about what is the 'right' way to treat a premature baby. 
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T: But, of course, this can happen, can't it, when a child is ... 
A: [Interrupting] I said if a child's asleep, then I leave it asleep. 
I said I won't wake it up. If a child's miserable, I said, and if 
it wants to go to sleep, then I let it, I said, because it's not you 
that's got to suffer him being miserable. If a child's tired, then 
I believe in letting it go to sleep and not waking it up for a feed. 
If it's hungry, it can wake me up. And that's how I've been with 
all my kids. 
T: Right. So, going back to this Care arrangement, you found it quite 
difficult visiting the children in foster care? 
A: They wouldn't let me go down because they used to say I upset them. 
I suppose it was because Tracey was 2~ and, you know, I used to feel 
bad inside because it used to hurt her every time I used to have to 
go. Because she never cried - she used to go away and play. 
T: But you hurt inside, did you? 
A: I felt a bit bad that they had to go into a home because of me being 
so stupid - like taking the overdose. [Dave looks uncomfortable and 
turns away from Angela and the therapist.] But I dunno, it just ... 
[Dave looks back towards Angela.] After a bit, I got used to it -
just sitting at home and coming away without them. At first it was 
just a big puzzle. I couldn't make anything out and my mind just 
wasn't with anything. I was just in a world of my own. 
The theme in the family organisation that comes to the fore here is that 
of withdrawing and shutting off emotionally in the face of unbearable 
pain. The subjectivities of the more powerless members of the family -
Angela and the children - become organised in relation to the passive 
aspect of the Be Strong driver: the Keep Quiet driver-adaptation. When 
Angela's distress became too great, she seemed to lack any permission to 
express it directly in the family and instead put herself to "sleep" by 
taking the overdose. Her only way of taking control was, paradoxically, 
to deny herself the possibility of expressing her own feelings, and 
thereby reinforcing the repressive organisation of family subjectivity 
at the level of emotionality. Similarly, all she could do was to impose 
this transactional horizon on to Matthew: if he was feeling "miserable", 
she would perhaps see prOjected on to him a reflection of her own pain 
and so would be unable "to suffer him being miserable" and could only 
let him "go to sleep". Similarly, Tracey's personal subjectivity has 
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become constructed in the same manner. She too shut off from any 
distress when her mother had to leave her: ·She never cried - she used 
to go away and play·. 
When the therapist tries to enable Ange1a to express some of her hurt, 
she is unable to accept this support. Instead she discounts her 
feelings in her own internalisation of patriarchal discourse, in which 
she subjects any such expression as being "stupid". This is reinforced 
by Dave's indication of his discomfort with such serious emotional 
issues (in the here-and-now and probably also in the past) - a powerful 
and oppressive signal, given his position of patriarchal power. Thus, 
it is not surprising that she felt she had to suppress her feelings of 
anger or hurt about what was'happening to her children: she "got used to 
it" and withdrew again into "a world of her own". 
A: Then, after a bit, I got used to it. But we wasn't allowed to go 
together. Either he had to go on his own or I had to go on my own. 
T: I see. 
A: Because going together, it confused them, because they thought they 
was coming home if we came together. 
[Ange1a explains how the foster mother had reported to the social 
worker that the children were "upset" by her visits.] 
T: So Matthew does well when he's in Care. 
A: Well they reckoned so, [Turns to Davel didn't they? He did improve, 
I admit. I suppose I was in the wrong letting him sleep as long as 
I did. But when he was there he was so happy he used to crawl an 
everything. It come to me that - when I was going - that he was 
only a baby. But it didn't worry him. 
T: So he benefited from being in Care and he enjoyed that. 
A: Well, by the looks of it, yes. But he's only a baby so you can't 
really tell. But he did have a vast improvement on him being in 
Care. 
D: Yes. 
A: It felt nice to see him improve the way he had. When I was with 
him. he was so floppy - he was falling to sleep. When they had him. 
it was as if they had more time for him than what I did. And he 
just improved ever so well - crawling and everything. I couldn't 
believe it when I went down. 
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Angela starts by describing how, subjected within the punitive discourse 
of the Care Apparatus, their organisation as a parenting subjectivity 
was forcibly dismantled. They were not allowed to appear 'together' in 
front of the children within the terms of a discourse of 'the best 
interests of the children' that was defined by the substitute parenting 
subjectivity, the foster parents. As, at this stage, no legal powers 
had been used, the degree of ideological 'power over', that was wielded 
by the Social Services Department and the foster family, serves as an 
indicator of the structural weakness of the Watkins' class position. 
Angela gives up trying to transact with the therapist from the position 
of 'good mother', as this position is not made available to her within 
the professionally defined childcare discourse within which she 1s now 
being resubjected. She has no choice but to take on the alternative 
position of 'bad mother', at least in comparison to the foster mother. 
Paradoxically, this position does allow her to express her pleasure at 
Matthew's progress away from her: "It felt nice to see him improve the 
way he had". In particular, she identifies the way in which he was no 
longer "so floppy" - no longer giving up and shutting off, but ·crawling 
and everything". Clearly, it was possible for him to construct himself 
as active and outgOing within the organisation of the foster family's 
subjectivity - they could have "time for him" in such a subject position 
in a way that Angela could not, given her apparent breakdown at the 
level of emotionality. This breakdown would seem to reflect a wider 
exclusion of emotional expression beneath the transactional horizon of 
the family as a whole - as part of maintaining some semblance of a 
functioning subjectivity at material and ideological levels. 
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[There follows a long discussion of the practicalities of Angela and 
Dave's current application for Matthew to be received into Care. 
Then the therapist starts to construct a family geneogram, beginning 
with Angela. She is interrupted by her consultant who hands a 
message to her.] 
T: Well, this is a message to me from [consultant]. I think I'll read 
it out to you. It says, NI think that this situation that we have 
here is a lot more serious than a simple request for a break in 
Care. My reasons are: 
(1) The fact that Angela is prepared to leave the decision to 
Matthew about whether to return home or not seems to me that she 
doesn't really care much one way or the other. 
(2) I wonder too how much Dave cares about the children, since the 
last time two of them went into Care, he didn't offer to care 
for them. 
(3) Most parents asking for Care, as a break in a desperate 
situation, are in an emotional state - a mixture of hurt, anger, 
distress, worry. This would be very understandable in this 
situation, but in fact this isn't the case here. Both parents 
are very calm and I feel that their lack of emotion is mor~ 
worrying, not just for Matthew but for the two girls too". 
This intervention does not conform at all to the principles of the Milan 
School. There is no positive connotation of the functionality of 
existing patterns of behaviour. Instead it is confrontational: it 
challenges Angela and Dave to construct themselves as an ideologically 
appropriate caring and controlling parenting subjectivity (and not leave 
vital decisions to Matthew or fail to provide emergency care). However 
it reverses the conventional gender bias of a parenting subjectivity by 
challenging Angela to construct herself in a Controlling Parent subject 
position and challenging Dave to construct himself in a Nurturing Parent 
Subject position. The intervention then confronts their failure to 
transact at the level of emotionality as if it were their choice - their 
responsibility - and backs this up with the implicit threat that, unless 
they stop 'refusing' to be emotional, the Care Apparatus might judge the 
existing organisation of their family subjectivity to be so out of line 
with what is expected that it should, once more, be dismantled. 
Although on the surface this intervention is punitive, in a paradoxical 
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and manipulative way, it may have been intended to help them to break 
through their block at the level of emotionality, by both stimulating an 
angry response and giving permission to transact at this level. 
It is debatable whether, overall, such a confrontational intervention 
could be empowering for a family subjectivity that is, in class terms, 
so powerless. It is delivered from people who are clearly occupying a 
much more powerful class position and its punitive tone emphasises the 
relative inequality between them. It is questionable whether the 
attempt to empower Angela by confronting the imbalance in the parenting 
subjectivity will actually be heard as such, or whether it is simply 
heard as a further put down of them as parents. Unless these basic 
issues of powerlessness are addressed, it must be doubtful whether a 
manoeuvre to force them into expressing feelings will have any lasting 
empowering effect. A more positive strategy might have been to work on 
empowering the family unit in its external transactions (e.g. with 
extended family and State Apparatuses), or, alternatively, to seek to 
empower them as separate individuals and, if necessary, allow the family 
unit to break up, perhaps temporarily (as had seemed to work for Matthew 
when he went into Care before). 
D: D'you mean that something's going to happen to the two girls? 
T: It sounds like that, doesn't it? Maybe she is wondering if once 
Matthew is in Care, then is it going to be the two girls next? 
[Pause. ] 
D: Does she want our answers on that as well? 
T: Do you want to reply to that? 
D: Yes, I do want to reply to the one at least. When I should have 
looked after the kids. Well, we've got to live on, keep things 
going. We've got H.P.s to payout. If I don't go to work, I lose 
my job and how am I going to look after the kids? The social worker 
thought it was for the best that they went into a home for the time 
being. 
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The immediate effect of the intervention is not to trigger a direct 
expression of emotionality from Dave or Angela. Instead. it triggers 
Dave. who hitherto had kept in the background. into stepping into the 
position of head of household to defend the family subjectivity as best 
he can against the attack. However he clearly feels in too weak a 
position to take on the therapist or even to get angry with her. His 
defence is undertaken from the role position of Victim (saying. in 
effect, "What could I do - I was the victim of circumstances"). While 
his lack of choice was undoubtedly real, due to his material situation. 
he denies himself both the possibility of being angry about it then, or 
angry with the therapist's insinuations now. 
A: I know I don't feel as much for Matthew, but that's only because of 
the way he is and the way I am with him. But I still try and give 
him love and affection - but it just doesn't work. I mean, I went 
into him last night and kissed him goodnight. He never kissed me -
just said he wanted to go to bed early. So I kissed him when he was 
asleep. 
[Pause.l 
T: So Matthew's a bit different from the others? 
A: Well, he is, yes. I mean, the girls do show me love and affection 
and that. I suppose, in a way, she's right: I do show a bit more 
feeling to the girls because they do show more. 
T: I'm not sure that she said that. 
A: Yeah, she reckons that we don't care - we've got no feelings. 
T: [Readsl Both parents are very calm and I feel that their lack of 
emotion is more worrying, not just for Matthew, but for the two 
girls too. 
A: I mean it's no good cracking up [looks over to Davel. I just said 
to Dave, I feel like a good cry but I won't cry. Not unless ... I 
don't cry in front of other people. If I do start getting emotional 
or crying or things like that, we aren't going to get nothing done. 
I mean [female friend) saw the state I was in, Friday. I mean if 
that isn't showing feelings because I'm that worried that I can't 
show my son affection and he can't give it to me. Everything that I 
try to do doesn't work, and what he does for me. If that doesn't 
show my feelings for my son, I don't know what is. I'm just trying 
to sort out something that's the best for him. I think, by going 
into Care. it might help me, if he's away from me. to show feeling 
towards me and my feelings towards him. 
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Angela seems to have heard the last part of the intervention as an 
accusation directed primarily towards her (as the parent who is 
conventionally expected to be taking on the 'expressive' role) to the 
effect that "We don't care - we've got no feelings". While she clearly 
recognises the gravity of this charge - that she may become disqualified 
as a 'mother' for failing to construct herself in the appropriate manner 
_ she seems unable to rise to the challenge and express her feelings 
directly. In the face of this here-and-now threat, she falls back into 
her learned experience of powerlessness and organises her personal 
subjectivity more and more around a passive Keep Quiet driver. 
We can only speculate as to the origins of such an adaptation, but this 
driver represents the main option that is open to a child to prevent 
her/his annihilation at an emotional level if s/he is forced to submit 
to systematic sexual or other abuse: while her/his body is being 
violated, s/he can at least hold on to some vestige of personal power by 
shutting off from (and thereby, in some sense, protecting) her/his 
feelings. To make such a decision ("I don't cry in front of other 
people"), protects the child from the final humiliation of exposing the 
rest of her/his vulnerability to further abuse. Being forced to open up 
at this level would therefore constitute a final violation of personal 
subjectivity: far from being a liberation of personal power, it would 
feel like "cracking up" and losing all control over personal boundaries. 
Although Angela responds to the therapist's challenge in one sense - she 
talks about expressing emotion - she protects her feelings in the here-
and-now by talking only about how she expressed her distress in another 
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(safer> situation: a transaction of mutuality with someone in a similar 
class and gender position. Gender is clearly important, since not only 
is she able to let out some of her feelings in front of her female 
friend, but she also finds that she can "show a bit more feeling to the 
girls because they show more", whereas her feelings become repressed 
when she is subjected at the losing end of a competitive power battle 
with Matthew (and more importantly, one suspects, with Dave). It only 
seems to be safe for her to show affection towards Matthew in a 
situation where he cannot reject or humiliate her at an emotional level: 
"So I kissed him when he was asleep". This then forms the basis of her 
rationale for Care: enforced separation might enable her to show "my 
feeling towards him". 
[Angela continues about how she does show affection for Matthew: "If 
I didn't care for Matthew, I wouldn't buy him nothing". She also 
mentions Dave's feelings.] 
A: He said that he felt - he feels - bad because he was losing a son. 
I mean he cried yesterday, like, after we was gone. He cried. 
[Turns to Dave] Dave had tears in his eyes, didn't he? But he said, 
if it would help, then it was for the best. But if that isn't 
showing feelings, I don't know what is. Now I'm getting a bit ratty 
now [looks to Dave for confirmation] because I just think them 
questions were a little bit hard. 
T: Really, the questions were hard? 
A: Yes, I think it was a bit below the belt. 
[The therapist refers to the "reasons" for their judgements 
contained in the intervention.] 
Again avoiding the therapist's challenge to express her own feelings 
<perhaps fearing violation from someone in authority - albeit a woman), 
Angela switches to expressing her husband's feelings for him. Once 
installed in this ideologically sanctioned pOSition, she feels 
suffiCiently powerful to take on the therapist (once she has checked 
with Dave that she is doing the 'right' thing> and suggest that the 
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intervention was in some sense abusive to them both: "a bit below the 
belt". The therapist fails to support Faith in this, her nearest 
expression of her feelings <"I'm getting a bit ratty"), responding not 
at an emotional level, but returning to the alienating distance of a 
discourse of "reasons", one that places her clearly in a position of 
'power over' Angela. 
A: Nobody can say that I'm not trying. It's not what I want, but I 
think it's for the best because I can't take no more. 
T: But there are two parents here looking after Matthew. 
A: Yes, but he plays up just as much for me as he does for Dave. And 
Dave's seen him for the last four days and Dave didn't think he 
could play up, but he did do. 
T: Can he show affection for you, Dave? 
D: Not really. Sometimes he does, but not all the time. He says to 
people, "When my Dad comes home, I want to play football". But when 
I get home, he just doesn't want to know. Or if I have too much of 
the ball, he says, "That's it" and sulks and just walks off and goes 
in the corner. He just doesn't want to know. 
Instead of colluding with Angela (as the woman) taking all the 
responsibility and all the blame for the childcare problems, the 
therapist exploits the weakness of the organisation of their family 
subjectivity to invite Dave into a position of taking equal 
responsibility. She moves straight into an enquiry about his emotional 
relationship with his son (although she stops short of asking him about 
bis feelings). Dave is not in a position to resist this (as Martin 
Hirst had been able to do from his position of greater patriarchal and 
class power). Indeed, his answer is disarmingly honest. In common with 
how many fathers are constructed in patriarchal society, Dave does not 
seem to have access to the level of emotionality in transacting with his 
sonj instead, he can only do things with him, like playing football. 
However, what emerges here is that he does not do this so much from a 
-382-
The Vatk1ns faJJJi.ly 
position of 'father', but from a Child subject position, one in which he 
is competing for the ball with his son up to the point where the game 
has to be abandoned. This scenario raises the possibility that Dave may 
occupy similar positions in relation to Matthew within the organisation 
of family subjectivity at home: instead of occupying the ideologically 
prescribed role of household head, it is possible that he may typically 
take on a Child position, competing with Matthew for Angela's attention. 
[The therapist raises with Dave the issue of "losing a son".] 
D: I think we would lose him if he didn't buck his ideas up and he 
loved it in a home - that means we've lost him again, haven't we? 
If he doesn't want to come back to us, that means that he's won and 
we've lost. Well, I have. [ ... 1 He knows what he's doing and he's 
got his own mind. He's got it all sussed out. It doesn't make no 
difference if we have him back, it's going to be ... like having a 
demon. 
T: Like having a demon? 
D: Like the devil. 
T: Do you feel he is beyond you being able to influence him? 
D: It doesn't make no difference what we try to do. I talk to him 
sometimes when I put him to bed. I say, "You ain't going to play up 
tomorrow - play your Mum up - because you're only going to get into 
trouble and be put away". He says, "10", definitely, "10". No 
smiling; straight faced. "l ain't going to play up". Then, when I 
come home, he's played up. He'll laugh at me and say, "Yes, I did". 
He's enjoyed it. That's the way it goes. So when we discussed it, 
we think he should go away for a bit. Might learn him a lesson. 
Subjected within the ideological construction of 'manhood', Dave's 
relationship with Matthew is constructed in terms of competitive power: 
unless Matthew is sufficiently intimidated by the Care process, 11 he's 
won and we've lost". Dave's difficulty in inserting himself in a 
position of patriarchal 'power over', due to some combination of his 
personal history of oppression and his current class pOSition, is 
reflected in the way that he is threatened by his son's growing 
autonomy: "He knows what he's doing and he's got his own mind". 
(Perhaps his daughters, whatever their behaviour, would not constitute 
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such a direct threat to his position.) Finding himself unable to 
construct himself as a 'man', Dave transacts instead from a powerless 
Child subject position, and projects on to Matthew an almost magical 
potency: he becomes Ita demon lt or "the devil" simply because he exercises 
some independence of "will". 
In order to maintain some vestige of control, Dave has had to embrace, 
as a substitute for his own Controlling Parent subject position, 
elements from outside (State) apparatuses in order to provide the 
requisite authority. In this way, threatening Matthew that he will be 
put away to "learn him a lesson", becomes an integral part of the 
ongoing organisation of family subjectivity. However, in doing so, Dave 
pays the price of submitting his family's subjectivity to potential 
engulfment and dismantling within the more powerful subjectivities of 
state Apparatuses, raising the galling possibility that Matthew might 
find that "he loved it in a home" and never wish to return. 
[Dave goes on to talk about Matthew's behaviour and, in particular, 
his stealing.] 
D: I've talked to our Mum about it. And our Dad. And they COUldn't 
understand where he got it from. When we did it, when we were 
little 'uns, we were walloped. All right, we did it when we were 
older, but not that young. Our Mum and Dad turned round and said, 
"It's best to have him put away. He'll understand then and he'll 
see that he's done wrong. And he might snap out of it." She said 
he should go in a Home and see what it's like, [turns to Angels] 
didn't she? 
A: [Looking down and sounding quiet and depressed] Yeah. [ ... ] 
Here Dave shows the extent to which his subjectivity, and hence that of 
his family, is still organised as part of his family of origin. He 
remains subjected within their ideological construction of authority in 
the family, in which violence, underpinned by the ever-present threat of 
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State intervention is seen as the only basis of parental control over 
children. This reflects a class culture in which parents (and perhaps, 
more specifically, men) do not have access to positions that are 
legitimated by structures of economic or ideological power, and are 
hence unable, on any consistent basis, to maintain their family 
subjectivities as autonomous responsible units. Although apparently 
unhappy with this, Angela seems herself to be so subjected within such 
discourses, that she has litle alternative but to acquiesce to them. 
T: If Matthew went into a home, that would be a loss for you, you 
would lose a son? 
D: It ain't so much that I'd lose a son, if it came to the point where 
it was what it was before - voluntary. If it became compulsory -
that means, in other words, we've lost a son. Because it's what he 
wants to ... And we aren't going to see him again. 
T: You seem to think that you'd miss out most in that situation. 
D: Yeah. Well, then he can change his whole name if he wants to. He 
can change it to whoever he wants to. So, in other words, we've 
lost a son because he ain't ours. [ ..• ] 
T: So having a son in your family is important to you? 
D: Yes it's important to me and to my elder brother as well, and he's 
tried for years. [ ... ] He'd do anything to have a son. [ ... 1 
T: Angela, do you want to comment on any of that? 
A: No. 
[Therapist is called out for consultation.] 
Dave elaborates on the fact that he is concerned at an emotional level 
with the loss of Matthew not as a person (he actually sounds as if he 
would be glad to see the back of him), but as a son and all that this 
means within the patriarchal ideology of the family. A 'son' represents 
the inheritance of his patriarchal power: someone who is subject to his 
authority and to whom he can pass on his power, and hence someone whose 
very existence enhances his own sense of power as 'head' of the 
household. This inheritance of men's 'right' to control family 
organisation is symbolised in the importance given to the continuity of 
the family name. Thus for Dave, the real threat of compulsory Care is 
not that he will be disempowered in relation to the Care Apparatus, but 
that Matthew will be so empowered in relation to him that he will be 
able "to change his whole name if he wants to" and become a man in his 
own right whose power position owes nothing to that of his father. 
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The therapist opens up the possibility that this patriarchal discourse 
may be questioned or commented on. However. Angela's inability to 
respond to this opening would indicate that her degree of subordination 
is such that she is not even aware of how oppressive such a discourse is 
for her. Within this model of family therapy. it is not easy for a 
therapist to be more overtly supportive to a woman. either by asking her 
how she feels about fathers and sons being so powerful in family 
organisation. or by herself confronting the man and challenging the 
oppressive nature of such ideological positions. When such a discourse 
is allowed to proceed unchallenged. there is an implicit reinforcement 
of the existing patriarchal organisation of the family's subjectivity. 
[Therapist returns.] 
T: [Consultant] and I have been talking and we were wondering if 
Matthew does leave this family and starts a new life somewhere else. 
how much of a gap will it leave in your lives. your lives together? 
Dave. you've talked about losing a son and what this means to you. 
We wonder what the next stage will be for Angela and Dave together. 
All normal married couples need something to argue about. What will 
they argue about if Matthew's gone? Will the arguing have to stop 
or will you both have to split up? Can Angela - can you be sure you 
will be happier if Matthew is sorted out? 
A: I dunno. It's hard to say until it happens. 
T: We wondered how many more overdoses before you know what you want 
out of life. 
A: I didn't take my overdoses because of the pressure of my kids. I 
took my overdoses for other reasons. Not because of my kids. And 
my kids were always fed and looked after before I even took my 
overdose. 
This intervention returns more closely to a systemic approach. 
Matthew's difficult behaviour is connoted positively as being functional 
in maintaining the homeostasis of the spouse SUbsystem: it keeps them 
together because they have something to argue about. Arguing itself is 
connoted positively: "All married couples need something to argue 
about". This emphasis on arguing is presumably a response to the total 
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lack of any expression of anger or conflict between Angela and Dave 
during the interview so far. All that we have seen is passivity and the 
pathos of their subordination within outside discourses and Apparatuses. 
What is missing in this intervention is any understanding of how this 
'flatness' and inability to express conflict may relate to both the 
subjection of the family within oppresive external power relations 
(including those of State agencies), and to the limited range of subject 
positions available to Angela within the internal organisation of the 
family. The only connection that is made is between Angela's overdosing 
behaviour - the only hint of her true feelings - and the possibility of 
her experiencing frustration at not getting what she wants out of life 
(or even knowing what that is). Unfortunately, the way that it is 
delivered comes over almost punitively and implies that she is being 
"stupid" taking overdoses because she sbould know what she wants out of 
life. Bo recognition is given of the possibility that surviving at all, 
in a position as powerless and oppressive as her own, may actually 
depend on shutting off from almost all her feelings, wants and needs: 
Unless there is a real change in her subject position, either through 
the empowerment of the whole family subjectivity in its dealings with 
the outside world (in particular, extended family and State 
Apparatuses), or through a shift in the dominance of patriarchal 
ideology within the family, Angela will not be in a position to enter 
into any meaningful negotiations (with Dave, the children, the Care 
Apparatus, or anything else) about what she wants for herself. So far, 
the position that she has occupied does not seem to have given her any 
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right to exist as a person in her own right. This is exemplified by the 
way in which she performed from the position of 'mother', feeding and 
looking after her children, right up to the point when she was about to 
take her own life. 
T: I think we'll draw to a close now and we'd like to see you soon. 
[ .•. ] We want you to do some homework. We want you to come up with 
some plans of what you are going to do when Matthew is away. 
[Therapist discusses arrangements and offers appointment time.] Can 
you make that? [To Dave] How's the situation with work? 
A: [Interrupting] I think that worrying about us is more important than 
his work. 
T: So shall we say 4.30 on Monday? 
D: Yes. 
A: Do you want them results for Monday? 
T: Yes. 
A: [Sounding animated] So we've now got to go back and prepare how we 
think it's going to be when Matthew is not there. 
Shifting the focus on to the marital relationship, and by implication on 
to the transactional level of emotionality, would seem to have, for the 
first time in this session, engaged Angela in the therapeutic process. 
The very raising of this issue by the female therapist contitutes a real 
challenge to the dominant organisation within the family which has so 
far marginalised any expression of feelings. Angela displays a sudden 
shift of mood, no longer shutting off entirely from her feelings and 
instead becoming positively assertive and energetic. Furthermore, she 
would seem to derive some personal support from the therapist's interest 
in this issue, and this empowers her quite dramatically to overrule her 
husband's concern for his job (his economic power base) and state that 
sorting out the marital relationship (her emotional power base) must 
take priority. In doing so she takes on a conventional, but powerful, 
feminine position within the family subjectivity, as the one who takes 
responsibility for the partner subjectivity. 
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SESSION 2 
T: How have things been? Have you been giving Matthew some thought 
over the weekend? Have you given yourselves much thought? 
D: He's been quite good. [Turns towards Angela] He hasn't played up at 
all really. 
A: Not much, no. [ ... ] He's played up, but we've told him off and 
he's done as he's told. 
T: There have been no incidents of stealing at all? 
A: Only like today, over at my mate's. But I happened to cop him and 
told him off. He just went and sat down and played in the bedroom. 
And then he went out again and I told him to stay in. 
T: He responded to that, did he? 
A: About twice. I had to tell him about twice. I copped him before it 
got too far. [ ... ] 
It would seem that the sudden change in the organisation of family 
subjectivity that we witnessed at the very end of the first session has 
not been sustained. Dave sets the tone of the session by ignoring the 
second part of the therapist's question and instead focusing on Matthew 
and establishing, as the dominant transactional level, discourse about 
activity. Angela does not contest this and continues in the same vein, 
the only disagreement being being the extent to which Matthew's 
behaviour might have improved. Thus there is no response to the 
question "Have you given yourselves much thought?" now, or at any stage 
during the session. Interestingly, the therapist never picks this up or 
asks whether the "homework", that Angela had seemed so keen on, has 
actually been completed. It is as if she too has become caught up in 
maintaining the <patriarchal) organisation of family subjectivity. 
T: You both look a bit low today. 
D: It's the weather. Soaking. 
A: Why don't you tell the truth? 
D: What we were talking about? 
A: He just thought, and I just thought, that some of the questions that 
[ J said were a 11 ttle bit below the belt - and it did hurt. I just 
want a break from Matthew because I can't control him, that's all. 
I'm not trying to get rid or him. It's not what I want or what 
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nobody wants. But I just thought him having a break and me having a 
break would give me time to catch up on Matthew, and Matthew time to 
catch up on me, and perhaps our family could be a family again. 
T: You feel that your family hasn't been like a family lately? 
A: No, it isn't. I mean, me and Dave, and one thing and another, and 
then Matthew. I mean, me and Dave - we never argue over Matthew, 
it's always other things. We've never argued over the kids and my 
overdoses have never been over the kids. I treat my three kids the 
same. It's just when you buy Matthew something, he just destroys 
it. 
[Angela continues about Matthew thanking her for a pair of new shoes 
over the weekend, but later biting the baby's leg.] 
It would seem that the confrontational tone of the first intervention 
had a more long lasting impact on Angela than any possibility of support 
in dealing with her marriage that she might have taken from the second. 
The former would seem to have left her, personally and on behalf of the 
partner/parenting subjectivity, with a grumbling and debilitating sense 
of hurt and injustice. Far from feeling sufficiently empowered to start 
renegotiating the organisation of their partner subjectivity, she is now 
situated in a collusive alliance with him as a parenting subjectivity 
which is under threat within a State controlled discourse of 'adequate 
childcare'. When Dave fails to take on the position of defending family 
subjectivity - perhaps because the issue concerns feelings - Angela is 
forced into the position of protecting the family (including Dave) 
against the perceived accusations of the therapist. In doing so, she 
excludes the possibility of expressing her own feelings or desires. 
Nevertheless, inserted within her childcare discourse from the position 
of 'mother', Angela briefly discloses that she and Dave have argued, and 
hints that this preceded and maybe led on to problems with Matthew: "I 
mean, me and Dave, and one thing and another, and then Matthew". 
Whereas the intervention had suggested that having Matthew "to argue 
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about" might have been functional in maintaining their relationship, she 
clarifies that, while there is considerable conflict within the partner 
subjectivity, "We never argue over xatthew, it's always other things". 
It is unfortunate that, having touched on what would seem to be the real 
issue for her (her conflict with Dave), she finds the need to retreat so 
quickly into her position of childcare spokeswoman. 
A: He looks at me as if he's looking right through me. It's a horrible 
feeling. It's a very cold look, as though he's shutting me out. In 
the end, I just give up because I'm not getting through to him. I'm 
wasting my energy. And I say, "Just go away" in the end because he 
just doesn't answer me whatsoever. I mean, I've sat down nicely 
with him and he stands there looking at me just with his eyes. 
He'll laugh at Dave, but he doesn't laugh with me. He just stands 
there staring at me as if to say, "I ain't talking to you - I only 
talk to my Dad" - as if I've done something really bad. And 1 say 
"Just go away". 
[Therapist asks about any changes in Matthew's attitude over the 
weekend and then goes ahead in making arrangements with Angela and 
Dave for just xatthew to have a two week break in foster care, in 
line with their request.] 
Angela briefly moves out of her parenting discourse and starts to 
express her own feelings of emotional rejection. Although she is 
speaking in relation to xatthew, one wonders how much this is a 
projection of her experience of her marital relationship which, as she 
has already hinted, is where her main distress is located <"My overdoses 
have never been over the kids"), but about which she has been unable to 
talk directly. While she feels powerless and unsupported to deal with 
her feelings in relation to Dave, she can use her power position as a 
parent to protect herself against further rejection by Matthew: she can 
translate her response of "Just go away" into action by insisting on his 
reception into Care. The therapist seems powerless to challenge the 
diversion of the issue onto (and 'scapegoating' of) Matthew in this way. 
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SESSION 3 
(Angela starts by describing an incident in which another woman had 
hit Tracey in a shop.] 
A: She lashed at me first, so I hit her back. I mean, nobody hits me 
and gets away with it. 
(Dave reaches over and slaps Angela on the knee, and grins towards 
the therapist.] 
A: I mean, not with my kids. 
D: [Interrupting] I did didn't 11 [Laughs.] 
A: (Remaining serious] I mean, not when my kids are involved. 
(Therapist discusses practical arrangements for Matthew to go into 
Care. ] 
This short scene illustrates how Angela's ability to stand up to others 
depends entirely on the subject position in which she is located. 
Subjected as mother and protector "with my kids", she can be pugnacious 
in her defence: "Nobody hits me and gets away with it". However, as 
Dave delights in pointing out, when she is subjected as his wife, she 
has no right to defend herself against his <play) violence. 
[The therapist starts to draw a geneogram (family tree) on a large 
sheet of paper. She discusses the history of each member of the 
extended family in turn, and their interrelationships, before asking 
about how Angela and Dave met, and their subsequent relationship.] 
A: Dave's not very nice when he's got beer in him, (To Dave] are you? 
D: (Looking sheepish] I haven't had any for ages. 
A: Not since that last incident. That's what put you off. Because you 
came in drunk. He was standing there. He thought he was great, 
standing there in front of the kids with a bottle of beer in his 
hands. So I says to the kids, "Take no notice, it's all beer talk." 
And he started on me and, all of a sudden. clever clogs here decided 
to put his head through my kitchen window. So I said to the kids, 
"Take no notice", trying to calm them down. "Shut the bathroom 
door," I said, "just ignore him, it's all beer." Then comes Dave. 
boots the bathroom door open and stands there with the beer in his 
hands. The kids were that frightened and screaming, and Matthew 
kept screaming. "No, no, no." Then he tried to stab himself with a 
knife. Then it was me. 
T: This happened out of the blue? [To Dave] You don't just put your 
head through the window, do you? 
A: Dave does. When he's got beer in him. It's twice that Dave's 
threatened me with a knife. 
T: [To Dave] Was it a bad time for you? Were things going on that you 
weren't happy with? 
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D: Yes, I'd had a tiff with Angela. 
A: [Interrupting] That's twice he's threatened me with a knife. 
T: Was that very long ago? 
D: It was some time ago, wasn't it? 
A: It was at [Dave's brother's] christening for the baby. 
T: Do you want to talk about that - or another day? 
D: [Quietly] Another day. [ •.. ] 
The geneogram exercise shifts the focus from the current organisation of 
the family around Matthew as scapegoat and opens up the transactional 
level of talking about relationships and feelings. This offers a 
supportive context within which Angela can start to look at her partner 
relationship. The events that she chooses to describe constitute a 
breakdown in Dave's personal subjectivity at the transactional level of 
activity. The 'domestic siege', in which weapons are used to threaten 
violence against self and others, is a form of breakdown that, in 
patriarchal culture, is generally specific to men. It may be seen to 
arise out of the way in which men are subjected within ideology in such 
a position that their sense of self depends on their having to be in 
control of others, in this case, their household. If this position is 
threatened, there is likely to be an escalation of the compulSion to 
exercise such control. Trapped by their position within ideology which 
prevents them venting their distress at an emotional level, breakdown is 
likely to occur at the level of behaviour/activity. 
Faced with his distress at his failure to construct his family as an 
autonomous unit under his control, Dave would seem to undergo such a 
breakdown of his personal subjectivity. This takes the form of a parody 
of the position that he is supposed to occupy: if he can do nothing 
else, at least he can show that he has the power, as a man, to stab 
himself or his wife or children. In this desperate and self-destructive 
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bid to hold on to his position within patriarchal ideology, he only 
succeeds in terrorising Angela and the children. Because he has 
transacted from an angry and frightened Child subject position, rather 
than the patriarchally sanctioned Persecutor role, he fails to win back 
from them (or the outside world) the 'respect' for his position which he 
had felt to be lacking. Rather than having patriarchal power as of 
ideological 'right', and backing this up with 'appropriate' use of 
violence, he now only possesses such power on a temporary basis, for as 
long as Angela and the children have no alternative but to stay with him 
and to acquiesce to the threat of his terror hanging over them. He is 
now "clever clogs" brandishing a knife rather than the man of the house. 
Nevertheless, his use of violence still renders him intimidating in the 
here-and-now of the session. He represents a physically strong and 
potentially violent man operating within a patriarchal culture that 
covertly sanctions violence against women. It is within this context 
that we note how the female therapist repeatedly cuts across Angela's 
accusation that, "It's twice Dave has threatened me with a knife"j how, 
instead of confronting his use of violence, she seeks to find an excuse 
for it, "Were there things going on that you weren't happy with?"j and 
how she is willing to grant Dave the option of deferring the discussion 
to another day. The therapist may be dulled in her response to the 
power issues here because of thinking within a conventional systems 
framework in which violence by one system member to another is viewed as 
but one punctuation of a pattern of circular causation between people in 
positions of equal interactional influence: it is no more (or less) 
significant than the transactions that precede or follow it. 
-394-
The Vatk1ns faJldly 
T: [To Davel That sort of thing must leave you feeling very unhappy. 
D: I did that day. 
T: You felt very unhappy that day. Is that blown over now? 
A: We still don't see eye to eye now, do we? 
T: On that thing? 
A: Not just that, other things as well. 
T: You said you don't see eye to eye all the time. 
D: No, Angela's right and I'm wrong. 
A: I dunno, I've sort of drifted away from him. [ ... ] 
T: So maybe you're not as close as you used to be - do you have a 
working relationship? It sounds like you organise things between 
you, and that can be valuable, can't it? [ ..• ] 
In examining the aftermath of this incident, the therapist establishes 
that Dave felt "very unhappy", but then allows him to hide from his real 
feelings by manoeuvring himself into the Victim role ("Angela's right 
and I'm wrong") from which he is able to shrug off Adult responsibility 
for what had happened. However, the therapist does not enquire from 
Angela how it felt to be threatened with a knife. By not doing so, she 
feeds into the existing pattern of partner organisation at an emotional 
level: Angela's feelings are denied any existence and hence do not have 
a place in the sorting out of marital issues. Finding herself <probably 
not for the first time) the victim of abuse, Angela is surrounded by a 
collusive wall of silence. In order to protect herself from further 
devastation at an emotional level, she has little alternative but to 
"drift away from him", to cut off from any emotional contact with the 
man that has abused her. Rather than confronting this process, the 
therapist positively connotes it as "a working relationship". 
T: How would it be different if you didn't argue? What would be there 
instead? 
A: I think what Dave would like is for me to love him ... 
D: [Interrupting] The way I love you. 
A: The way that he sees he loves me. But I don't. 
T: I suppose love comes in different shapes and forms and things. 
A: Well, I said to Dave that he's left it too late to start showing his 
feelings and his love now. Why didn't he show it three years ago? 
T: Why three years ago? 
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A: That's when we seemed to be just drifting apart. 
T: [To Dave] Can you remember what was happening at that point in time? 
D: I thought everything was all right. 
T: I notice that Linda is 2~, so maybe ... [To Angela] Were you 
pregnant with Linda? 
A: Yes, they said I had a tilted womb and I said, "I'm not, I'm 
pregnant". When you tried to have (pause, looks down) sex, I used 
to cry because it used to hurt me that much and I couldn't do it. 
And I sort of went off it and it doesn't interest me now, but Dave 
doesn't see it like that, which I understand his point. I mean, I'm 
being sort of mean, in a way, because I don't even like it. As far 
as I'm concerned, it's true that Dave hasn't had it for 3 years. 
T: And is that a point of disagreement between you? 
A: Yes. [Pause.] He wants to know why. He thinks that I must be 
giving it somebody else because I'm not giving it to him. So I says 
to him, "Why should I be giving it to someone else if I'm not giving 
it to you - it just doesn't interest me". It's just a cold subject. 
I don't know if it's because I feel I'm only 25 and I've got 3 kids 
as it is. I mean, it's a lot of hard work. [ ... ] 
D: I mean you hear about things in the paper like "34 year old can't 
get enough off her husband so she's got different blokes coming in" 
and all of a sudden, Angela says she's gone off sex, sex is nothing 
- it's hard to believe. [Pause.] I know she doesn't want to get 
pregnant again because she's young anyway. I mean, I suppose I 
don't want her to have any more kids just yet anyway. I would like 
another one, but with the way she is, no chance of that. 
In this passage, we see how the emotional and sexual relationship 
between Angela and Dave is constrained and distorted by the subject 
posi tions that they occupy within ideology. The definition of .. love" 
becomes the subject of a power struggle. Dave attempts to force Angela 
to "love" him the "way I love you": to deny her own fee11ngs and 
redefine herself as a sexual subject in the image of how he defines 
himself. In patriarchal ideology, as promulgated in the popular press, 
love becomes conflated with non-stop sexual demand and availability: 
someone who "can't get enough" off their partner. Emotional closeness 
becomes represented only in the physical act of sex. 
Although Angela understands 'love' in the relationship as his "showing 
his feelings" (and not in making incessant demands for sex), she is 
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nevertheless so caught up in this oppressive ideological framework that 
she actually sees herself as being "mean". This is not simply because 
she has refused to submit to sexual activity, but because she is unable 
sufficiently to distort herself at the level of emotionality to appear 
as wanting sex all the time: "I'm being sort of mean, in a way, because 
I don't even like it". Subjected as he is within ideology, Dave sees 
love itself in terms of power and control: the basis of his self-image. 
Thus, rather that understanding what has happened in terms of Angela's 
reaction to her sense of violation, he immediately sees it in terms of 
his loss of control over her sexuality (she "might be giving it to 
somebody else") and also over her fertility - whether or not she should 
"have any more kids just yet anyway". 
T: When you thought about that and wondered why, you wondered whether 
it was because Angela didn't want children. 
D: Because she doesn't love me, that means I haven't got no rights at 
all to have sex with her. So I'm nothing to Angela really. Just a 
friend. [ ... ] 
T: And you would prefer to be Angela's lover rather than just her close 
friend? 
D: I would be ... I just feel left out, not wanted anymore, just 
somebody to be there when she wants somebody to be there. That's 
why I thought that's what I am to her just lately. She knows she 
can go out because I'll be there. 
T: That must feel very lonely. 
D: Oh yes. I don't like talking about it to Angela, (sighs) because it 
just causes arguments, I suppose. But it hurts, hurts a lot. But 
it's no good talking about it. 
T: You've tried to talk about it, but it hasn't been successful. 
D: No, I keep saying the wrong things. 
T: You have tried to talk about it? 
D: I have tried to say why she doesn't love me, but then I get ratty 
because the answers I want to know are not the ones I'm supposed to 
be getting. So I get ratty about it and we just start arguing ( ... ] 
Dave becomes even more explicit about how Angela's "love" is to be 
constructed within patriarchal ideology as equivalent to his "rights 
to have sex with her", his control of her as his sexual object. "Love" 
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thus comes to mean the opposite of being a "friend", or "somebody to be 
there" to help out the other personj it represents domination rather 
than mutuality. He experiences his loss of sexual rights as his 
rejection as a person, since the only position that he knows to be 
available to him is the ideologically determined position of the 
dominant partner: "l just feel left out, not wanted anymore". The 
therapist implicitly accepts these definitions and and offers him 
sympathy as a Victim (IIThat must feel very lonely"), as if Angela had 
the power to accept or reject him on her terms. It is the terms in 
which the discourse of "love" is constructed that determine why their 
attempts to talk about it are so unsuccessful. These terms are entirely 
dictated by Dave. It is he who is in a position to define "why she 
doesn't love me" - Angela has no voice from which she can speak her own 
desire herself. It is he who is in a position to get angry when she 
fails to deliver "the answers I want to kno~'. Her only protection for 
her feelings then (and now) is to withdraw and organise her personal 
subjectivity according to her Keep Quiet driver-adaptation. 
T: But you're still here together. That's hopeful, isn't it? 
D: I dunno. I suppose she could be a bit scared of me ... [Turns to 
AngelaJ Of being left on your own. 
A: No. 
D: You are. [Quietlyl Go on and leave me with the three kids. 
T: Your guess would be that Angela's afraid of being left on her own. 
D: Well, she'd probably miss out on a couple of things. On things she 
couldn't afford. I mean you don't get much on the Social anyway 
with the One Parent Benefit and, the way MIs Thatcher is going 
along, there'll be nothing left of it. So you'd lose out on things 
like that. I know I don't get much, but what I have got, I give to 
Angela and the kids and that's it. [Pause.] 
I'm trying hard, but I don't seem to be getting nowhere. [ ... 1 
T: What do you do ..• What do you do with your frustration? 
D: Dunno. I just keep it inside until she's gone out - then I cry. 
A: He takes it out on everybody else, on the door. 
D: Yes, I take it out on the door, or the wall. [ ... l 
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Dave describes the material factors which make Angela dependent within 
the organisation of the partner subjectivity. Having no real connection 
at the level of emotionality, the current organisation seems only to be 
upheld by his constant threat of violence and his economic power as the 
family breadwinner. His economic power over Angela derives from her 
lack of positive options, whether as a woman on her own or as a single 
parent, due to the lack of equal employment prospects or satisfactory 
State provision in terms of welfare benefits and housing. Angela's 
position is further weakened by the emotional underpinnings of familial 
ideology within civil society: the sense of inadequacy, failure and 
guilt that is projected on to women moving out on their own and which 
isolates them from those who remain organised as part of two-parent 
family subjectivities. 
T: (To Angela) Do you feel that it is a hopeless case between you, or 
could he ask the right question? 
A: I dunno. I'm just that confused at the moment. I'm just so puzzled 
by him and there's a lot going on with Matthew. I just don't know 
what to think. I suppose I'm frightened in case I do start loving 
him again, and then I'll go back to square one, like being rejected 
and this, that and the other. Perhaps I am frightened. He keeps 
saying, "Perhaps you'll love me in the future" and I say, "I don't 
know, you'll have to see what the future brings". And then he keeps 
going on, "You want a divorce. That's what you and everybody 
wants". Yet no-one mentions it - only Dave - and this is what narks 
me, because he keeps saying it and saying it. [ ... 1 
T: So you're not prepared to put your cards on the table at this stage. 
A: I dunno. One time I was divorcing him because I'd had a belly-full. 
I was sick of the arguments, the fights. I've got a sollicitor, but 
I haven't done much about it. According to Dave, I just use him, 
use him for a dogsbody. 
The therapist's question acknowledges that the terms of Dave's discourse 
have not, so far, got close to Angela's experience - she has not been 
asked "the right question". Angela is able to use this support to 
express her confusion and fear at being subjected within a discourse in 
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which her only choices were constructed and dictated by Dave: "love" (as 
defined by him) or "divorce". Whereas it seems legitimate for Dave to 
make demands on her (as part of "love">, if she asks for anything for 
herself, this becomes defined as trying to "use him, use him for a 
dogsbody". The therapist offers no support for Angela to continue to 
explore her experience and clarify what she wants. Instead the 
statement, "So you're not prepared to put your cards on the table at 
this stage" pushes Angela back into having to choose between "love" and 
"divorce", neither of which reflect her own desires or preferences. 
D: That's what I think. 
T: That's how you feel. 
D: That's how I feel inside. It ain't supposed to be like that in real 
life, is it1 I mean you read about men getting beat up by their 
wives, [laughs) but that's just the way I am inside. Everybody 
else'S marriage seems to be perfect bar mine. I never thought it 
would happen to me. 
T: You thought it was never going to happen to you - 1s that because of 
you or because of the way you and Angela were once? 
D: Both. It's just the way I am. I mean, I actually haven't been 
perfect. 
T: What do you think you could have done differently? 
D: Showed a b1t more love and kindness towards her. When Matthew was 
born, she said I neglected both of them. I suppose I did because I 
used to go out all of the time. I used to be in the darts team and 
football and Pool - or down the boozer. And I used to leave Angela 
in the house with the kids. I haven't done that for ages. 
T: Do you think you were more distant then than you are now? 
D: I didn't think I was doing anything wrong. I thought I was doing 
what everybody else does when they're married - they can go out and 
enjoy themselves and have fun. 
T: So you saw your mates doing that? 
D: I saw my mates doing it and I thought, "I can do it". But I never 
thought about Angela - what she was doing. 
Instead of staying with Angela's experience of fear and bewilderment, 
the therapist chooses to support Dave to make the shift from the level 
of thinking to that of his feelings ("That's how you feel") and, for the 
first time, Dave is able to become aware of, and start to express, the 
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gulf between his actual experience of himself in relation to Angela, and 
how he had thought things should be from his position within patriarchal 
ideology. His notion of a "perfect" marriage is one in which 
"everybody" (i.e. the man) is totally free to go out and do whatever he 
wants, while the woman remains at home, unquestioningly under his 
control, doing all the domestic and child-care work. However, through 
making contact with his own experience, rather than filtering it through 
this ideology, he is at last able to take responsibility for some of the 
effects that his actions have had on Angela at an emotional level, and 
to say what he would have liked to have done differently. 
T: Do you remember that time, Angela? 
A: Yes, I used to go to the hospital every morning afternoon and night 
and Dave wouldn't come over, only - that was on Christmas, when he 
was born, he went up to see him. I think he went up to see him. I 
don't know, because he was rushed straight off - Matthew - because 
he was premature, see, and he was having a job breathing and he had 
to go under an oxygen mask. When Dave come in I asked him to hold 
him and I know he was really frightened because he was no bigger 
that a doll, a premature doll, and Dave said "No", and he tended to 
go and look at all the other babies instead of standing there and 
looking at his own son. 
D: I just wanted to know why they were bigger than mine. [ ..• ] 
T: [To Angela] You had to give Matthew a lot of attention in the early 
months. You must have got very close to him. 
A: Well, I did. And then when Dave started drifting away from me, I 
drifted away from Matthew, as if to say, "It was your fault". I 
used to feed him and that was it. I used to push him to one side. 
[ ... ] 
T: So Matthew and Dave are in the same position, really, to you. You 
all have difficulty in getting close. 
A: I have difficulty in getting close to Dave and Matthew. They seem 
to be the same at the moment, but Tracey and Linda, no. I'm very 
close to the girls. But, Dave and Matthew, I'm not close at all. 
[The therapist is called out by the consultant and returns to give 
them feedback on their honesty and sadness, and to suggest to them 
that they focus on their marriage while Matthew is in Care.] 
What emerges here is the extent to which both parents projected very 
strong feelings on to the space that Matthew came to occupy - how 
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aspects of his personal subjectivity were already constructed for him in 
ways over which he had no control. As we have seen earlier, Dave had a 
very clear expectation that a "son" represented a reflection and an 
exten~on of his patriarchal power. Consequently, it is not surprising 
that he was shocked to see his son appear as a tiny, fragile and 
vulnerable creature, so at odds with his preconceived notion (and which 
perhaps reflected all too clearly his own fragility and vulnerability -
feelings from which his position in ideology normally distanced him). 
His imagery is positively phallic when he says, "I just wanted to know 
why they were bigger than mine" - and it is interesting how, later, 
Matthew's signification switched from "premature doll" to "demon". 
Angela describes how her feelings towards Dave came to take over her 
relationship with Matthew, although she had been initially close to him: 
"when Dave started drifting away from me, I drifted away from Matthew, 
as if to say, 'It was your fault'''. She displays great inSight into the 
fact that she displaced her anger against Dave (a male who was 
oppressive and unavailable) on to Matthew (a male who was vulnerable and 
ever-present). While she felt powerless to confront Dave with her 
feelings, she was in a position to project them on to Matthew and then 
to reject him. In this way, she constructed a subject position for 
Matthew to occupy as if he were Dave. Within the organisation of family 
subjectivity, their positions become conflated and indistinguishable: "I 
have difficulty in getting close to Dave and Matthew. They seem to be 
the same at the moment". This is clearly a gender issue, since she has 
no problem in being "very close to the girls". 
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SESSION 4 
[The session starts with form filling and an extensive discussion of 
arrangements for Matthew to go into foster care and what information 
about Matthew and the family should be given to the foster family.) 
T: I suppose we could mention Tracey and Linda. I think we might have 
to mention that they've been in care once before when you went into 
hospital. 
A: [Head down) Yes. [Sniffs and wipes her eyes) They'll probably want 
to know why I went into hospital. That was through an overdose. 
T: That may be helpful. 
[Angela sniffs and mumbles indistinctlYi Dave looks away.) 
A: I'm the sort of person really. [looks over to Davel in a way. that 
gets very depressed. 
D: Quickly. 
A: I get depressed quickly ... 
D: [Interjecting] Bored. 
A: •.. and. you know. just completely fed up. 
T: Dave thinks that you get bored. 
A: Well. fed up and bored is really the same. isn't it? [ ... 1 
Angela seems on the verge of expressing some of the feelings that lay 
behind her overdose and breakdown. Perhaps due to the authority 
position taken on by the therapist (as the bureaucratic form-filler), 
Angela does not turn to her for supporti instead. she looks across to 
Dave before she speaks the word "depressed". However. not only does he 
offer her no support (as before. he rejects her non-verbally when she 
tries to show her feelings). but he interrupts and redefines what she 1s 
trying to say. As Angela begins to contact the anger underlying her 
"depression" (that she is "completely fed up"). Dave is able to use h1s 
power within the organisation of the partner subjectivity to redefine 
her depression as just her getting "bored" (a word that is often used by 
parents to redefine the anger of their children in such a way that they 
can then be blamed for it). Although painting out what Dave is doing. 
the therapist then goes along with Angela's acquiescence to his 
redefini tion that" fed up and bored 1s really the same thing". 
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[The therapist continues the process of forDrfilling, asking Dave 
for details of family finances and explaining the procedures for 
visiting. She refers back to a meeting that they had with the 
Social Services Team Manager about the criteria for whether or not 
Matthew is allowed to return home after the two weeks are over.] 
T: Two weeks is quite long enough for you, is it? 
D Not really. But if we say the necessity for Care is longer, they'll 
probably think that, really, we don't want him anyway. So two weeks 
and we'll just have to see what happens from there. [To therapist] 
Because your Head [the Team Manager] was very strict on that. 
T: She is, isn't she. Very strict. 
A: I suppose she has to be. [Pause.] I dunno, I found her quite 
understanding. She only said a few things that I thought was a bit 
Iow. I mean, like, between me and Dave. I mean that is very hard. 
T: What bit between you and Dave? 
A: Where she says we've got to try to pull ourselves together. 
Otherwise, if she didn't think it was working out, they might take 
him into compulsory, which I think was a bit hard. So, say, if me 
and Dave don't get on, or even if Matthew isn't fair, that they'll 
take Xatthew off me, because me and Dave can't keep as a family. I 
thought that was a bit rough, as if to say I have to lie and cheat 
and say to Dave "I love you" - and yet I don't - just so that I can 
keep my son. [ .•. ] She didn't put it in so many words, but I knew 
exactly what she was aiming for. 
T: You felt a bit trapped by that, did you? 
A: Yes, because she said we've got to work hard as a family. But I 
mean, if it doesn't work out, I don't want to lose my son because me 
and him can't work it out. [To Davel I mean. we'll try, won't we? 
But if I say to Dave it hasn't worked and it's no good - I've still 
got no feelings for you, I still don't love you - I can't come here 
and then say, "Well yes, I do love Dave; we're working out as a 
family", just so that I can keep my son. I'd have to tell the 
truth, but I wouldn't want to lose Matthew for good. [ ... ] 
The figure of the Team Manager would seem to represent the authority of 
the State Apparatus within whose discourse both the family and (to some 
extent) the therapist are subjected or "trapped". For the therapist, it 
is not clear how much this apparent subjection to the dictates of the 
"very strict" manager is just a strategic manoeuvre, so that she herself 
does not come to be seen as the embodiment of that 'power over' the 
family. or whether the management structure of the department means 
that. in a very real sense, she too cannot seriously question the terms 
of the discourse that is imposed. 
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Angela is devastatingly clear about what she thinks she is expected to 
do in order that they may be seen to be "working out as a family". At 
the cost of denying her true feelings, she understands that she not only 
has to construct herself in the position of 'competent mother' but also 
as 'loving wife', if they are going to be allowed to construct 
themselves once again as an independent family unit. Dave seems willing 
to defer to this outside authority - but may feel that he stands to gain 
if Angela can be reconstructed as a 'loving wife' for him (however 
phoney this is). By contrast, for Angela, the consequences are, to say 
the least, "a bit rough": she stands to be locked back into the position 
of 'loving wife' and sex object (as constructed by Dave) , the very 
position of being subjected to oppression, violation and isolation that 
had previously driven her to suicide. It is interesting that, despite 
the implied sanction that she will be separated from her child, she is 
clear that she will not live the pretence that she understands is 
required of her: "I'd have to tell her the truth" even though she 
"wouldn't want to lose Matthew for good". 
T: What we'd like to do is, when Matthew is with [foster parents), we 
all meet up once a week and we'll look at those sorts of things. 
And I think, for us, 'getting on' means a whole load of things. It 
doesn't always mean that you have to love each other. We'll just 
perhaps look at the areas where you do get on and the areas where 
you don't get on. 
A: [Interrupting] But what's going to happen to Matthew? This is all 
I'm worried about - with me and Dave not seeing eye to eye in that 
fortnight. Will Matthew be took off me because me and Dave can't 
see eye to eye? Surely we can still pull together even if me and 
you don't get on, can't we? 
T: I suppose a lot depends on whether you decide to live together at 
the end of that time. 
A: I mean, we don't get on now, but we're still together. We do some 
things together. It's not that we're always apart. 
T: And some people can work out that sort of arrangement where they 
live together and provide a caring, comfortable ... 
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A: [Interrupting] Being together - it does help the kids because we are 
together, we're not split up. I mean, I have gone through divorce 
proceedings between me and Dave, but I haven't actually filled the 
form in or given any marriage certificate. So therefore you can see 
they are waiting for me. So I mean, we are trying. [ ... 1 
The discourse of the Team manager, as mediated through the therapist, 
enables Angela to explore only a very limited range of alternatives. 
For example, she is not offered the poss1bility of separating from Dave 
and reconstructing herself (with or without Matthew) within the overall 
subjectivity of a one-parent family. Instead, all the therapist can 
offer her are various modifications of her existing partner subjectivity 
that still construct them "together" as parents. While no longer having 
to "love" Dave, she is limited in the therapist's discourse to the 
various positions that might be denoted by "getting on", which the 
therapist later qualifies as comprising the "sort of arrangement" that 
will "provide a caring, comfortable" family atmosphere. Angela complies 
and constructs herself within this ideology ("We are trying"), dutifully 
identifying herself with the shared assumption that "it does help the 
kids because we are together" and citing her inability to fill out her 
divorce papers as evidence supporting this. 
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SESSION 5 
T: Have you been able to visit Matthew? 
A: We went Sunday. It didn't go off very good, Sunday. C ••• l He was 
miserable, crying, and he didn't speak to me whatsoever at all. 
T: How did you understand that? 
A: I'm used to it really. 
T: So there hasn't been any difference. 
A: No. It hurt, but I took no notice and kept talking to him, trying 
not to let it show. C ••• ] 
T: He's in quite a strange situation at the moment. Did you see him as 
being different to the way he is ... 
D&A:[Simultaneously] He's happy there. 
A: He's really happy and he's not naughty for them whatsoever. C ••• l 
T: [To Davel Do you think that he's not getting as close to Angela as 
you would have expected? 
D: I'd have thought it would have got better myself, but it doesn't 
seem to. He's drifting a lot further away. 
A: [Interrupting] I mean, he called me a pig. He was very rude, wasn't 
he? He kept saying "Stupid Daddy" and things like this. He was 
really rude and I said, "If you don't pack it in, I'm going to smack 
you". I said, "There's no need for that", so I gave him a whack. 
[ ... ] 
Within Dave's discourse as head of the household, Matthew's reception 
into Care was both to "learn him a lesson" (reimpose control over him), 
and as a "break" for both Matthew and Angela, which would somehow lead 
to their rediscovering their positive feelings for one another. What 
seems to have happened so far corresponds to Dave's worst fear. Matthew 
is manifestly thriving within the alternative family organistion into 
which he has been inserted: he is "really happy" and this is actually 
giving him support to continue to resist within the punitive discourse 
set up by Dave (and Angela). It is now far safer for him to be angry, 
"rude" or "miserable" with them. What is lacking is any emotional 
support for Angela to be able to hear and deal with his anger as an 
obvious and appropriate response to his being sent awaYi instead she 
feels so powerless herself that she only perceives it as yet another 
"hurt" in Matthew's' battle' for emotional supremacy (" I'm used to it") 
- a similar battle to that which Dave had already won at her expense. 
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T: So you're feeling shut out again. 
A: I'm still feeling the same because it takes him 20 minutes to half 
an hour before he'll talk to me. 
T: Does anyone else shut you out like Matthew does? 
A: [Pausel I dunno. [Points towards Davel Only him over there. 
D: I don't shut nobody out. 
T: [To Angela) You feel that Dave does. How does he shut you out? 
A: I dunno. Me and him still ain't getting on, so [laughs] I still 
feel shut out at the moment - not having Matthew there - I mean the 
house is that quiet. 
[Angela and the therapist move back to discussing Angela's feelings 
for Matthew and the distance between them.] 
The therapist is able to use the disruption of family subjectivity, 
(caused by Matthew's absence) to help Angela to experience how she had 
been projecting on to Matthew her sense of being "shut out" when, 
ultimately, these feelings related to Dave. She finds that she misses 
her contact with Matthew: with "not having Matthew there ... the house 
is that quiet". This brings into stark relief how little contact she 
receives from Dave: "Me and him still ain't getting on". However, this 
insight is not sustained or used as an opportunity to raise and deal 
with the issues of the partner relationshipi instead it seems that it is 
easier and safer for the therapist to go with and become part of the 
existing organisation of family subJectivity and focus on the 
relationship between Angela and Matthew as if that were the crucial 
issue. 
A: I talk to our Mum and that lot about it, and she says, "Don't worry 
about it" and I tell her that Matthew - about the visits and how 
Matthew's been and she says. "Oh, he'll come round to it". And I 
seen Sheila [Foster Motherl and she asked me and I told Shella and 
she said that's to be expected anyway. But somehow I can't get on 
wi th Sheila. I'm not being horrible, but she's all Dave: "Have you 
seen it through Dave's eyes?" and this, that and the other. ( •.. ) 
I said, "What about somebody looking through mine?" I says. "I 
really feel - but nobody listens to know how I feel, how me and 
Matthew are", I said, you know. No offence to Dave, but she was all 
Dave. That was it. She didn't want to know what I wanted to say, 
so I just lost my temper with her in the end and she could see I was 
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getting upset and ratty, and I'm afraid, if she hadn't gone in, I'd 
have lamped her one. 
T: So you couldn't make her understand how upsetting this is for you, 
what it feels like to be you, Angela, not being able to get close to 
your son. 
A: Yes, to her it didn't seem nothing. It was, "Have you looked at it 
through Dave's eyes" or, "Have you ever looked at it through 
Matthew's eyes" and I says, "How about somebody looking at it 
through my eyes - how I feel - never mind Dave or anybody else: me". 
But no, she wouldn't have it. [ ... J 
Angela has turned for support to the various women with whom she is in 
contact, but found that no-one offered her much empathy (this may also 
apply to some extent to the way the therapist has responded so far). 
Instead, each has tried to subject Angela within her own particular 
discourse. Her Mum is unwilling to share her emotional pain to do with 
her estrangement from Mathew and sees his behaviour as unproblematic: 
"Oh, he'll come round to it". More oppressive for Angela is Sheila's 
response. Sheila would seem to operate from an unquestioned acceptance 
of patriarchal ideology: Angela, as the woman, is made responsible for 
the maintenance and organisation of family subjectivity at the emotional 
levelj it is her duty to empathise with every male within the family, to 
think and feel for them, and to construct her own subjectivity in such a 
way that their needs are always met at the expense of hers. Sheila's 
own insertion within this form of feminine subjectivity would tend to be 
reproduced and reinforced through the activity of fostering. 
In response to Angela's plea for someone to "look through my eyes", 
someone who "listens to know how I feel", the therapist offers only a 
guarded an oblique reply, since, within a systemic approach, offering 
empathy and support to one member of the family would be seen as over-
identification and undermining the therapist's manoevrability. Instead 
-409-
The Watk1ns family 
of being able to offer something of herself - to say, "1 want to know 
how you feel" - the therapist keeps the issue at a distance: "So you 
couldn't make [Sheila] understand how upsetting this is for you". The 
therapist subjects Angela in her reply not as a woman in her own right, 
but only as a mother "who is not being able to get close" to her son. 
T:What I'd like you to do, Angela and then Dave, is to tell each 
other how it feels. Tell Dave how it feels for you. 
A: How I feel - so shut off from him, I mean, not being able to 
communicate with him - you know, like the girls are able to give me 
love back - not being able to have Matthew to sit by me and cuddle 
me, teling me he loves me and things like this. This is what I 
don't think they understand. He's so cold 1 can't even get that 
close even though 1 do try. I don't like being nasty to him and 
shutting him off, but it's just because 1 don't get nothing back off 
Matthew. He doesn't want to know me. 
T: So you feel there's ... When you're getting that love ... 
A: [Interrupting] I'm not getting nothing - there's nothing there. 
It's as if there's just something there and it's stopping us 
communicating together, but what that is, I don't know. But I don't 
get no love off him. His Dad has to ask him - well, to say, "Do you 
love your Mum?" - it's him that's telling Matthew to say it, it's 
not Matthew that's saying it himself. Matthew doesn't give me no 
love, but he doesn't give me kisses, he doesn't sit by me. Like, if 
I'm run down, the girls will come and say, "Are you all right, 
Mummy?" and offer and that lot. I don't get any of that off Matthew 
- there's nothing there. 
The therapist attempts to set up a dialogue between Angela and Dave at 
the level of feelings. Angela selects to express her feelings towards 
Matthew rather than Dave <perhaps lacking suffiCient support from the 
therapist to risk disclosing her real experience of the marital 
relationship). However, the way that she talks about her frustration 
with Matthew, she might as well be talking about a partner relationship: 
what she is missing from Matthew (no mention of Dave) is for him "to sit 
by me and cuddle me, telling me he loves me and things like that". 
Interestingly, Dave does not seem threatened by Matthew being invited 
into the vacant position of 'spouse'; on the contrary, he actively tries 
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to set his son up by pushing Matthew into saying that he "loves" his 
mother, and thereby almost acting as a proxy for him. 
Whereas Matthew appears powerful enough within the gender organisation 
of family subectivity to resist being subjected in this position ("He 
doesn't want to know me"), the girls apparently willingly accept being 
subjected in the position of 'mother' to their own mother: "Like if I'm 
run down, the girls will come and say, 'Are you all right, Mummy?' and 
offer that lot". This may be the most effective way, within the current 
organisation of family subjectivity, for them to have much closeness 
with their mother. The girls otherwise only occupy a very marginal and 
incidental position, and are hardly mentioned at all within a family 
discourse that is heavily patriarchally dominated. Overall, we may see 
how Angela and Dave are themselves so powerless and needy that, in a 
paradoxical way, they actually use their power base as parents in order 
to compete for the available Child subject pOSitions within the 
organisation of family subjectivity. 
T: So, when you don't get that, you begin to feel nasty? 
A: Yes I do, and if he plays up and then he pushes me, then that's it: 
I let loose, but not just on Matthew, I take it out on the other two 
as well. I don't mean to, it's just that he builds me up that much. 
D: [Interrupting) You've forgotten one - me. 
A: Well yes [waves hand dismissively] I take it out on everybOdy. 
T: And then you said that Dave sometimes comes into this: Dave 
sometimes says, "Tell your Mum". 
A: [To Dave] Well you do, don't you? 
D: Well, I say that to Matthew. I says, "Go on, go on and say that you 
love your Mum and give her a kiss - it will make her feel better". 
But Angela knows that I've sent him in to do those things. But ... 
A: [Interrupting] I can't do it. I just say, "No", because it's not 
Matthew doing it. I say to Dave, "You've told him to say that", so 
therefore I don't kiss Matthew and I won't hold him because I know 
damn well that somebody's asked him to come and do it. If he'd just 
do it on his own - but he has to be told to come and kiss me or to 
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say that he loves me. [ ... 1 He won't do it on his own - like the 
girls just come up and kiss us anyway. [Pause.) 
Rather than risk occupying the partner position himself (and perhaps be 
found wanting>, Dave inserts Matthew in his place with instructions on 
how to give Angela a kiss and "make her feel better". This does not 
fool Angela who is well aware that xatthew is not acting spontaneously 
but has been sent: "It's not Matthew doing it". However, her plea, "If 
he'd just do it on his own", would more appropriately have been directed 
at Dave - but it is Matthew, and not he, who then gets the brunt of 
Angela's anger at the lack of emotional support that she is receiving. 
Hiding behind Matthew in this way, Dave manages to appear wronged and 
hurt when some of this anger actually spills over on to him (having 
already engulfed not just Matthew but the girls as well). Angela's 
continued projection of her feelings onto Matthew would indicate that 
she remains insufficiently supported to be in touch with her feelings 
towards Dave. Moreover, unless this process is confronted, Matthew's 
subjectivity will continue to remain distorted and abused as a 'decoy' 
or 'scapegoat' within the family organisation. 
T: So Dave, how does it feel for you, what is it like through your 
eyes? 
A: [Interrupting) With Matthew. 
D: I know. Well, to me, he's frightened of Angela. He's scared stiff 
of her. That's how I see it. All right, Angela's the two girls 
most of the time and Matthew gets pushed to the one side. But he's 
frightened of Angela, in case Angela hits him hard. She hits the 
others, but she hits xatthew harder than she hits the other two, and 
I think that's why he's so cold against Angela. Because Angela 
can't give no love towards him, because he's a disappointed child _ 
or something like that - so he's probably thinking the same: "If she 
ain't going to give me no love, I ain't going to give her no love". 
So that's why he's the way he is - through my eyes. 
T: I see. So you would guess that Mathew is thinking the same things 
as Angela: "If my Mum can't give me any love, why should I give her 
any?" and Angela is thinking, "If Matthew can't give me any love, 
why should I give Matthew any love?" 
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D: I mean, I want him to love Angela. I don't want to keep going up to 
him and saying, "Love your Hum". It's the only way I can get him to 
do anything. l .•. ] 
[Therapist is called out for consultation. Videotape runs out.] 
Dave neatly redefines the question once again: instead of speaking about 
his feelings towards Xatthew, he speaks "through Xatthew's eyes". As he 
had done before, Dave uses Xatthew as a 'mouthpiece' on to whom he can 
project what are probably his own feelings of rejection and revenge: "If 
she ain't going to give me no love, I ain't going to give her no love". 
Over and above projecting these feelings on to Xatthew ("So that's why 
he's the way he is - through my eyes"), Dave relocates the issue of 
violence, away from his 'domestic sieges', and on to Xatthew being 
"scared stiff" in case Angela "hits him hard". Using Xatthew's subject 
posi tion ("his eyes") allows Dave to speak from the refuge of an 
apparent Victim position, from which he does not have to take 
responsibility for his own violence. The therapist is unable to sustain 
the purpose of her original question and instead goes along with an 
organisation of family subjectivity in which Dave does not have to 
declare his feelings and all 'problems' are located solely in the 
relationship between Angela and Xatthew. 
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SESSION 6 
[The session starts with Angela reporting an improvement in 
Matthew's behaviour towards her. He has shown her some spontaneous 
affection the previous evening when they visited. There follows a 
discussion of arrangements for Matthew coming home.] 
T: Great - they'll all be back together again. And the other piece of 
homework, I think, was to - you were going to think about what you 
said - it was this thing about when Dave came home from work, wasn't 
it? And he felt the pressure of having to tell Matthew to come and 
say sorry, or come and kiss you and say he loves you. 
A: Yes. 
T: And that didn't work for you because you knew it wasn't coming from 
Matthew and we wondered how Dave should deal with that - whether you 
had any ideas about .•. 
A: [Interrupting) I told him just to talk to Matthew when he come in, 
but not to say, like, "Go and kiss Xummy" , and hoping that he will 
do what he did last night - he'll probably do - well, I hope he'll 
do - in the future. I mean, I'm not going to push him or anything: 
I'm not going to expect miracles straight away. [ ... 1 
There would seem to have been a significant change in the organisation 
of the parenting subjectivity following the discussion in the previous 
session. This seems to have enabled Angela to insert Dave into a Parent 
position alongside her rather than undermining her: "1 told him to talk 
to Matthew when he come in, but not to say, like, 'Go and kiss Xummy'". 
This is clearly empowering for Angela, and it also has a knock-on effect 
on the overall organisation of the family subjectivity: it stops Dave 
pressuring Matthew to occupy the vacant 'spouse' position, allowing him 
instead to return to transacting from Child positions. This may well be 
the key to his being able to relate spontaneously, as a ch1ld, when they 
came to visit him. However, this restructuring of the parenting 
subjectivity does not, in itself, empower Angela any further as a person 
in her own right within the organisation of the partner subjectivity. 
T: How about you two, anyway? Did you think of the three things 
together that you wanted to talk about? 
D: I forgot all about it until Angela said, coming over here. 
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A: Well, I did mention it, but I think we forgot about it with all the 
excitement over Matthew. [Pause.) But I'm not fussy what Dave 
wants to talk about. 
T: Well, are you feeling that you need to discuss your relationship at 
the minute? 
D: No, I'm all right at the moment. 
T: You've had a lot of ups and downs in the past. 
A: Yes. [Pause. Angela looks at Dave.] 
T: Is that something that you've got to think about? [Pause.) 
A: I suppose we have, yes. I don't really know what to say at the 
moment. I've been all Matthew, reallYi I haven't bothered with us, 
really, have I? 
D: [Grunts] Yes. [ ... ] 
T: How did you imagine we'd spend the time today? [Pause.] 
A: Dunno. [Angela laughs and then Dave joins in.l 
D: Well, I imagined it would be about Matthew coming home, that's all. 
A: Well, I know that you were going to discuss us, because you said, 
like, on Monday, but I forgot to ask him the questions - because I 
didn't mention it until tea-time, coming over here. So he didn't -
so you didn't think about it, did you, until you was coming over. 
T: So it sound like you've had a busy three days and maybe you haven't 
had time to discuss that together, or think about whether you want 
to discuss it, and, if you do, what you want to discuss. Would it 
be helpful to give you five minutes together now, on your own, in 
private, just to think about it? 
A: Yes, if you like. [Therapist leaves them with paper and pens.] 
It emerges that the therapist had set them some homework to do with the 
marital relationship, but that Dave had "forgot all about it". He 1s 
clearly unmotivated to discuss such issues, either feeling threatened or 
not seeing anything in it for himself: MI'm all right at the momentM. 
Thus when Angela Mdid mention it" to him, he was not receptive, and she 
may have felt powerless to take it further. However, in the presence of 
the therapist, Angela is sufficiently empowered to be able to overrule 
Dave and accept, on behalf of the partner subjectivity, the therapist's 
suggestion that they do the work in the here-and-now. 
T: 
A: 
D: 
T: 
[The therapist restarts the session with an intervention from the 
consultant which congratulates them on what has happened with 
Matthew, but warns them that "miracles can't happen overnight".] 
Where did you get to in your discussions? 
[Laughs nervously] Not really. 
Not really very far. 
Is there anywhere to get to? 
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D: Only that Angela doesn't want to know me. 
A: I just don't think it will work between me and Dave, still. I still 
don't think it will. He wants to try. 
D: [Raising voice) But you don't want to. As far as you're concerned, 
I can just go and clear off. 
A: Don't say it like that. 
D: [Raised voice] It's true. 
A: I've never said that at all. 
D: [Raised voice) All right, you've never said it in so many words. 
It's just that I'm not wanted. 
A: I never said that neither. Don't start an argument in here. 
D: Why not? 
A: You've asked me to try and I've turned round and said, "I don't 
know" . As far as I know, it still won't - might still not work. I 
mean it hasn't worked out for us now. I said I just can't change my 
mind, just like that. 
D: Nobody said you'll have to. I've never said you have to anyway. 
Attempting to renegotiate the terms of their subjectivity in the absence 
of the therapist, Angela and Dave seem to have remained stuck in their 
deadlocked positions. Angela's pessimism and defensiveness suggests 
that she remains alienated within a discursive structure that prevents 
her from articulating her deeper feelings or what she wants for herself 
(whether inside or outside the relationship). Her choices are still 
constructed for her by Dave; it seems still to be "love" on his terms, 
or the ending of the relationship. Thus Dave is able to translate her 
inability to "love" him <in the way that he desires) into "Angela 
doesn't want to know me ... I can just go and clear off". In the 
presence ot" the therapist, Angela struggles to break out of this 
discourse ("I've never said that at all"), but all that she can say on 
her own behalf is "I don't know". Sadly, she is not offered any support 
in this struggle by the therapist. 
D: I said I'll wait. 
T: How long are you prepared to wait, Dave? 
D: As long as it takes. 
T: Does anyone know how long it's going to take? [Pause.) 
A: No. [Pause.] 
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T: Is it satisfactory not to have a time limit - it could go on for 
ever and ever like this? 
D: No, I'm going to make sure that it don't go on like that for ever 
and ever, even if Angela don't want to give it a go. 
T: How are you going to do that? 
D: I don't know. [Pause.) I'm going to have to try not to be jealous 
and whatever it is - possessive - that she keeps saying I am. I'm 
going to have to try, I suppose. [Pause.) 
T: So these - jealous and possessive ... 
D: I'm jealous and possessive. I don't like it when she goes out all 
the time. That's how I start arguments because I'm jealous. [ ... ) 
It's like if she goes to her Mum's and they say, well, they've got a 
do coming on and they say, "Tell Dave, it will be all right". I 
just don't like things like that all the time. I know it doesn't 
happen all the time - but half the time it does. 
T: So how often does it happen? 
D: It hasn't happened just lately, but when she does go out with her 
Mum and with her family, I keep thinking things in my head - what's 
she doing, who's she going with, is she with any lads - things like 
that, and it just builds up inside me and, when Angela comes home, I 
pick on her and say. "Who was you with, and kissing?" and things 
like this. I'm so jealous, you see. C ... ] 
Rather than supporting Angela in making sense of her pOSition, the 
therapist chooses to explore Dave's side of things, but in a way that 
deconstructs his control over the terms of the discourse - ones that 
have, until now, defined Angela as the unreasonable one. From the 
position of being able to wait "as long as it takes" for Angela to come 
around to his way of thinking, he comes to realise that he is powerless 
"to make sure that it don't go on like that for ever". From this paint, 
he starts to acknowledge that it is he who may need to change his 
position if they are to reform as a partner subjectivity. He begins to 
recognise that his "jealous and possessive" attitude is extremely 
oppressive to Angela and. as he talks, it becomes clear how much it is 
simply a reflection of his internalisation of patriarchal ideology. 
While he can exercise the choice of being part of a peer group 
subjectivity as well as the family (for example, when he went out with 
his mates after the birth of Matthew), a similar choice is not open to 
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Angela within his understanding of a 'normal' marriage. His sense of 
control over family and partner subjectivities is profoundly threatened 
by Angela going out and enjoying herself as part of the organisation of 
her family of origin, without even seeking his permission first. As 
soon as she is out of his control, even for a short time, he immediately 
assumes that she must be subjecting herself in relation to another man. 
A woman in her own right (or a married woman choosing to act as part of 
her family of origin), are subject positions that cannot be 
conceptualised within his internalisation of patriarchal discourse. 
D: I'm in love with Angela and I care, but Angela's not in love with 
me, you see. I don't know if she cares. She says that she loves 
me, but not in the way that somebody, who loves somebody, should. I 
don't know what she means by that, but .•. 
T: Have you ever asked her what she means by that? 
D: No, no. [Looks thoughtful.] 
T: Would you like to ask her? 
D: She wouldn't answer me anyway, [laughs) would you? 
A: You never try, do you. 
D: True, I never try. It's like you say, when you come home I have a 
go at her. I had a go at her last night. [ ... ] 
T: Do you do anything right for Angela? 
D: No, I'm doing everything wrong. 
[Dave goes over again with the therapist how he reacts when Angela 
goes out with her family.] 
Having temporarily moved out of the terms of the patriarchal discourse, 
Dave is more open both to his own experience and, to a limited extent, 
to that of Angela. From his uncertain new pOSition, he begins to be 
aware that "love" could mean something different for Angela, although he 
still sees his definition as right (ideologically sanctioned) and hers 
as wrong: "She says that she loves me, but not in the way that somebody, 
who loves somebody, should". The therapist encourages Dave to find out 
more about Angela's experience of "love", and to risk his own 
vulnerability by asking her directly. Had he followed this through, 
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this could have profoundly changed the organisation of their 
subjectivity, opening up the possibility of transacting at the level of 
emotionality. Instead, he retreats into a Victim position and, avoiding 
any real responsibility for his side of the relationship, he blames 
himself in a grandiose and unrealistic fashion: "I'm doing everything 
wrong". In this position he appears so helpless that when he states, 
"True, I never try" he is not challenged by either Angela or the 
therapist, and he is thereby able to avoid the therapist's invitation to 
speak to Angela as an equal partner. 
T: What puzzles me is that - I don't know whether it puzzles you - but 
we hear fron Angela that it's not going to work between the two of 
you - it never will - and that several times in the past she's 
thought about leaving, and she has in fact left, and yet she's still 
here. That puzzles me. 
D: No, but I ... It's a bit towards me, I suppose. I mean, I go down 
and beg for her to come back - say I'm sorry and it won't happen 
again. But as soon as I've been drinking, it starts up again. 
T: What starts up again? 
D: Me picking on Angela. [Pause.] 
T: Have you asked Angela what she would like ... 
D: [Interrupting) No, I ... 
T: If she would like you to be any different? Maybe she likes you 
being like this. 
D: No, I don't think she likes me, [looks at Angela] especially when 
I've had a drink of beer. [Pause.] I'm nasty when I've had a 
drink. I don't mean to be evil, but next day she says, "Do you 
remember what you said?" I can't remember half the things I've 
said, so, practically, it's all beer talk anyway, but Angela 
remembers everything I said, [to Angela] don't you? 
The therapist returns to the issues of the partner subjectivity, and 
invites Dave to sort out her "puzzle" by imagining what might be going 
on for Angela - again placing him in the position of having to take her 
experience seriously. He becomes less confident at speaking for her and 
starts to own some of his responsibility in bringing about the breakdown 
of their partner subjectivity. He describes a pattern whereby he 
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switches to the Victim position (Ill go down and beg") in order to set up 
Angela in the conventionally feminine position of Rescuer <having him 
back) so that he can, once more, persecute her from a position of 
patriarchal power (11 It starts up again... Me picking on Angels"). It 
is perhaps a mark of her disempowerment (perhaps more so at the level of 
emotional than of material relations) that he is repeatably able to sway 
her decision with such a transparent deception. Building on the greater 
openness in the organisation of Dave's subjectivity, the therapist 
invites him to risk a dialogue at the level of emotionality: "Have you 
asked Angela what she would like?" Again Dave baulks at entering into 
thiS, and instead speaks for Angela to prevent her speaking for herself. 
However his greater openness is reflected in the way that, rather than 
just impose his construction of her subjectivity, he more nearly sees 
the issue "through her eyes". 
T: 
A: 
T: 
A: 
D: 
A: 
T: 
A: 
D: 
A: 
T: 
A: 
So how would you like him to be different, Angela? 
As 1 told him - he's just jealous and possessive and all he used to 
think about was just one thing. [Pause.] 
Between the two of you, or between you and someone else? 
(Laughs) No, between me and Dave. 
Nobody else. (Laughs.] 
I mean, if 1 was to stop in with Dave, he doesn't talk to me, he's 
all the telly. If you sit by him, he just mauls you. He just 
doesn't leave you alone, d'you know what I mean? He just sort of 
mauls you. You can't sit by Dave without him touching you. I 
dunno, he just mauls you. 
And that doesn't feel right to you at the time. 
No, I think there's more to life than sex and everything. I said to 
Dave, "1 ain't a sex machine". 
I never said you was. 
But that's the only time he's nic'e is when he wants it. But after 
he's had it, that's it. 
So it feels a bit mechanical. 
It just feels - I used to feel that he used to want me just for sex 
_ that was the only time he was nice to me. Then, that's it - when 
he's got what he wants, that's it, back to square one. 
-420-
The Vatkins family 
The therapist abandons trying to enable Dave to make contact with Angela 
at the level of emotionality and instead offers Angela support to 
express herself directly. Angela speaks of the issue that is probably 
even more oppressive for her than Dave's drunken violence: his sexual 
abuse of her, constructing her as the object of his sexual activity, his 
"sex machine", without making any genuine contact with her at the level 
of emotionality or discourse - "He doesn't talk to me, he's all the 
telly. If you sit by him, he just mauls you". The only contact that he 
does make at other levels is itself abusive - being "nice" only as a way 
of getting sexual favours from her and then abandoning her "when he's 
got what he wants". 
T: And are there times when you want sex? 
A: No, it doesn't interest me. I mean, he often keeps saying I'm a 
lemon. [Pause.] I mean, a lot of people do [laughs in 
embarrassment] because I just don't like it, it doesn't interest me. 
I don't know whether I'm scared in case I catch again for another. 
I mean, I'm only 25 and I've got three kids nOWj I'm struggling now. 
T: Do you think it is that? 
A: It could be. It just doesn't - I don't enjoy it. 
T: So it's not just fear of catching for another child, it's that you 
don't enjoy it too. Or maybe the two are somehow confused together? 
A: It could be, yes. It could be just the way Dave does it. I mean, 
he doesn't do it friendly, he just attacks it, he's like a bull. I 
mean, everything that Dave does is so rough - he's not gentle at 
all. It's just as if he's thinking of himself and not me. 
T: I see. So it doesn't seem like you're sharing very much. 
A: No. [Pause, looks at Dave] He just attacks everything. He probably 
doesn't mean to, [smiles] but I mean, he's just rough. 
Angela reveals the extent to which her desire has come to be so 
reconstructed within patriarchal ideology, that it is no longer 
recognisable to her as something that belongs to her. Sexual activity 
is something that she is forced to do, but "it doesn't interest me". As 
a woman, she is firstly constructed as a sexual object by which men may 
achieve their gratification: "He just attacks it ..• It's just as if 
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he's thinking of himself and not me". But also, even more oppressively, 
she must construct herself as a sexual subject, as someone who actively 
desires men (and only men) and whose desire is simply the reflection of 
men's desire: a desire for physical arousal through contact at the level 
of activity only, without significant contact at the levels of 
emotionality or discourse. When she fails to construct her desire in 
the requisite manner ("I don't enjoy it"), Dave immediately locates her 
within the structure of patriarchal ideology as 'deviant': as a lesbian 
(a "lemon"). This vividly demonstrates how sexist and heterosexist 
ideologies interlink in the patriarchal oppression of her desire. 
T: Does it feel like a sharing for you, Dave, or how does it feel for 
you? 
D: [Looks embarrassed, squirms in chair and smiles] I mean, I don't 
even know things like that ... [Mutters inaudibly.] 
T: Have you ever talked about this together before? 
A: No, not really. [Pause.] 
T: Shall we continue to discuss it. Would you like to discuss it a bit 
more? [Pause.] 
A: If you want to look at it. [Looks at Dave.] 
D: I ain't bothered if you ... [Pause.) I'm probably no good at it 
anyway. [Smiles.] 
T: It seems to me that we have one person here saying that you don't 
like sex, and it seems that Dave has shown that he does like sex. 
A: Yes. 
D: It wouldn't be right if I didn't like it. I mean... I mean. I 
could be gay. I mean. if I didn't have it with a woman, people 
could think, "He's probably gay then. having it with blokes." 
T: So you're worried how people see you. 
D: No, because I've never talked to anyone about it. 
T: People don't find it an easy subject to talk about. 
D: They all boast about it at work, "Oh I had a good ride last night 
with my missus" and it's the same thing every day at work, "And how 
about you, did you?" and things like that. I just walk away and let 
them get on with it. [ •.. 1 
It is now revealed the extent to which Dave's own desire, as a (working 
class> man, is constructed for him as 'phallic' within patriarchal 
ideology. Sexual activity, so constructed. does not allow for any 
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sharing, or even any awareness of intimate feelings: "I don't even know 
things like that". Again when challenged at the level of emotionality, 
he retreats into the role of Victim, inviting the therapist to rescue 
him: "I'm probably no good at it anyway". Sadly, the therapist misses 
the opportunity to support Dave in learning about Angela's version of 
"love", and hence perhaps to enrich and empower his own transactions at 
the level of emotionality (and be able to offer some mutuality in the 
organisation of the partner subjectivity>. Instead, she rescues him by 
redefining the situation, in conventionally patriarchal terms, as one 
between "persons", one of whom "does like sex" and the other does not. 
Issues of gender difference are excluded from this discourse and the 
meaning of "sex" itself is rendered 'common-sense' and unproblematic. 
Faced with the sudden disappearance of the therapist's support, Angela 
has little choice but to agree with her and hence implicitly accept that 
the issue is about "sex" rather than "sharing". With the terms of the 
discourse now on more familiar ground, Dave is able to explain the 
forces that determine the construction of his 'masculinity' within his 
everyday experience as a working class man. He is subjected within an 
ideology that compensates for a collective experience of subordination, 
under the relations of capitalism, by an exaggerated domination of those 
in weaker structural positions under relations of patriarchy: women and 
gay men. His desire is constructed for him as 'phallic', excluding the 
possibility that he might feel attracted to other men, or that 
tenderness might emerge as part of the expression of his desire towards 
women: his sexuality becomes reduced to the terms of "a good ride". 
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T: Do you think that this is an important problem in your relationship? 
A: According to Sheila it is, but I can't see any difference, and, I 
mean, Sheila shouldn't come out with things the way she has told me 
anyway, I mean, bringing her own personal life into it. I mean, I 
told her that I didn't like sex and this, that and the other, and 
she says, well, nor does she, but she does it with her husband -
even if she has to lie back and think of England, she still does it. 
[The therapist laughs and then Angela laughs.] 
She said that you've just got to try and she reckons that's all 
that's the matter between me and Dave. 
T: And do you agree with her? 
A: No. I don't know about Dave. [Looks over to Dave.l 
T: D'you think that it is important for a person to ... for sex to be 
part of their ... 
A: I suppose it is, yes. 
T: D'you miss it in any way at all? 
A: No. [Pause.] It doesn't worry me - I know I'm not a lemon - I 
ain't after women. It just doesn't interest me. [Pause.) I 
suppose it's because I've got no feeling - much feeling - for Dave, 
that's probably why I don't do it. 
T: Do you think that if you had feeling for Dave, then it would come 
naturally? 
A: Probably, yes. 
T: And do you think that within you it is there, but you need to warm 
to the situation - you need the right circumstances for that to 
happen? 
A: I don't hate Dave. But I don't love him. 
T: Do you think that people have to love each other to live together 
happily? 
[There follows a general discussion of whether people need to love 
each other to live together, or to have sex with each other.) 
Angela's aside about Sheila demonstrates the pervasive ideological 
influence of the Care apparatus: not only did she have to reform their 
parenting subjectivity in line with the 'model' foster family, but she 
was also pressured to reconstruct herself within the partner 
subjectivity. However, Angela is now sufficiently empowered to start to 
be critical of the emotional price that Sheila appears willing to pay in 
order to construct herself as a 'woman-as-object' - the signification of 
the 'model' wife that is specified within patriarchal discourse. Angela 
alsO wants to know where Dave now stands on this: "I don't know about 
Dave", but the therapist does not allow space for her to get an answer. 
Instead, she returns to the terms of the patriarchal discourse of "sex". 
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Nevertheless, Angela manages to re-insert "feeling" into this discourse, 
suggesting that this might explain why she did not want "sex" with Dave. 
Although the therapist gives some limited support to this modification -
making connections between Angela's "feeling" and her present 
"circumstances" - she does not set up terms of discourse that enable 
Angela to speak her desire directly. Angela is stuck between "hate" and 
"love", but neither seem to signify her true feelings towards Dave. The 
therapist's notion of a desire that "would come naturally" seems to miss 
Angela, perhaps since it provides no opportunity to consider any past 
experiences of (sexual) abuse and how these might have so distorted and 
destroyed her desire that she has no access to any forms of sexuality 
that feel in any way spontaneous. At this pOint, perhaps fearing to get 
into such issues, the therapist suddenly shifts the transactional level 
from emotionality to that of discourse - to a discussion about how 
people live in general. She hints that maybe they could reconstruct 
their partner subjectivity in a way that would allow them "to live 
together happily" without having to confront such difficult issues. 
[The therapist takes a break for consultation and then returns.) 
T: [Reading) We've been talking again and what we want to say to you is 
that we hear what you are saying about sex, but we are not sure who 
out of the two of you is most worried about getting close. Dave 
tries to get close, but he is worried about being rejected. If 
Angela tries to get close, you're worried about getting pregnant and 
we know that women can often go off sex after having a baby. What 
we wanted to say to you both is that we can see that there's a lot 
of uncertainty and we wondered whether you could give each other 
comfort without sex. But then we thought that maybe this is not the 
answer. 
A: Is that it? 
T: That's it. 
A: Oh. [Laughs.) 
D: I was waiting for the rest. 
[The therapist goes over the intervention again and offers an 
appointment for the next week. They agree to this, although they do 
not in fact keep the appointment.) 
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The main aim of the intervention would seem to be to introduce terms 
such as "getting close" and "giving comfort" instead of "sex" within the 
partnership discourse. This is done within a strategic-style framework 
that does not pin down the position of the therapeutic team: they 
simultaneously suggest that Angela and Dave "give each other comfort 
without sex" and that "maybe this is not the answer". Rather than 
challenge the family's belief system overtly, a technique of suggestion 
is employed in order to slip in certain new possibilities for 
structuring the partner subjectivity in less conventionally patriarchal 
terms, which could be less oppressive for Angela in that they would 
enable some transactions of emotional intimacy to take place. 
These new concepts do not refer to, or take account of, experiences of 
abuse or differentials of power in defining the emotional organisation 
of the partner subjectivity. Indeed the overall terms of the discourse 
remain conventionally patriarchal. It is expected that men will want 
"sex" <albeit as a way of getting close), but they face rejection from 
women who have excuses for not offering it ("~omen can often go off sex 
after having a baby"). Thus the content of the intervention, together 
with the manner in which it is delivered, fail to give Angela any real 
support or understanding, either in dealing with her past experiences of 
oppression, or in renegotiating the terms of her current relationship. 
As long as these issues remain unaddressed, any possibility of real 
change in the organisation of the partner <and hence the family> 
subjectivity would seem remote - as this would depend on dealing with 
the power relations that underlie their individual and collective 
breakdown at the level of emotionality. 
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SESSION 7 (8 MONTHS LATER) 
(A male student, Simon, acts as co-worker during this session.] 
A: Who's going to start? 
D: He is. (Points at Simon.) Simon is. 
S: No, I'm not going to start. You know what's happened, I don't. 
D: Well then, Angela, fire away. 
A: Well, me and Dave are going through a divorce. We're going to fight 
for custody of the kids on (). I have got the kids at the moment, 
but at the moment they are playing me up like anything because they 
don't want me, they want their Dad. I've shoved it and ignored it, 
but it's getting out of hand - it's just getting worse and worse. 
So I seen Dave, Monday, explained to Dave exactly how the kids were 
playing up and how I felt - was there anything he could do to help? 
( ... 3 I've rung my solicitors to tell them I've written a letter to 
Dave explaining that I couldn't cope with the kids any more - I'd 
had enough. Dave reckons it's an easy way out for me, because he 
reckons that I just want to muck about with Bill. It isn't. I 
can't cope with them no more. He knows because we all sat there 
that day, me Dave and Bill. I mean, Bill's tried to help. He's 
even explained to Dave exactly how the kids have been. ( ... ] 
T: You and Dave met up together on Monday night to discuss this. 
A: Well I rang up his works and asked him to come down and talk, yes. 
The presence of a second male worker has an immediate impact on the 
power dynamics of the session: there is an assumption of control by the 
two men. Dave is able to appoint Simon, as the man, to start the 
session (although Simon is effectively a stranger to the family>. It is 
only after Simon declines this offer that Dave gives permission to 
Angela to "fire away". This manoeuvre constructs Angela as speaking 
within, and on behalf of, an overall organisation of family subjectivity 
which is still controlled by Dave. Nevertheless, what then emerges from 
Angela's account is a number of significant changes in this 
organisation. Their separation does not, of itself, constitute any 
fundamental Change, since they were only barely organised together as a 
partner subjectivity before. However, it does seem to have had a major 
impact on their construction as a parenting subjectivity. Although 
initially saddled with the main responsibility for the children - a 
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continuation of the existing organisation of family subjectivity _ 
Angela seems now to have inserted herself into a more independent 
position, from which she can actually request that Dave take over the 
main responsibility for parenting. This is something that would 
probably have been impossible, had they still been living together. 
Although situating herself as powerless to negotiate with the children 
over their expressed demands that "they don't want me, they want him", 
she does seem qUite assertive and empowered in the way that she took the 
initiative in setting up a three-way meeting between herself, her new 
partner and Dave, and then put her proposal to him. 
T: So, Dave, is that the way you see it? What did Angela say to you on 
Monday? 
D: She just asked me, will I take the kids - in so many words - and I 
said I'll have to think about it. It'll take about three months _ 
if I have the kids, it will be in about three months time, as I 
explained to you. But I've made the decision. I'll have the kids 
and I'll keep on working and do the best I can and I'll look after 
them. But it won't be until three months as I've explained to her. 
T: Yes. So how far was that a definite plan between the two of you? 
Were you able to make that a definite plan between the two of you? 
A: No. 
D: No, I said I'll tell her today. Well, I've been thinking all week 
and I went and seen the missus - we talked it out and she 
understands. 
T: Who understands? 
D: My girlfriend. She's having a baby as well, see. So we come to a 
decision and said, all right, fine, we'll sort it out. 
T: So you checked it out with her because you see her being involved in 
the planning? 
D: Yes. I'm not going to pack her in just because I've got the three 
kids now. I mean, Angela's got her life and I've got my life. I 
can sort it out and enjoy myself, so there's no way I was going to 
give her the elbow. 
From his post ion in patriarchal ideology, Dave was clearly taken aback 
by the challenge to the gendering of their parenting subjectivity, not 
just in the content of Angela's request but by the way that she 
delivered it: not pleading or apologising for herself, but asking 
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directly, "in so many words", from the position of an equal parent. If 
Dave had responded immediately, he would have allowed her to be in 
control of family decision making and, most importantly, in a position 
to pass over all chi1dcare responsibility to him. This would have 
constituted an exact reversal of the organisation of their parenting 
subjectivity and an effective loss of patriarchal power for Dave. He is 
clearly not willing to lose his position, so by imposing a three month 
delay on his own terms, he retains overall control ("I've made the 
decision") and restates the underlying message that his needs and his 
convenience must come first ("I can sort it out and enjoy myself"). 
However he acknowledges that, while they still may be subjected together 
as parents, Angela is no longer bound up as part of his partner 
subjectivity: "Angela's got her life and I've got my life". It is 
interesting to see the position into which he slots his new girlfriend: 
he does not seek to incorporate her within a parenting subjectivity, 
either in addition to, or as a substitute for, Ange1a. Instead, he 
locates her solely within the organisation of a partner subjectivity. 
(There is a discussion about accommodation, schools and custody 
arrangements, then the therapists are called out for consultation.) 
T: Sorry we've taken quite a while, but we've really had quite a lot of 
trouble, Simon and I, convincing our COlleagues behind the screen 
here that it's all going to be as straightforward as you're telling 
us it's going to be. Our colleagues think that you've made the 
right decisions on the whole, but each of them has some grave 
doubts. One colleague, who has worked in a children's home, said 
that what you've seen so far with the children's reactions is only 
the tip of the iceberg. (Doubts are then expressed about hOusing 
matters and Dave's childcare arrangements.) We thought that unless 
you were able to convince them about those sorts of things in Court 
- thinking of you, Dave - that that sounds like someone who is not 
sure what he wants. And although we accept what you're saying about 
waiting for those three months - the various things you've got to 
see to - I don't think the Court would wear that so readily. And 
then the other colleague wanted to know, when the children play Dave 
up and want to go back to their Mum - and, you know, it's our 
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experience that all children in this situation will want to do that 
- what will Angela and Dave do then? And this colleague ended up 
saying that these children will come into Care sooner or later. 
[Pause.) I must say, I'm beginning to wonder that myself. 
This intervention delivers a very mixed message, one which gives Angela 
and Dave some small affirmation as a parenting subjectivity ("Our 
colleagues think that you've made the right decisions overall"), but 
which uses a variety of figures of authority (each "colleague" and "The 
Court") to cast doubt on whether they are acting sufficiently 
'responsibly' as parents for the planned reorganisation of their family 
subjectivity to be acceptable within external discourses: "These 
children will come into Care sooner or later". The overall tone is 
punitive: the power accorded to the authority figures effectively 
reaffirming their disempowered class position. It is possible that, as 
before, the negativity of the intervention is intended to be empowering 
in a paradoxical waYi it may be so designed as to force Angela or Dave 
into the position of being angry in defence of their children, thereby 
reconstructing the emotional aspect of their parenting subject1v1ties 
and demonstrating their emotional 'fitness' to be seen as parents. 
No attempt is made to facilitate or support the emergence of any 
emotionality. None of the emotional issues to do with the separation 
are recognised as belonging to Angela or Dave, but are prOjected solely 
on to the children, who are thereby set up to express, not just their 
own distress, but also that of their parents: "What you've seen so far 
with the children'S reactions is only the tip of the iceberg">. Rather 
than supporting or enabling any reorganisation of family subjectivity, 
this intervention places the whole family in a trap in which any such 
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expression of distress by the children forces Angela back into the very 
partnership with Dave from which she is trying to free herself: "When 
the children play Dave up ... what will Angela and Dave do then?" 
A: Well, that's what I said, because, at the moment, I'm struggling 
now. Bill's put a claim in for me and the three kids, but, at the 
moment, all that I'm getting is Family Allowance because they've 
stopped my book. But, I mean, I haven't got nothing for them at the 
moment. I'm struggling... I haven't got any money. 
[Angela goes into details of her financial situation.] 
T: Well, somebody's got to take responsibility for these children [ ... l 
A: I mean, Bill took me and my three kids on - well, he was trying to, 
but it don't seem to be working. I mean, Bill keeps putting me off 
it and saying, "Try and cope", and I just can't cope. I mean, Bill 
doesn't want me to do it, but Dave just thinks I'm dOing it to get 
out of it - which I think everybody does, but I ain't. I mean, if 
they were in my situation and see what I'm going through, you might 
understand. It's a pity the kids ain't here, because I'd love them 
to explain to you exactly how they feel - on their own, without me 
or Dave here - and then you'd see it. But I can't last out for 
nearly three months, I know I couldn't. [ .•. l 
The intervention leads Angela to have to justify, even harder, why she 
(and Bill) are unable to subject themselves as parents any longer. She 
explains how the State Apparatus of income maintenance forces her into 
economic dependence on men and, even then, lets her down so badly that 
she is actually unable to establish the requiSite family subjectivity 
with Bill. The therapist's reply - "Well, somebody's got to take 
responsibility for these children" - implies that she is failing (once 
again) to take on the ideologically prescribed position of 'mother'. 
Caught by the ideological force of this coming from another woman, 
Angela is no longer able to suppress her feelings entirely, and, for a 
brief moment, she implores anyone (preferably the therapist) to 
understand "what I'm going through". She then switches <in line with 
the intervention) to put the children forward as the only family members 
whose feelings are likely to be heard within the current discourse. 
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A: It just doesn't seem to be working no matter what I try for them. 
[Raises voice] I can't win either way. This is why I asked Dave for 
his help and I can't see why I'm in the wrong. I mean, if Dave 
can't help me, [looks to therapist] I'm asking you if you'd help. 
T: Right. When do you need this help to start from, Angela? 
A: I suppose when it is all over in the Court. Well, it's got to start 
from now, because we're getting nowhere now. We ain't gone to Court 
yet and I don't know what's going to happen in there. 
T: And what do you think is the worst that could happen if you don't 
get ... 
A: [Interrupting] I mean, the way I'm going on and the way Dave's going 
on, they'll put them into Care anyway. I've been told that. 
D: [Interrupting] What d'you mean, lithe way I'm going on"? I ain't 
done nothing. If [woman known to them] can cope with her three 
kids on her own, you can. 
A: She ain't coping with them, [ ] is. (Pause.] 
T: What about the comments my colleagues, Dave, made about the things 
that the judge in the Court will want to know about? [ ... ] 
A: Dave's got to prove to them that I'm an unfit mother, because that's 
what he's got me down for. 
D: I've got you down for it because you are and you know it. 
A: Well if I am, then you have the kids, if I'm an unfit mother. 
D: . I don't understand why you're struggling, Angela. You did all right 
when you lived in [ ], so ... 
A: Well, if I'm struggling all right, why am I an unfit mother? 
D: You know that. (Pause.] 
A: Well, I tell you what, [Angela gets up from her chair and walks over 
to Dave, who looks up at her but keeps his arms folded; she pOints 
her finger at him and her voice rises to a scream] you have the kids 
because I can't fucking cope! [Slams door and leaves the room.] 
[Dave and the therapist sit in silence for about two minutes.) 
Without even having the children present to express anger and hurt on 
her behalf, Angela is placed in a position of sheer desperation. She 
starts to scream at some of the injustice of her position. She 
questions why, within the current discourse, Dave seems to have a right 
to expect her to help, but this does not work the other way around: 
"This is why I asked Dave for his help and I can't see why I'm in the 
wrong". She then asks the therapist directly for her help, but, 
although the therapist seems to be responding positively, she never asks 
Angela what help she actually wants for herself. In the absence of any 
clear recognition from the therapist, Angela shifts her ground and 
adopts the terms of the therapist's childcare discourse as a way of 
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expressing the urgency of the situation: "The way I'm going on and the 
way Dave's going on, they'll put them into Care anyway". 
She no longer attempts to subject herself within the terms of 
patriarchal ideology and ascribes equal responsibility to Dave for what 
is going wrong with their parenting, rather than blame it all on 
herself. This leaves her very vulnerable, and dependent on the 
therapist to support such a statement against the inevitable counter-
attack by Dave, who is able to draw upon all the assumptions of 
conventional ideology: "What d'you mean, 'the way I'm going on''? I 
ain't done nothing. If [ ) can cope with her three kids on her own, you 
can". In the event, the therapist does try to subject Dave as an 
<equally> responsible parent by reminding him that he will have to 
demonstrate his potential competence in Court. However, Dave is able to 
use the ideologically loaded term "unfit mother" to restore a power 
hierarchy between himself and Angela - one that defines her as still 
responsibile for childcare but simultaneously connotes her as 
'inadequate". Angela fights unsuccessfully to find her own way through 
this double-bind: "You have the kids if I'm an unfit mother", but finds 
herself trapped and alone. Her only remaining choices are to submit or 
to explode, and the force of her emotionality directs her into the 
latter course. Her explosion of feeling, although appearing dramatic 
and stunning the others into silence, is not a powerful act. It is a 
manifestation of breakdown: an expression of hurt and defeat, not a 
triumphant victory over her subjection in an intolerable position. 
T: I don't know where we go from here. I think I'd like to go and see 
Angela and see how she is. There are still things to talk about the 
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children, aren't there? It doesn't feel to me that that is resolved 
satisfactorily. [Pause.] What do you think that Angela was saying 
then, Dave? I mean, she said you could have the children. What did 
she mean by that? 
D: I think she said I could have them right now. 
T: I got that impression. 
[Door opens and Linda comes in crying. Dave comforts her on his 
knee. The therapist goes out to see Angela who returns after a few 
minutes. Linda gets down and goes round table to Angela but does 
not make contact with her and comes back to sit on Dave's knee.] 
T: Dave, one thing we heard you say to Angela was that she was an unfit 
mother, and then you said to her, "You have the children". That 
seemed like a contradiction, really. Why do you expect her to have 
the children if she's an unfit mother? Can you explain that? 
D: No. [Pause. Dave takes Linda's hat off for her.] 
T: Would you add anything to that? What are your observations on that 
comment? 
D: I shouldn't have said it in the first place. (Sounds close to 
tears] I haven't come here to upset Angela, I haven't come here to 
upset the kids. I shouldn't have said nothing. 
[Dave goes on to reminisce about how he supported Angela while she 
was living in a mental health rehabilitation hostel before they were 
married. ] 
To start with, both Dave and the therapist seem to be too stunned to 
respond to Angela's outburst of emotion - indicating just how far she 
had moved out of her accustomed (and expected) range of subject 
positions, and had transgressed the rules of the family subjectivity 
that had excluded any such direct expression of feeling. After some 
moments of trying to maintain transactions at the level of discourse 
("there are still things to talk about the children"), the therapist 
goes out to give support to Angela and to help her to return. At the 
expense of making herself emotionally vulnerable (as the only one who 
has exposed her hurt and desperation>, Angela has finally convinced Dave 
and the therapist that she is at breaking-point and has forced Dave to 
take seriously her request for him to have the children right away. 
This marks a (temporary> shift in the organisation of the family 
subjectivity (when Linda checks this out, she finds that it 1s Dave who 
will now provide for her immediate care). Still keeping the lid on any 
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acknowledgement of feelings, the therapist confronts Dave with the 
inconsistency of the ideological position that he had been imposing on 
Angela. This shifts Dave from his position of patriarchal power into 
one where he actually comes near to expressing his own vulnerability 
(starting to cry). However, he still manages to avoid dealing with the 
recent emotional conflict. He chooses the much safer ground of 
reminiscing about a time when Angela was not angry with him, but was in 
need of his support (which he had been able to offer). 
[Simon talks to Dave about how good it is that a father wants to 
have custody and discusses possible arrangements. The therapists 
are called out for consultation.] 
T: I'll read this out. It's to you and I. Simon. "The team think that 
we're pushing Dave too fast and too hard. He would be a strange 
sort of man if he wasn't scared to take on the full care of the 
children and taking them away from their mother. He realises that 
things have to be thought out carefully and slowly before the 
children are moved. so that everyone knows where they stand. At the 
same time. we can sympathise with Angela's frustration". [Pause.] 
Does that fit in with the way the two of you were feeling? 
D: Yes. 
A: Dave was hoping that everything would be solved today. yes. 
[Further discussion of practical arrangements with Dave sticking to 
the need for a three month delay.] 
T: Do you think we've managed to sort everything out in today's 
session? 
[Dave is sorting Linda out with some drawing paper.] 
A: No, not really. It's still the same. We still don't know what's 
happening. [Pause.] 
T: Would you agree with that, Dave? 
D: If she wants money to keep her going. I'll keep her until I sort 
myself out. [Wipes Linda's nose for her.] 
T: So you're asking for time to sort yourself out. 
A: I don't mind giving him time. it's just that I'm not giving him 
three months. 
T: So what would be a compromise? 
[Further negotiation results in a compromise of two months and all 
arrangements are agreed.] 
A: That's fine with me. 
T: That's fine with you? 
A: Yes. [No further family sessions are arranged. 
offered individual follow-up and support. 
offer was taken up.] 
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In the event, neither 
The Vatkins fa1lJily 
The intervention serves to reinforce the shift in the organisation of 
parenting responsibility within the family subjectivity for which Angela 
had been asking - albeit out of desperation rather than out of any sense 
of positive choice. As a consequence of this, all but the last line of 
the intervention is directed towards Dave as the newly emerging 
'responsible' parent. Thus, having abdicated from the subject position 
of 'mother', Angela is now effectively marginalised: she has lost the 
only role that gave her any significance within the organisation of 
family subjectivity. 
The intervention starts with a "one-down" manoeuvre that tells the 
therapists off for "pushing Dave too fast and too hard", apparently 
placing them on a more equal power relationship with Dave. The purpose 
of this may have been to counteract the authoritarianism of the previous 
intervention, and to establish Dave in the position of a careful and 
responsible parent. The process of his taking on "full care of the 
children" is reconstructed within the patriarchal imagery of a heroic 
'capture'. However, this contains a covert message encouraging him to 
be more open with his feelings (as he will be taking on the position of 
'mother' as well as 'father' with respect to his children): he is given 
permission, as a man, to feel "scared" that he is taking his children 
"away from their mother". Positive connotation is used to reframe the 
way that he has put his needs first as acting "carefully and slowly 
so that everyone knows where they stand". This offers Dave a basis for 
negotiation that creates the impression that he is operating from the 
position of a responsible parent, a connotation of his subject position 
that, he acknowledges, "fits in with" the way he is feeling. 
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Nevertheless, it is unclear whether the strategic elements of this 
intervention will provide sufficient support for Dave to be able to 
maintain the position of 'responsible parent' for very long. It would 
seem that it has done little more than to bolster up an illusion of 
competance and responsibility - one that is based on so little real 
substance that it could break down at any time. There has been no 
thorough examination of the material, ideological and emotional aspects 
of how he will sustain this new organisation of family subjectivity -
one that stands outside the conventional structures of patriarchy. 
For Angela, her future subjectivity must inevitably be constructed 
around the notion of being an "unfit mother" - a connotation that could 
only have been challenged by a proper examination of all the material, 
ideological and emotional factors that had so far denied her the 
resources with which to care for her children (or to have anything for 
herself in her own right). The therapy had failed to address the issues 
underlying her powerlessness: it was "still the same" between Dave and 
herself. However, she did seem to be empowered, albeit on a temporary 
basis, when the therapist supported her in negotiating a "compromise" on 
the arrangements. Although the concession of a month to someone already 
at breaking point would seem to be of little value, the fact that she 
found herself sufficiently important to have some impact on Dave's 
position was probably of far greater significance. The question that 
remains is whether, had the therapist used a different approach 
throughout, and offered more direct support to Angela, would she still 
have opted for this particular outcome, or could she have been empowered 
to renegotiate her relationships with Dave andlor the children? 
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This research must be seen as a preliminary step in constructing a 
framework of critical theory by which to analyse the organisation of 
(and shifts in) family power relations - both leading up to and during 
the process of family therapy. My conclusions fall into two sections: 
an evaluation of the usefulness of the theoretical framework 
(conclusions for theory), and an overview of those elements of therapy 
that may have emerged as particularly empowering or disempowering 
(conclusions for practice). As was discussed in the Chapter on 
Methodology, this research has primarily been geared towards the former 
task, so any conclusions with respect to practice must be seen as only 
being of a preliminary nature. 
Evalyation Of the theoretical framework 
To borrow Lynn Hoffman's phrase, the choice of a theoretical framework 
is an "art of lenses" (1990 p.l). However, while she uses this term to 
describe the multifarious viewpoints by which 'reality' may be viewed 
(as in a constructivist approach), I will use it in a different sense. 
If the metaphor is followed through, it may be seen that it is only one 
specification of lens that will bring a particular issue into focus. 
The purpose of this research was to test out whether a framework of 
critical theory could provide a suitably operational "lens" through 
which to identify shifting patterns of power relations within the 
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context of three different family case studies. Although clearly in 
need of refinement and further development, I would consider that this 
framework has served to bring certain issues of power relations into a 
sharp focus - a focus which would have been impossible using any "lens" 
derived from systems theory. Perhaps the single most important outcome 
of this research has been to highlight how issues of power may be seen 
to be fundamental in structuring the organisation of families and also 
in influencing their experience of distress and breakdown. 
The organisation of each of the three families did not seem to reflect 
much possibility for empowerment based on internal relations of 'power 
together', either within the family as a whole, or within constituent 
subjectivities <e.g. the partner subjectivity or the women-of-the-
family). Our only glimpse of such a possibility was in Lesley Xorton's 
momentary solidarity with her mother in resisting the oppressive demands 
of her brother. By and large, from the evidence of the transcripts, 
these families may be seen to be structured mainly on the basis of 
relations of domination and subordination. A possible inference that 
may be drawn from this is that it may be preCisely because of this lack 
of 'power together', that these three families suffered breakdown - a 
breakdown that was focused on the degree of powerlessness and lack of 
recognition experienced by particularly vulnerable family members. 
From the material that is available from the transcripts, it is the 
power relations of patriarchy that stand out as having the most obvious 
impact on familial organisation, in terms of instituting power 
hierarchies based on gender and generation, and on an ideology of 
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heterosexism. In each family studied, there is strong evidence of the 
coercive domination of women and children by the male head of the 
household, although this is less overt in relation to the Korton family. 
This instance demonstrates that it is not simply the actions of 
individual men that are the source of the domination of women and 
children in families, but it is their insertion into the wider 
structures of patriarchy that renders, even such an apparently reluctant 
tyrant as Frank Korton, so all-powerful in relation to his wife. 
Evidence on the impact of class position figures less prominently in our 
raw material, since the focus of the therapists' questions has tended to 
be on intra-familial differences <where class is generally not an issue) 
rather than on the family's subjection within class-based structures of 
ideology, economic activity and welfare. Nevertheless, certain issues 
of class do emerge, for example, in the significance of the children 
having private education to the overall power position of Faith Hirst. 
Using a class perspective, one may note the relative ease with which the 
Morton and Hirst families had been able to construct their 
subjectivities in line with bourgeois expectations of autonomy - even 
though both families had problems in establishing their separate 
identities at the outset, being forced to live as part of a parent's 
household. By contrast, the Watkins family would seem to occupy a 
significantly lower class position - what Rapp would define as "hard-
living" working class. They would seem never to have been able to 
establish themselves in the bourgeois manner, instead remaining an 
integral part of wider networks of social support in order to survive -
including both extended family and State Apparatuses. It was the terms 
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of their engagement with the latter that demonstrate most vividly the 
extent of their disempowerment in terms of their class position. What 
is missing from these case examples is any data on the significance of 
racist oppression in determining familial organisation, and the 
possibilities for individual and collective empowerment within that. 
At the heart of the theoretical framework is the dialectical concept of 
'subjectivity'. This mediates between the external structuring of an 
already existing array of potential subject positions, and the specific 
ways in which a family or family member may negotiate, at anyone 
instant, a repertoire of subject positions through which they may 
express, develop and satisfy (some part of) their various desires and 
abilities. It is this dynamic that provides an alternative "lens" to 
that of systems theory: one that provides a language by which to speak 
of organisation, but does not reify or mystify the 'whole' 
('individual', 'family' or 'society') as an entity-in-itselfj one that 
deconstructs a given organisation so that it may be seen, not as somehow 
natural and pre-given, but as arising out of a particular set of power 
relations and struggles. What may be observed, in relation to each of 
the case studies, is the way in which families and family members move 
in and out of, renegotiate and are trapped by, the array of subject 
positions that exist for them given their structural position within the 
social formation. Whereas the concept of • system' implies an ideal of 
harmony against which a particular 'dysfunctional' organisation is 
judged, the concept of 'subjectivity' highlights the specific sacrifices 
and distortions that are reqUired in order to participate in a 
particular context within an oppressive social formation. 
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From a systems perspective, the organisation of the Korton family would 
simply be seen as 'dysfunctional', with a number of family members 
displaying symptomatic behaviour due to the lack of a conventional 
hierarchy of authority within the family. Using the concept of 
'subjectivity', the breakdown of the Korton family may be seen to relate 
not only to Frank's inability to insert the family subjectivity into a 
patriarchally defined slot, but also to the absence of any subject 
positions available within the family which allowed Kary any significant 
degree of recognition or self-expression. It may be seen that it was 
this combination of factors that resulted in the children being inserted 
into their particular subject positions and adaptations - as 'carers', 
'minders' or 'peace-keepers' - ones which neither offered them 
sufficient possibilities for expressing their own desires or capacities, 
nor enabled them to participate unproblematica1ly within the accepted 
structures of the social formation. The intervention of the therapist 
served to modify the only 'problem' in power relations that was apparent 
with the "lens" of systems theory: Frank's failure to impose patriarchal 
authority over Derek and the children. What becomes clear, with the 
perspective of subjectivity, is how oppressive this 'restoration' of 
authority could be for other family members, and in particular for Kary. 
It is thus possible to weigh the advantages in terms of social survival 
to be gained by conforming to this required 'blueprint' against the cost 
in terms of internal repression and subordination that this may entail. 
The theoretical framework comprises not just the overarching concept of 
subjectivity, but also some understanding of specific subject positions 
that is derived from psychoanalysis and Transactional Analysis. While 
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the distinction of ego-states has been useful as a descriptive tool. 
they have not. in themselves. proved to be of great analytical value in 
exposing the underlying power relations in any of the case studies. 
However. from Lacan and the object-relations school. we have derived 
concepts that can expose the stereotypical positions into which women 
and men are inserted within a patriarchal social order: how men are 
inducted into some variant of the position of domination ("The Name of 
the Father" or "The Phallus"). while women are conSistently constructed 
around various split objectifications (good/bad. mother/sex object). 
We saw how. under pressure. Martin Hirst fell back to a position of 
impersonal but unquestioned authority ("The Name of the Father") in his 
dealings with his wife and son - a position whose ideological 
legitimation was so powerful at an unconscious level that he was able to 
count on the male therapist's instant agreement that "that sort of thing 
has to be wiped out". Dave Watkins. like Frank Morton. seemed to be 
uncomfortably aware of the existence of the signification "The Name of 
the Father". but unable to take on such a position for himself. 
However. in his discussion of issues of sexuality. Dave showed how his 
desire was constructed in terms of "The Phallus". a desire which seemed 
to alienate him just as much from his own feelings as it did from the 
'object' of his sexual actiVity. Angela. 
Fai th Hirst was most dramatically placed in the position of "bad" object 
by her three year old son when he urinated over her. However. in a more 
subtle way. she had already been placed in a similar position (that of 
'bad mother') by her husband. who was able to subject her to the full 
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force of patriarchal ideology for not exercising 'proper' control over 
her son. Demonstrating the pervasive operation of patriarchy, it was 
primarily the State Apparatus of Social Services (whose key 
representatives were all women) which forced Angela Watkins into the 
'bad mother' objectification, although it was Dave who actually threw 
the term" unfi t mother" at her during the final session. It was Dave 
who constructed her as the object of his 'phallic' sexual desire - as 
the feeling-less object to which he could be "rough" and insensitive 
when he obtained his pleasure (although Angela was also invited to take 
on this objectification in the discourse of the foster mother, Sheila, 
who herself 'willingly' excluded any aspect of her own desire when she 
chose to "lie back and think of England"). 
Other elements of the theoretical framework focus on matters of process 
- the constantly changing pattern of transactions taking place within, 
or external to, the family subjectivity. These both reflect, and at the 
same time reproduce, a specific organisation of power relations, whether 
they be of 'power over' or 'power together'. Reformulated from its 
origin in Transactional Analysis, the concept of 'role' has emerged as 
especially revealing in terms of an analysis of power relations. The 
case studies illustrate how transacting from role positions can serve to 
perpetuate existing inequalities in power by getting in the way of any 
genuine renegotiation of power relationships. For example, even by 
recourse to the Victim position (the one with least potential for 'power 
over'), Dave Watkins was able to slide out of any genuine renegotiation 
with Angela or the female therapist over what might be meant by "love". 
In general, the existing power structure may be seen to be reflected in 
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family members having differential access to specific role positions. 
We saw how Xartin Hirst was able to switch into the role position of 
Persecutor in order to maintain his 'power over' his son, whereas Faith 
could only compete with Colin for the much less powerful Aggressor 
position. Similarly, given the vacuum of patriarchal power within the 
Morton family, while Derek was engaged in a pattern of mutual rescuing 
with his mother, it was he and not she who was able to switch into the 
role of Persecutor (when she had failed to slice the bread in exactly 
the right way>. 
The texts of the transcripts only give a small proportion of the 
available clues concerning the operation of driver-adaptations. These 
provide a means of analYSing how, on a minute-by-minute basis, 
individual subjectivities come to be distorted as part of the overall 
organisation of a family subjectivity. As we saw with the Morton 
family, these distortions may be gender-related. Frank and Derek would 
seem to have moved into adaptations such as Be Perfect and Be In Control 
which, while blocking much of their capacity to express themselves, 
nevertheless sustained them in positions of effective 'power over' Mary. 
By contrast, within the organisation of family subjectivity, Mary only 
had recourse to adaptations, such as to Please others, which only 
reinforced her position of subordination. Of particular interest is the 
different implications of the Be Strong/Keep Quiet adaptation for men 
and for women. Whereas this adaptation served to exclude any feeling or 
vulnerability from the organisation of Martin Hirst's subjectivity, 
enabling him to act from the position of 11 The Name of the Father", the 
passive version of the same adaptation rendered Angela Watkins passive 
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and "depressed" - not having access to her feelings actually exaggerated 
her state of powerlessness. 
While it is not clear from the transcript whether the breakdown of the 
Hirst family could be conceptualised in terms of an exaggeration of such 
adaptations, this perspective would seem to be of value in analysing the 
breakdown of the Morton and Watkins families. The 'protest' behaviour 
exhibited by Derek Watkins (his obsessional routines), and by Angela 
Watkins (her "depression" and attempt at suicide), may both be 
understood as driver-adaptations taken to the extreme, so that instead 
of their leading them to 'fit in' with what was expected of them (at the 
expense of their own self-expression), the exaggerated adaptations 
placed them beyond the pale of bourgeois subjectivity. 
Connected to the concept of driver-adaptations, is the differentiation 
of transactional levels into activity, discourse and emotionality. It 
may be seen how the dominant adaptations of the men in each family (Be 
Perfect, Be In Control, Be Strong) accorded with the establishment of 
discourse and rationality - talking about activity/behaviour - as the 
transactional level at which each family conducted itself in relation to 
an outsider (the therapist). It was generally only in resposnse to 
deliberate interventions by the therapist that the transactional level 
shifted to allow any expression of feelings. In working with the 
Mortons, Minuchin only permitted the entry into the session of certain 
(conventionally masculine) emotions such as frustration and anger, but 
not the (feminine) emotions of vulnerability, sadness or hurt. With 
both the Hirst and Watkins families, the respective therapists made real 
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efforts to open up the possibility of transacting at the level of 
emotionality but, in each case, it was only the woman who took advantage 
of this, whereas the man retreated deeper into personality adaptations 
that cut off any awareness o:f' even having feelings. It may be seen that 
such a transactional imbalance served to maintain an overall imbalance 
of power, with only the women having revealed any vulnerability. 
The reformulated concept of projection is of value in analysing why, in 
all three families, it fell to a child to 'protest' about their mother's 
distress and powerlesness, and signal to the outside world that the 
family could no longer carry on with its current internal organisation. 
We saw how projection, taking place in a context of unequal power, 
resulted in pre-school children becoming the reCipient of feelings 
displaced from the oppressive organisation of their parents' partner 
subjectivity. In the course of the session, Faith Hirst had to put 
forward Colin as being in danger that "he will be hurt" in order to gain 
some recognition, within the terms of a male-dominated discourse, for 
her own feelings of being "on the edge". Dave Watkins revealed how he 
effectively used Matthew as a 'human shield' to soak up Angela's anger 
at the way that her needs were being totally discounted within their 
partner subjectivity. Both Faith Hirst and Angela Watkins may be seen 
to have projected on to their sons many of the attributes that actually 
related to their husbands, in particular the possession of patriarchal 
power. At some point, each constructs her son as if he were (or should 
be) mature enough to display the idealised attributes of a partner that 
actually offered her the recognition that her real partner failed to do. 
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Ioward$ an empowering practice in family therapy 
Given that the methodological emphasis of this research has been on the 
processes of change within therapy rather than on final outcomes, no 
categoriC conclusion may be reached as to the value (or otherwise) of 
family therapy as an enterprise, or of specific forms of intervention, 
in terms of shifts in power relations that may (or may not) be sustained 
outside the therapy sessions themselves. Nevertheless, we are in a 
position to look at the impact of various interventions on the minute-
by-minute organisation of family power relations within the context of 
the therapy sessions, and thus to reach preliminary conclusions as to 
whether family work may have the potential to empower oppressed and 
vulnerable family members, andlor to empower the family as a whole in 
relation to external structures - if such changes could be sustained 
when the family is resubjected within the prevailing discursive, 
economiC and emotional structures of their everyday living. 
All three therapists made certain interventions that would seem to have 
had an impact on intra-familial power relations. By forming strategic 
alliances with Derek Morton's siblings, Minuchin was able to empower 
them in their dealings with their brother, enabling the substitution of 
transactions of mutuality (including having arguments) instead of their 
being silenced by the exercise of his "tyrannical" or "manipulative" 
power. However, by contrast, Minuchin overtly modelled the position of 
"The Name of the Father" and, used this to coerce Frank into taking such 
a position of 'power over', both in relation to his wife and to his 
adul t children. 
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The student therapist achieved an immediate and empowering impact on the 
minute-by-minute organisation of the Hirst family, both when he 
addressed Faith as a woman in her own right (in relation to her work 
experience), and when he asked Martin how he felt about domestic and 
childcare matters. These moves offered Faith and Martin the possibility 
of transacting in previously prohibited ways - ways that, with further 
support from the therapist, could perhaps have opened up for them the 
possibility of a fuller and more mutual transactional repertoire within 
the organisation of their partner subjectivity. This would also have 
required Martin to give up some of his patriarchal power over Faith. In 
turn, any reduction in Martin's use of "The Name of the Father" position 
would probably have been reflected in a knock-on transformation of the 
terms of his relationships with the children - thereby also releasing 
Faith from her burden of having to exercise his patriarchal power by 
proxy, in the suppression of the desire of their son. 
What is less clear is the impact, empowering or otherwise, of the formal 
interventions that were delivered to the family. Although they 
highlighted issues of inequality, they were not grounded in any 
awareness of wider patriarchal <and other) power structures because of 
their formulation within a systemic analysis. The absence of such an 
understanding made it extremely difficult for Faith to achieve any 
significant renegotiation of her position. By exposing only one part of 
the picture, there was a danger that she would see her inability to 
change as her own personal failure - as resulting from the 'inadequacy' 
of her personality. The interventions also sought to alter family 
members' collective view of themselves - so as to connote their internal 
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differences in a positive light. This does seem to have been reflected 
both in an acceptance that some conflict could be 'healthy' - increasing 
the possibility of dissident voices being heard within the organisation 
of family subjectivity - and a shift in the power position of the family 
as a whole in their sense of being able to participate in external 
discourses: Faith is left encouraged that her family could be considered 
"normal". However, the empowering effect of this for Faith is mitigated 
by the fact that little has been done to address her personal 
oppression, particularly within the context of the partner subjectivity. 
The female therapist achieved some success in confronting the oppressive 
form of "love" that Dave Watkins was demanding, and in enabling Angela 
to start to articulate her own very different experience. However, this 
was not sufficiently supported in order to achieve any fundamental 
change in the power relations between them at the level of emotionality: 
Angela was still left with the choice of enduring further emotional and 
sexual abuse or going for a separation. <However, this exploration may 
perhaps have empowered Angela to make her later decision to leave Dave.> 
The degree of personal support or recognition that the therapist was 
able to offer to Angela seemed to be limited both by the remoteness that 
derived from her systemic style of working <and her consequent inability 
to commit herself on issues of oppression), and by her being situated as 
part of the childcare apparatus of the Social Services Department, one 
which had been, and was currently, involved in making punitive 
judgements as to whether or not Angela was performing as a 'fit' mother. 
Again, it difficult to assess what was the overall impact of the various 
formal interventions. The earlier interventions had an almost punitive 
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tone and, whether or not they were designed to elicit an angry reaction 
(and hence perhaps stir up a motivation for change), their actual impact 
did little to shift the powerlessness shown by Angela, and by the family 
subjectivity as a whole, in dealing with their oppression and distress. 
An overview of these case examples suggests a number of issues that 
would need to be addressed in the development of a more politically 
sensitive practice. Firstly, there is the issue of the location of the 
therapist(s) with respect to structures of class, race and gender. 
While the case studies do not provide any data on issues of race, they 
do provide some pointers as to the impact of the class position and 
gender of the therapist. It was in relation to the work with the 
Watkins family, that it became apparent that the therapist <and her 
consultants) were actually located as part of an Apparatus of State 
control which placed them in a position of oppressive 'power over' the 
family. This was reflected both in the punitive tone of some of the 
early interventions, and in the authority vested in the Team Manager to 
determine how Angela should construct her emotionality towards Dave in 
order for them to be viewed as a potential parenting subjectivity. 
The different subject positions open to male and female therapists are 
illustrated when the female therapist is joined by a male student for 
the last session of her work with the Watkins family. Despite her long 
working relationship with the family, she was immediately overlooked in 
the opening discourse, with Dave turning to the student to open the 
session. In his style of working, Minuchin used his masculinity as a 
model and as a competitive challenge in his dealings with the male 
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members of the Morton family (and also modelled how to put down and 
marginalise Mary). A female therapist would not have had access to the 
range of patriarchally sanctioned subject positions that he employed so 
as to exert 'power over' various family members. Using his access to 
positions of male power in a different way, the therapist with the Hirst 
family was perhaps able to challenge certain of the patriarchal features 
of the family organisation, for example in inviting the man to say how 
he felt about what was going on in the home. Such a question from a 
woman might more easily have been dismissed - a dismissal that would 
have been sanctioned by the prevailing assumptions of patriarchal 
ideology. Situated within such power relations, there would seem to 
have been occasions in which the female therapist fell into the position 
of colluding with Dave Watkins (for example, on the issue of his 
violence). However, at other times, she was able to use her confidence 
at addressing emotional issues to help him to compare his 
internalisation of ideology with his more personal experience, and hence 
to open up a discussion of issues of emotional intimacy in a way that 
neither of the male therapists even attempted. 
While, inevitably, therapists may start from positions of power relating 
to their role within a professional agency and their wider positions 
with regard to structures of race, gender and class within the social 
formation as a whole, some steps may be taken to confront the issues 
that may arise from this. For example, some degree of 'matching' may be 
desirable, so that those family members suffering oppression are offered 
the opportunity of working with someone who shares at least some of 
their experience. This would be more likely to be achievable if the 
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therapy is offered by co-workers who embrace some variety of experience 
- say a mixed race or mixed gender working pair. It is crucial tbat 
such power issues are open for discussion as part of the therapeutic 
agenda: how do different family members feel about working wi th someone 
who may have the potential to exercise power over them in specific ways 
(and also bow, say, black or female therapists may feel about working 
with family members who may act oppressively towards them). Again, sucb 
discussions may be made easier if there is more than one therapist 
present - and tbe therapists may themselves share bow they feel in 
relation to potential issues of power between themselves. Any statutory 
authority (for example, in relation to child protection) would need to 
be examined in terms of its implications for transactions of domination 
(and, equally importantly) recognition between therapists and specific 
family members. 
There is a need for a critical appraisal of agency structures and 
professional practices to see how far these exacerbate any imbalances of 
power. Overly hierarchical organisations may disempower both workers 
and, to an even greater extent, consumers. Similarly, professionals' 
use of strategic manoeuvring, one-way screens or hidden consultants will 
inevitably place them in positions of 'power over' family members. 
Whatever the reduction in oppression that may be achieved in a 
rearrangement of family subjectivity, if this process is imposed from 
outside and cannot be owned fully by the family members themselves, it 
is not likely to be empowering in any lasting sense. Therapists should 
perhaps express a commitment not to use their power in oppressive ways, 
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and be willing to accept challenge from any family member who may feel 
on the receiving end of some form of domination or manipulation. 
The second set of issues that come to the fore concern therapeutic 
strategy: how to balance the empowering of a family as a unit in its 
participation in an oppressive social formation, with the redressing of 
internal patterns of inequality within a family. In practice, these 
aims may sometimes appear to be in contradiction. In his work with the 
Hirst family, the therapist achieved a redefinition of their collective 
self-esteem that would seem to have empowered them once more to 
partiCipate in the external transactions required of them within the 
social formation. However, by not addreSSing the issues of patriarchal 
oppression within the family, the position faced by Faith (and, to some 
extent, the children) remained much the same. It may also be seen that, 
with their reconstructed subjectivity, the family would not be empowered 
to challenge any external structures of oppression that they might 
encounter. For example, if Faith came up against sexist discrimination 
if she tried to return to employment, her lack of recognition for 
herself as a woman in her own right, within the organisation of the 
family, would reduce her ability to resist and fight back. From this 
discussion, it may be seen that a genuinely empowering outcome would not 
be one that simply allows a family to slot back into the external 
structures of the social formation, but one which also equips them to 
challenge and renegotiate the terms of this participation. This can 
only be achieved by a significant renegotiation of internal power 
structures within the family organisation, with increased possibilities 
for 'power together' instead of relations of 'power over'. 
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A key issue for practice is how to set up a process of therapy that is 
emancipatory and involving, and that is open and honest in relation to 
power issues, with a family group which comprises both oppressors and 
oppressed. What has been central to feminist and other radical therapy 
movements have been the principles of openness, honesty and equality of 
power between therapist and client - principles of 'power together' that 
are derived from the political practice of consciousness raising. Such 
practice is relatively straightforward when clients share a common 
structural position of dlsempowerment. However, in seeking to achieve 
change in settings that comprise people in positions of 'power over' one 
another, a critical perspective suggests that a ruling group may not 
willingly give up its control, and will have access to the means whereby 
to reassert its control if this is threatened. Gramsci's conclusions in 
relation to the empowerment of subordinated groups within the structures 
of the State may be equally applicable to proceses of change within 
families: what is likely to be more successful in the long term is an 
incremental "'War of Position" - facilitating a gradual renegotiation of 
specific positions within the material, ideological and emotional 
relations of families, and in the specific external structures within 
which families may be subjected. 
While, in order to engage with those presently subordinated within the 
organisation, it would be necessary to indicate at the outset that the 
goal is the renegotiation of power relations, this must be done in a 
sufficiently gentle way so as not to frighten off those currently in 
positions of domination (and without whose participation no change may 
be negotiated). What would seem to be crucial is to stress the 
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potential advantages in terms of closeness and mutual recognition that 
might follow from a more egalitarian internal organisation - and that 
any process of change should be gradual and incremental. Similarly, it 
must be made clear that the therapist is not simply seeking to impose an 
alternative (but just as restricting) 'blueprint' on familial 
organisation - that any changes must arise out of family members' 
awareness of their own experience and consciousness of both the reality 
of their subordination (or domination> and their possibilities for 
mutual support and recognition with others. 
This raises the issue of how the therapist may 'join' with the existing 
organisation of a family subjectivity: how to engage respectfully with a 
family while not seeming to collude with the oppressive aspects of its 
structure. Both male therapists started their work by setting up an 
initial relationship with the man in a way that implicitly validated 
(and did not question) his position as head of the household. (We do 
not know how the female therapist made her first contact with the 
Watkins family.) If empowerment in therapy is seen in terms of an 
incremental "War of Position", then it would seem to be important to 
join in a way that is not overtly disrespectful of the man (and avoids 
any head-on confrontation), but which implicitly starts to challenge the 
assumptions of patriarchal authority. It may perhaps be sufficient to 
make some comment to draw attention to - or, more powerfully, to invite 
other family members to comment on - what happens when Dad is given such 
priority. 
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This would suggest the need for a family therapy practice that is 
strategic, not in the sense of secret manipulation by the therapist, but 
in the sense of setting up a gradual and incremental set of experiences 
for family members that might enable them to renegotiate their power 
relations in small steps. This might involve working separately with 
certain sections of the family as well as working with the whole family 
together. For example, in the instance of a family in which some from 
of sexual abuse has taken place, it might be appropriate to work 
separately to support the victim and confront the perpetrator, then work 
with the victim and other siblings or a non-abusing parent to establish 
some structures of 'power together', before attempting to facilitate a 
renegotiation of family power relations with the whole family present 
(in the event of the rest of the family choosing to permit the 
perpetrator to rejoin them). Rather than, at the outset, confronting 
all oppressive aspects of a family's organisation at once, a more 
gradual and gentle confrontation of specific issues as they arise may 
perhaps be more productive in the long run. Such an approach may be 
seen not to be devious or manipulative - it is simply relating the 
process of empowerment to the pace of family members. Any attempt to 
force the pace might itself be experienced as abusive, not just by those 
family members currently in positions of domination, but also by those 
in subordinated positions whose empowerment is to be facilitated. 
In such ways it may be possible to confront the dilemmas of working with 
an organisation that is structured on the basis of unequal power 
<dilemmas that we have seen apply equally to working towards the 
empowerment of individuals>. While there is no conclusive evidence that 
-457-
Conclusions 
any of these pieces of work was empowering in any overall sense (there 
were gains and losses in each case), this research has demonstrated 
that, on a minute-by-minute basis, certain therapeutic interventions 
could have specific impacts on familial power relations - sometimes 
empowering and sometimes quite the reverse. Evidence that some observed 
interventions could be (temporarily) empowering suggests that, in 
prinCiple, it is possible to engage with an organisation structured on 
the basis of unequal power in such a way as both to increase the 
opportunities for negotiation for its most disadvantaged members, and to 
enhance options in terms of its participation in wider social and 
economic structures. Evidence of even small and temporary shifts may 
provide a foundation for developing more effective approaches that could 
achieve greater and mere lasting changes. 
By locating such interventions within a theoretical framework in which 
power relations are central (rather than peripheral as with systems 
perspectives), it may be possible to develop a more 'critical' tradition 
of family therapy practice. Although marking a radical shift from 
current approaches, there would nevertheless seem to be opportunities to 
incorporate elements of existing practice, not only from feminists and 
others who have challenged the systemiC orthodoxy, but also those 
aspects of the psychoanalytic and gestalt approaches that may 
potentially be reformulated within a framework of critical theory. The 
development of such a 'critical' family therapy would need to proceed 
hand-in-hand with evaluation studies, both in terms of process (as with 
this research) and in terms of outcome evaluations that examine how (and 
whether) empowering changes may be sustained in the longer term. 
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